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PREFACE
A legal framework is required for most human endeavours, whether it be 
to apply justice or to establish codes of public conduct or to provide 
facilities for the conduct of social or economic life by regulating and thus 
enabling such activities to be carried out in an orderly manner. The 
number of these activities have proliferated considerably mostly as a 
result of the extraordinary industrial and social development o f the 
world. Hence, like in all other activities legislation is required to establish 
rules and regulations to control mining activities. This book is an attempt 
to provide a detailed study of such a legal framework within which the 
orderly development and operations relating to the activities of mineral 
exploitation in Zambia are carried out. The term mining law here is used 
to mean those enactments which in various ways regulate the acquisition 
and tenure of mining rights and mining grounds, and the practice of 
mining-right holders. It relates primarily to the disposition of mining 
rights and the specific imposts that relate to the exploitation of mineral 
deposits. The main aspects of mining law cover such things as definition 
of minerals, ownership of resources, law relating to the right to mine, 
conditions of governing the issue and holding of mining rights, and the 
relationship between mineral-and surface-right holders. This is in con­
tradiction to mining regulations, which control the method of working a 
mine. The term mining regulations covers a broad spectrum and includes 
such diverse elements as fiscal and monetary policy, labour relations, 
a n d  safety measures concerning machines and people.
Traditionally writers on the subject of mining law treated it as an 
aspect of land law. Mining activities today present novel and intricate 
questions that are based upon developments in technology, multiple use 
of mineral bearing lands, multiple methods of taxation, and techniques 
of leasing, financing, and operating mineral properties. While the fixed 
rules of land law may have provided a skeleton upon which to build, it is 
generally accepted that mining legislation has departed from them in 
order to meet the practical requirements of the miners and the mining 
industry. Thus a body of legal concepts has developed which is peculiar 
in its application to mining activities. The reader should not therefore 
fall into the trap of drawing too close an analogy between mining law 
and land law, for it could lead to erroneous solutions to mining pro­
blems. Mining law has acquired a status of its own.
The principal aim of any country’s mining legislation is to encourage 
the orderly exploitation and development of its mineral resources and to 
obtain revenues for the development of its economy. To attain these ob­
jectives the mining law must help to develop a healthy atmosphere for 
mining. Mining capital in Zambia is to some extent private and foreign in 
origin, and, as is known, in general such capital is timid with regard to 
venturing into most developing countries.1 Thus this study makes the 
basic assumption that because of the absence of local sources of capital, 
foreign investment in the mining industry is desirable. Since investors in­
vest to make a profit, the need of the private investor to realise a fair 
return on his investment is recognised, one must also bear in mind that 
mining investment can only take place on the basis of reasonable con­
sistence in the long-term stabilty of operating conditions, consequently 
certain aspects of the mining legislation will be evaluated in terms of how 
it affects the flow of foreign capital.
This book is based on a doctoral thesis written for Oxford University 
while at Trinity College, Oxford. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. 
Alan Milner, Fellow of Trinity College, who supervised the writing of the 
thesis. His guidance was invaluable. I wish also to thank the British 
Council and the University of Zambia who generously granted me finan­
cial assistance to study at Oxford. In a work of this kind an obvious debt 
is owed to many people I interviewed or held discussions with when 
gathering material for this book and those who helped type the 
manuscript in its various stages. Throughout the period of research and 
writing my wife, Marjorie and the children gave me warm support and 
bore many lonely hours. To them I am grateful. Lastly, I wish to thank 
tjie publishers for their encouragement and for publishing this book, and 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Minea Ltd for generously subsidising the 
publication o’f this book.
E.g. Lindlcy, Mines and Minerals, 1914.
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UNITS
During its Colonial Period, Zambia used pounds, shillings, and pence, 
which were always equal to British Currency. In 1968 Zambia decimal­
ised its currency on the basis of 10 Zambian Shillings = 1 decimalised 
Kwacha *  100 ngwee. When most o f this duty was completed 1 Kwacha 
was equal to £0.85. In 1976 and 1978 the Kwacha was devalued. At 
current exchange rate 1 Kwacha = £. 0955
xxvüi
I

INTRODUCTION
It is important to place mining rights in their economic context and to 
show the importance and place of minerals in the Zambian economy. 
This gives the essential background to understanding the significance and 
explaining some of the policies that have been involved with respect to 
mining law in Zambia. It is also important in this preliminary chapter to 
discuss the system of mining rights in other parts of the world and the 
sources of law affecting mining rights.
The Political History of Zambia
The country has a land area of 756,309 square kilometres1 yet it is very 
thinly populated, its inhabitants numbering only 4.75 million.2 Unlike 
the greatest part of Southern Africa most of Zambia was never a con­
quered colony.3 In 1889 Rhodes secured a charter incorporating the 
British South Africa Company and granting it powers to enter into 
treaties and concessions with African Chiefs.4 The North-Western part 
of the country was acquired through various treaties and concessions 
made with Lewanika, the Chief of Barotseland, by officials of the Com­
pany.5 In 1889 the Barotseland and North-Western Rhodesia Order in 
Council was passed and it defined the country’s boundaries and provided 
for its administration by the Company. The North-Eastern part of what 
is now Zambia was acquired through treaties with African Chiefs in 
which concessions were made to Sharpe and Thomson as agents of the 
Company.6 By 1900 the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council was 
enacted, and it gave the Company statutory powers of administration.
In the years 1900-1911, the North-Eastern part of the country and the 
North-Western part were administered separately. However, as time
1. Ministry o f Information, Government o f the Republic o f Zambia, Zambia in 
Brief, 1970. p .l.
2. Government of the Republic of Zambia, Census Report. 1974.
3. There was a campaign against the Ngoni in 1897, however, see Barnes, Politics in 
a Changing Society: The Fort Jameson Ngoni, 1954. There are several books on 
the history of Zambia e.g. Gann, History o f  Northern Rhodesia; Early Days to 
1953, 1964; Hanna, The Beginnings o f  Nyataland and North-Eastern Rhodesia, 
1859-95, 1956, and Wills, A n Introduction to the History o f  Central Africa, 1973.
4. Royal Charter of Incorporation o f the British South Africa Company, 29 
October, 1889.
5. See, p36.
6. Ibid.
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passed it became increasingly apparent that the two territories — both 
under the British South Africa Company’s control and both following a 
quite similar pattern of development — could be more effectively ad­
ministered as a single territory. On 4 May, 1911, the two territories were 
amalgamated by the 1911 Northern Rhodesia Order in Council which 
revoked both the North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia Orders in 
Council. Its provisions were brought into operation by the Northern 
Rhodesia Proclamation of 17 August 1911J  The country remained under 
the rule of the Company and governing powers were vested in a Com­
pany administration, and a Council of Company Officails, subject to 
ultimate British control,8 although this was terminated on 1 February 
1924, by the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council. The British govern­
ment assumed responsibility for the administration of the territory while 
the status of Northern Rhodesia became that of a protectorate, a situa­
tion which obtained until 1 August 19539 when the territory was made 
part of the illfated British Central African Federation. The Federation 
was dissolved in December 1963, and by 24 October, 1964, Northern 
Rhodesia became the independent state of Zambia.10
Minerals Produced
Zambia is one of the richest métallogénie areas of the world.
TABLE I
TONNAGES OF MINERALS PRODUCED
1978
Mineral Tonnage Value in Kwacha
Copper 587,398 612,178,000
Zinc 12,336 24,821,000
Lead 12,878 12,087,000
Cobalt 1,823 35,152,895
Coal 615,145 1,246,000
Source: Zambia Mining Year Book (1978)
7. Northern Rhodesia Proclamation No. 1, of 1911.
8. Royal Charter o f Incorporation o f the British South Africa Company, 29 
October, 1889.
9. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Dissolution, Order in Council, 1963.
10. Zambia Independence Order, 1964.
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The main mineral produced in Zambia as can be seen from table 1, is 
copper. The earliest known reference to copper mining in this general 
portion o f Central Africa was made by Filippo Figafetta in his book, A 
Report on the Kingdom o f  Congo.11 He mentions the mines o f Bembe as 
having been given to the Portuguese by the King of the Congo towards 
the end of the sixteenth century. From about the eighteenth century, the 
inhabitants of Zambia and Katanga exported smelted copper in the form 
of bangles or crosses to ports on both the Atlantic and the Indian ocean 
coasts of Africa.12 Africans used iron for their tools, but copper was par­
ticularly important for ornaments and as a means of exchange.13 The 
presence and use of the metal in Central Africa was known to the earliest 
explorers.14 The discovery of the mines by white prospectors was in the 
majority o f cases made easier by the existence o f earlier native work­
ings.15
TABLE II
WORLD COPPER STATISTICS 
Country Production per
thousand tons ReserveI per
mmm
United States o f America 1,362 7 7 .J
Russia 1,100 34.9
Chile 1,039 53.8
Canada 644 20.8
Zambia 643 27.2
Source: Zambia Mining Year Book (1978) and Mining Adnual Review (1971)
11. Figafetta, A Report on the Kingdom o f  Congo, 1969, This book was first 
published in 1591.
12. Hall, Zambia. 1965, p.10.
13. Gann, ‘Northern Rhodesia Copper Industry and World o f  Coppers’ (1955) 18 
Rhodes-Lningstone Journal, pp.1-18.
14. Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa, 1857.
15. Davey, The Northern Copper (B.S.A.) Company Ltd., Report on the Company’s 
Properties, 1905, p .23. Many prospectors in those days have written to state the 
same. Brooks for instance points out that prizes o f £5 were given for disclosure of 
any information o f a place which showed even minor evidence o f copper mining 
or other metal content and that prospecting camps were usually established near 
villages, in order to get in touch with local people, Brooks himself discovered 
some of the mines. See Brooks. ‘How the Northern Rhodesian Coppers were 
founded’ 1950 Northern Rhodesia Journal, p.42. Dr Bancroft, a former 
Professor o f Geology at McGill University, who discovered Bancroft mine has 
stated the same. See Bancroft, Mining in Northern Rhodesia, 1962.
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Today Zambia is among the leading copper producing countries of the 
world and has vast deposits of this mineral, containing 13 per cent of the 
world’s known reserves.16
Most of the copper in Zambia is mined on what has come to be known 
as the Copperbelt. This is an undulating area, roughly 144 kilometres in 
length by 48 kilometres in width. Nine major mines spread all over the 
Copperbelt are in production,17 and several copper mining projects are 
in varying stages of consideration and preparation. Exploratory develop­
ment at Seberere and Mokambo is being pursued by a Romanian concern 
and may increase known ore reserves considerably. Kansashi mine near 
Solwezi was reopened in 1975. A small mine at Jifumpa near Kasempa 
was opened in 1976 by Mines Industrial Development Corporation Small 
Mines Ltd. To a lesser extent than copper, Zambia produces other 
minerals. Zinc, lead, and silver are produced at Broken Hill mine in 
Kabwe. The mine’s grade is among the highest in the world, but the mine 
has not been operating at full capacity owing to the complexity of its 
ores. Cobalt is produced as a by-product of copper. Coal is being mined 
at Maamba in the Southern Province. It is largely for the consumption of 
the copper mines.18 Amethyst is produced by Northern Minerals Ltd., 
one of the largest producers of any semi-precious stone in the world. At 
present it produces about 50% of the world’s amethyst and has the 
world’s largest known amethyst deposit.
Large nickel deposits are now being explored in the Munali prospect­
ing licence area while Iron ore occurences are common and widely 
distributed throughout Zambia. Only a limited amount of work has been 
done on the great majority of the deposits where recent tabulation of 
deposits showed the existence of a minimum of 1,000 million tonnes of 
mineral grading between 50 and 60 per cent.20
16. Mines Industrial Development Corporation, Prospects fo r  Zambia's Mining 
Industry, 1970, p .20.
17. Chambishi, Chibuluma, Chingóla, Kalengwa, Konkola, Luanshya, Mufulira, 
Rokana and Bwana Mkubwa. Other possible mines are given in Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Report, 1972, p. 195.
18. It was developed largely for this purpose after the Southern Rhodesian supplies 
were threatened.
19. Mines Industrial Development Corporation, Zambia Mining Industry, 1974, p.5.
20. Mines Industrial Development Corporation, Prospects fo r  Zambian Mining 
Industry, 1970, p.J. Other minerals also produced are listed as cadmium, cement, 
gold, gypsum, manganese, tin and feldspar.
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Minerals and the Zambian Economy
The Zambian mining industry is of tremendous importance to the Zam­
bian economy. The capital investment is over K6.130 million and it is the 
most important sector of the economy whose effects are felt even in the 
remotest districts. Health, education, communications, police — all 
these as well as the cash-flow from the towns to the ruràl village, are the 
results of the shared proceeds of the mining operations. As the table 
below shows, the mining industry accounts for most of the net gross 
domestic product.
TABLE III
CONTRIBUTION OF MINING INDUSTRY 
TO DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Year Gross Domestic Product
(Million Kwacha) Mining industry’s Contribution
to the Domestic Product
(Million Kwacha)
1973 1628 562 34%
1974 1820 616 33%
1975 1562 145 9%
1976 1793 462 26%
1977 2011 225 11%
1978 2291 260 11%
Source: Zambia Mining Year Book (1978)
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Copper and the other minerals are the country’s major exports. Table IV 
gives the value of copper exports in relation to Zambia’s total exports.
TABLE IV
CONTRIBUTION OF COPPER TO EXPORTS
Yeai Value of Domestic Exports 
(Million Kwacha)
Value of Copper Exports 
(Million Kwacha)
1972 527 491 93%
1973 732 696 95%
1974 841 786 93%
197Ì 518 479 93%
1976 701 660 94%
1977 706 661 94%
1978 649 608 94<7c
Source: Zambia Mining Year Book (1978)
In 1974, the mines contributed 52% of government revenue. Indirectly, 
they contribute several further millions, mainly through duty on imports 
and taxes on mining employees’ earnings.
TABLE v
CONTRIBUTION OF MINING INDUSTRY 
TO REVENUE
Year Government Revenue 
(Million Kwacha)
Mining industry’s 
Contribution 
(Million Kwacha)
1973 386 108 28%
1974 649 337 52%
1975 433 59 14%
1976 417 5 1%
1977 498 - -
1978 533 - -
:: Zambia Mining Year Book (1978)
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The Mining industry is a leading employer of labour in the country, 
employing about 15% of all the people who receive cash wages in Zam­
bia. The table below illustrates this:-
TABLE VI
MINING LABOUR STRENGTH
Year Expatriate Zambian
1970 4,375 44,094
1971 4,751 44,997
1972 4,600 46,245
1973 4,505 48,287
1974 4,392 51,736
1975 4,493 52,992
1976 4,060 53,082
1977 3,609 55,446
1978 3,245 53,437
Source: Zambia Mining Year Book (1978)
There is no doubt that the importance of mining in the Zambian 
society transcends its economic value and that it has social and political 
significance.21 Further, the process of industrialisation, whether 
generated by political policies or economic innovation, is widely 
associated with movements from rural areas to urban centres.22 The 
attraction of bright lights and economic pressures combine to bring 
people out of the rural areas into the towns. About 35% of the Zambian 
population of 6 million live in the urban centres. Most of this urban 
population is concentrated on the Copperbelt and the Central 
Province.23
21. Mines Industrial Development Corp., supra, p.6. There are several countries, 
however, with large dependence on one commodity though to a lesser degree, e.g. 
Algeria — petroleum, Chile — copper, Zaire — copper, Bolivia — tin, Jamaica 
— bauxite, Liberia — iron, Venezuela — petroleum, Iraq — petroleum and a few 
more. See Year Book o f  International Trade and Trade Statistics, 1966.
22. Kuper, Urbanisation and Migration in West Africa, 1955, p .1.
23. See 1963 and 1969 Census Reports. See also Davies, Zambia in Maps, 1970, p. 11.
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TABLE VII
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING 
TO PROVINCES
Year
Province 1963 1969
Central 505,000 707,000
Copperbelt 544,000 815,000
Eastern 480,000 509,000
Luapula 357,000 338,000
North Western 211,000 227,000
Northern 564,000 541,000
Southern 466,000 499,000
Western 363,000 417,000
8 Total 3,490,000 ¿,053,000
Source: 1963 and 1969 Census figures.
Most of the people who live on the Copper belt migrated there in response 
to mining labour requirements. In the towns an African entered into 
social intercourse with his fellow Africans of other ethnic groups and 
also Europeans and Indians. This situation has brought about profound 
social changes in the structure of the African society which are beyond 
the scope of this study.
However, it is important to make the following statement. Whether 
the mining industry will continue to be of great significance and value to 
Zambia depends on the future of copper, which in turn depends on 
basically three factors:-
(a) world demand,
(b) supply trends in the world and
(c) movements in the world copper price.
World demand depends in turn on a host of factors, including the 
development of techniques of utilisation, trends in supply and the pro­
cessing of competitive metals such as aluminium.24 Technical
24. The other possible threat the Nodule Industry has been dismissed. See United
States, Department o f the Interior Bureau o f Mines Mineral Year Book, 1 Metals, 
Minerals and Fuels, 1971. Copper has a very high degree o f thermal and electrical 
conductivity and is therefore ultimately connected with electrical industry. 
Electrical uses probably account for about half of the world's consumption and 
of the balance the building industry takes a considerable proportion probably 
about 1OT· o f total production. See Mining Mirror, 5 December, 1973, p.70; and 
also 5 No*. 1 Optima p.26.
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developments may have on balance a negative influence, as 
improvements in telephone engineering, for example, especially the use 
of concentrators, reduce the volume of copper wire needed for a given 
message volume, while the increased use of microwave techniques and 
satellites cuts down the need for long distance cables.
The threat posed by aluminium is very powerful. Aluminium is a 
relatively new metal, whose uses have not yet been fully explored but 
which already shows a surprising flexibility. One hundred years ago 
aluminium was a commercial nonentity of the metallurgical world. It was 
used with copper to form aluminium bronze and for ornaments, but its 
other uses were specialised, such as the manufacture of artificial teeth. 
Today aluminium is used extensively in building and bridge work.25 
Furthermore, bauxite is plentiful in the earth’s crust and an innovation 
which materially reduced the currently expensive cost of its processing 
would have a major impact on the demand for copper. Also because 
most of the copper is utilised by the industrialised countries (e.g. 
Zambia’s copper is mostly imported by Japan, Britain, France and 
Germany)26 its price is dependent on the state of the economies in the 
industrialised countries. For instance, in 1973, high"prices of the metal 
prevailed throughout the year,27 the contrast may be made with 1976 
when the industry went through a difficult time. The price of copper fell 
sieeply owing largely to the world economic recession. It collapsed from 
a peak £1,400 per tonne on 1 April, 1974 to fluctuate between £500 and 
just over £600 per tonne from December, 1974 to April 1976; while min­
ing costs have escalated in the aftermath of world-wide inflation. As a 
result, receipts from copper exports plumetted.28
25. Brown and Butler, 'The Production Marketing and Consumption o f  Copper and 
Aluminium. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1968.
26. Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., Zambia Mining Year Book, 1974,
p. 31. See also Webb, Development Strategies fo r  Mineral Exporters. Institute o f  
Development Studies, University o f  Sussex, 1974.
27. During 1973-1974, Zambia’s two mining companies reached a record level of 
K920 million in profits, Times o f  Zambia 31 July, 1975, p.2; and see both 
Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., and Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd., 
Annual Reports 1973.
28. At the end of its financial year on March 31, 1975, Nchanga Consolidated 
Copper Mines Ltd's profit after tax was K58.5 million compared with K113.2 
million for the previous financial year. And in the first five months of 1975 the 
country as a whole earned K222.458.806 from copper, roughly half of 1974’s 
revenue in the same period. See Times o f  Zambia, 31 July, 1975, p.2. See also 
Daniel, 'Increasing strain on Zambia's Copperbelt’ The Guardian, 31 March 
1976, p.20.
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The Mining Industry And Foreign Investment
A study of the Zambian industry is also a study of the debate on the role 
of private investment in the developing world, as the industry is largely 
foreign-financed. Most developing countries, having recently acquired 
their independence, attach great weight to their independence and watch 
suspiciously any foreign relationship which may affect the newly won 
sovereignty. These countries have misgivings about foreign companies 
because although foreign investment does not necessarily imply political 
domination — e.g. United States investment in Canada and Western 
Europe — when the host country is significantly weaker than the lender, 
political dependence may well follow economic dependence.29 Foreign 
investment may also have several other disadvantages. One such major 
disadvantage is that it ties an underdeveloped nation’s economic cycle to 
the multinational companies without the country having any control over 
that cycle.30 In additon, many of these investments create ‘one crop 
economies’, leaving the host nation economically helpless in relation to 
the world markets. Among the largest investments in developing coun­
tries, for example, are those in raw material production such as sugar­
cane, petroleum, and minerals. All these are largely consumed in the 
Western European countries. Their level of operation is by and large 
determined, therefore, by the business cycle in these consuming areas. 
There is also the problem of the outflow of profits.31 Allied to the pro­
blem of profits going out is the general question of the effect of absentee 
ownership upon the national economy, the balance of payments and the 
sentiments of nationalism. Nationals of the host country frequently com­
plain, with some justification that their national wealth is being consum­
ed abroad for others’ comfort, and in the case of mining, they complain 
that they are finally left with ‘holes’ in the ground.32 A complementary 
version of that out-cry is the question ‘why do we export copper bars and 
import electric motors?’
The other problem with foreign investment is that it seeks out those 
economic activities that yield the highest profit and as sanctioned by the
29. United Nations Report on Multinational Corporation in World Development, 
Document E/55 00/Rev/84/ESA/6,/1973, p.46; and also Bostock and Harvey; 
Economic Independence and Zambian Copper, 1972, p .9.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid. See also United Nations General Assembly Debates (Provisional) 1972, 
A/C2/SR/1051, p .5.
32. For a general discussion of this problem, see Bernstein, Foreign Investment in 
Latin America, 1966, p .13.
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business ethic, it neglects many activities which may be of social impor­
tance.33 Investors usually aim at maximising profits while the local 
society aims at maximising some broader measure of social welfare. 
Foreign investment, however, may have undoubted advantages for the 
recipient country.34 An inflow of private capital contributes to the reci­
pient country’s development process by helping to reduce the shortage of 
domestic savings and by increasing the supply of foreign exchange. In 
this respect Zambia’s mines are a very good example.35 Similarly, it can 
also be argued that as the investment opera tes, the increase in real 
income resulting from such investment is greater than the resultant 
increase in the income of the foreign investor. Thus, the presence of 
foreign capital may in this respect allow a large labour force to be 
employed. Partly it is because it brings physical and finan« ial capital to 
the country. Such direct foreign investment also includes on-monetary 
transfers of other resources — technological knowledge, i market infor­
mation, material and supervisory personnel, organisational experience 
and innovations in products and production techniques — aj! of which 
are normally in short supply in the developing world. By being a carrier 
of technological and organisational change, the foreign investment may 
be highly significant in providing private technical assistance and 
demonstration effects that are of benefit elsewhere in the economy. It 
can also stimulate additional domestic investment in the recipient coun­
try that is, if the foreign capital is used to develop the country’s infra­
structure and such extra investment, may be both local and external.
It would therefore be foolish to condemn foreign capital on the basis 
of its disadvantages alone. What is needed is a greater awareness among 
developing countries of its dangers so that they can reject the worst deals 
while trying to extract much better terms in the future. Many developing 
countries in recent years have taken measures directed at trying to reduce 
the disadvantages of foreign capital particularly in the area of the 
exploitation of mineral resources. Such measures are plausible if they do 
not hinder further investment in the countries concerned.
33. Ibid.
34. These are discussed at length by several authors, e.g. Fatorous, Government 
Guarantees to Foreign Investors, 1963. Friedmann, Legal Aspects o f  Foreign 
Investment, 1959; and Nwogugu. The Legal Problems o f  Foreign Investment in 
Developing Countries, 1955.
35. Practically all Zambian foreign exchange comes from its mining industry. Some 
writers on economic development see mining as the magic route to fast and 
sustained economic development, e.g. Kamarck, The Economics o f  African 
Development, 1967. For a contrary view; see Frank, Capitalism and Under­
development in Latin America, 1971.
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It is of course, impossible, within the limits of this book to treat the min­
ing systems in the different countries of the world, but a brief mention of 
the major classification of mineral tenure can be made. All the mineral 
systems employed in the handling of mineral wealth can be reduced 
basically into two primary classes.36 First is the lease system, also known 
as the regalien system. Under this system the state owns the title to 
minerals, and the miner derives his right to work the minerals by some 
form of tenure derived from the state and not from the land-owner. The 
miner’s tenure is seldom equivalent to a property right but is a bundle of 
rights and obligations, the composition of which varies greatly from 
country to country. This system has its origin in the rights of kings and 
feudal lords to the mineral products of the ground and to the disposal of 
them. It can be further traced to the classical Greek states where citizens 
and friendly aliens were given the right to mine in return for a payment 
of one-twenty-fourth part of the profits. The main purpose of this 
system at its instigation was a means of obtaining revenue. In Roman 
times permission to mine was granted to explorers on payment of one- 
tenth part of the produce to the Imperial Roman Treasury and one-tenth 
part to the owner of the soil.37 In feudal times the rights of the crown 
were split up, passing to feudal lords, but Kings gradually repossessed 
for themselves of their legal rights in respect of mines.38
A variation of the same system is what sometimes is termed the 
dominal system. Under this system the minerals belong to the state and 
the state holds the right of working them itself or of disposing of them to 
the highest bidder as it thinks proper. In such a variation perhaps the 
regalien system of mining rights prevails at present under a more or less 
constitutionally modified system in the majority of the nations in the 
world, particularly those in the developing areas of the world.
Mineral Systems Generally
36. These systems were classified as such quite early, see Alford, Mining Law o f  the 
British Empire, 1906, pp. 1-9. See also Shamel, Mining, Mineral and Geological 
Law, 1907, p.7, who discussed the influence of Roman Law on the systems. The 
classification excludes communist countries where land and mineral resources are 
nationalised and mining is carried on as a state industry.
37. Collins, ‘World Survey of Mineral Legislation for Land Areas' (1971) 80 Mining 
Industry, Transactions o f  the Institution o f  the Mining and Metallurgy, p.A. 10.
38. Ibid.
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The second system is that under which the minerals accede to or go 
with the ownership of the surface. Under this system any individual 
under specified restrictions has the right to locate on discovery or other­
wise certain limited areas of grounds to hold, work or dispose of the 
same. This system is referred to as the claim system or the system of 
‘accession.’ It has its origin in the early days of mining in the United 
States in the first half of the last century. Great numbers of men rushed 
to the gold fields of California and a few years later to those of Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. Its origin was the need for the 
preservation of public peace in these countries at the time. Some arrange­
ments had to be made on the spot to determine the area of ground on 
which a man was allowed to work, and the conditions under which he 
could hold and deal with it. Hence arose the right of the discoverer of 
workable gold, or other valuable ores or minerals, to claim the owner­
ship of a small plot of ground of limited area on which he expected to 
make such discoveries, adjacent to those of other persons.39 Under this 
system in its modern form, a prospector can obtain private property 
rights to minerals by discovery and registration of the claim at an office 
set up for the purpose. It prevails mainly in Western countries.
There are great differences between the two main classifications, 
which flow from the fact that ownership of minerals is vestfed in different 
institutions, e.g. the question to whom royalties are payable when 
minerals are being worked.
In lingland, during the early period of her recorded history, the owner­
ship of the minerals in the earth’s crust was a subject of continuous con­
tention between the King and owners of the soil; usually the King being 
the stronger party, prevailed whenever he or his favourites to whom he 
might have granted mineral rights cared to assert them. These preten­
sions, however, were subsequently abandoned as to all minerals except 
gold and silver, which were called the royal metals, and held to belong 
absolutely to the Crown wherever they might be found. Such claim to the 
royal metals falls under the regalien system of mining tenure. It prevails 
even today in theory, in the law of England but as there is no gold or 
silver in commercial quantities in England, the regalien rights of the 
Crown are of a theoretical rather than practical importance. For other 
minerals, the owner of the surface, wherever situated, is entitled to
39. Alford, supra, p.2.
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everything beneath or within it. The right of searching for minerals can­
not under common law be exercised except in a few rare instances 
without the direct consent of the surface landlord or the legal owners of 
the mining right. This principle is today subject to numerous statutory 
exceptions.40 This theory of ownership accompanied the common law of 
England to ail those countries in which it has been the basis of the legal 
system. And in some of these, the theory has been of some practical 
importance. Although the English common law, in respect of mining 
rights, has in the first instance been applied generally to new territories of 
the Commonwealth, it has not been continued or adopted. Instead the 
various colonies and former colonies have by statute enacted how mining 
rights should be acquired from the state, which remains the paramount 
owner of the minerals.41
This, however, is not true of Zambia. From the early 1900s to 1964 the 
mining rights in the country were exercised by a foreign private com­
pany, the British South Africa Company, which claimed ownership of 
minerals throughout the country by virtue of the concessions it obtained 
from African chiefs. As a result, the Company introduced special and ex­
tensive codified legislation on the subject of mining. The rights were then 
acquired at independence by the Zambian government, which repealed 
the legislation introduced by the Company and introduced its own exten­
sive mining legislation based on different concepts from that of the 
Company.
Sources of Law Relating to Mining Rights
In order to understand the diverse origins and applications of Zambian 
law on the subject of mining, it is desirable to give a brief statement of 
the different sources from which such law is derived and the extent to 
which the various sources are important to the subject at hand. The 
sources of Zambian law in general, and therefore of Zambian mining 
law, are customary law, the common law of England and the various
40. By statute the property in petroleum existing in its natural condition is vested in 
the Crown, together with the exclusive right of searching and bring fot and 
getting such petroleum. See Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934. Furthermore, coal 
is statutorily vested in the National Coal Board, see Coal Act, 1938 and Coal 
Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946.
41. This was done quite early in some of these countries, e.g. Australia. For an 
analysis of its early laws and an example of how this was done see Kemp, Law o f  
Mines and Minerals: Being a Collection o f  the Statutes Relating there to 1910.
laws, both colonial and post-independence, enacted by Parliament to 
regulate mining and the acquisition of mining rights.
Customary Law
The first law that ever existed in Zambia was the indigenous law of the 
tribes. It is generally referred to as customary law — and the great 
majority of Zambians still conduct most of their activities in accordance 
with and subject to customary law. Moreover, if all courts of whatever 
status are considered, far more cases are decided under customary law 
than under any of the other laws in force in the country.42 In this regard 
it should be appreciated that the use of this term ‘customary law’ does 
not indicate that there is a single uniform set of customs prevailing 
throughout the country. It is used rather as a blanket description cover­
ing many different systems. They are largely tribal in origin, and usually 
operate only within the area occupied by the tribe. There are local varia­
tions within such an area,43 but by and large the broad principles in all 
the various systems are the same. As for mining rights this source of law 
is not very important because it has been superseded by legislation. But 
historically land tenure concepts were very important and are still fairly 
important in tribal areas. They are discussed when considering the 
validity of the British South Africa Company claims that they acquired 
mining rights from African chiefs in Chapter five.44
Common Law
Like most other former British colonies and protectorates, Zambia is a 
common law jurisdiction.45 This description is supported by the history
42. This covers such areas as divorce, contracts, and tort. For a detailed analysis of 
the cases that come under customary law see Spalding, Hoover and Piper, ‘One 
Nation One Judiciary, The Lower Courts of Zambia’ 1970 Zambia Law Journal, 
p .219.
43. But such divergences as there are can easily be exaggerated as Kuper has so rightly 
warned, ... ‘in the vast continent of Africa there are hundreds of tribes, each with 
its own history and way of life. This cultural variety is important but it must not 
be exaggerated. It under-estimates the tremendous effect of past contact and over 
emphasizes African conversation. Moreover, the piling up of enthnographic 
details produces an impression of chaos where in fact only variations on a few 
themes’ See Kuper, ‘Cultures in Transition’ 1952 The Listener, p.212.
44. See p .15.
45. Church, ‘The Common Law and Zambia’ 1974 Zambia Law Journal, p .l. There 
are several other studies on the common law and Africa which are very useful on 
this subject, e.g. Danniels, The Common Law in West Africa, 1964, Chapters 3 
and 4; Allott, New Essays in African Law, 1970, Chapters 1—3; and Park, The 
Sources o f  Nigerian Law, 1963 Chapters 2 and 3.
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of the country as well as by current statutory guide-lines and judicial 
declarations. And in this sense the Zambian legal system is a product of 
its history.
The common law system of judicial administration was first introduc­
ed by the British in 1889. The Royal Charter of 29 October, 1889, 
incorporating the British South Africa Company, which also entrusted 
the administration of Zambia to the Company, authorised it. to ad­
minister justice. Section 14 of the Order46 paved the way )for the 
introduction o f English law into the territory by stating that:
In the administration of justice to the said peoples or inhabitants 
careful regard shall always be had to the customs and laws 
of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties 
respectively belong, especially with regard to the holding, 
possession, transfer and disposition of land and goods, and 
testate or intestate succession thereto, marriages, divorces, 
legitimacy, and other rights of property and personal rights, 
but subject to any British laws which may be in force 
in any of the territories aforesaid and applicable to the 
people or inhabitants thereof.
In the Barotseland — North Western Rhodesia Order in Council of 
1899,47 the main purpose of which was to establish an elaborate judicial 
system in the part of the territory to which it pertained, it was stated that 
English law was to apply except where otherwise stated in the Order. The 
North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1900,48 made similar provi­
sion for the rest of Northern Rhodesia not covered by the Barotseland 
Order in Council of 1899. Several other statutes refer to the law of 
England,49 but by far the most important is Chapter four of the present 
laws of Zambia. This piece of legislation, the title of which is the English 
Law Extent of Application Act, provides that (a) the common law, (b) 
the doctrines of equity, (c) the statutes which were in force in England on 
the 17th day of August, 1911, and (d) any later English statutes applied 
to Zambia, shall be in force in the Republic. For a statute of fundamen­
tal significance, Chapter four is uncomfortably vague. There is doubt 
about the significance of the 1911 date, about precisely which pre-1911
46. Royal Charter o f Incorporation o f the British South Africa Company 29 
October, 1889 in that it allowed the introduction o f English law which once 
introduced would supersede customary law.
47. Barotseland-North-Western Order in Council, 1889, article 6.
48. Nort-Eastem Rhodesia Order in Council, 1900, article 4.
49. See aim the Subordinate Courts Act, Chapter 43 of the Laws of Zambia, s. 14, 
and The High Court Act, Chapter 50 o f the Laws of Zambia, s.9.
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English statutes are applicable, about what the doctrine of equity means 
and most of all there is doubt about whether it embraces the law as 
developed in the other common law jurisdictions other than England.30 
It is possible to argue that the law referred to can include only English 
common law, not that developed by any other jurisdiction. The history 
of the enactment supports this view although past history is increasingly 
of questionable significance. The title of the Act, as well as the side notes 
to it also support the view that it refers exclusively to England,31 
although these too are not necessarily determinative o f the issue. So also 
is this construction favoured by the preliminary definition given in the 
interpretation and general provision of the statutes,32 although there is 
again room for dispute open on this point. So far the practice of Zam­
bian courts is to refer to English cases and decisions from other common 
law jurisdictions when there is an absence o f Zambian authorities and 
develop the law against the background of the local social conditions. As 
a result the development of Zambian law has been influenced by deci­
sions of English-speaking courts from many parts of the world.53 Even 
more important is the readiness with which Zambian judges run to deci­
sions and reasons of these courts. Such decisions are not technically 
binding, but in recent years there has been a noticeable increase in respect 
for them and frequently there seems to be little real difference between 
referring to them and actually following them as authoritative statements 
of the law.34 Similarly when a statute is common to both Zambia and a 
foreign country the Zambian courts have borrowed from other jurisdic­
tions. In The People v. Chaponda, 55 the issue was whether section 203
50. The Common law in this sense is used to describe the whole o f the Law except 
that which has its origin in statutes. There are other senses in which the word is 
often used as common law as opposed to equity and common law as opposed to 
customs. See Danniels, supra, p .149.
51. In the side notes the following words appear, 'Extent to which the law of 
England is in force in the territory.’ See The English Law Extent o f Application 
Act, Chapter 4 of the Laws of Zambia.
52. The Interpretation and General Provisions Act, Chapter 2 of the Laws of Zambia 
defined ‘Common Law’ as the Common Law of England, see, s.3.
53 In Kachasu v. Attorney-General Selected Judgements o f  Zambia N o .tu  o j 1969 
several American cases were cited, e.g. Minersville School District v.' Gobits 
(1950), 310 U.S. 586; Zuvilla v. Mass (1944), 112 Colo. 183; West Virginia Stale 
Board o f  Education v. Barnette (1943), 319 U.S. 642. So were several Nigerian 
cases cited, e.g. Arzika v. Governer o f  Northern Region [ 1961 ] All N.L.R. 379; 
Cheranci v. Cheranci [1960] All N.L.R. 24 and D P.P. v. Obi [1961] All N.L.R. 
186.
54. In Chipango v. Attorney General Selected judgement of Zambia No. 11 of 1971, 
several foreign cases were cited, e.g. H. Das v. District Magistrate Cutback A.I.R. 
056) 1969 S.C. 43; Mohammed Shaft and Another v. State o f  Jammu and 
Kashmir A.I.R. (57) 1970, 688; Uganda v. Commissioner o f  Prisons (1966) E.A. 
514 and State o f  Bombay v. Atmaran 1951 S.C.R. 169.
55. High Court of Zambia, Judgement No. H P.A/101/73.
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of the Zambian Criminal Procedure Code56 entitled the accused to an 
acquittal. Reference was made to certain East African cases as there 
appeared at the time to be no recorded decisions on this point in Zam­
bia.57 Section 200 of the Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code58 is word for 
word the same as its Zambian-counterpart Section 203·. Apart from the 
technical arguments, there are compelling reasons of practical policy that 
favour a broad geographical reference for ‘common law’ in Zambia. 
There is a strong temptation for a court or a student of law in Zambia to 
open up the definition and include sources from other common law 
jurisdiction particularly those within the continent of Africa. The pro­
blems faced by developing nations in Africa often have much in com­
mon, and are governed by identical or similar statutory provisions and 
have led to similar approaches towards solutions. In contrast, English 
law has not changed greatly in recent times and remains geared to the 
problems and attitudes of a much different society. There are times too, 
when other non-English sources may prove valuable for Zambia. Sources 
from such diverse jurisdictions as America or Australia, both because of 
the substantive insights they may offer and merely because their use itself 
may bring room for manoeuvre into the law, in any case in so far as these 
are all common-law jurisdications, they fit into the sources of law poten­
tially permitted by a liberal interpretation of Chapter four of the laws of 
Zambia.
There is also a clear need in a discussion of mining rights to consider 
sources of law from other jurisdictions and occasionally, even those out­
side the common law, even though they can at most only be persuasive; 
after all, mineral occurences are spread unevenly across the world. The 
main source o f Zambian common law, Britain, is, except for its modern 
coal industry, not a great mining country; consequently it has not ex­
perienced some of the problems that arise as a result of having an active 
mining industry and lying in a mineralised region. And even if it had, it 
follows a system of mineral tenure distinct from that of Zambia (which 
presents distinct mineral problems) and is not a poor nation desperately
56. Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter 160 of the Laws of Zambia.
57. The East African cases of R.v.Jiwannath and Am m k Sigh [1944] E.A. 62, and 
Musa and Another v. R. [1962] E.A. were referred to.
58. Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter 175 o f  the Laws o f  Kenya. Another example 
o f  this practice in Zambian courts is Patel v. Attorney-General Selected 
Judgements of Zambia, No, 13 of 1970 where Public Prosecutor v. Venkata 
(1961) A.C. 104 and Awolowo v. Federal Minister o f  Internal Affairs [1962] All 
N.L.R. 117, were cited.
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trying to attract foreign capital in order to exploit its mineral resources as 
Zambia is. A country like Zambia has much more in common with coun­
tries like Botswana and South Africa, in relation to some aspects of min­
ing legislation, than with Britain. Thus in this book, in the absence of 
Zambian decisions on the points at issue, legislation and cases from other 
mining jurisdictions whose mining system is based on the same principles 
as the Zambian legislation are sometimes referred to. The reason for this 
is that the common law is a very important source of law in this book. 
The whole of the common law of England, both mining and non-mining, 
as it existed in 1911 as Chapter four of the laws of Zambia specifies, is in 
force in Zambia in so far as it can be applied.
Legislation
By far the most important source is, however, the legislation concerning 
mining enacted in Zambia both by the colonial government in the early 
1900s and more recently by the post-independence parliament. The first
major enactment was the 1912 Mining Proclamation,59 and this has been 
followed over the years by repealing, replacing and extending legislation, 
the 1958 Mining Ordinance,60 the 1969 Mines and Minerals Act.61 The 
Mines and Minerals Act of 1976,62 the Income Tax Act,63 the Copper 
(Export) Tax of 1966,64 the Mineral Tax Act of 1970, and numerous In­
come Tax (Amendment) Acts.65 In addition there are several statutes, 
sections which affect mining rights in fairly significant ways such as the 
Water Act.66
59. Mining Proclamation, No. 1 o f 1912.
60. Mining Ordinance, No. 13 o f 1958, s. 108.
61. Mines and Minerals Act, Chapter 329 of the Laws of Zambia.
62. Mines and Minerals Act, No. 32 o f 1976.
63. Income Tax Act, Chapter 668 o f the Laws of Zambia.
64. Copper (Export) Tax Act, Chapter 669 of the Laws of Zambia.
65. Mineral Tax Act, 1970. As amended by the Mineral Tax (Amendment) Act, No.
11, 1973 and the Mineral Tax (Amendment) Act, No. 10 o f 1975.
66. Water Act, Chapter 312 of the Laws of Zambia.
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THE BASIS OF THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA 
COMPANY CLAIMS TO MINERAL RIGHTS IN ZAMBIA
The Historical Background to the Granting of the
Concessions
Two principal factors account for the British South Africa Company’s 
activities in Zambia. These are first the persistent tradition handed down 
from remote antiquity that vast deposits of gold lay ready for the miner 
somewhere in Africa, and secondly the desire to acquire more land for 
the British Empire. In this respect the turning point for Zambia was in 
1867, when a missionary from Inyati made a journey northwards to the 
Zambezi, his aim being to reach the Victoria Falls. He was accompanied 
on the trip by one Hartley. On the trip they noticed several disused mine 
shafts and learnt of a gold trade that was going on between the local 
inhabitants and the Portuguese.1 On their return to the Transvaal, 
Hartley reported their findings to Mauch, a geologist. Later in the same 
year Hartley and Mauch went North and together identified the reefs 
which were later called the Tati and the Northern gold field mines.
On their return they published exaggerated reports of what they had 
seen in an effort to encourage Transvaal miners to move north. They 
reported for instance that in Mashonaland, part of present-day 
Zimbabwe, they had traced one gold-bearing lode for 130 kilometres.2 
These discoveries by Mauch and Hartley made the whole gold hunt seem 
conceivably worthwhile. The Transvaal miners easily reached Tatjlland 
tried to obtain concessions from the local chiefs but they found it dif­
ficult to obtain them as the local chief, Mzilikazi, was opposed to the 
mining of gold by Europeans. Eventually, however, the miners were 
allowed to dig on a temporary basis without any formal agreements.
1. The Portuguese had by the ISth century established themselves on the East Coast 
of Africa and carried on a gold trade particularly around Sofala. See Exelson; 
The Portuguese in South-East Africa 1600—1970, 1960; and Wills, supra 
Chapters 1 and 2.
2. Hole, The Making o f  Rhodesia. 1928, p .3. Hole was a British South Africa 
Company Official in Southern Africa.
20
In 1868 Mzilikazi died and Lobengula succeeded him; within a few 
months of his installation, he granted two mineral concessions. On 9 
April, 1870, he gave Barnes a verbal grant of the Northern Gold fields 
(an area bounded by the Gwelo and Hunyani river — today the rich 
midlands area of Zimbabwe) and confirmed this in writing the next 
year.3 The concession granted Barnes the right to prospect for gold. He 
formed no exploration company, however, and never utilised his conces­
sion. Then on 29 April, 1870, Lobengula gave another concession to the 
London and Limpopo Company in the Tati area between the Shashi and 
Ramahlane rivers. The concession granted mineral rights, permission to 
operate machinery, erect buildings and make a road to Shashi; in return, 
the Company was to pay Lobengula £60 per annum.
Rhodes and Mineral Concessions
In 1871 Rhodes arrived in Kimberely, then a rapidly growing mining 
town around the recently discovered diamond fields. He began by work­
ing on his brother’s mining claim, but after a short time turned to buying 
and selling claims. Within a few years, he amassed a large fortune and 
formed a company, De Beers Ltd., which gained control of most of the 
Kimberely diamond mines.
Rhodes was greatly inspired by the vision of a united Africa under the 
British flag and attempted to persuade the British government to acquire 
most of Africa as a colony. When his efforts failed, he conceived the idea 
of floating a private company to implement his ideas. He set out to win 
the support of the Dutch in the South, for he respectrd this influential 
group, and knew that without its support the attainment of his dream 
was not possible. The unification of South Africa became his immediate 
goal but the independent attitude of the Transvaal Boers under Kruger’s 
leadership proved an obstacle. Kruger’s aim to preserve the Transvaal 
for the Boers was strengthened by the discovery of rich gold deposits on 
the Witwatersrand, which greatly increased the wealth and prestige of the 
Transvaal. Rhodes, in an attempt to outflank Kruger, decided to go 
north and find more gold.
In 1887 Lobengula had entered into a treaty with the Transvaal 
government. It was an elementary agreement which simply laid the basis 
for perpetual peace and friendship and regulated matters such as
3. Ibid., p.3.
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extradition, but its signing disturbed Rhodes. He persuaded Sir Hercules 
Robinson, the British High Commissioner in South Africa to send one 
John Moffat to negotiate an understanding between Lobengula and the 
British government. Moffat concluded a treaty with Lobengula, its main 
stipulation being that Lobengula would never make further agreements 
with any power except Britain without the previous knowledge and 
sanction of Her Majesty’s High Commissioner for South Africa.4 The 
conclusion of the treaty was commmunicated to Lord Knutsford, the 
Secretary of State for the colonies who . gave authority to Sir Hercules 
Robinson to ratify it. To maintain the British advantage, in 1888 
Rhodes’ De Beers Company dispatched Rudd to Lobengula, with 
instructions to obtain a mineral concession. This led to the conclusion of 
the Rudd concession on 30 October, 1888.5 It granted Rudd complete 
and exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated in the 
Matebele Kingdom principalities and dominions, together with full per­
mission to do all things that were necessary to win and procure the 
minerals. In return for handing over the complete mineral rights of the 
Kingdom, principalities, and dominions, Lebengula and his heirs were to 
get the sum of one hundred thousands rounds of suitable bail cartridges 
and a steam boat with guns suitable for defensive purposes, or in lieu of 
the steam boat the sum of five hundred pounds at the election of 
Lobengula. The guns and the money were to be given as soon as mining 
commenced in the territory. Lobengula never got the gun boat and the 
rifles arrived in a defective condition. He did, however, get his payment 
of one hundred pounds a month while he lived.
The Rudd Concession is a simple document consisting of one long 
sentence'. It is signed by Lobengula using his seal, on the one part, and 
Rudd on the other.6 Two witnesses’ signatures appear on the document, 
belonging to Helm and Dreyer. There is an endorsement by Helm certify­
ing that the document was fully interpreted and explained to Lobengula 
and his council and that the constitutional usages of the Matebele were 
complied with prior to the execution of the concession.
4. A fascimilc of the treaty is contained in Hole, supra, p.34.
5. Ibid., p .3.
6. A fascimile of the treaty is contained in Hole, supra, p.74 and in Hole, Southern ' 
Rhodesia, 1909, p. 103.
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With the Rudd concession in hand, Rhodes brought about the 
amalgamation of a number of financial groups interested in developing 
the lands north of the Limpopo river, into the British South Africa Com­
pany, and approached the British government with a request for a Royal 
Charter. His reasons were set out in the Royal Warrant and were mainly 
that (a) the existence of a powerful British Company would be advan­
tageous to the commercial and other interests of the United Kingdom 
and her colonies; (b) the company would carry into effect diverse conces­
sions and agreements which had been made by chiefs in the region and 
such other concessions and treaties as the petitioners should obtain and
(c) that if the concession obtained could be carried out, the conditions of 
the natives could be improved and their civilisation advanced.7
Rhodes’ request was opposed by English Liberals who maintained that 
a Royal Charter would confer a practical monopoly of Southern Africa 
resources upon a handful of Cape Town and London capitalists. The 
conservative view, on the other hand, supported the company which they 
thought ought to be able to draw into its nets most of what was worth 
having in Southern Africa. The British government was unwilling to be 
involved in the expense of running overseas territories. Rhodes eventual­
ly won over some of his opponents and persuaded a few to accept seats 
on the Company’s Board of Directors. He was also fortunate in that Sir 
Hercules Robinson, the British High Commissioner at the Cape, sup­
ported him and recommended a charter company as the cheapest way of 
annexing the territory. The Charter was granted on 29 October, 1889,8 
framed to a great extent on the precedent of the Charter granted to the 
British North Borneo Company. Under the Charter, the Company was 
authorised and empowered to hold, use and retain for the purpose of the 
Company the full benefit of the concessions and agreements it had 
already acquired in so far as they were valid.9 It was further authorised 
and empowered, subject to the approval of one of the Principal 
Secretaries of State, from time to time to acquire by any concession, 
agreement, grant, or treaty all or any rights, interests, authorities,
The Granting of the Charter
7. Hole, supra, pp 107—111.
8. Royal Charter of Incorporation of the British South Africa Company, 29 
October, 1889.
9. Ibid., see the preamble.
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jurisdictions and powers of any kind or nature whatever including 
powers necessary for the purposes of government and the preservation of 
public order in or for the property, comprised or referred to in the con­
cessions or affecting other territories, lands or property in Africa. The 
Company was empowered to make ordinances which were subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of State. It was also empowered to carry on 
mining and other industries and to make concessions for mining and 
other rights. The area of operation for the Company was defined as the 
area of Southern Africa lying to the north of British Bechuanaland and 
to the north and west of the South African Republic and to the west of 
the Portuguese dominion of Mozambique and east of Angola.10 The 
Charter was to be reviewed at the end of twenty years and thereafter at 
the end of every succeeding ten years. The Company later drew up a deed 
of settlement, dated 3 February, 1891, which set out the objectives of the 
Company,11 reflecting the powers granted to it by the Charter.
After the grant of the Charter, Rhodes occupied the part of 
Mashonaland around the area later named as Salisbury in Zimbabwe. He 
was also determined to extend the influence of the British South Africa 
Company, as far north and east as possible. Thus at the Second Meeting 
of the Company on 29 November, 1892, Rhodes pointed out that the 
Rudd concession was obtained with the idea that the north would have to 
be taken with the hinterland of the country.12 f 
Hence in 1890 his emissaries Selous and Colquhoun obtained a conces­
sion from Mutasa Chief of the Manica. It was a comprehensive conces­
sion to the Company granting exclusive mineral and commercial rights to 
the Company in return for help against outside attack and assistance in 
education and the spread of Christianity.13 At about this time too 
Lippert obtained a concession from Lobengula which the British South 
Africa Company purchased from him in 1892. It conferred on Lippert 
more or less the same powers as the Rudd concession did on Rudd earlier 
with respect to minerals, but had additional clauses granting all land in 
Lobengula’s Kingdom.14
10. As originally drawn, the Charter covered the area south of the Zambezi river. On 
5 March, 1891, the Charter was amended to include the area north of the 
Zambezi.
11. Deed of Settlement, 3 February, 1891.
12. British South Africa Company Second Annual Meeting, 29 November, 1892,
British South Africa Company Blue Books, 1892.
13. A copy of the concession is reprinted in Hole, supra, p. 107.
14. Baxter, ‘The Barotse Concessions’ (1951) 2 Northern Rhodesia Journal, p.39.
See also Letter from Coillard to Hunter, 15 August, 1890 in C.O. 5/2/11, which 
read, ‘The King Lewanika is most anxious to solicit that the protection of the 
British government should be extended to him and his people.’
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The Lewanika Concessions
After gaining control of the then Rhodesia, Rhodes moved further north 
to what is now Zambia, reaching it through Barotseland. The Chief of 
the Barotse, Lewanika, had through a letter written by Coillard, a mis­
sionary, to Sir Sidney Shippard, Administrator for Bechuanaland, on 
Lewanika’s behalf already requested British protection on 8 January, 
1889.15 There have been many attempts to explain why Lewanika wanted 
protection. It has been suggested that Lewanika thought that British pro­
tection might save his kingdom from both the Portuguese advances from 
the east or west and the attacks by his powerful Matebele neighbours in 
the South.16 Alternatively, it has been said he might also have hoped that 
British proctection would secure his position as a Lozi ruler — a position 
which had been threatened by a serious rebellious faction within the 
Kingdom. The influence of Coillard, who is said to have thought highly 
of Britain and had close personal links with England through his British 
wife was important. Coillard was worried by the German annexation of 
South-West Africa, and feared the approach of white gold seekers and 
adventurers without what he considered proper government to deal with 
them, since he viewed the structure of the Barotse state with distrust, im­
bued with paganism. Ultimately, it was on the advice of Coillard and 
Khama of Bechuanaland that Lewanika sent his request for protection to 
the British government. At the same time that Lewanika was asking for 
British protection, a number of South Africa companies were in 
Barotseland asking him for mineral concessions. He was very reluctant 
to grant a concession to any of them as he preferred to have his country 
declared a British protectorate. In April, 1889, there arrived in 
Barotseland one Henry Ware from Kimberely.17 He had been sent by the 
King and Nind consortium with instructions to try to obtain a mineral 
concession from Lewanika. In the negotiation Ware, knowing that 
Lewanika was anxious to be put under British protection, made great 
play with the promise of the protection of the Queen. He also gave 
Lewanika considerable gifts in the form of guns, blankets and clothes. 
On 27 June, 1889, an agreement was concluded granting Ware the:-
16 Halt, Zambia, 1965, P-63. Coillard attributes the initiative for soliciting British
protection mainly to Lewanika who, according to him was driven on to do so by 
the realisation that his hold on his kingdom was tenuous, Coillard, On the 
Threshold o f  Central Africa, 1897, p.329
17. Baxter, supra, p.39.
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Sole absolute and exclusive right to dig, 
mine and quarry for precious stones, gold,’ 
silver and all other minerals and metals 
o f whatever description for the term of 
twenty years, in the area extending east 
from the river Magila, the boundary to 
the north to cattle path leading to 
Maccikunninboe, the boundary to the South 
to the Zambezi river.18
The area as described in mostly present day Ila country in parts of the 
Southern Province of Zambia. Lewanika was to get two hundred pounds 
a year and a royalty of four per cent on all minerals or precious stones 
that were mined in the area. Ware ceded this concession to Nind and 
King on 11 October, 1889 and it was bought by Rhodes for nine hundred 
pounds and ten thousand shares in the British South Africa Company.
Rhodes then sent Lochner to negotiate with Lewanika for a more com­
prehensive agreement than the Limited Ware Concession. In the negotia­
tions Lochner too invoked the name of Queen Victoria, knowing like 
Ware before him that Lewanika had asked the Queen to declare his 
country a protectorate. He told Lewanika that he was an ambassador 
from the Queen and had been sent to offer her protection for 
Barotseland — not merely a concession but an alliance between the 
Barotse nation and the British government.19 If the Chief chose to reject 
such an offer, he warned that it would be taken as an unfriendly act, sug­
gesting that the Queen might even be driven to force her friendship on 
Barotseland.
Any suggestions that the British South Africa Company was not the 
same entity as the British government were quickly glossed over. Lochner
18. See Baxter, ‘The Concessions o f Northern Rhodesia’ (1963) Occassional Papers o f  
the National Archives o f  Rhodesia and Nyasaland, pp.3—4, for copies of the 
concessions.
19. Later the colonial office admitted that Lochner may have made too free a use of 
the Queen’s name. See Letter from Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 19 
October, 1891, No. 169 in F.O. Con. 6/78.
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pointed out that the president of the Company was the Duke of Aber- 
corn, whose Duchess was a member of the Royal Household, and that 
another director, the Duke of Fife, had a father-in-law who was the heir 
to the British throne. Whenever he wrote a letter to Lewanika during this 
time he used ‘On Her Majesty’s Service’ envelopes, obviously to rein­
force his representations that he was acting for the Queen.20 There is also 
evidence that during the negotiations Lochner organised a party to 
celebrate the Queen’s birthday. One report indicated that the date on 
which the party was organised was one month after the Queen’s official 
birthday, but a British South Africa Company report, gives the date as 
the 24th of May.21 At the party, sports were organised and oxen were 
killed for the consumption of guests — all the Barotse Councillors and 
the Chief — and at night fireworks were organised.
One month after the party, on 22 June, the Barotse National Council 
gathered to consider the request for a concession. After the National 
Council had deliberated for several days, Lochner hired one Mokoatsa 
from Khama’s Kingdom, to deliver a message which purported to have 
come from Khama.22 In it he urged the Barotse people to put themselves 
in the hands of the Queen and went on to say:
Barotse, I have tasted delicious food and I have 
shared it with you. What have you done with it?
I have sent messengers like Mokoatsa.
How have you received them? Today, I hear 
sinister rumours, you speak again of revolution.
Take care Lewaika is my friend, and if you dare to 
make attempts against his life or power, I am Khama, 
you will see me with your eyes and hear me.23
Mokoatsa went on to tell them that the British South Africa Cqmpany 
was made up of the Queen’s men who had been given the job by the 
British government of spreading civilisation in .the heart of Africa. The 
Mokoatsa plot played a significant part in making Lewanika agree to the
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20. Johnsons, Reality Versus Romance in Southern C · · 893, p. 145.
21. Compare the reports in Hall, su p ra , p .68  an d  thosi in Holt
22. Mokoatsa was well known to  L ochner to  be a  reg- ir mes
23. See Letter from Lochner to British South Africa Company, . 
African South. 392.
Lochner concession. Lochner himself admitted this in a letter to the 
Company, in which he wrote:
Macquetsie, Khama’s messenger, was of the greatest 
possible help to me, as of course the Barotse 
listened to him more readily than they did to me, 
he made an excellent speech, told him that if I was 
successful, sometime back, I would ask the Company 
to make him a good present, he stated that if the 
Company would give him a wagon nothing would 
please him more.24
Another influence was the concurrence of the missionaries. This is 
shown by Coillard’s own admission and also the extent to which the mis­
sionaries were blamed when Lewanika later repudiated the concession.25 
Coillard himself wrote after the concession was granted that Lewanika 
had acted on the advice he had given him, feeling that it,was coming 
from a friend.26 Lochner too in a letter to the British South Africa Com­
pany stated that had it not been for the influence Coillard had secured 
over the King, his mission would have been impossible.27
The Lochner concession was concluded and signed on 27 June, 1890. 
Two versions of the concession are accessible, both in the Colonial 
Office papers. The substance of the two copies of the concessions, 
however, is the same.28 In the concession the Chief gave the British 
South Africa Company:
24. Ibid.
25. Coillard Journal, 22’May, 1891, C.O. 51/11.
26. Ibid.
27. See letter from Lochner to Harris, 9 April, 1890, No. 320 African South, 392.
28. The copy left in Lewanika’s possession contained the following clause not 
contained in the version Lochner took back to Rhodes. ‘The Company further 
agreed that it will forthwith under the King’s supervision and authority assist in 
the establishment of propagation of the Christian religion and the education and 
civilisation of the native subjects of the King by the establishment maintenance 
and endownment of such churches, schools and trading stations as may be from 
time to time mutually agreed upon by the King and the Resident Representative.’ 
See Letter from Middleton to Salisbury, 27 October, 1890, Enclosure in No. 158
F.O. 403/157. This of course was never done. See letter from Governor Stanley 
to Colonial Office, 25 September, 1924, C.O. 795-99.
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The sole absolute and exclusive and perpetual rights 
and power over the whole o f the territory of the 
Barotse nation, or any future extension thereof including 
all subject and dependent territories ... to search for 
diamonds, gold, coal, oil and all other precious stones, 
minerals or substances.29
The Company in return promised Lewanika British protection from out­
side attack, to appoint a British resident, to pay the Chief mineral 
royalties, an annual sum of £2,000 and supply him with a gun boat and 
guns. The concession described the area it covered in rather vague terms 
stating it as:
The whole o f the territory of the Barotse nation and any 
further extension thereof, including all subject and 
development territory.30
In the text of the concession it was provided that the concession had to be 
considered as a treaty between the Barotse nation and the government of 
Her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria. This gives weight to the argument 
that at all times Lewanika thought that the concession was being made 
with the Queen and Lewanika considered this very important.31 This is 
evidenced by the fact that the Chief gave two magnificent elephant tasks, 
which are a token of submission in African customs to the Queen though 
they never reached her.32 Coillard too seemed to have believed that the 
concession was with the Queen, for he was later to write:
29. See copy in No. 320 African South 392.
30. Ibid. This description of the area not in terms of physical features, left the area 
covered vague. It left such questions as what amounted to the Barotse Kingdom 
and whose future extensions of the Barotse Kingdom unanswered.
31. Yeta in a letter to the Colonial Office 22 March, 1922. ‘We were assured that 
whatever dealing we were going to make with the Company would be regarded as 
being made with Her Majesty’ C.O. 795-90. Also Rev. Jalla who worked in 
Barotse at the time of the concessions swore an affidavit that ‘Lewanika meant 
that whatever rights (he) gave them believing the British South Africa Company 
to be asking for the Crown and not as a Commercial concern’ Northern Rhodesia 
Government, British South Africa Claims to Mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia" 
(White Paper), 1964, p. 14.
32. Johnson, supra and also Mathers, Zambezia 1891. A book published in the 
Company’s interest revealed that the two fine tusks o f ivory each weighing 
considerably over 1001b (45.5kg) were hung in the Board room of the British 
South Africa Company’s office in Capetown.
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If  the British p ro tec to ra te  has been used sim ply as a 
b lind , I em phatically  protest against it and regret if I 
have unw ittingly been a dupe o r  an  accom plice in such 
tran sac tio n s .33
As agreed under the concession, the Company sent one Corydon to take 
up the post of British Resident in Barotseland. He arrived on 27 
September, 1897, with instructions to obtain a new concession from 
Lewanika, which would give the Company more powers than it had 
acquired'under the Lochner concession. Corydon persuaded Lewanika 
to travel to the Victoria Falls to meet Captain Lawley, the Company 
Administrator of Matebeleland. In June, 1898, a concession was agreed 
upon between Lewanika on the one hand and the British South Africa 
Company on the other.34
The Lawley concession was not confirmed by the British government 
but another concession negotiated between Lewanika and the Company 
in October, 1900 and repeating the provisions of the Lawley concession 
was approved by the British government in 1901.35 The concession was 
approved subject inter alia to the following conditions: (a) that the con­
cession was not deemed to confer upon the British South Africa Com­
pany any rights inconsistent with the provisions of the 1899 North- 
Western Rhodesia Order in Council or with any laws enacted by the High 
Commissioner and the British South Africa Company charter and (b) 
that the privileges conferred in the concession were not to be alienated by 
the Company without the written consent of the British government.36
The new concession granted absolute and perpetual rights and powers 
to the Company to (a) carry on any manufacturing, commercial or other 
trading business; (b) search for, dig, win and keep diamonds, gold, coal, 
oil and other precious stones, minerals or substances; (c) construct, 
improve, equip, work and manage public works, railways, tramways, 
roads, bridges, lighting, waterworks and all other works and convenience 
of general or public utility; (d) carry on the business of banking in all its 
branches; (e) buy, sell, refine, manipulate, mint and deal in precious 
stones, special coins and all other metals and minerals; (f) manufacture
33. Letter from Coillard to the British South Africa Company, 5 June, 1891, Coillard 
Journal C.O. 51/11.
34. Baxter, supra, p.41.
35. This concession was nftpntvtd  on the 23 November, 1901. African South 
No. 1146.
36. Ibid.
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and import arms and ammunition of all kinds and (g) do all such things 
as are incidental or conducive to the exercise, attainment or protection of 
all or any of the rights, powers and concessions granted and to carry out 
administrative rights to deal with and adjudicate upon all cases between 
white men and Africans. Cases between Africans only were to be dealt 
with by the Chief. The Chief was promised payment of an annual sum of 
eight hundred and fifty pounds which was stated to include the annual 
payment of two hundred pounds due to Lewanika under the Ware Con­
cession.
It would appear that even though the Lochner concession was not 
mentioned specifically, it was the intention of the British South Africa 
Company to make some substantial changes to it. The reduction of the 
annual subsidy to eight hundred and fifty pounds seems to be one such 
change. The Company, however, received all the rights it had gained 
under the Lochner concession. The 1900 concession stated that it covered 
all the areas of Lewanika’s territories but at his insistence it did not cover 
Barotseland proper, that is the area between Sesheke and Lealui where 
the Lozi live. In this concession too there was a provision similar to that 
in the Lochner concession to the effect that the agreement was to be con­
sidered as a treaty of alliance made between the Barotse nation and the 
government of Queen Victoria.
In 1909, the British South Africa Company obtained their last conces­
sion in the Barotse area. Unlike the earlier concessions, it did not grant 
mineral rights but granted it land right« throughout Lewanika’s territory 
except in Barotseland proper itself.
The North-Eastern Concessions
In the North-Eastern part of the country, Johnson, Administrator of the 
Nyasaland Protectorate, financed by and at the suggestion of Rhodes, 
undertook concession-seeking journeys in 1889. He enlisted Alfred 
Sharpe, a solicitor, on the mission and entrusted to him the important 
task of obtaining a concession from Msiri the ruler of Katanga. Sharpe 
claimed to have within a very short time, made extensive journeys 
throughout the Luangwa region and then on to Katanga. He obtained 
concessions from a number of small chiefs and Kazembe, the Lunda 
Chief in the Luapula valley but did not obtain one from Msiri, the ruler
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of the copper-rich region of Katanga or with Mpezeni of the Ngoni since 
both these Chiefs refused to make any agreement with him. He also 
obtained concessions from Nsama and a Chief named Mwapi.37
Rhodes, unaware that Johnson had sent Sharpe, but anxious to 
acquire Katanga, because of its copper deposits, acted independently and 
sent Thomson on a similar mission. Thomson travelled through the 
upper Kafue and Luapula regions and obtained a number of concessions 
from the chiefs he met, but because of ill-health he never reached Msiri in 
Katanga. Nevertheless, he managed to obtain concessions from the 
following Chiefs: Kabwiri, Kawende, Katara, Mansala (female chief), 
Thitambo, Msiri (not the same as the one referred to above), Kalonga, 
Simesi, Nguemba, M anyesha, Chamira, Chipepo, Cheria and 
Mlembwe.38 Most of these concessions contained the same provisions ex­
cept for certain negligible variations. In the main, the chiefs accepted the 
British flag, placed themselves under the protection of the Queen and 
granted the Company the sole right to search, prospect, exploit, dig for 
and keep all minerals and metals and the sole right to construct, improve, 
equip, work, manage and control all kinds of works and conveniences of 
general and public utility and the right to employ all commercial 
privileges of whatsoever kind, and lastly, the Company was given the 
right to do such things as are incidental to the exercise, attainment or 
protection of all or any of the rights, powers and concessions granted. 
The chiefs agreed not to enter into any treaty of alliance with any other 
person, or company. In all the concessions it was stated that they should 
be understood to be in the nature of a covenant between the chief and the 
Queen of Britain. Some of them did not, however, grant mineral rights 
and went no further than a grant of exclusive commercial rights. In 
return for the grant of such considerable interests contained in the 
concessions, the chiefs were paid varying sums of money, though none 
exceeding fifty pounds.
In general the concessions appear to have been based on a precedent 
supplied by the British South Africa Company. It will be sufficient to 
quote the main part of the concessions to give a general picture of the 
sort of documents that are being referred to. The main part of the 
concessions concluded between Mwapi and Sharpe for example, read:
37. North-Eastern Rhodesia (1895-1911) File No. N .E ./A 3/8/3 (National Archives), 
Lusaka.
38. Ibid. The whole operation seems to have been rushed — Thomson signed all these 
treaties between 10 September and*27 December, 1890.
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I the under-signed, Mwapi, Chief of Lukusasi country, do 
hereby concede to the Royal British South Africa 
Chartered Company, Ltd., the exclusive mining rights 
over the extent of territory which I possess, which is 
bounded as follows: On the East and South by the 
watershed between the Lukusasi river and its head­
waters and the Luangwa river on the north, the 
north-western and the west, by the watershed o f the 
Lukusasi river a rd  on the South by the South 
Latitude 13°.40 or there about39
These documents, noting the one quoted above were fairly technical even 
by modern standards. It was therefore unlikely that any African chief at 
the time could have comprehended the meaning of words such as 
‘latitude’ or indeed the meaning of mineral rights as distinguished from 
land rights. And since these tidy European concepts have no counter­
parts in tribal customary law, as is shown later, it is probable that no 
amount of interpreting could have made the chiefs appreciate the 
significance of the documents. Hence there is reason to suspect that most 
of the concessions were obtained by deception. Some of them refer to 
chiefs who have never been in existence in Zambia. One chief in a conces­
sion is oddly described as paramount chief of the countries of Senga and 
Ilala two different tribes living hundreds of kilometres apart.40 Another 
incidence is the concession with Nansala, called Chieftain of the Lobisa 
country of Mbalala. In fact, it appears that she was merely a village 
head-woman who was put forward by the people because they did not 
want to disclose the real chief. There is also the treaty with Mwambwiri 
said to be the paramount chief of the Kiwende of no known tribe.
As further evidence that the chiefs were not informed of the true 
nature of the documents they were signing, there is in colonial records 
made at the time of the signing of the concessions, the evidence of a Dr 
Swan concerning the methods employed by Sharpe to obtain conces­
sions. He wrote:
39. ZA/19/File No. 35 (National Archives), Lusaka.
40. This chief is named as Tshavira. Also neither Simesi nor Kalonga were chiefs of 
the Lamba tribes attributed to them in the concessions.
One day a Mr. Sharpe turned up with a paper 
which he asked me to get Mushili to sign. I read 
the paper through and found that it made over the 
mineral and land rights o f that country to the 
Company. I said I will take it to the Chief, but I 
think he is going to be very angry when I translate 
it to him. Mr. Sharpe told me not to translate it and 
asked me to just get him to sign it. He said that since 
Mush ili wa< n y  friend he would do anything for me.
• ' as a Christian 1 could not do such
r-?ed to the document being read, 
the Chief was very angry and 
expelled S om  the country41
There is also evidence of one Mwebela, who claimed to have been a 
witness at the meeting between Thomson and Chief Mushili, obtained in 
1964 by the Zambian government. In which he stated:
The Whitemen came with their book and they asked 
Mushili to put his thumb print in the presence of ...
Musepelo, Kanamina, Mukwemba and myself, Mwebela 
and told the chief to look after that book carefully.
They used black stuff, that black stuff was put against 
that one and then on the paper. I do not remember 
them making any cross on the paper. There was not a 
meeting of all the people of the village they said;
As all the chiefs have run away from us, so we want 
you to accept us by putting this mark on the book, 
and we recognise you as the only chief here.
The Mupundus, they were interpreting they did not 
talk about land. They did not talk about Iyela (metals).
I know what was talked about; if they did talk about 
it, I would have known.42
There is reason, therefore, to suspect that many of the concessions were 
obtained by various deceptive methods. Quite apart from the inadequacy
41. Northern Rhodesia Government, British South Africa Company’s Claims to 
Mineral Rights in Northern Rhodesia, (white Paper), 1964, p.15.
42. Evidence deposed by Mwebela, a nephew of Chief Mushili, collected by M.I.O. 
Faber, 1 September, 1964, Maxwell Stamp Papers, 1964.
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o f the money said to have been paid to the various chiefs, nobodv knows 
whether in fact they were ever paid as there is no evidence to substantiate 
Sharpe\s and Thomson’s claims ftiat they were. In 1892 the concessions 
were sent to the Colonial Office which asked Johnson to report on 
whether they should be recognised by the Secretary of State.43 Earlier, on 
18 July,. Johnson had issued a circular establishing a legal procedure for 
registering and recognising concessions within the British sphere of in­
fluence. Under this system, no concession would be registered unless it 
received his sanction.44 Before he could approve a concession, it had to 
conform to the following conditions: (a) the chief who gave the conces­
sion must have been the real ruler of the country covered and not merely 
some sub-chief; (b) the purchaser must have given what Johnson con­
sidered a fair price. In each case in which he was satisfied that the claims 
fulfilled the conditions he had laid down, he issued a certificate of claim 
which after approval by the British Government, recognised the validity 
of the concession
It is doubtful that Johnson had any legal authority to set up this pro­
cedure.45 He was not authorised by the British government nor by any 
law in existence at the time. It is even doubtful that Johnson had autho­
rity to issue certificates of claim in the region covered by Thomson and 
Sharpe, as the British Nyasaland Protectorate of which he was admini­
strator did not extend to these areas which were simply in what was n 
called the British sphere of influence, though the Company could ac e 
concessions under its Royal Charter subject to the approval ot he 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. One cannot therefore come to an 
easy conclusion as to the legal effect of these certificates of da  m 
although by 1893 Johnson issued such certificates recognising Sharpe 
and Thomson concessions, thereby he established the basis of the Br . sh 
South Africa Company’s claim to mineral rights in Zambia east of f he 
Kafue and in what became known as the Katanga pedicle across the 
Congo (Zaire) border. The claims were recognised by the British govern­
ment in 1894 on the basis of the certificates issued by Johnson.46
43. African South, No. 1146.
44. ZA/19/File No. 35 (National Archives), Lusaka.
45. Krishnamurthy, ‘The Thomson Treaties and Johnson’s Certificate of Claim’ 
(1969) 8 African Social Research, p.50. See also letter from Johnson to the 
Foreign Office, 19 August, 1893, F.O. 2/66.
46. ZA/19/File No. 35 (National Archives), Lusaka.
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In discussing Johnson’s decision to issue the claims it is doubtful that 
he could have subjected the Thomson and Sharpe concession to close 
scrutiny. He could not possibly have satisfied himself that some of the 
vendors had the authority to dispose o f what they disposed of in these 
concessions.47 Indeed, there is evidence that Johnson himself seemed to 
doubt the legitimacy of the concessions, for in a letter to the Colonial 
Office he urged it to recognise as much of the contents o f these conces­
sions as was legally admissible, and went on to say that ‘the fact that 
certain points might have to be rejected was not sufficient reason for 
non-recognition of other parts’.48 It seems most likely that Johnson 
acted under pressure from the British South Africa Company officials, 
particularly Rhodes. In connection with a land dispute at the same time 
as the Thomson and Sharpe treaties were before Johnson, Rhodes wrote 
to Johnson in these terms:
I would impress this point upon you ... the 
Chartered Company have been paying and are still 
paying £10,000 a year to you for nothing. It is even 
prepared to increase its subsidy to £15,000 a year but 
in justice to its shareholders, the Company must 
have secured to it the reversionary rights o f the land 
and the minerals both within the protectorate and 
sphere without it4®
The British South Africa Company asserted a right to the ownership of, 
or exclusive control over, all the minerals throughout Zambia on the 
basis o f the concessions, a consequent right to alienate these minerals in 
any way it wished, and a right to levy royalties on all minerals won by 
whoever won them. The Company held the rights for over sixty years.50 
During this period attempts were made to divest the Company of its 
claims.
47. In some concessions no witnesses are given, in others no interpreters, in other still 
the chiefs do not exist. As monopolies they were against the Charter. They have 
also been severely critised by historians, Hanna, supra, p .115, Gann, supra, p.63, 
and Slimm, 'Commercial concessions and politics during the colonial period: The 
Role o f the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia, 1890-1964’
1971, African Affairs, p.21.
48. Letter from Johnson to Foreign Office, 17 October, 1894, F.O. 2/67 and 
Hanna, supra, p. 115 quotes him as having referred to them as absurdly worded.
49. Letter from Rhodes to Johnson, 4 April, 1893. British South Africa Company 
Papers, Central African Archives, (Microfilm in library o f Royal Commonwealth 
Society, London).
50. Financially, the Company earned over £170 million and the British government 
collected £40 million in taxes, Northern Rhodesia Government, British South 
Africa Company claims to Mineral Rights in Northern Rhodesia, (White Paper), 
1964, p .24.
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CHALLENGES TO THE BRITISH SOUTH 
AFRICA COMPANY CLAIMS
The British South Africa Company always asserted that its title to the 
mineral rights of Zambia in addition to having its origins in the conces­
sions (discussed in the previous chapter,) was confirmed by the Com­
pany’s long continued possession of them,1 as well as subsequent legisla­
tion and agreements. While the Company’s enjoyment of the title before 
1924 is referable to the administrative position which it held in later 
years, it seems this relied on its influence with the Colonial Office. Dur­
ing the period after 1924 its ownership of mineral rights was subject to 
frequent protests from local chiefs, colonial officials and other sym­
pathisers. The protest ended only with the transfer of the rights to the 
Zambian government in 1964.
Early Challenges to the Claims
Lewanika and the Claims
Within Barotseland itself it seems soon after the conclusion of the con­
cessions, there was widespread discontent. The ordinary people are 
reported to have accused Lewanika of having sold the country.2 
Lewanika himself laid the blame for their conclusion on the missionaries 
who, (as pointed out in the last chapter), acted as his advisers during the 
negotiations for the concessions.3 The awareness among the Lozi of what 
had transpired seemed to have been partly due to a white trader, George 
Middleton, who was present in Barotseland at the time of the negotia­
tions of the concessions. During his trips to Mafeking for supplies, he 
came to a conclusion that the British South Africa Company was not the
1. W illiam s, supra , p .3. But act o f  ow nership  exercised over m ines only  give rise to  a 
presum ption  o f  ow nership , o r  if exercised during  the  s ta tu to ry  period, m ay su p ­
po rt a  s ta tu to ry  title in the absence o r inadequacy o f  rebu tting  evidence. Sec 
tairweather v. Si. Marybone Property Co. Ltd., (19631 A .C . S10; Ashton v.
Stook (1877), 6  C h .D . 719; and  Wild v. Holt (1842), 11 L .J . Ex. 285
2. M ainga, Bulozi Under the Luyana Kings, 1973, p. 182.
3. C ited by C ap lin , A Political History o f  Barotseland 1878-1965, L ondon  U niversi­
ty . P h .D ., thesis, 1968, p . 147. T he ch ief denounced  C oillard  as a  lia r, secret agent 
;m d, th ief.
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same thing as the British government and was no more than a mining 
Company, and informed Lewanika about his findings.4 The 
Chief instructed Middleton to write to the Queen. The letter dated 27 Oc­
tober, 18905 denounced the Lochner concession on the ground that: (a) 
the objects of the Company were not explained to Lewanika; (b) that 
Lewanika, being illiterate, could not read his copy of the concession; (c) 
that the terms of the written agreements were opposed to his wishes and 
those of his people; (d) that he was opposed to granting any monopoly 
and the ceding of his country in perpetuity with sole, absolute and 
perpetual rights of administration commerce, industry and entire natural 
resources to a commercial association, and that he never realised that the 
document he was signing was nothing less than that: (e) that Lochner 
pretended to be an envoy of the Queen and threatened him that his 
refusal to sign the concession would entail trouble and the Queen would 
compel him to enter into a treaty and (f) that Lewanika signed the docu­
ment under the impression that it would secure him personal protection 
of the Queen and the British government.
The letter further stated that since the concessions were obtained under 
misrepresentation and insufficient explanation Lewanika was cancelling 
the concessions. In the same letter, the Chief repudiated the Ware con­
cession and alleged that he had only given Ware permission to search for 
gold in the Batoka country and the concession was subject to an agree­
ment that if and when gold was discovered the Chief would determine the 
mining area. The Chief then expressed his indignation at the sweeping 
nature of the agreements and the very exclusive terms of the rights stated 
to have been conceded by him to the Company. Thus, it would appear 
both parties to these concessions, soon after their conclusion, were giving 
the documents different interpretations as to what they purported to
Ibid.
5. Letter reprinted in Baxter, ‘The Barotse Concession’, (1952) 2 Northern Rhodesia 
Journal, p .44
stand for and convey. Company officials dismissed this letter as having 
been the work of Middleton,6 but later events seem to suggest that
Lewanika had something to do with the letter himself. In November, 
1890, he sent another letter to the Queen, the main part of which was a 
request for British protection, but part of the letter denied the granting 
of the concession that had been obtained from him. The relevant part of 
it read:
I was told that the said Company was known to the 
Queen and her government and had received such 
powers that any treaty or alliance I made was in the 
light of as good as a treaty or an alliance made with your Ma­
jesty’s government. On the strength of this, I had no hesitation in 
conceding to them the whole of my country.
What I wanted was not money but protection, not 
the protection of a mining and mercantile company, 
nothing else, it is because the Company made use of 
the Queen’s name that they won my consent to 
make the concessions of my country to them.7
In this letter Lewanika went on to express his fears about what would 
happen if his people came to know about these concessions, which sug­
gested that his people might not have been as well consulted as had been 
suggested by the Company.
The letter of 27 October was not replied to but that of November was 
answered by the British High Commissioner for Bechuanaland. In this 
reply Lewanika was told that the Company was acting under a royal 
charter and that he was under British protection.8 This advice appears to 
have been given despite the earlier admission by the British government 
that the situation was otherwise and that Lochner in his negotiations did 
use the Queen’s name improperly.9
6. Ibid.
7. Letter from Lewanika to the Queen, 1 November, 1890, in No. 119 F.O. con. 
6178. Letter also reprinted in Baxter, supra, p.47.
8. Baxter, supra, p.47
9. See p .32
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The Settlers and the Concessions
When the 1912 Mining Proclamation was being drawn up, the British 
South Africa Company suggested the inclusion of a preamble which ap­
pears to have been intended to give statutory backing to its claims to 
mineral rights.10 The settler representatives questioned the need for a 
preamble and alleged that it was an attempt by the company to secure its 
claims to mineral rights.11 The colonial office appears to have wanted to 
avoid the inclusion of the preamble,12 although with the insistence of the 
Company, a preamble was indeed included.
Continued protests against the Company’s claims led in 1920 to the 
Secretary of State asking the Law Officers for an opinion on whether or 
not the Company was right in its claims that the mineral rights of the ter­
ritory belonged to it by virtue of the concessions obtained from native 
chiefs.13 The Law Officers advised on 19 June, 1920, that the Company 
was indeed right in its contention with regard to mineral rights.14 
Because of the summary nature of the opinion, it is not possible to 
discuss it any further.
In the same year settlers took up the matter with the British govern­
ment, they argued that on economic grounds the lard  and minerals of 
Northern Rhodesia belonged to the Crown and should be used for the 
benefit of the country.15 This was expressed later in a resolution passed 
in June of 1920 requesting the British government to refer the question of 
ownership of mineral rights to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council.16 They also sent a petition to the Queen asking her to use her in­
fluence to restore the mineral rightsofN orthern Rhodesia to the people
10. Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial and 
Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia, 1938 Colonial No. 143, p .301. Also see 
letter from the Company to the Colonial Office, 13 Feb., 1911. It categorically 
stated that they intended to have a mining law which reinforced its claims, C.O. 
417-506
11. The Pim Report, ibid.
12. C.O. 417-506.
13. Letter from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Law Officers, 6 May, 
1920, C.O. 795-95.
14. Report o f the Law Officers, 19 June, C.O. 795-95
15. The Pim Report, supra.
16. It was passed on the 29 June. It read ‘This Council, after consideration o f your... 
advises that the whole question of ownership of the land and mineral rights in 
Northern Rhodesia be submitted without delay to the Judicial Committee of His 
Majesty’s Privy Council’, see Letter from the High Commissioner to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 September, 1920, African South No. 162
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of the country.17 At this stage the reaction of the Company was that the 
position was covered by the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council of 
1911, which it stated recognised the continued existence and validity of 
its concessions explicitly by the reference to them in section 40 of the 
Order in Council18 This it is submitted was wrong in that section 40 
vested the land and mineral rights in the Company as administrator and 
clearly this was enough to sustain its claim that it owned the rights in its 
private commercial capacity.19
In response to the settlers’ protests, Mr Winston Churchill, then 
Colonial Secretary, in 1921 appointed an advisory committee under Lord 
Buxton, to inquire into the position of the Company in both the 
Rhodesias.20 In its report the Committee recommended among other 
things that the question of the Company’s claim to mineral rights should 
be referred to the Privy Council for determination and expressed its own 
doubts about the validity of the Company’s claims.21 It emphasised that 
because of the number of interests involved and the obscurity and com­
plexity of the position it was imperative to have a decision which would 
finally bind all parties and acknowledged that such a settlement could in 
the nature of the case only be obtained through a legal decision which 
would not be open to challenge. This conclusion by the Committee was 
reached after a careful consideration of the full documentary informa­
tion supplied to it by the Colonial Office and the Company, and the 
hearing of witnesses including the chairman of the Company.22
The Company’s Attitude to a Reference to the Privy Council
The Company, while agreeing that an authoritative decision was 
necessary, did not consider that a reference to the Privy Council was re­
quired and suggested instead that in order to avoid long and expensive 
legal proceedings its claims should be settled by agreement with the
17. Pim Report, supra.
18. Letter from the Company to the Colonial Office, 1 December, 1920 African 
South No. 164.
19. In any case in R.v. McCaulay, 11920], A.C. 715, it was held that rights cannot be 
separately enjoyed where, they are in 'in addition to ’.
20. Report of the Committee Appointed by the Secretary for the Colonies to 
ConsiderCertain Questions Relating to Rhodesia, Cmd, 1471, 1921. Throughout 
this study it is referred to as the Buxton Commission.
21. Ibid, clause 12.
22. This is expressly stated in the introductory part of the Report, Ibid., p i.
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Crown.23 The basis of this argument was an earlier reference to the Privy 
Council of a Southern Rhodesian land case. The long delay which occur- 
ed in the Southern Rhodesian reference was in great part due to the war 
which broke out just as the proceedings began and there was no reason 
why the Northern Rhodesian case could not be disposed of far more 
rapidly. In any case settlement on the lines suggested by the company as 
the report of the committee pointed out would have been ignoring vitally 
interested parties such as the local population whose opinion on the mat­
ter was more important than any time that would be saved.
The British South Africa Company, it would appear, was not anxious 
to have the matter adjudicated upon by the Privy Council because on the 
basis of the Southern Rhodesian experience it was not confident about 
the outcome of such a reference.24 There the Company had claimed that it 
owned land on the basis of a land concession granted to Lippert by Chief 
Lobengula as referred to already. On 17 April, 1914, the Legislative 
Council of Southern Rhodesia passed resolutions to the effect that: (a) 
the ownership of the unalienated land in Southern Rhodesia was not 
vested in and was never acquired by the British South Africa Company as 
its commercial or private property, hence any powers conferred on the 
Company in respect of land in Southern Rhodesia was conferred on it as 
administrator of the territory for the time being; (b) that if by the 
exercise of powers conferred on it in respect of land, the Company 
acquired ownership of the land, such ownership was so vested in it as an 
administrative and public asset only, and the Company other than in its 
capacity as a government and administration nad no title to the lands or 
to any revenues derived therefrom and (c) that on the Company ceasing 
to be the government and administration of the territory, all unalienated 
land at such time should be the property of the government and its 
possession and administration should pass to such government as public 
domain.25 The Colonial Office by Order in Council dated 16 July, 1914, 
referred the resolutions to the Privy Council and asked it to ascertain
23. Letter from the Company to the Colonial Office, 30 November, 1920, Buxton 
commission Report, Annexure vol. 147, 1921. See also Memorandum forwarded 
by the British South Africa Company on 3 March, 1921, The Rhodesian 
Problem, C.O. 879. African South No. 120, p.274.
24. In re Southern Rhodesia, 11919J, A.C.211
23. Ibid., pp.229-230
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whether the contentions were well founded.26 The Privy Council affirm­
ed the first and second resolutions and denied the third. TheCompany’s 
claim was refused even in respect of land of which it had made grants to 
itself. The Privy Council took the view that the Lippert concession was a 
personal contract between Lobengula and the Company though entered 
into by the concessionaire with the Paramount Chief and stated further 
that:
Like other legal documents, its effects must depend 
upon the construction of its terms according to 
ordinary legal rules; it is indeed of importance to 
the Company’s case largely because it confers private 
rights, and it is not in any sense a mere public act or 
act of State.27
This decision seems to have influenced the attitudes of the Company to 
the question of referring the mineral rights dispute to the Privy Council. 
It can be said to have thrown some light on the likely position in Zam­
bia.28 Although the problem concerned land rights, it had great 
similarities to the mineral position in Zambia. The Lippert concession in 
its terms was very similar to the Lewanika concessions, the only diffe­
rence being that it purported to have conveyed land rights and not 
mineral rights as was the case with the Lewanika concessions. Another 
fundamental point in common between the 1914 questions and the ones 
relating to minerals was that there was no express grant of land or 
mineral rights by the Crown to the Company. Indeed there was nothing 
that could be in, any way construed as an implied grant, and the Privy 
Council expressly refused to accept the argument that by his mineral and 
land concessions Lobengula had sold his country out and out.
The Company’s counsel in his argument in the case stated that the 
Company owned the whole of the land under the concession from 
Lobengula, just as it held the minerals29 — which implied that he pro­
ceeded on the basis that the Company’s land rights and its mineral rights 
stood or fell together. The Judicial Committee decided that land
26. Ib id .
27. Ib id ., p e r L o n d o n  S um m er, p .236.
28. It has im pliedly been acknow ledged by C om pany  officials th a t the  circum stances 
were so very sim ilar tha t the re  was a high p robab ility  o f  an  un fav o u rab le  deci­
sion , See W illiam s, Mining Law o f  Northern Rhodesia, 1963, p . 150.
29. In re Southern Rhodesia, su p ra , p .236.
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belonged to the Crown by reason of conquest. In Zambia, as there was 
no conquest, there was a distinct possibility that the Privy Council could 
reach a conclusion that the land and minerals still belonged to the native 
population. The Company denied that its concessions in Northern 
Rhodesia were open to the same objections as urged against the Lippert 
concessions in Southern Rhodesia since the Company argued, these con­
tained ample provision for the protection and benefit of the subjects of 
the chiefs, both with regard to land and minerals. Apparent is the fact 
that about this time the Company began to argue that what it had 
acquired was not title to minerals but a title to mineral rights, i.e., right 
to authorising the mining and taking away of minerals over the whole 
territory. In the context of the Southern Rhodesia case the analogy 
would be to argue that what they had acquired was not land, a matter 
which was adjudicated upon, but rights to the use ofi the land. And the 
Company started to assert more forcefully that whatever it had acquired 
in the concessions was of no practical importance as legislation had sup­
plemented and completed the Company’s title.30
The recommendation of the Buxton Committee was accepted by the 
Colonial Office.31 And its implementation got as far as the drawing up 
of questions to be presented to the Privy Council.32 However, the deci­
sion by the Colonial Office was strongly opposed by the Company,33 but 
was welcomed locally by settlers and by Yeta, the new Barotse Chief, 
who immediately requested that the natives be given a chance to present 
their case and pointed out that it would be a great injustice if this was not 
done.34 For hitherto unclear reasons, the Colonial Office did not act 
further on the recommendation. No information is available in Zambia 
or publicly elsewhere about the negotiations between the Company and
30. Williams, supra p. 150
31. Letter from the Secretary of State to the High Commissioner, 15 August, 1921, 
which read, *1 am now able to state that Her Majesty’s government has accepted 
the Report of the Buxton Committee on Northern Rhodesia. Further, I am mak­
ing arrangements for a reference to the judicial Committee of the Privy Council’, 
in African South 1083-1096. 120.
32. The question drafted read ‘Whether the British South Africa Company in its 
commercial capacity is entitled for its own benefit to the whole or any part of the 
mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia’, see letter from the Colonial Secretary to the 
Company, African South No. 172.
33. Letter from the Company, to the Colonial Office, 15 October, 1922. It read... ‘It 
would surely be an unprecedented course for the Crown to commit itself to 
embarking on costly litigation without knowing that any dispute exists for a legal 
tribunal to decide.’ African South No. 148.
34. Letter from Yeta to High Commissioner for South Africa, 22 March, 1922, 
African South No. 189. See also Yeta’s letter to Churchill, Colonial Secretary, 10 
October, 1922. African South No. 190.
44
the Colonial Office which preceded it or the reason which led to the 
reversal of Mr Churchill’s earlier decision that the matter should go to 
the Privy Council. But the failure to act is widely attributed to the 
Company’s influence over the Colonial Office.35 After the 1922 election, 
Churchill left the Colonial Office and was succeeded by Mr Ormsby- 
Gore, a friend and relation by marriage of the British South Africa 
Company chairman of the time, Sir Dougal Malcolm. The new Colonial 
Secretary closed the matter and dropped the reference to the Privy 
Council.
The other recommendation of the Buxton Commission was that 
Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia should be administered 
directly by the Crown.36 As a result of this the Company put forward 
proposals for a comprehensive settlement covering both Rhodesias. It 
included one that the Company should be recognised as owning the 
mineral rights it acquired in Northern Rhodesia.37 In return the 
Company volunteered to relinquish its powers of government but wanted 
to be reimbursed for its administrative expenses over the years.38 The 
Colonial Office accepted the proposals and the Company was paid £33/4 
million. The Colonial Office recognised its claims to mineral rights based 
on the concessions it obtained from African chiefs and embodied the 
recognition in the Devonshire agreement of 1923,39 which was later put 
into force by the 1924 Northern Rhodesia Order in Council.40
1938 Yeta Agreement
When Lewanika died he was succeeded by Yeta, who continued to pro­
test about the concessions. In both 1921 and 1923 he sent vigorous peti­
tions to the Colonial Office demanding that the Company should
35. Hall, supra, p.40. See also Northern Rhodesia Government, The British South 
Africa Company’s Claims to Mineral Royalties in Northern Rhodesia, Rhodeisa 
(White Paper), 1964, pp.24-25.
36. Buxton Commission Report, supra, clause 12.
37. Letter from Colonial Office to British South Africa company. Letter N o.l,
10 July, 1923, Cmd., 1924.
38. See correspondence Regarding a Proposed Settlement of Various Outstanding 
Questions Relating to the British South Africa Company’s Position in Southern 
and Northern Rhodesia, July, Cmd, 1914.
39. Agreement between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the British South 
Africa Company for the settlement of outstanding questions relating to Southern 
and Northern Rhodesia, 29 September, 1923, Cmd, 1924, clause (g).
40. Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924.
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relinguish its claims to mineral rights.41 In them he argued that the Company 
had been given mineral rights in their capacity as a government of the day 
and not as a private company in a commercial sense. He stated:
We were assured that whatever (dealings we were 
going to make with the Company would be regarded 
as being made with Her majesty and her imperial 
government, and what surprises us today is this that 
the Company claims that all rigHts granted to it have 
been granted td it as a commercial concern, and 
not as agent for the Crown.42
In 1926 Yeta challenged the Company’s claims. He granted Minerals 
Separation Ltd., the right to  prospect and work for minerals for five 
years in the Kashendeko area, and the Dongwe Lalafuta area o f Zam­
bia.43 This grant was ratified by the Colonial Office and the Northern 
Rhodesia· government in 1929. The British South Africa Company 
brought an action in the High Court o f Northern Rhodesia against Yeta 
and Minerals Separation Ltd. The Company claimed that the Chief was 
not entitled to  grant prospecting rights in any area covered by the conces­
sions o f 1900 and 1909, and that consequently the 1926 grants to 
Minerals Separation Ltd., were void. Later the Company proposed a 
settlement out o f court. This led to the 1938 British South Africa Com­
pany and Barotsdand Agreement,44 in which the Company and the 
Chief agreed that the company recognises: (a) the sole and exclusive right 
to minerals belonging to  the Barotse Chief and Council in two areas of 
land totalling about 10,400 square kilometres which the Company had 
agreed under the 1900 concession to devote to the exclusive use of the 
Chief and his people, provided, however, that in these latter areas there 
should be no alienation o f the mineral rights to any third party unless 
and until the Company had approved in writing the terms to be offered 
to such third party; (b) within the remainder of the areas reserved from 
prospecting under the concessions of 1900 and 1909, the sole and ex-
41. Africm  Sthgk N 6 .113. The protest! were written with the bdp of counciUon * 
win were aHfe when the concession« were drawn up.
42. Letter from Yeta to Colond Flair, Resident Commissioner, C.O. 795-95.
43. The information on this dispute is based on letters hi C.O. 795-95.
44. Agnssaant between the British South Africa Company and Yeta and Members of 
the Barotse Council and Others, 12 August, 193«, C.O. 795-95.
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elusive right to minerals was to be vested in the Company but no 
prospecting or mining was to take place without the consent of the Chief 
or his successors, to which consent he could attach any conditions he 
pleased regarding royalties; (c) The Dongwe Lalafuta concession was 
declared void, but the British South Africa Company, with Yeta’s con­
sent, were to make a new and similar grant for a period not exceeding 
five years in the same area, to Minerals Separation Ltd., if it applied for 
such a grant within two years, from the date of the agreement with 
royalties o f £2.50 per annum payable to be received by the British South 
Africa Company but to be transmitted to Yeta, and (d) in the rest of the 
territory covered by the concessions of 1900 and 1909, the sole and ex­
clusive rights of minerals were to be vested in the British South Africa 
Company as a result of the agreement judgement was entered in the High 
Court by consent in favour of the company on 1 March, 1938.45
The Agreement made no attempt to define the extent of the areas 
covered by the 1900 concessions. Though a map was attached, it was 
agreed that no inference was to be drawn from it to the extent of the 
Lewanika concessions of 1900 and 1909 and that no admission was made 
as to the accuracy o f the map in the agreement.46 During these negotia­
tions, Yeta appears to have desired legal advice but this he does not seem 
to have got as the Colonial Office had stated earlier that:
it is an invariable rule that when a native chief is 
received by the High Commissioner he should be 
accompanied only by his own followers and a 
representative o f the government.47
This agreement seems to be another instance of the Company’s insistence 
on settling the question out o f court. In practice Yeta exercised the rights 
he wanted to, as the prospecting grant to Minerals Separation Ltd., was 
re-issued and the royalty payment were payable to him and not to the 
British South Africa Company.
43. It should be noticed that the court in this conient judgment declared that what
the Company held was the sole exclusive right to the •minerals', which is contrary
to the views expressed above by the Company regarding the character of those 
rights. See Williams, The Mining Law o f  Northern Rhodesia, supra, p.5.
46. Letter from Colonial Office to British South Africa Company, C.O. 795-95.
47. In 1921 Yet* had written to Prince Connaught asking that he be accompanied by 
legal advisers in such matters. See Letter 30 March 1921, C.O. 417-283 but Gover­
nor Stanley replied in the terms mentioned in the text. See Stanley to Yeta,
30 March. 1921, C.O. 4I7-6J9.
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The Legislative Council, Governor Young, and the Company’s Claims
The Legislative Council
In 1924, with the end of the Company’s rule in Northern Rhodesia, a 
Legislative Council was instituted in the territory in an attempt to give 
settlers a say in the running of the country. It quickly became the centre 
of opposition to the Company’s continued ownership of mineral rights. 
On 20 July, 1927, a motion demanding the investigation of the matter 
was introduced.48 In support of the motion it was charged that the claims 
were baseless as the concessions obtained from African chiefs were even 
on the lowest form of reasoning inequitable. It was complained that the 
price alleged to have been paid for the acquisition of the rights and the 
administrative duties performed were not commensurate with the rights 
given, and doubts were expressed about the areas the concessions 
covered. The Governor defended the Company’s claims and stated that 
the concessions, having been recognised by the Colonial Office in 1923, 
could not be challenged.49 He believed that they could be challenged only 
if it appeared that a considerable portion of the territory was not covered 
by the concessions of which the Colonial Office had taken cognisance. 
He discouraged Council members from raising doubts about the con­
cessions as they would have the effect of raising doubt as to the validity 
of the mining rights given to the developing companies and could 
discourage the flow of capital into the country. This was not a very 
accurate statement of the problem, as what was-at issue had little to do 
with operating mines. The Company itself was not directly concerned 
with mineral production. The issue was as to who was supposed to be 
issuing permits allowing others to engage in mining operations and more 
important to whom the royalty was payable i.e., to the Company or to 
the country in which the minerals were located.50
48. The motion was introduced by Mr Strike. It read, ‘that the claims of the British 
South Africa Company to the mineral rights in this territory call for a searching 
investigation by the government.’ See Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council 
Debates, July, 1927 p. 164
49. Ibid., p. 169. This was Governor Maxwell.
50. In fact later on one of the leading Mining groups in the country, Anglo-American 
Corporation Ltd., publicly supported the government efforts to recover the 
rights. See Chairman’s remarks, Annua! Stockholders Meeting, 7 May, 1964.
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In the 1930s interest in the mineral rights rose sharply. The mining 
industry was becoming prosperous and this made the practical meaning 
of the Company’s claims obvious in that the mining companies began to 
pay royalties on a handsome scale.51 In 1937 Stephenson, one of the 
earliest Company administrators, published his autobiography.52 In it he 
vehemently challenged the Company’s claims and was particularly 
scatching about the concessions obtained by Thomson in 1890 in an area 
where he had personally run up the Union Jack less than a decade later. 
In 1938 Sir Alan Pim was invited to Northern Rhodesia to examine the 
financial situation in the territory. In his report he complained of the fact 
that at a time when the country lacked money, a private company was 
reaping thousands of pounds on the basis of what he termed ques­
tionable concessions.53 During this period attacks on the Company and 
demands for a judicial inquiry continued unabated in the legislative 
council.54
Governor Young and the claims
These events, and the convictions of the Governor of the territory in the 
thirties, Sir Hubert Young, led to the biggest threat to the Company’s 
claims and to a reference of the problem to the Law Officers for an 
opinion. Sir Hubert became convinced that it could not be right for a 
private company to retain in perpetuity the entire mineral rights over the 
territory, and that if the claims were not right in law, he as governor 
would be failing in his duty be acquiescing in the existing position.55 He 
first made approaches to the Company but was not successful. Then he 
initiated in Lusaka a research exercise, after which he came to the conclu­
sion that the Company had no legal title to the minerals of Northern 
Rhodesia. Thus by August 1937 he sent a dispatch to the Colonial 
Secretary, Ormsby-Gore.56 In it he argued that the concessions did not
51 In 1936 [hey paid £13,000 and in 1937 £31,000 to the Company in royalties, See 
Colonial Office Report fo r  1936 and 1937.
52. Stephenson, Chimpula’s Tale, 1937, p.30.
53. The Pirn Report, supra, p .135.
54. On 14 October, 1936, Mr Moor complained that it was unjustifiable that the 
countryishould lack money simply because the British South Africa Company was 
exporting the money to shareholders. See Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council 
Debates, October, 1936, p.97.
55. Governor Young’s letter to Colonial Secretary Ormsby-Gore, 19 March, 1938, 
C.o. 795-95, File No. 45105.
56. Governor Young’s letter to Ormsby-Gore, the Colonial Secretary, 21 April, 1937, 
C.O. 795-95. File No. 45105.
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cover the whole country; that prior to 1923 it was not the intention of the 
British government to recognise the mineral rights of the Company in 
any area covered either by the Lewanika concessions or the certificates of 
claim and that in consequence the British government was not bound by 
the 1923 agreement to recognise the mineral rights of the Company in 
any area of Northern Rhodesia which was not covered either by the 
Lewanika concessions or the certificates of claim. He also argued that in 
ratifying the Lewanika concessions of 1900 it was the intention of the 
British government that this concession should extend only over the area 
of Lewanika’s dominion, whatever that area might be, and not over 
areas in which Lewanika did not then exercise and had never in the past 
exercised suzerainty. Further that the boundary drawn in the Order in 
Council of 1899 was not the boundary of Lewanika’s dominions and that 
Barotseland, North-Western Rhodesia, as so defined, included con­
siderable areas in which Lewanika did not exercise and had never in the 
past exercised suzerainty; and further argued that in approving the exten­
sion of Barotseland, North-Western Rhodesia in 1905 the British govern­
ment did not intend Lewanika’s suzerainty over areas in which he did not 
then exercise and had never previously exercised suzerainty. Also that in 
approving the additional concessions of 1906 and 1909, the British 
government did not intend to do more than acquiesce in the renunciation by 
Lewanika to the Company in its administrative capacity of any claim to 
ownership of land in areas other than the Barotse reserve in which he had at 
one time exercised suzerainty. On the question of the 1912 Mining Pro­
clamation and 1923 agreements, Young argued that they only confirmed the 
Company’s mineral rights in the areas covered by the concessions; and fur­
ther alleged that during the 20 years from 1890 to 1910 the Company had 
pursued a deliberate policy of building its title to the mineral rights over 
areas not in reality covered by the concessions. He also suggested that the 
true facts were not known by the Colonial Office and that the 1923 negotia­
tions were not therefore fully informed of the position.
The Colonial O ffice’s reaction
In reply to Sir Hubert Young, the Colonial Secretary57 stated that he was 
not prepared to re-open the question of the title of the British South
57. O rm sby-G ore  to  Y oung, 28 Jan u a ry , 1938, C .O . 795-95, File N o. 4$ 105.
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Africa Company to the ownership of the mineral rights throughout 
Northern Rhodesia. Its ownership, he argued, had in practice been 
recognised ever since the Company first administered the country by the 
general public and by all persons and companies engaged in mining 
enterprises by previous Governors of the country, and by successive 
Secretaries of State for the Colonies. It had, he continued, been em­
bodied in the statute law of the territory at least since 1912, in the 
preamble to the Mining Proclamation of that year, which received the 
approval of the Secretary of State and that it was finally recognised in the 
1923 agreement. He further argued that at the 1923 conference, the 
Colonial Office did not question that the Lewanika concessions extended 
as far east as the Kafue river. And as the rest ot the territory was 
covered by the concessions approved in the certificate of claims issued by 
Sir Harry Johnson, this the Colonial Secretary argued was tantamount to 
an acceptance of the view that the Company had acquired under the con­
cessions mineral rights extending over the whole of Northern Rhodesia, 
with certain exceptions previously referred to in the agreement, as finally 
signed. The Crown recognised the Company as the owner of the mineral 
rights acquired by virtue of the concessions. The Colon.al Secretary 
further argued that the words ‘Mineral rights acquired’ in clause (g) of 
the 1923 agreement meant rights which the Company had de facto  ac­
quired and which it claimed to have acquired and not rights which it 
could show to have properly acquired.
On the Colonial Secretary’s arguments concerning the 1923 agree­
ment, one could still submit that it is unlikely that it was the intention ot 
the British government to recognise the Company’s rights despite· the ac­
tual legal position. Further, if the intention was otherwise, it is difficult 
to justify why different words were used for a similar situation in the case 
of Southern Rhodesia, where no reference, whatsoever was made to the 
concessions and the 1923 agreement simply read:
Subject to the laws in force for the time being in 
Southern Rhodesia the Crown recognises the 
Company as the owner of the mineral rights throughout 
that territory save so far as the Company has by its 
own acts parted with such rights.58
58. See the Devonshire agreement, supra, clause (h)
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In any case the 1923 agreement and the subsequent legislation passed to 
enforce it, in no way deal with the question of the areas not covered by 
the Lewanika and Johnson treaties. The Colonial Secretary’s view of the 
issue does not appear to have been the consistent Colonial Office’s view. 
Its representative at the negotiations in 1933 for the new mining law 
stated:
If doubt existed as to whether the ownership of all 
minerals had in fact, passed under the concessions 
then mere confirmation by the Secretary o f State 
of these concessions could not in anyway clear up that 
doubt or enlarge the terms of the concessions 
themselves.
In his arguments concerning recognition, the Colonial Secretary seems to 
have made one fundamental mistake in interpreting the purpose o f the 
recognition of the concessions in 1901 and 1894. The letters of the Com­
pany applying for recognition of the concessions entered into in 
Barotseland in 1900 were for recognition of the Lewanika concessions,59 
and the approval letter of 23 November, 190160 was directed at the con­
cession. The same situation prevailed in the North-Eastern part of the 
country, in the letter from the Company, dated 11 April, 1894, applying 
for the recognition of its North-Eastern concessions. Although in the 
Company’s letter of 9 June, 1910, and that of 30 November, 1920, to the 
Colonial Office, the Company treats the certificates of claims issued by 
Sir Harry Johnson and not the original treaties as the governing 
documents,61 in the agreement of 24 November, 1924 it is the conces­
sions which were confirmed.62 With regard to his argument concerning 
the Johnson certificates, it is also unlikely that these certificates in 
themselves could be regarded as the source of title since even on their 
face value there are many contradictions inherent in them. Some of the 
treaties referred to in certificate of claim A made no reference to mineral 
rights but granted ‘all commercial privileges of whatever kind,63 but cer­
tificate of claim A itself, under which these treaties were confirmed,
59. Letter from British South Africa Company to Colonial Office, 11 April, 1894,
African South No. 948
60. Letter from Colonial Office to British South Africa Company, 30 November,
1901, African South No. 948.
61. See letters in African South No. 948.
62. Devonshire agreement, supra. Clause (g)
63. E.g, concession granted by Chief Ntara.
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described the Company as claiming to have obtained inter alia the 
exclusive mineral rights under these and the remaining treaties and 
recognised by it.64 The certificates of claim covering the Company’s 
freehold areas in the extreme north of North-Eastern Rhodesia, certi­
ficates E,F, and K, made no mention of mineral rights, but merely 
recognised the claim of the African Lakes Company to have acquired the 
three estates in fee simple. But each of the three deeds of sale confirmed 
by the certificates granted mineral rights to the Company.65 In some 
certificates only tribes are mentioned with no reference to areas.66 It 
seems unlikely that such certificates can be a source of what is not 
granted in the documents they purport to approve. To assume this is the 
case is to accept that in the construction of the true nature of the rights 
acquired by the Company, the meaning of the document by which the 
Company claimed the rights is irrelevant, a legally unacceptable 
proposition.
The Colonial Secretary’s argument that areas not covered by the 
Lewanika concessions were covered by the Johnson treaties, without 
specifying which particular certificate of claim, suggested that Lewanika 
and the23 chiefs cited as having granted mineral rights in the certificates 
of claim A and B were the only chiefs who could claim the whole body of 
minerals within the limits of Zambia, a country with 73 tribes, each with 
its own chief. How one becomes a chief of a particular area is a legal 
question and who is chief at a given time is a question of fact. The first of 
these questions is one strictly controlled by the customary law of the 
area.67
A chief could only act as an agent of his tribe. At common law in case 
of agent-principal situations, it is necessary that such authority be 
lawful. Where, however, authority though not legally conferred is held 
to bind another, it is only when the other has so acted as from his words 
or conduct to lead another to believe that he has appointed the person 
exercising the authority to act as his agent or that he has authority from 
him, and not where the purchaser has clothed the agent with such 
authority.68 And the principal has to act in such a way that
64. See certificate o f claim A
63. See ZA/9 File No. 35 (National Archives), Lusaka.
66. Concession granted by Katara, Ibid.
67. See Goldin and Gelfand, African Law and Custom in Rhodesia, 1975. Chapter 3 
and 5 discuss chiefs and traditional government.
68. Fuller v. Giyn Mills and Company [1914] 2 K.B. 211. See also Spiro v Lintern 
[1973] 3 All E.R. 319.
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reasonable man would take the representation to be true and believe that 
he was intended to act on it.69 Where no such authority could be implied 
the contract is not binding on the principal.70 Some of the conditions 
imposed by the concessions and the certificates of claim were altered 
without any reference at all to the chiefs involved in the transactions. 
Certificates A and B imposed the payment of 1 % royalties to chiefs as a 
condition in 1893 for the recognition by the Crown of the then existing 
treaties with the native chiefs in that area and several of the concessions 
obtained provided for the payment of varying sums of royalty. In 1911 it 
was agreed between the Crown and the Company that the royalty should 
be treated as administrative revenue and that half these fees should be 
paid for the benefit of the natives on commutation of the 1% payable 
under the certificates of claim and concessions.71
At common law, a contract in writing cannot be altered by one party 
without the conscnt of the other. It can only be modified with the con­
sent of both parties.72 Where a variation which is inconsistent with the 
terms of the contracts is made by consent, this amounts to a new agree­
ment which supersedes the original contract.73 Any contracts subse­
quently carried against these rules remains unaltered.74 Thus, the changes 
seem to have violated the original concessions.
Sir Hurbert Young, even after the Colonial Secretary’s reply, insisted 
on a reference to the Privy Council. He stated that whether the matter 
might have been raised at the Devonshire Conference in 1923, it was not 
relevant to the issue.75 He pointed out that knowledge that the Company 
had been recognised as owner of the right did not prevent the Buxton 
Committee from recommending a judicial inquiry or the Colonial 
Secretary of the time from approving the Committee’s recommendation. 
As regards the argument of the Colonial Secretary that the Company was 
in any case the de facto  owner of the rights, Sir Hubert argued that 
although the words in the 1923 agreement meant that the Company had 
de facto  rights acquired by virtue of concessions or treaties while
69. Per Lord Cransworth in Pole v. Leask (1863), 33 L.J. Ch. 155 at pp. 161—162.
70. Llyods Bank v. Chartered Bank o f  India, Australia and China (1929) 1 K.B.40
71. C.O. 795-99.
72. Ruotor v. Bowels [1912] 2 Ch. 60.
73. Williams Brothers v. Ed. T. Agux L td  [1914] A.C. 510 at p. 527.
74. Moore v. Campbell (.USA), 10 Exch. 323.
75. Letter from Governor Young to Ormsby-Gore, Colonial Secretary 29 March, 
1938. C O. 795-90.
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they can be de facto  exercised, cannot be de facto  acquired unless they 
have been acquired de jure.16 Sir Hubert Young then suggested that the 
rights should in the event that the Colonial Office was unwilling to have a 
judicial determination of the matter, be purchased.77 This was rejected 
by the Colonial Office which argued that:
from the government’s standpoint, the purchase of the 
ownership of undiscovered minerals would mean (a) a gamble as 
there is no basis for fixing the price to be paid, (b) a heavy loan 
burden for a long period, as there would be no return at all in 
earlier years.7®
Other evidence, however, suggests that there would have been a substan­
tial economic advantage to the country. The Pim Commission’s Report 
referred to earlier summed up the condition of the country without the 
mineral rights in these words:
Government has no real policy on any of the big 
issues, and though they have money for the moment 
the prospects are uncertain and, o f course the greater 
part of what would normally be government income 
goes to the British South Africa Company; altogether it 
is a depressing place.79
But perhaps the Colonial Secretary’s insistence that nothing, should uc 
done can be explained in some notes appearing in the Colonial Office 
files which were primarily internal memorandum. In one, he stated:
As I was one of those responsible for the 1923 agreement 
I should regard it as personal breach of faith on my 
part to authorise such action.80
During all this time the British South Africa Company’s attitude was 
simply that there was nothing in the questions raised by Sir Hilbert
76. Ibid.
77. C.O. 795-99.
78. C.O. 795-95*. File No. 45105.
79. Letter from Sir Alan Pim to Mr. Boyd at Colonial Office, II September, 1937, 
C O. 795-99
80. Note by Colonial Secretary dated 28 January, 1938, C.O. 793-90.
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Young which was not considered and disposed of before the 1923 agree­
ment was concluded. The Company was nevertheless worried by Sir 
Hubert’s requests for a reference of its claims to the Privy Council. 
Behind the scenes it suggested to the Colonial Office that the questions at 
issue should be settled by discussion with Sir Hubert while he was in 
London on leave,81 and began insisting on a new mining bill in what 
seemed to be an attempt to reinforce its claims to mining rights. In the 
draft, for instance, clause 5 was designed to give the Company statutory 
title to mineral rights. But agreement on the bill could not be reached 
because of opposition from settlers and as a result the effort was 
abandoned.82
The real problem it seems was that any attempts to have the matter 
settled by a judicial inquiry were opposed by both the Company and the 
Colonial Office. Th»t the Colonial Office was inclined to the Company’s 
view can easily be gathered from the preceding discussion, and the 
Colonial office notes suggest that there was always a consideration of the 
Company's reaction before any action was taken and the Company was 
usually consulted and informed of the Colonial Office’s view on any 
niatter concerning mineral rights before even the government of the 
territory was advised of it. One of the Colonial Officials wrote the 
following note in an internal memorandum file:
Whatever the misdeeds of the Company in the 
past when building up its title to the Northern 
Rhodesian minerals we have worked amicably with 
them since the Colonial Office took over the country 
and that it would seem to be a great .mistake to 
antagonise the Company.83
Governor Young was transferred in the same capacity to Trinidad before 
the reference to the Law Officers was completed. A Colonial Office 
official showed obvious relief at his transfer when he wrote:
81. Letter from Sir Dougal Malcolm President of the Company to Sir Malcom 
MacDonald, Colonial Secretary, 19 October, 1928, C.O. 795-99.
82. Summary o f Proceedings of Conference on the Mining Law in relation to 
Forestry, 18 March, 1937 C.O. 795-88, File 45040.
83. Note signed by Mr Otmsby-Gore in C.O. 795-95, File No. 45105
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It is clear that most of the arguments so tenaciously put 
forward by Sir Hubert Young would have little chance 
of being successfully sustained in a court of law. He has 
in fact wasted a good deal of everybody’s time and it 
is perhaps as well that he is no longer in Northern 
Rhodesia to receive the news which we shall have to send.84
The 1938 Reference to the Law Officers
Factors which influenced the reference
Three factors seemed to have influenced the Colonial Office to agree to a 
reference to the Law Officers. Firstly, Governor Young’s persistence as 
already shown,85 secondly, that of the Legislative Council which was in 
1938 preparing another resolution, and thirdly, in 1938 the appointment 
of a Royal Commission to inquire into the question of amalgamating the 
two Rhodesias.86 Settlers threatened to raise the mineral rights question 
at the public hearings of the Commission. Would-be witnesses publicly 
challenged the Company’s claims.87 The Company retorted rather sur­
prisingly by asking those opposed to its claims to go to court,88 while in 
private continuing to oppose any suggestion that the matter be referred 
to the Privy Council.
Thus on 9 July, 1938, the Colonial Office referred the matter to the 
Law Officers.89 The questions put before the Law Officers were phrased 
on the basis of some of Sir Hubert Young’s arguments. The Colonial 
Office, however, also expressed opinion on the merits of each and every 
argument. It appears that by this tactic they hoped to influence the out­
come of the proceedings. A note by one of the Colonial Officials handl­
ing the matter suggests this even more when he wrote that:
84. Note by Sir Andrew Cohen, dated 26 October, 1938, in one of the files in C.O. 
795-95. File No. 45105.
85. As Gann has observed ‘Young was the type of man who would bristle and bang 
the table when he thought banging the table would do any good.’ See Gann 
supra, p.270.
86. Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission, Cmd, 5949; 1939.
87. For instance Mr Knight, a member of the legislative Council declared: ‘If I had 
my way, I would contest the claims before the Privy Council; they had never 
recognised the British South Africa claims.’ See Rhodesia Herald 19 July, 1938, 
p i
88. Ibid.
89. Reference to Law Officers, 9 July, 1938, C.O. 795-99, File No. 45105.
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The legal adviser and the department are agreed that 
this is desireable, since we should hardly be 
justified in putting Sir Hubert Young’s contentions 
without letting the Law Officers know what we think 
o f them.90
Moreover, the Colonial Office renders itself open to the suspicion that 
some of the evidence on the matter was not given to the Law Officers. 
Although this cannot be proved conclusively, in the absence of evidence 
of what was given, suspicion can be justified by the surprise expressed at 
this note in one of the Colonial Office files:
The Governor also expects us to refer to and include a 
copy of another rather damaging letter which has been 
unearthed from record.91
At the same time it must be pointed out that there was caution not to 
cause Sir Hubert Young to resign as it was thought it would be difficult 
to justify publicly why the matter was not being taken up when the 
Colonial Office was asked to do so.92 The Law Officers were requested 
to give their advice from both the strictly legal aspect and from the point 
of view of good faith. The main question put to them was to advise the 
Crown whether it could challenge the Company’s title to mineral rights 
in the territory of Northern Rhodesia in areas not covered by the 
certificate of claims issued by Johnson and the Lewanika concessions.93
Opinion o f  Law Officers
The opinion of the Law Officers was delivered on 5 October, 1938.94 
They expressed the view that the Barotseland-North Western Rhodesia
90. Note in C.O. 795-99 File No. 45105.
91. Note signed by Mr Fox, C.O. 795-99, File No. 45105.
92. Notes by Sir O. Bushe and Sir C. Parkinson, C.O. 795-99, File No. 45105.
93. Reference to Law Officers, C.O. 795-99, File No. 45105.
94. Opinion of Law Officers, C.O. 795-99, File No. 45105.
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Order in Council of 1899 was the decisive document in the matter. They 
took the position that when in 1899 Lewanika sought Queen Victoria’s 
protection and the terms of the 1900 concession were being negotiated by 
the Company, the boundaries of Lewanika’s jurisdiction were not 
known for certain. The Law Officers’ view was that the Secretary of 
State’s dispatch of August 1904 made it clear that it was intended that the 
area covered by the 1899 Order should be coterminous with lands over 
which Lewanika’s suzerainty ran, that the King of Italy’s Award deter­
mined by the western limit of the Barotse Kingdom, and that when the 
area embraced by the 1899 Order was extended in 1905 to cover the area 
of the river the transferred area in the west was confirmed as being part 
of the Barotse Kingdom. They further added that whatever might have 
since been discovered as to the real limits of Lewanika’s dominion in the 
olden days, the Crown could not go behind the 1899 Order in Council 
which from a legal point of view was as final in defining the limits of the 
Barotse Kingdom as the treaty of Versailles was final as to the bound­
aries it altered.
The Law Officers dismissed summarily the suggestion that the Crown 
was in a position to prove fraud against the Company in that certain 
documents indicated that the Company subordinated their administ­
rative duty to their commercial interests, e.g. in recommending the 1905 
extension of the area covered by the 1899 Order in Council, stating that 
even if Lewanika’s jurisdiction was assumed never to have extended over 
some parts of the country, the Crown and the Company had agreed to 
treat it as so doing in 1900; and subsequently they added that legislation 
in the territory had been based on the Company’s possession of the 
rights. Apart from the legal aspects of the question, the Law Officers felt 
that from the point of view of good faith, the Crown could not be 
justified in challenging the Company’s title, on the grounds that the 
Company was a pioneer in the area in question and that but for it and its 
activities there might well have been no Northern Rhodesia.95
Criticism o f  the Law Officers’ opinion
The question before the Law Officers was ‘whether or not the British 
government could challenge the Company position’, as such the point in 
the opinion was that the recognition in practice of the Company’s rights 
by the Colonial Office over a period of years coupled with
95. Ibid.
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specific recognition of these rights in the preamble to the 1912 Mining 
Proclamation, debarred the British government from challenging the 
Company’s rights. This did not touch on the question whether others, 
such as the natives of the country, could challenge the claims. Similarly, 
their view of the effect of the 1899 Order in Council and the 1905 exten­
sion of the area it covered treats successive statutes as fully superseding 
the true situation and thereby disposing of any doubts which might have 
existed. It is a fundamental rule of law that all statutes other those which 
are merely declaratory of which relate only to matters of procedure or of 
evidence are prima facie prospective and retrospective effect is not to be 
given to them unless by express words or necessary implication, it ap­
pears that this was the intention of the legislature.96 Transactions are 
neither invalidated by reason of their failure to comply with formal re- 
quirments subsequently imposed97 nor on the other hand, can they be 
rendered valid by subsequent relaxation of the law, whether relating to 
form or substance. Similarly legislation does not appear to have been 
held to impose new liabilities or alter the facts existing before its com­
mencement.98
The dominant purpose in construing a statute is therefore to ascertain 
the intention of the legislature. But this is only as so expressed in the 
statute to be construed.99 This intention is primarily to be sought in the 
words used in the statute itself, which must be read according to their 
ordinary grammatical sense. A statute should not be interpreted in such a 
way as to extend its operation beyond what was the plain intention of the 
legislature.100 This is so even where there is strong suspicion that the 
result of the interpretation of a statute according to its primary meaning 
is not what the legislature intended.101 For upon a finding that the words 
are precise the words speak the intention of the legislature.102 It is for the
96. Re Norman, Ex parte Board o f  Trade, [1893] 2 Q.B. 369 at p.420.
97. Hikson v. Darlow (1883), 23 Ch. 690; See also Smith v. üaflader [Ί901] A.C. at 
p. 305.
98. Croxford v. Universal Insurance Company [1936] 2 K.B. 253.
99. Pye v. Minister o f  Lands fo r  New South Wales [1954] 3 All E.R. 514 at p.254; 
See also R. v. Kuntawala 2N.R.L.R. 79.
100. Solmon and Company v. Solmon 1956 R & N 364.
101. Solmon and Company v. Solmon [1897] A.C.22
102. R.v. Cowley 1956 R. & N. 523 at p.352.
60
legislature to amend the statute construed if it finds its meaning contrary 
to its intention a Court can only substitute the clear meaning of the 
words of a statute for its own where the legislature has used language of 
the widest kind, so wide that, if its full grammatical meaning is given to 
it, the provision will produce injustice of a kind that would revolt a 
reasonable man.103 In this case the court acts upon the view that the 
legislature could not have intended to produce a result which would 
revolt the mind of any reasonable man, unless they have manifested that 
intention by express words.104 The natural interpretation of the 1899 
Order in Council would not result in palpable injustice. Besides, only 
contracts which have been entered into upon terms which are not in 
accordance with statutory provisions are automatically modified by the 
relevant statutes so as to accord with those provisions and take effect as 
if those provisions were incorporated in them,e.g. an employment con­
tract affected by minimum wages regulations. In all other cases a statute 
does not automatically modify the particular class of contracts to which 
it relates, but only confers power under which contracts of that class may 
be modified individually. The Law Officers’ interpretation of the effect 
of the 1899 Order in Council and their assertion that it was the intention 
of the legislature to alter the boundary covered by the concessions seems 
to be a violation of rules referred to here. It is also a self-defeating argu­
ment in that it amounts to saying that it was the intention of the British 
government, prior to 1923, to recognise the rights of the Company as 
having been acquired in virtue of the Lewanika concessions in any area in 
which the mineral rights had been previously acquired in virtue of the 
certificate of claim A since the area there overlaps the area covered by the 
1899 Order in Council.
The 1899 Order in Council was made at the suggestion of the Com­
pany. It was made solely for administrative and political convenience 
and did not state that it intended to revive the Barotse boundary. The 
Order’s provisions are all concerned with administrative matters, such as 
the appointment of administrators, judges, and empowering the High
103. R. v. Kuntawala 2 N.R.L.R. 79, at p .80
104. In re Brockel Bank* Export Dunn and Raeburn (1889), 23 Q.B.461, at p.462-463; 
see also Wilkes v. Goodman [1927] 2 K.B. 86
Commissioner to make proclamations for the administration of justice, 
the raising of revenue and the imposition of taxes and customs dues, 
while in fixing the boundary between the two territories the British 
government was under the impression that it was roughly describing the 
eastern boundary of Lewanika’s dominion on the information before 
them, provision was made in both the Orders for the boundary to be 
changed at any time, and in any case it could not have been the intention 
of the British government, in describing this line in the Order in Council, 
to include in Barotseland North-Western Rhodesia any areas in which 
Lewanika did not then exercise and had never in the past exercised 
suzerainty. The boundary drawn in the Order in Council of 1899 was not 
the boundary of Lewanika’s dominion, as is shown elsewhere in this 
book. But Barotseland as defined in the Order included considerable 
areas in which Lewanika did not exercise and had never exercised 
suzerainty. The delimitation of the boundary clearly had no effect on the 
actual boundaries of Barotseland and thus no effect whatsoever on the 
geographical limits of the Lewanika concessions.
In addition to the above objections to the interpretations of the 1899 
Order in Council by the Law Officers, their interpretation offends a 
fundamental rule of evidence. While a document stands and provided it 
is intelligible, it is both exclusive and conclusive as to evidence of what its 
terms are. Extrinsic facts are generally inadmissible to add to, vary or 
contradicts its terms. 105 To admit the evidence of the 1899 Order in 
Council as being available to contradict the terms of the concessions, 
would be to violate the above principle of the law of evidence and defeat 
the very evils the rules guard against,106 as it would be to substitute for 
the terms of the concessions those of a subsequent enactment on a matter 
already dealt with by the concessions. Since the terms of the 1899 Order 
in Council and those of the 1905 Order in Council and terms of the con­
cessions cannot co-exist, the subsequent alteration of the Barotse boun­
dary would have the effect of wiping out the provisions in the con­
cessions dealing with the same subject matter. Also to be kept in view the 
fact that the 1899 Order in Council and the 1905 Order in Council were 
drawn up without the participation of any of the chiefs alleged
105. Henderson v. Aurlher 11907] 1 K.B. 10; Angell v. Duke (1875), L.R. 10 Q .B . 174
106. T/iomson (Pvt) Ltd, v. Bennet (1962) K S N  689.
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to have granted the mining rights to the Company. The concessions were 
not documents handed by one party to the other as a record of what the 
Company was undertaking to do or granted. They purport to be 
'documents of both parties, and therefore no question of what the other 
party thought they meant is relevant. The opinion contradicts other legal 
advice in the Colonial records on the question of boundaries. The 
Colonial Office at a meeting to consider the country’s mining legislation 
stated that:
Our reasons for suggesting this amendment is that we 
should not like it to be put on record, even in your 
mouth, that we are aware that the extent of the 
concessions of 1900 and 1909 has never been 
definitely settled.107
As regards the Law Officers’ argument that the Company opened up 
Northern Rhodesia and as mandatories on behalf of the Crown con­
tinued to bear the burden of administration on the basis that they had, in 
the area acquired the mineral rights granted in the concessions this could 
be said of Southern Rhodesia as well. However, in the latter case the 
matter relating to land was referred to the Privy Council with little 
difficulty and the Privy Council found against the Company. What this 
amounts to is the fact that the Law Officers in fact did not examine the 
basis of the claims to mineral rights by deciding that the 1899 legislation 
put the Company in a position that it was not by the instruments by 
which it claimed those rights.
The Law Officers’ opinion compared with other opinions in other British 
Colonies
The Law Officer’s opinion on mineral rights in Zambia seems to be con­
trary to other Law Officers’ opinions in some of the countries in Africa 
where Britain had jurisdiction and similar situations arose notably in 
Botswana, South Africa and Ghana. To take the case of the then 
Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana), the British government ap­
pointed a Commission108 to inquire into a report upon alleged land and
107. Letter from Colonial Office to the British South Africa Company C.O. 795-90. 
See also Summary of Proceedings of Conference on the Mining Law in Relation 
to Foresty 18 March, 1937, C.O. 795-88, File No. 4500.
108. Commission was appointed by the Bechuanaland Protectorate Proclamation,
10 January, 1893.
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mineral grants claimed by several Europeans. The Law Officers recom­
mended to the Commission that: (a) grants of any kind made or purpor­
ting to be made by the chief alone, without the express consent of the tribe 
or council, were not valid; (b) titles granted by one chief to land in the oc­
cupation of another chief were not as a general rule valid without the ex­
press concurrence of the later, and (c) no grant was valid which had been 
obtained by fraudulent or otherwise improper means or for which 
Valuable considerations had not been given, or of which the condition 
had not been fulfilled.109 In this way several claims were invalidated by 
the commission set up to examine the concessions.110 In one case a con­
cession was invalidated on the grounds that the consideration was inade­
quate,111 while in another on the ground that the extent of the ground 
claimed was far in excess of what the chief intended to lease and included 
several tribes ruled by different chiefs,112 both grounds were advanced 
by Sir Hubert Young and other opponents of the Company’s claims.113 
The Commission also invalidated mineral rights claims on the sole 
ground that they were in the nature of monopolies, and likely to interfere 
with the practical workings, of the general or financial administration of 
any future government,114 a fact alleged in the Zambian case by several 
independent commissions referred to earlier.115
A similar policy was invoked in South Africa after the British govern­
ment annexed the territories and obliterated the sovereignty of the South 
Africa Republic. Then it asked the Law Officers to determine in what 
relation it stood to the concessions granted by the previous government 
of the state116 who advised that for the mineral and land claims to be 
valid the concessions on which they were based must have been duly 
acquired in the first instance, and also the condition of their acquisition 
must have subsequently been duly performed. Pursuant to this opinion,
109. See Correspondence Relating to Concession in Bechuanaland Protectorate 
1893-1901, Colonial, March 1903, African South No. 537.
110. The Concession between Chief of the Bangwa Ketsi and the Gesertsire Con­
cessions Syndicate was invalidated on the grounds that the Chief was ignorant of 
the true intent and purpose of the document signed by him, See Report o f the 
Commission, African South No. 537.
111. The Sebele Chief of the Baken and Allway concession, the Report o f  the 
Commission, ibid.
112. The claims by Riele and J Nicholas, Report, ibid.
113. See p .53.
114. See concession, granted by Chief Lamber o f the Koia to Duncan, see Report, 
ibid.
115. E.g. The Pim Commission, supra.
116. The Transvaal Concession Commission, 19 April, 1901, Cmd., 623, 1901.
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the Transvaal Concession Commission invalidated several mining rights 
claims.117
In the Gold Coast (Ghana) prospectors and concession hunters obtain­
ed concession from local chiefs in the second half of the 19th century. 
The Colonial Office in 1889 decided to intervene in order to protect 
through legislation, the interests of ordinary citizens and to regulate the 
mining industry of the future. It consistently pursued, from the establish­
ment of its authority over the territory, the policy of according full 
recognition to the peoples’ rights of ownership of land and minerals. It 
established a concessions’ court to which future as well as past grants by 
local chiefs were to be notified, and the court had power to certify the 
concessions valid or invalid. The conditions which were required in order 
that a certificate of validity might be issued included such matters as 
proof of express consent, or concurrence of every person whose consent 
was necessary by customary law and of adequate consideration.118
It seems the 1938 Law Officers’ opinion was enthusiastically received 
by both the Colonial Office and the British South Africa Company.119 
With it they both sought to silence the Company’s critics and took the 
unusual step of publishing in March 1939, in the Official Gazette of the 
Northern Rhodesia government a dispatch, conveying the opinion, to the 
Government of the territory from the Colonial Secretary.120 The 
dispatch explained that the Company’s claims to mineral rights were 
valid and could not be challenged, but did not reveal the substance of the 
legal opinion. It simply stated that both the Attorney-General and the 
Solicitor-General of the United Kingdom are agreed that the claims to 
the rights were valid.121
The Period Between 1938 and 1960
The Legislative Council
Just before the publication of the referred to dispatch there were renewed 
demands for the matter to be referred to the Judicial Committee of the
117. The Dvnamite Concession, Ibid.
118. See Concession Ordinace No. 14 of 1900. For.a fuller discussion of the British 
Concession policy and legislation in Ghana, see Ilegbune, British Concessions 
Policy and legislation in Southern Ghana, Ph.D thesis, London University, 1975.
119. Note by Sir Andrew Cohen in C.O. 795-99, File No.45105.
120. General Notice 118 of 1939 in the Government Gazette, Lusaka, 10 March, 1939. 
The opinion itself was not communicated.
121. The Solicitor-General was named as Sir Terence O’Connor, ibid.
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Privy Council. On 13 December the same year, a motion was moved in 
the Legislative Council, to that effect. It read:
This Council requests government to refer the 
question of the rights of the British South Africa 
Company to precious and base minerals in Northern 
Rhodesia, founded on the concessions obtained from 
Lewanika and on the certificates o f claim issued by Sir 
Harry Johnson to the Judicial Committee of His 
Majesty’s Privy Council for investigation, in order that 
a decision as to their legality may be obtained.122
In support of this motion many of the reasons discussed before were 
cited. The motion was withdrawn when members of the Council were 
informed that the matter was before the British government. However, 
the publication of the dispatch in 1938 was not the end of the matter as 
on May 17, 1941 the purchasing of the rights was again suggested.123 The 
government rejected the suggestion on the ground that the time was not 
opportune for any such venture. Southern Rhodesia, which had been in a 
similar situation, had purchased the Company’s mineral rights in 
1933.124
Four years of little or no significant activity passed before the mattei 
was again raised by Sir Roy Welensky. On 11 December, 1945, he intro 
duced a motion concerning the 1939 dispatch which read:
This Council does not accept as final the conclusions 
reached by the Secretary of State in his Dispatch 
No. 374 o f 31 December, 1938, regarding the validity 
o f the British South Africa Company’s claims to 
mineral royalties in respect of that part of the territory 
known as the Copperbelt.125
In support of his motion Sir Roy advanced more or less the same reasons 
as previously advanced by Sir Hubert Young. He suggested that the
122. Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, December, 1938, P .116. The 
motion was introduced by Captain Smith.
123. Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, May, 1941. p. 113. This was 
suggested by Captain Smith.
124. The rights were purchased in Southern Rhodesia for £2 million. See Sklar, 
Corporate Power in an African State: 1975, p.35.
125. Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, December, 1945. p. 160.
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rights should be expropriated or alternatively be purchased by the 
government. His view, however, was that in the event of the latter then it 
was the British government’s duty to pay because in his own words they 
had made more than the cost incurred out of the share of taxation they 
have gathered.126 The motion was carried on 12 December, 1945. The 
following year the dispute was referred to the Law Officers once again. 
This reference was not published and the Legislative Council was not 
informed and the result was not communicated to them. However, it 
seems the Company’s claims to the mineral rights again received support 
from the Law Officers who apparently could not be persuaded to depart 
from the opinion of their predecessors in 1938 that the validity of the 
rights could not be challenged.127 Also as a result of the 1945 resolution, 
an inquiry was set up but nothing materialised from it. This led to com­
plaints in the Legislative Council and by 22 March, 1948, another resolu­
tion was passed and phrased in similar language to its 
predecessor. 128Besides, general attacks and denunciations of the British 
government by members of the Legislative Council were made such as 
when Sir Roy stated:
1 find it difficult to express in decent English my views 
of the action of a government of that nature that they 
should sell, give, batter — or whatever you are to call 
it — the mineral wealth of a country for which they 
were the trustees.129
He was referring to the 1923 agreement. Up to this time the Company 
had made no attempts to answer its critics in the Legislative Council; but 
when, in 1949, on March 24, Sir Roy introduced a motion in the Council 
proposing the imposition of a special tax on mineral royalties,130 the 
motion provoked violent exchanges between the chairman of the Com­
pany and Sir Roy. The Company eventually made overtures to Sir Roy
126. Ibid.
127. The opinion is not yet available to the public.
128. It read ‘that the Secretary of State for the Colonies be asked to reconsider the 
decision contained in General Notice No. 118 of 1939 to the effect that the British 
South Africa Company’s claim to the mineral rights are vested in the people of 
Northern Rhodesia’, See Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates,
January, 1948, p.690.
129. Ibid., p.690.
130. The motion read, ‘in the opinion of this house the time is opportune for the 
introduction of legislation providing for the imposition of a special tax on mineral 
royalties recovered from minerals in this country’ See Northern Rhodesia 
Legislative Council Debates, March, 1949, p .670.
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and persuaded the Colonial Office to call a conference to discuss the 
matter. As a result, the Secretary of State invited the Governor of the ter­
ritory, Sir Roy Welensky, and one other member of the Legislative 
Council to a meeting in London with representatives of the Company.131
The 1950 Agreement
This led to an agreement between the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
on behalf of the British government and the Governor of Northern 
Rhodesia and the British South Africa Company. The agreement was 
formalised in 1950.132 It provided that the British South Africa Com­
pany should continue to enjoy its mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia 
for a period of thirty-seven years from 1948. The British government 
undertook to secure that any government which became responsible dur­
ing the period for the administration of Northern Rhodesia should 
become bound to the arrangement. This was designed to enable the 
British government to bind a successor government. By doing this, in a 
way, the British government could be said to have given away part of its 
protecting responsibility. There was, however, no question of the settle­
ment of the legal nature of the dispute, although this is one of the 
agreements the Company claimed confirmed the title to its claims.133
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE
The Nationalist Government and the claims
By the middle of the 1950s it became clear that should independence 
come to Northern Rhodesia the mineral rights issue would achieve 
prominence. Some time in 1956 the nationalists movement of the African 
National Congress consulted lawyers in London but owing to lack of 
funds it did not proceed. Later in 1960 the other nationalist movement,
131. C o lon ial R epo rt, N o rth ern  R hodesia , Sir Roy w as accom pan ied  by M r. Becket.
132. A greem ent w ith the  British S ou th  A frica C om pany  on  the  M inera l R ights ow ned 
by the  C om pany  in  N orth ern  R hodesia  an d  fo r th e  E ven tual T ran sfe r o f  the 
Rights to  the  N o rthern  R hodesia  G overnm ent, 1951 co lon ial N o. 272.
133. As a  result o f  the  agreem ent the  revenue o f  N o rth ern  R hodesia rose by £700,000 
in 1950 a lone . See Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, Septem ber, 
1950, p .362.
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the United National Independence Party, made it clear that when it gain­
ed power the mineral rights would be taken over.134
The question of the rights was given much publicity when in 1961 a 
local paper the Central African Mail, complained that despite exchange 
control regulations the Company, because it was registered in London, 
was still allowed to remove its royalties from the country.,35This provok­
ed the Company into publishing a rejoinder in the form of a circular and 
as an advertisement in the local press. It gave an account of the Com­
pany’s record. It claimed to be largely responsible for developing the 
Copperbelt mines. It claimed this without disclosing the amount of 
money it had put in the mining companies and the amount of money it 
had received from the mineral royalties. The Company accused its 
opponents of being communists and described the paper’s attitudes as 
part of the softening-up process in a campaign to deprive it of its legal 
rights.
The reaction of the Company was however, a tactical error for its 
defensive tone greatly encouraged its critics. Up to tha^ moment there 
had been nothing like a campaign, but one quickly followed in the 
knowledge that the Company felt vulnerable and this intensified when in 
1963 an African government was elected to power for the first time in 
Northern Rhodesia. The then Minister of Finance, who was still a 
Colonial Official, approached the Company and suggested that the 
government should: (a) buy out all the Company’s future royalties for a 
consideration comprising 50% cash and shares, and 50<7o government 
bonds payable in equal instalments over the 23 years that the 1950 agree­
ment had to run, and (b) would remit until 1986 the 80% royalty that it 
would be purchasing from the Company in exchange for an allotment of 
cash and shares by the mining companies. This offer was rejected by the 
Company.136 But towards the end of 1963 the Company became worried 
about the fate of the rights for it became obvious that the country would 
become independent the following year. In September 1963 its president 
made approaches to the government. The Company was also under 
pressure to settle from Anglo-American Corporation Ltd., partly 
because of its twenty per cent holding in the Company and the realisation 
that to win maximum compensation for the rights it was vital to secure
134. It stated in one of its policy pamphlets that ‘the mineral riches of the country 
remain... the inalienable possession o f the people’ — IVhen the United National 
Independence Party becomes Government, 1962, p.7.
135. See the Author’s Account, Halil High Price o f  Principles, 1969, p.78.
136. Faber and Potter, Towards Economic Independence, 1971 p .12.
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an agreement before the country obtained independence.
From the government’s point of view its efforts to recover the rights 
were encouraged by a United Nations report.137 In 1963 a United 
Nations mission had been asked to make a study of the country’s 
economy. In its report it was very critical of the Country’s continued 
ownership of the mineral rights. It went on to state that:
The issue of the rights of the British South Africa 
Company is essentially distinct from the question of its 
royalties, Zambians will not need in the future to obtain 
the permission of a foreign company to prospect on their 
own soil. The responsibility for shaping the exploratory 
work in the nation’s territory, and for ensuing adequate 
development of its mineral resources, should pass to the 
government after independence.138
In October 1963, negotiations were conducted between the government 
and the Company. A proposal that it transfers the mineral rights to the 
government for twenty-two years and a half annual payments amounting 
to £35 million was rejected by the Company on the grounds that it could 
not rely on an African government to honour the payments particularly 
as the British government refused to guarantee the annual payments. 
Surprisingly the Company even turned down a scheme proposed by 
Anglo-American Corporation Ltd., and Roan Selection Trust Ltd., 
which the two Companies were willing to guarantee.139
At the 1964 Constitutional Conference convened to draw the inde­
pendence constitution, nationalist representative realised that under the 
constitutional instruments whereby Northern Rhodesia was to become 
independent, the British government proposed to fulfil a pledge made to 
the Company in the 1950 agreement to ensure that the new 
Zambian government was bound to observe thfe provisions of the 1950 
agreement.140 At this point also the Central African Mail published a
137. U .N ./E .C .A ./F .A .O . Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development 
o f  Zambia, 1964.
138. Ibid., p.48.
139. For a fuller discussion of the scheme, see Faber and Potter, supra. Both authors 
worked in the Ministry o f Finance in Zambia and were closely involved in the 
dispute.
140. The first clause eventually became section 18 concerned with the protection from 
deprivation o f property in the 1964 constitution. The second became clause 17 of 
the Independence Order in Council jpy means of which ‘all rights, liabilities, and 
obligations' o f Her Majesty in respect of the territory became those of the 
President o f Zaipbia.
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series of articles in which revelations were made about the frail founda­
tions upon which the mineral rights were founded and these had a 
significant effect in that they led the government to commission an 
investigation into the validity of the Company’s claims and hence to 
jettison the idea of paying compensation. The Company, however, insi­
sted that if the rights were to be taken over, proper compensation should 
be paid. The government issued a whitepaper after its research referred 
to above was finished.141 In it the government argued that the claims 
were invalid as having been obtained by fraud in that the chiefs were 
acting under false representations made by the concession hunters to the 
effect that they represented the Queen, and also that, even if they were 
valid, on their true interpretation the concessions did not cover the 
Copperbelt.
The main thrust of the white paper was, however, that after inde­
pendence the government would not ratify nor assume the obligations 
created by the agreement. Rather it believed that it was the duty of the 
British government to extinguish before independence and without 
further liability to the Zambian government any claims which the Com­
pany might have under the 1950 agreement or any earlier agreement. The 
government attitude was reinforced by its discovery, in one of the 
colonial records accidentally left behind, a loose note which was a 
memorandum prepared for the attention of the Colonial Secretary in 
1948 which went a long way to conceding its position. It stated:
...if action had been taken at the right time there 
is little doubt that the Company would not have 
established mineral rights in these areas...142
The note went on to suggest that the responsibility for the situation as it 
existed rested entirely on the British government and that thus it should 
bear part of the purchase price when the rights were purchased. At about 
the same time as the production of the white paper, the government 
sought legal opinion from a British firm in London which advised
141. Northern Rhodesia Government, The British South Africa Company claims to 
Mineral Rights in Northern Rhodesia, supra, 1964.
142. Ibid., p .11. The note was written by Sir Andrew Cohen for the attention o f the 
British Colonial Secretary.
them that the Company’s mineral rights claims were invalid in that it 
never possessed and did not at that moment possess a legally established 
claim to the ownership of mineral rights on the Copperbelt. The opinion 
did not go into the question of the legality of the claims, but it 
considered the legality of the Company’s boundary claims, and conclud­
ed that both the 1923 and 1950 agreements alike only recognised the 
Company’s rights to the extent they already existed, that it was not the 
intention of the agreement to add to those rights, and that the Com­
pany’s claim to title had to be founded upon the original concessions and 
treaties and those did not cover the Copperbelt.
In September 1964, the Colonial Office called a conference in London 
to discuss the matter. At this conference the Northern Rhodesia govern­
ment position hardened further and its delegation refused to talk to the 
Company on the grounds that it should talk to the British government as 
it was they that had confirmed its rights, agreeing only to talk to the 
British government. They also stated that, for their part, they would not 
pay any compensation to the Company but indicated a willingness to pay 
a gesture of goodwill amounting to £2 million. This was a very significant 
drop from the original offer of £50 million. Nevertheless, the willingness 
of the government to pay any amount at all was inconsistent with its 
stand that the rights were a responsibility of the British government. 
Such a stand logically led to the need to demand a refund of money 
illegally obtained by the Company in the form of royalties. But it can be 
explained on the ground that, although the government appeared tough, 
it was worried about the image of the country and its ability to attract 
foreign investment thereafter, particularly since merchant bankers had 
advised to pay compensation as did some of its own advisers and con­
sultants. At this conference the Company lowered the amount of com­
pensation it was demanding to £15 million. Although the Lord 
Chancellor of England, who chaired the meeting, met both parties 
separately the talks ended in deadlock. As a result both the British 
government and the Company suggested that the question of the legality 
of the mineral rights should be referred to the Privy Council, a reference 
they had both schemed to prevent in the past. The Zambian government 
rejected the suggestion for the same reasons as the Company had done so 
in 1920 — that such a reference would take a long time to bring to a 
conclusion.
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After the deadlock, the Zambian government announced that in the 
absence of a settlement on its terms, it would proceed to amend the 
constitution and expropriate the mineral rights without compensation 
immediately after independence and published a bill to that effect.143 In 
this respect it seems the government would have been within its legal 
rights had it gone ahead with this action. Although the generally consis­
tent practice of states is that acquired rights must be respected by a 
successor state,144 ordinarily both international145 and domestic146 law 
recognise the right of a sovereign state to terminate concessions or con­
tracts unilaterally. A state cannot be compelled to carry on with arrange­
ments made by its predecessors which are either contrary to its public 
interests or obstructive to the realisation of its ideas of social develop­
ment. This applies to the ones in issue here, particularly in that they were 
a monopoly and the injury was aggravated by the fact that the monopoly 
was foreign. This principle is supported by the majority of leading 
writers on the subject and of world governments, and is not 
questioned by judicial decisions.147 In fact several countries ranging 
from the relatively conservative industrial states of Europe to 
underdeveloped countries of Africa have themselves used one form of 
nationalisation of concessions or another as an instrument for 
reconstructing in a substantial degree their national economies.148
Internationally, expropriation of property rights and, domestically, 
repudiation of contracts are, however, only justified when they are
The Threat to Expropriate the Rights
143. Zambian Government Gazette, Vol. 1. No. 1
144. Transvaal Commission Report, supra.
145. England cancelled concessionary interests in Tanganyika and Palestine after the 
first world war, see O'Connell, ‘Critique of the Iranian Oil Litigation’ (1955) 4 
InternationaI and comparative Law Quarterly p.267.
146. At common law a party is entitled to repudiate a contract, sucii repudiation gives 
the injured party only a right of action for damages, see Heynes v. Dixon (1900)
2 Ch. 561.
147. E.g. Company General o f  Orinoco v. Venezuela Opinion o f  Umpire Piumley, 31st 
Julv 1905, Raltons Report. French-Venezuela Mixed Claims Commission, 1902. 
d.224. Delagoa Bay Case. 11 More Int. Arbitrations, p .1191 and also Nissan v. 
Attorney-General [1970] A.C. 179.
148. Katzarov, Theory o f  Nationalisations, 1964, discusses incidents of nationalisation 
throughout the wona, p.425. See also United Nations Resolutions,
14 December, 1962, G.A. res. 1803, 17 U.N.9 A/R. supp. 17A/J0/7.
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accompanied by a recognition of the equities involved.149 What is pro­
tected is the value of the property right which Is  assessable in the uiOial 
improvement valuation manner. But it is an obvious corollary of the rule 
that the rights in question must be valid not only by reason of the acquisi­
tion in the first instance, but by reason of their conditions having subse­
quently been duly performed.150 In a case where the rights are invalid, 
cancellation without compensation appears in the absence of special 
circumstances to be legally justifiable. Special circumstances would arise 
where the rights’ holder has for instance expended the money, as in such 
a case non-payment of compensation would amount to the unjust enrich­
ment of the state.
The Company in this case, it would appear, would not be owed any 
compensation. Apart from the fact that the Company did not directly in­
vest in mining and that it had been reimbursed for its administrative 
deficit, it gained a sum of £135 million before tax in the period up to 1964 
in royalty payments.151 It took much of this money out of the country. 
In 1964 its value of investments in Zambia showed that the value of local 
investments held by the Company amounted to only 10 per cent of its 
gross royalty receipts, and to less than one-fifth of its investments port­
folio.152 The Company was unwilling to give the money to the country as 
it thought this would weaken its title, as it indicated when in 1936 it was 
asked by the Colonial Office to consider making an annual payment on 
equitable grounds for the benefits of the local people on the grounds that 
in return for its vast mineral resources, it was making purely nominal 
payments.153 The Company’s reply rejected the request, stating that if it 
were to make ex-gratia annual payments, many people would conclude 
that its title to mineral rights was not secure and that consequently the 
gesture proposed would have the opposite result from that intended.154
149 Norwegian Shipowners Claim. 1 Rep Int. Arbitration Awards 309, (1948); Lena 
Gold Fields Lid., v. U.S.S.R. Award 3 September, 1930; and also Heyman v 
Darwins [19421 A.C. 356.
150. Transvaal Commission Report, supra, p .l 17.
151. Northern Rhodesia Government, British South Africa Company claims to Mineral 
Rights in Northern Rhodesia, (White paper) 1964. Anglo-American Corporation 
which held some shares in the British South Africa Company made similar 
distinction, its chairman in a speech distinguished productive capital from 
non-productive capital, Chairman’s Remarks, Annual stock holders meeting,
7 May, 1964.
152. Northern Rhodesia Government, British South Africa Company claims to Mineral 
Rights in Northern Rhodesia, (White paper), supra, p. 15.
153. C.O. 795-99.
154. Ibid.
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The failure by the Company to reinvest its royalty earnings within the 
country was particularly unfortunate because ordinarily they are impos­
ed as compensation for the exploitation of a wasting asset,.and therefore 
should be utilised for the building up of other sources of revenue, to 
replace the mining industry when it is eventually worked out. Therefore 
the only persons it seems who could merit any compensation were those 
who had bought shares in the Company in the genuine belief that the 
royalty payments were validly founded but even these would have had 
their due return from the excessive royalties the Company drew and their 
subsequent reinvestment. It may be argued that this is not strictly correct 
since someone who had bought the shares in, say 1962, would not have 
got much in the way of royalty payments. But then he would still benefit 
from the subsequent reinvestment of the royalty payments and in any 
case it can be argued that along with shares one buys all the associated 
risks.
The 1964 Agreement
The matter was settled finally a few hours before the independence of 
Zambia.155 The Commonweath Secretary offered the Company £4 
million contributed in equal shares by the British government and the 
Zambian government which it accepted. And on 14 December of the 
same year a formal agreement was signed under which the Company 
transferred the mineral rights to the Zambian government with 
retrospective effect from 24 October, 1964.
The Company has however maintained that the agreement was forced 
on it and that it was deprived of its legally held mining rights without 
adequate compensation.156 The nature of the interest the Company 
acquired through its concessions is a legal question that can be resolved 
by a consideration of the legal rules that applied to the transactions at the 
time of their making. Where subsequent legislation affected them, then 
the true legal effect of such legislation can be interpreted by generally 
accepted rules of construction, a task we shall concentrate on in the 
following chapter.
155. For an account o f the final stage, see Hall, High Price o f  Principles, pp.69-92.
156. Its President stated, ‘1 was told that a decision had to be reached within the next 
eleven minutes because the Zambian ministers and the Secretary of State were 
about to leave for other engagements which would occupy them until the 
independence ceremony at midnight. Your President faced with the alternative of 
expropriation without compensation felt there was no course open to him but to 
acquiesce,’ British South Africa Company Circular to Shareholders, December, 
1964.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE BRITISH SOUTH 
AFRICA COMPANY CLAIMS
The basis of the British South Africa Company’s claims, it has been 
established was the concessions obtained from various African chiefs. In 
this respect first to be settled therefore is whether in fact the chiefs had 
power to grant the rights claimed by the Company. If not, it must be ask­
ed then whether legislation vested the rights in it. A further question we 
need to settle is what, if anything, was the joint effect of the Devonshire 
agreement and the 1950 agreement both made between the Crown and 
the Company and in both of which it was later claimed the Crown 
recognised the Company as the owner of the mineral rights throughout 
the country. The final question to be answered is whether or not on their 
true interpretation the concessions indeed covered all the minerals and in 
the whole country. The substantial questions, then, though complicated 
in detail, are in fact simple and can be summarized as: to what mineral 
rights or royalties had the Company any title in view of the concessions, 
legislation, and recognition by the Crown, all of which have already been 
discussed in detail in the previous chapters?
Customary Land Tenure Concepts and the Grant of the Rights
The main question here is whether the concessions on which the 
Company’s claims were based could convey the sort of title claimed by it 
especially that the chiefs from whom they were acquired had no 
authority under customary land law to give away the mineral rights of 
their kingdoms and the transactions themselves were contrary to 
customary law. The land laws of the tribes contain no provision for the 
granting by the chief of tracts of land or mineral rights as were promised 
by these concessions. Thus, the proper law to be applied in determining 
the validity of these transactions being private contracts is that of the 
conceding kingdom, being also their place of conclusion.1 It is this law 
which should characterise the interest the Company acquired. Two
1. Massey Harris Co. (SA) Lid., v. Ohio Stores 2 N.R.L.R. 37; See also O ’Connell, 
State Succession and International Law, 1967, P.303; and Leroux v. Brown 
(1882), 12, Q.B.D. 801 Taylor v. Great Eastern Railway [1901) 1 K.B. 774 seems 
to hold otherwise but can be distinguished on the grounds that in this case the 
contract was only wrong procedurally. The chapter ignores the fact that it is 
doubtful whether the concessions are contracts at all. It can be argued that the 
concessions were o f no binding effect on the chief, as no court existed (P.T.O.)
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principal rules of customary land tenure seem to suggest that an African 
chief in Zambia had no right to grant mineral concessions of the nature 
claimed by the Company. These principles relate to the ownership of 
land and its inalienability.
Ownership o f  Land
Ordinarily under customary law when people speak of land they refer to 
the surface of the earth, but the legal conception of land goes further 
than this and includes the things that go with it such as the vegetation, 
the animal creatures and mineral rights.2 In this respect the fundamental 
answer to the question, who is the owner of the land among all tribes in 
Zambia is that the land in effect belongs to the whole community. The 
interests of individual and constituent members of the tribe or communi­
ty are not interests of allodial ownership. In each case the title, whatever 
it may be, is vested in the group as a community and not in any of its 
members. The individual member’s rights may be broadly stated as rights 
of possession. The community stated here represents both its dead and 
liv ing members so that title is never vested in an individual but remains a 
continual flow of people from generation to generation. The notion of 
individual ownership of land by an individual member of the community 
is thus quite foreign to all tribes in Zambia.3 This is supported by prac­
tice among the tribes and has been acknowledged in several colonial 
reports concerning Zambia. An Arusha Conference which was called to 
consider land use in Zambia, after recommending the encouragement of 
individual land ownership as a means of encouraging the development of 
agriculture in the territory, commented that ‘the roots of traditional con­
cepts and customs in land ownership would not easily be dislodged’ and 
‘the changes proposed would confront the African with difficulties of
to which the chief could be nude «menable. See In re South«m Rhodesia, supra
p.215: and also Cook v. Spring [1899] A C. 752 at p.575
2. White, Northern Rhodesia Land Tenure Report, No. 1. Tonga, Southern 
Province, 1956, p.2.
3. This is not restricted to Zambia, Viscount Haldane, quoting Chief Justice Rayner 
in the Report on Land Tenure in West Africa of 1898 observed: T h e  next fact 
which is important to bear in mind, in order to understand the native land law is 
that the notion o f individual ownership is quite foreign to native ¡deas’. See
Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Nigeria 119211 2 A.C.399.at pp.404-405
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understanding’.4 The Conference clearly thereby acknowledged the non­
individual nature of the customary land tenure system and implied that 
the European conception of individual ownership of land has no part in 
the traditional system.
Position o f  the chiefs
The chief is everywhere in Zambia regarded as the symbol of residuary 
and ultimate ownership of all land held by the tribal community, and in a 
loose mode of speech is sometimes called its ‘owner’. He holds it on 
behalf of the whole community in the capacity of a caretaker or trustee 
only. His position is not comparable to the Crown’s position in England, 
whereby the ownership of all land in England is in the Crown alone and 
everybody else holds his land only as tenant of the Crown. Thus the 
significance given to the term ‘owner of land’ is different from the 
ordinary use of the word and it is important to distinguish the two senses 
to avoid confusion. For instance among the Bemba when they say 
‘mwine mpanga’xn reference to the chief they do not mean by this state­
ment that he is absolutely entitled to do as he likes with every piece of 
land within the boundaries of the Kingdom. His rights are clearly defined 
and the expression ‘owner of land’ primarily refers to political control 
exercised by the chief over his territorial area and where appropriate in­
cludes also the idea of supernatural control expressed through economic 
rituals. As White, for a long time a Local Court adviser in Zambia, 
observed on the use of the word in anthropological studies about the 
tribal communities in Zambia:
‘owner o f the land’ is of course an attempt to translate 
various vernacular expressions, it contains no legal 
actuality. Nor can it be regarded as denoting an authority 
who controls the allocation of land since no such system 
of controlled allocation exists.5
The people in each community clearly understand the political ownership 
of the chief, for instance, the Lunda summarise it in the phrase ‘chalo 
chamfumu Katongo Kamulanda’ which means the whole realm belongs
4. ...Report on African Land Tenure Developments in Kenya and Uganda and their 
Application to Northern Rhodesia, 1960, pp.6 and 8
5. White, 'A Survey o f  African land tenure in Northern Rhodesia' (19J9) 4 Journal 
o f  African Administration, pp.6-7
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to the chief but each commoner has his place of settlement. They insist, 
however, that in no sense do they imply that the chief owns the land in 
the western sense of having power to do anything with it. He is but a 
trustee who is as much controlled in his employment of the public lands 
by his people as they are by him. The description of the chief’s position 
by analogy to the idea of trusteeship is not wholly accurate. There is 
fundamental difference between him and a trustee strictly so called in 
that whereas a trustee of land had the legal title vested in him and is 
therefore the legal owner of it, the title to communal land is vested in the 
tribe and not in the chief individually.
Power o f  chiefs
The chiefs’ rights vary from tribe to tribe, but in none of the tribes has a 
chief any right that would entitle him to dispose of the land. In some 
tribes, such as the Lozi, the chief has the right to distribute previously 
unallocated land to subjects who are short of land and to newcomers.6 
Every subject has the right to ask for land for building and for cultiva­
tion from the chief and he may be given certain arable land as he may 
need it for himself and his family, and so long as he is making use of his 
land he enjoys absolute legal security of tenure. Once land is thus 
allocated by the chief to a man, that man acquires the right to be pro­
tected against all encroachment on this land by any one, including the 
chief and he passes this right to his heir and anyone to whom he may give 
or lend the land. No one, can, however, settle on the land within the 
kingdom unless he becomes a subject to the chief and accepts the obliga­
tions this entails, failure to carry out which was and is punished.7
The power of the chief with respect to land in other tribes such as the 
Bemba, Ngoni, or Lunda is much less than that of the Lozi chief. The 
emphasis is essentially on the political control which the chief exercises 
over his territory. The chief may ‘give’ land but in fact it is acknowledged 
that all he does is give a man permission to live on land.8 In such a case 
he is exercising control over the movement of his people and not allocat­
6. G luckm an 'Essay on Lozi land and Royal Property' (1943) 10 The Rhodes 
Livingstone Papers, p. 14.
7. Ibid.
8. This led Cunnisson to refer to Kazembe as having power of allocating land. See 
Cunnisson, ‘Kingship and local organisation on the Luapula River’ (1950) S 
Rhodes Livingstone Institute Communication, p. 12.
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ing land as such. In every case whether a village or an individual is con­
cerned, they pick their own site and merely obtain permission to move on 
to it. They must take care to avoid trespassing on land already being used 
by another. As with the Lozi, however, all people who live in a given 
chief’s territory must accept his political control.
In societies such as the Tonga, who traditionally had no chiefs, the 
headman of a village did not allocate land to his village, and his only par­
ticipation in the acquisition of land was to provide information as to 
whether or not existing rights were already enjoyed by an individual on a 
piece of land which another wishes to acquire. The situation could be 
said to be the same as among the other tribes discussed above except for 
the Lozi who had a strong central political authority.
Anyhow the main consequence of the distinction between societies 
with a strong centralised political structure and those without it is that 
the former have a conception of a tribal area and unit occupying a ter­
ritory.9 Hence the rule that a person seeking to live in such an area must 
be accepted by the political authority controlling the area, and must 
himself accept its political control in order to live there. This right to live 
in the area included by implication the right to use land, but the land to 
be used is not allocated to him by the chief in the sense that the chief can­
not deny an individual empty land where it exists.
Inalienability o f  Land
The second main feature of customary land tenure in Zambia is that land 
is inalienable and always belongs to the tribe or community. There is 
perhaps no other principle more fundamental to the indigenous land 
tenure systems throughout Zambia than this theory of the inalienability 
of land. The idea of land purchase as understood in Europe is entirely 
foreign to African thought and custom. Chiefs and councillors are on 
record as being emphatic that land sales did not occur and would not be 
tolerated.10 Not one sale of empty land can be found in traditional Zam­
bian society.
9. White, 'Terminological confusion in African Land Tenure' (1958) 3 Journal o f  
African Administration, p. 125.
10. Conroy, ‘The General Principles o f  Land Tenure' (1946) 14 Rhodes Livingstone 
Papers, p.95.
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There is abundant evidence of the observance of this principle. The 
1964 Report on the Economy o f  Barotseland observed that the idea of a 
market in land was absolutely foreign to the Barotse people.11 Land 
among the Lozi people cannot be bought or sold, the report emphasises, 
and it is not even possible to leise or rent it. Yet this is in the very 
kingdom in which the British South Africa Company obtained their most 
important concessions. .Richards, in a sociological· study of the Bemba, 
observed that in the course of ordinary conversation no Bemba lists 
among his assets his possession^ occupation of a given tract of land. In 
answer to a direct question as to the ownership of his country any chief 
will reply quite simply that the whole territory belongs to him.12 Richards 
further states in reference to the sale of land that:
as elsewhere, the concept o f  land as a  saleable com m odity 
will revolutionise native society. In the case o f  the chief, 
land ow nership will be servered from  political responsibility, 
and the com m oner will acquire the right to  exploit land to  
his individual advantage, and such phenom ena as absentee 
landlordism , m ortgaging, and excessive fractionation , that 
have been so pronounced am ong the Indian peasantry, may 
ap p e a r .13
There are no known sales of land in the Eastern Province among the 
Ngoni nor are there any among the Tonga in the Southern Province. This 
is confirmed by Helen in her anthropological study of the Ngoni. She 
observed that:
Land tenure  is a simple recognition o f  individual usage. 
This u sufructuary  right ob ta ins th roughou t the  Ngoni 
country  and  all la^d  is vested to  Ngoni m inds in the 
hands o f  their P aram oun t C hief (M pezeni) — although 
in fact the  Secretary o f  S tate  fo r the  C olonies is legally 
invested with their co n tro l. L and th erefo re  has no
11. Selwyn, Report on the Economy o f  Barotseland, 1964, p.30; See also Gluckman, 
supra, at p.33.
12. Richards, Land Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia, 1939, p.42.
13. Ibid., at pp. 274-75.
monetary value and inheritance is essentially the retention 
of usufructuary rights by kinship groups.14
The economic situation in traditional society supports the view that land 
could not be sold and as long as a subsistence economy existed, people 
obtained the goods they needed by work on their lands. Societies under 
such conditions are characterised by a low level of economic production 
with little or no wealth or capital accumulation and land cannot 
therefore have an exchange value. The only instances which have been 
recorded of the transfer of land when money has changed hands indicate 
that the money relates to improvements made on the land as distinguish­
ed from the land itself.15
It has been argued in reference to West Africa that the tribe, as the 
owner, has the competence of an individual owner of property to deal 
with its property in any way it wishes including to dispose of i t .16 
However, that may be in West Africa, this argument is not supported by 
the practice of any of the tribes of Zambia and is emphatically denied by 
them. Moreover, the communal land tenure prevalent in West Africa can 
be distinguished from that in Zambia in that in Zambia land belongs to 
the tribe whereas in West Africa it belongs to the family, which is a much 
smaller unit than the tribe. Even if it were, it is contended that the pro­
cedure for a valid transfer of group-owned property were not observed. 
The tribe, being a group, can act as such only through recognised pro­
cedures. The title to group-owned property can be transferred only by 
the owning group as a whole through its regular management agency act­
ing on its behalf. There is no rigid rule, of course, as to what procedures 
should be observed in the case of group dispositions but the bare 
minimum seems to be that the group should be properly consulted and 
represented, that is that the consent of the people must in one way or 
another be given. At the very least the unanimous consent of the tribal 
council, and possibly that the transaction after being sanctioned by the
14. Helen, Some Aspects o f  land use and over population in the Ngoni Reserves o f  
Northern Rhodesia, 1962, p. 196. In Hermansburg Mission Society v. Commis­
sioner o f  Native Affairs a South African Court when dealing with a grant of 
concessions by African chiefs to European companies observed ‘when they were 
governed by their own customs and laws the notion of separate ownership in land 
or of alienation of land by a chief or any one else was foreign to their ideas,’ 
[1906] T.S. 135 al p.142.
15. Government of Zambia, Land Tenure Report 1963, (Unpublished).
16. Ibid.
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council and the chief should be submitted to a public meeting duly con­
vened which should approve the transaction. In the case of the British 
South Africa Company’s concessions, they could not allege group consent 
with much success as it is unlikely that they could even be credited with 
having obtained the consent of the chiefs. As observed in an earlier 
chapter very often there was no consultation. In other cases non-existent 
chiefs were alleged to be party to the concessions, and in many others the 
Company officials wrote the concessions and asked chiefs to sign with no 
consultation with their people, and in some instances deception was us­
ed. In conclusion, therefore, it can be asserted that in view of the 
preceding discussion, the grant of the concessions was not within the 
legal powers of the chiefs and consequently without authority.
Legal Result when Tribal Property is Transferred Without Authority
What then is the legal result where there is purported alienation of tribal 
property without authority? Is the transaction void, as not being an act 
with authority or is it merely avoidable? Did title not pass to the British 
South Africa Company, or did it pass subject to divestment upon action 
taken by the tribe to have the purported alienation set aside?
It is possible to submit here that the sounder view is that title does not 
pass, i.e. that a purported alienation is void or invalid where the transfer 
is without authority or is contrary to law. Thus, where this happens there 
is a strong implication of an intention on the part of the chief to treat the 
property as his own absolutely or representation that the land belongs to 
him individually and as such is an attempt by the chief to give away what 
he has not got. This in fact appears to have been the view the British 
government adopted in other parts of Southern Africa. In the case of the 
Dynamite Concession,17 where the Transvaal Dynamite Company had 
been granted a concession by the South Africa government in December, 
1888, through Mr Lippert, on proof that the concession was obtained on 
the corruption of government officers responsible for the granting of the 
concession the Transvaal Commission held that the concession could not 
be valid and was void because it was without authority and also it had 
been obtained by fraud.
17. Report o f  lhe Transvaal Concessions Commission, 19 April, 1901.
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In the case of the concession between Chief o f  the Bangwaketsi and the 
Gase-Tsire Concession syndicate, 18 where the Company had acquired 
from the chief a grant of the right to prospect for precious stones and the 
minerals throughout his territory, the Bechuanaland Commission held 
that the concession was invalid on the grounds that the chief in question 
did not understand the true intent and purpose of the documents signed 
by him, since the documents were not properly explained to, nor fully 
understood by him before signing them. In the issue of the Secheland 
concession, 19 the Commission commented that it is an invariable rule 
that ‘no grant made by a native chief is valid without the authority of the 
tribe’. Here an analogy can be drawn with the situation in West Africa 
where family land has been alienated without authority. In Owiredu v. 
Morshie20 where the headman of the family and some of the principal 
members of the family leased family property ignoring other principal 
members of the family in the transaction, the lease was held invalid and 
of no effect as a lease. The court holding that the family being a corpo­
rate body, can be bound only by corporate acts, i.e. acts of its properly 
constituted managing agency, and insisted that the head of a family can­
not make a testamentary gift of family property which is effective.
There are, however, some West African cases21 on the same issue, in 
which the courts have held that such a transaction is voidable and not 
void.These cases can be distinguished in that it was because the family or 
members of it had in effect acquiesced in the development of their land 
by an outsider over a period of time and as such they are all circum­
stances where it would be inequitable for the court to support the claim 
of the family for recovery of possession. A voidable transaction is a tran­
saction which is valid when made. Now if the families in these cases had 
acted timeously, the ground for restoring possession to them would have 
been that there had been no sale, the vendor having no title. Accordingly,
18. Report o f  the Bechuanaland Concessions Commission, 1901
19. Ibid.
20. (1952), 14 W.A.C. All. See also Honger v. Bassil (1954), 14 W.A.C. A 569.
21. E.g. A bey v. Oilennu (1954), 14 W.A.C. 567.
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the real justification for rejecting the family’s claims in these cases would 
appear to lie in the inequity of allowing a negligent family to be unjustly 
enriched as against an innocent purchase who developed the land over a 
period of time, believing it to be unquestionably his own.22 So that the 
claim here is defeated by the rule of estoppel and still leaves intact the 
rule that title does not pass where communal property is irregularly 
transferred.23
The fundamental issue o f  justice presented in the cases that hold 
that such a transaction is voidable, is one way of deciding as to which of 
the two innocent parties, the purchaser or the unconsulted members of 
the family, is to bear the loss in the case of a purported sale of family 
property not made by the proper persons. Such an issue of justice does 
not arise here. The Company knew all the time or ought reasonbly to 
have known that its rights were precarious and its ownership of the rights 
did not involve expenditure. In fact as observed earlier it was the reverse. 
It involved gaining royalties without any expenditure at all. In Naested v. 
Kia Ora Syndicate,24 the court, while acknowledging that a plaintiff is 
entitled to damages for the loss of rights being the subject-matter of a 
contract, decided that where the tenant was at the time of entering into 
the contract aware that the right of the landlord to let him the property 
for the full period of the lease was defective, and that therefore, he, the 
tenant was liable to be deprived of his rights, he is not thereafter on being 
deprived of these entitled to claim damages from the landlord. Decisions 
in cases where natives lacking authority have entered into legal relation­
ships support this submission. In Massey Harris Co. (SA) Ltd. v. Ohio 
Stores25 the plaintiff, a white man from Zimbabwe entered into a con­
tract with an African in Zambia which at the time was not allowed by the 
Credit Sales to Native Ordinance of 1936. When the white man sued to 
enforce the contract, the court held that the contract was unen­
22. It can be said that here the doctrine of estoppel is applicable, whose effect is that 
a party is not allowed to say that a certain statement of fact is untrue, whether in 
reality it is true or not through Having made it appear otherwise through his own 
deed. See Willmont v. Berber (1850) 15 Ch.D. 105 Anglo-American Telegraph 
Co. v. Spurting (1879), Q.B.D. 188 and also Re Sugden's Trusts, Sugden v. 
Walker {1917] I Ch. 510.
23. Bentsi—Enchill, Ghana Land Law. 1964, p.44 and also OUenu, Principles 
o f  Customary Law in Ghana, 1962, p. 126. Both authors take the stand 
that the head of the family acting alone cannot make a valid 
alienation o f land.
24. 1935 S.R. 117.
25. 2 N.R.L.R. 37.
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forceable even though legally binding in Zimbabwe. And in Komo and 
Leboho  v. Holmes,26 where a will had been made and customary law of 
the area did not recognise the right of testamentary disposition, the court 
stated that where natives deliberately entered into legal relationships 
inconsistent with customary law, or made contracts or dispositions 
unknown to customary law, such legal relationships would be invalid. 
Here an analogy can also be drawn with the common law. Contracts at 
common law are void if against established law27 and a contract made by 
a company though not unlawful is void if ultra vires the legal restrictions 
imposed on the capacity of the parties.28
The Interests Claimed by the Company and Customary Law
Apart from the position advanced in the preceding section, the conces­
sions could not grant, severe, exclusive mineral rights in perpetuity 
Customary law, differing from English common law, would not 
recognise such a grant as such interests are unknown to it, and since the 
rights of parties under a contract must be determined by the law of the 
land where the resultant conditions and rights are to be enforced,29 it 
would at most operate as a licence to mine and remove minerals — a 
right recognised by customary law.
Under customary land tenure concepts, every member of a tribe is en­
titled to enter upon tribal land at any time and to take and make use of, 
either for his domestic or commercial purposes, anything which is the 
natural product of the land including minerals, excepting any products 
of the land resulting from human effort. This is an inherent fundamental 
right of a subject of a tribe, which does not depend upon the pleasure of 
the chief and which he can enforce against the chief or any other 
members who are unlawfully depriving him thereof. He can excercise it 
on any portion of the tribal land, cultivated or uncultivated, but it does 
not extend over land which has lawfully been enclosed bv another sub­
ject. In the exercise of that right a person could go on any portion of the 
land to hunt, or collect salt or minerals. This right did not entitle him to 
such natural produce if another subject had already reduced it into his
26. 1935 S.R. 86
27. Re Trepca Mines Lid.. [1963] Ch. 199, al p.221. See also Wild v. Simpson (1919)
2 K.B. 544.
28. Sinclair v. Brou^han [19141 A.C. 398.
29. Massey Harris Co. (SA) Ltd. v. Ohio Stores, supra.
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possession. Thus, he could not take minerals dug by another or wood 
gathered by another, or take minerals or wood enclosed by another.
This type of use of land by the subject takes out of the land. It does not 
improve the land. In the eyes of customary law, it is a use by the com­
munity at large, not an appropriation of any portion of land into the sub­
ject’s exclusive possession and occupation. Therefore the exercise of that 
right does not confer upon the individual who uses the land any right, 
title or interest in the portion of the land over which the right is exercised. 
It is. an incident of the community’s absolute ownership of the land.
The contention advanced here was upheld in rather similar cir­
cumstances in South Africa in Le Roux and Others v. Loewenthal.30 
There, owners of two farms declared that the owners of the two farms 
‘do hereby sell, cede, assign and make over unto the party of the second 
part all the coal rights of and under and appertaining to the said farm 
together with all rights of mining and removing the said coal in or under 
'the said farms’.31 ... Such a transfer was in fact unknown to the Roman- 
Dutch Law, under which ownership of minerals goes with that of the soil 
and is inseparable. The court held that under such circumstances no one 
can transfer minerals and mining rights not severed from the soil unless 
he transferred the soil which contained them as well. It resolved that 
since the owner of the land could grant permission to win and remove 
coal, a cession of coal and rights without the transfer of the land which 
the coal is situated at most operated to confer upon the concessionary 
the right to mine and remove the coal.
If the concession had operated as licences they would not in general be 
valid after 1905, unless registered. According to legislation, introduced 
in that year every document purporting to grant, convey or transfer land 
or any interest in land, or to be a lease or agreement for lease or permit of 
occupation of land for a longer term than one year, or to create any
30. f 19031 T.S. See also L.E.D.B. v. Federal Admmislralor-General. 1960 L.L.R. 276
31. Ibid.
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charge upon land, was required to be registered in the deeds registry in 
order to be binding otherwise unlike as between parties.32 The same 
principles seem to have been adopted by the Privy Council in land cases. 
In Oyekan and others v. Adele,33 the Privy Council had to construe the 
interests granted by a British Crown grant which granted the residence of 
the Oba to King Docemo, his heirs, executors, administrators and 
assignees forever at a time no man in Lagos was entitled to own it 
absolutely as it belonged to the family. The decision turned on an act of 
state, but during the course of this judgement, Lord Denning, however, 
made some comments on the Crown grants, which because of their 
similarity to the British South Africa Company concessions are very per­
tinent to the argument here. Commenting on the nature of the interest 
the documents purported to convey, he said:
Those words are familiar in English law, they would fit well 
into a society which had the same legal structure as 
England; but they do not fit at all well into the structure of 
Lagos. The grant is drawn up according to the English 
conception where by one man is able to have the entire 
ownership of land himself, with power to sell it to another 
absolutely, power to transfer it by will to anyone he likes 
on his death, or, if he leaves it undisposed on his death, 
it passed by law to his heir and now to personal 
representatives.'·*
After acknowledging this, Lord Denning went on to observe that the 
inhabitants of Lagos in 1870 approached land in a very different fashion, 
and stated:
Many of these Crown grants were made in the English 
form; and much misunderstanding has arisen on that 
account. People have claimed rights under the grants in 
English fashions as though thereby they gained a title 
superior to the rights of the rest of the family under the
32. Lands and Deeds Registry Act, Chapter 287 of the Laws of Zambia, ss. 4 and 6. 
This Act replaced the North-Western Land and Deeds Registry Proclamation, 
1910 and also the North-Eastern Rhodesia Lands and Deeds Regulations, 1905
33. (1957] 2 All. E.R. 785. See also Sakanvawo Oshodi v. Moriamo Dakota [1930] 
A.C. 667, and Sunmonu v. Disu Raphael [1927] A.C. 881.
34. Oj'ekdna v. Adele supra p.789.
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local law, several of these cases have reached their 
l ordships, and it has been uniformly held that these 
government grants do not convey English titles or English 
rights o f ownership. The words “ his heirs, executors, 
administrators, and assignees forever” are to be rejected as 
meaningless and inapplicable in their African setting.
... It leaves the interests of the family or occupiers 
intact, to be determined, as therefore, by the local law.35
The Privy Council in re Southern Rhodesia,36 rejected the contention 
advanced by the British South Africa Company that the concession in 
question could be construed to give the Company absolute land rights 
thereby implicitly accepting the contention advanced here. More impor­
tant, this was in reference to the Lippert concession which was obtained 
by the Company in Southern Rhodesia in similar circumstances to the 
ones the Company obtained in Zambia and at more or less the same time. 
The Privy Council stated:
Some tribes are so low in the scale of social organisation 
that their usages and conceptions of rights and duties are 
not to be reconciled with the institutions or the legal 
ideas of civilised society. Such a gulf cannot be bridged.
It would be idle to impute to such people some shadow 
of rights known to our own law and then to transmute it 
into the substance of transferable rights of property 
as we know them.·17
It further alluded to the dangers of construeing the concession as giving 
the Company perpetual and exclusive rights:
The consequences of the constructions which the 
Company puts on the documents would indeed be 
extreme. It would follow that Herr Lippert was, or could 
become at pleasure, owner of the entire kingdom for 
nothing is reserved in favour o f the inhabitants — from 
the kraals o f the King’s wives to the scene of assembly
3J. Ibid.. p.790.
36. supra.
37. In re Southern Rhodesia, supra, at p.233. In fact the court went further and ,  
declared that ‘the Lippert concaskn  may have some value as helping to explain 
how and why the Crown came to confer the administration of Southern Rhodesia 
upon the Company but as a title deed to the unalienated lands it is vahideu.’
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of his indunas and his pitso  — Thenceforward the entire 
tribe were sojourners on sufferance where they had 
ranged in arms, dependent on the good nature of this 
stranger from Johannesburg even for gardens in w hich 
to grow their mealies and pastures on which to  graze 
their cattle.38
In this particular case the British South Africa Company argued that the 
ignorance of Lobengula as to the nature of the rights he was transferring 
ought not to derogate from the amplitude of a grant, which was as wide 
as he knew how to make. The argument seems at one time to have been 
implicitly accepted by the Privy Council in an earlier case39 but was 
specifically rejected by the Privy Council in this case. It categorically 
stated:
Their Lordships can not accept this argument. As well 
it might be said that a savage who sold ten bullocks, being 
the highest numbers up to which he knew how to 
count, had thereby sold his whole herd numbering in 
fact many hundreds.40
Some of the Concessions were Obtained by Fraud
At common law fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representa­
tion has been made knowingly or without belief in its truth or recklessly 
without caring whether it be true or false.41 A principal is vicariously 
liable for the fraud of an agent,42 so that if an agent in the scope of his 
authority is himself fraudulent, the fraud is transmitted to the principal.
Incidence o f  Fraud
The facts suggest that the Company officials fraudulently misrepresented 
the nature of the documents. They made statements which were untrue 
and which they knew to be untrue and whatever were their motives were 
liable. For instance, there is the question of the copy of the Lochner con­
38. Ibid., p.237
39. Cook v. Spring, supra, at p .512
40. In re Southern Rhodesia, supra, at p.236
41 Derry \^P eek  (.1889) 14 App. Cas 337
42. Lloyd v. Grace, smith and Company [1912] A.C. 716
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cession left behind in Barotseland containing clauses which were not pre­
sent in the copy retained by the Company. Lewanika himself, denied that 
he had given rights to the Company which were exclusive and in per­
petuity in nature. He alleged that he and his councillors did not write the 
agreements, but that the Company wrote them and then asked for their 
signatures, that the Company wrote agreements and concessions, whose 
words he and his councillors did not know the meaning of, because as he 
further alleged the verbal explanations did not give the Company the 
right to sell land or own the minerals.43
Several other incidents indicate the use of fraud in obtaining the con­
cessions. There is the case of Khama’s messenger Mokoatsa referred to 
earlier, whose appearance seems to have been plain deception and was 
admitted to be such by the Company. There is also the fact that in each 
case the Company officials alleged that they were acting for the Queen 
and that they were offering British protection which they knew they were 
not and had no right to do so. There is too evidence of gifts showered on 
some of the chiefs. Besides some of the concessions refer to chiefs who 
do not exist and lastly there is the evidence of one Dr Swan and one 
Mwebela referred to earlier and both of whom were present at the con­
clusion of some of the concessions. Thus the probability of the 
widespread use of fraud in obtaining the concessions is significantly 
increased when it is realised that the concessions were not only written by 
the Company but were composed in difficult technical terms in the 
English language and yet were addressed as being from the chiefs and 
their national councils, people who could not even write or read their 
own names in their own language.44
43. Letter from Lewanika to the Queen. 1 November, 1890. No. 119*F.O . Con. 6178
44. For instance they contained such phrases as ‘1 further declare 
that I hereby also transfer, assign and make over to the said 
Company all minerals, mining rights, game reserves and all 
taxes and tolls and duties and privileges of what ever
sort and kind which at present appertain to the territory 
hereby transferred’ — See concession obtained by Sharpe from 
Chief Fuji File No. 35, ZA/1/90, (National Archives),
(Lusaka). In re Southern Rhodesia, when referring to the 
need to examine concessions obtained from African chiefs 
closely, the Privy Council sarcastically state... ‘but their 
Lordships are relieved from the duty of inquiring into the (P.T.O.)
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Legal result where concessions were obtained by fraud
A representation is only material if it is one of the causes that induces a 
contract.45 These statements made by the Company officials were likely 
to be very effective. Most African chiefs were eager to get British protec­
tion because of the tribal wars that were prevalent during the period. The 
Company statements were intended to exploit this and cause, and in fact 
they appear to have caused, the chiefs to make the contracts.
It could, however, be argued that in some cases the chiefs were 
motivated by monetary gains. But at common law once it is shown that a 
representation was calculated to influence the judgement of a reasonable 
man, the presumption is that the representee was so influenced, and a 
rebuttal of this is not proved by suggesting that there were other con­
tributory causes which played a substantial part.46 Generally fraud 
renders a contract voidable at the instance of the party deceived. It re­
mains binding until set aside.47 In any action brought to enforce it the 
party deceived can assert his right to have it stated as void.48 If he elects 
to disaffirm, there are several courses open to him. He may repudiate it 
without resort to legal proceedings in which case repudiation becomes 
effective as soon as he does all he can in the circumstances to make it 
known that the underlying principle should be that a purchaser should be 
allowed to keep what he has fraudulently.obtained.49 Lewanika before 
he died repudiated his concessions with the Company several times as 
shown in the previous chapter, a matter which was ignored by both the 
crown and the Company.
In the preceding pages we have suggested that the Company did not 
acquire any mineral rights as a result of the concessions. It remains
circumstances under which this grant was made by the fact 
that competent officials reported to the High Commissioner, 
after making full inquiry under his direction, that the 
concession had been properly obtained and that its terms 
correctly expressed Lobengula’s intentions and exactly 
reflected his understanding of the matter. This is a testimony 
to his enlightenment and acumen, which perhaps goes beyond 
what might have been supposed’. Supra, p.236.
45. See Smith v. Chadwick (1884), 9 App. Cas. 187 and Paxman v. Union 
Assurance Society Ltd. (1923), 29 L.T.R. 424.
46. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch. D. 459
47. Ansom  v. Smith (1881), 41 Ch. D. 348 at p.371
48. Derry v. Peek (1889), 14 App. Cas 337 Newbigging v. Adam
(1886), 34 Ch. D. 582; and also Carand Universal Finance Company Ltd., v. 
Cadwell| [1963], 2 All E.R. 547.
49. Harper v.' Webster 1956 R. & N. 10.
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to be determined whether the Company did acquire them subsequently 
through a grant legislation at the instance of the British government or 
by some other competent authority.
Effect of Legislation on the Company’s Position
In considering this question, we need first to determine when the mineral 
rights became the property of the Crown and secondly an examination of 
the true construction of the legislation concerned.
Land was vested in the Crown
At common law, communal title to land by the native inhabitants of a 
territory which was acquired by the Crown is recognised as a legally en­
forceable right. This is probably an instance of common law apply­
ing existing international rules, in this case, the already well established 
and unquestionable proposition that a change of sovereignty does not 
affect existing private rights. As early as the sixteenth century this princi­
ple had been considered to apply to the Indian tribes in America.50 
Indian land tenure systems were seen as constituting distinct patterns of 
rights not derived from the common law but recognised by it. Several 
judicial decisions give support to this principle.51 Blackstone’s Commen­
taries state that there was a distinction between settled colonies where the 
land, being a desert and uncultivated, was claimed by right of occu­
pancy, and the conquered or ceded colonies. The difference between the 
laws of the two kinds of colonies was that in those claimed by right of 
occupancy all the English laws which were applicable to the Colony are 
immediately in force on its foundation, but in the conquered or ceded 
kind the colony may have a law of its own and that law remains in force 
until altered. Blackstone’s statement of the law has been followed by 
many judicial decisions52 although this distinction was somewhat blurred 
by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890. In this Act it was provided that 
the jurisdiction held by the Crown shall be enjoyed in the same and as 
ample a manner as if Her Majesty had acquired that jurisdiction by the
50. See Tee-Tit-Ton Case 348 U.S. 278
51. Tijani v. The Secretary Southern Nigeria where Viscount Halden 
stated ‘a mere change in Sovereignty is not to be presumed as 
meant to disturb rights of private owners’, supra, p .12. See also 
Oyekan v. Adele supra, at p.789, for a similar statement of the law.
52. Campbell v. Hill 98 E.R. 1045 at p. 1047.
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cession or conquest of the territory. However, the meaning of this Act 
has been a subject of judicial interpretation which has left Blackstone- 
rule intact.
It has been stated that:
The language does not assimilate the jurisdiction 
exercised in a foreign country either in nature or degree, 
to that which belongs to the Crown in a conquered 
territory. Its object is simply to provide that such 
jurisdiction as may have been acquired by express 
consent or sufferance of the foreign state shall be exercised 
by the Crown precisely as if it were exercised by sole 
virtue of the prerogative.53
Several other cases support this opinion.54
Applying to Zambia the law as stated by Blackstone which as we 
observed in an earlier chapter was never a conquered territory places the 
country into the category of countries where local law of the people con­
tinued to apply until it was altered. In fact at various times this recogni­
tion of customary law was buttressed by statutes in Zambia.55 Thus for 
legislation to extinguish customary rights it must be explicit.56 A point 
which means that legislation must reveal a unit of intention to extinguish 
the rights in question. This can be done if the legislation in question 
clearly states its intention to achieve the desired results. In this respect we 
can therefore observe that although the British government did grant the 
British South Africa Company the right to own land in 1889,57 and in 
1911 granted58 the right to alienate such land, a right which the Crown 
later revoked (as it transferred in 1924 to the Governor the right to 
alienate land in the name of the Crown and on its behalf which could
53. Hall, a treatise on the Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction o f  the British 
Crown, 1894, pp  11-12; See also  Sobhuza v. Miller [1926], A .C . 518.
54. E .g . Nyali Ltd. v. Attorney-General, per L ord  D enning [1956], 1 Q-E). ]. at p .9
1. at p.9.
55. E.g. Royal Charter of Incorporation of the British South Africa 
Company, 29 October, 1889, Clause 14; Barotseland North-Western 
Rhodesia Order in Council, 1899 Article 9; North-Eastern Rhodesia 
Order in Council 1900, and Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911.
56. Colder v. Attorney-General o f  British Columbia (1969), 7 D.L.R. 59.
57. Royal Charter incorporating the British South Africa Company, 29 
October, 1889, s.3.
58. Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911, s.40.
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lawfully be granted or disposed of by the Crown,59) it was not until 1928 
that it extinguished African land rights.60 In that year machinery was 
needed by which African land rights over land granted or available for 
grant to non-Africans for economic development could be extinguished. 
This led to the passing of the Northern Rhodesia (Crown Lands and 
Native Reserves) Order in Council. By this Order in Council, land (other 
than land in Barotseland, the freehold areas vested in the British South 
Africa Company, and land alienated by that Company before 1 April, 
1924, or in perpetuity by the government of Northern Rhodesia between 
April, 1924 and 22 March, 1928) was divided into Crown lands and 
Native Reserves. All rights of the British Sovereign in or in relation to the 
Crown lands were vested in and made exercisable by the Governor who 
was empowered, subject to the provisions of any law and of any direc­
tions given to him by the Secretary of State, to make grents and disposi­
tion of Crown lands. In the same legislation the rest of the land was 
vested in the Secretary of State and set aside in perpetuity for the sole and 
exclusive use and occupation of the Natives of Northern Rhodesia.
Here it could be submitted that after customary land rights were ex­
tinguished by this Order in Council, the minerals were vested in persons 
and entities in whom the Order vested the land and as detailed by it, i.e. 
in the three freehold areas in the British South Africa Company, in 
unalienated Crown land in the Crown, in alienated lands to the various 
persons to whom such land had been alienated, and in the Native 
Reserves in the Secretary of State. As at common law minerals are part 
and parcel of the land,61 and consequently the owner of land is entitled 
prima facie to everything beneath or within it down to the centre of the 
earth. If land is acquired, the estate thus acquired includes minerals 
which at the time of acquiring the interests had not been severed in right 
or in fact. The ownership in the minerals under the land, however, may
59. Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924, s2; for Governors 
powers see s. 14.
60. Northern Rhodesia (Crown Lands and Native Reserve) Order in 
Council, 192S. In its preamble the Order clearly states that its purpose 
is to declare land within Northern Rhodesia Crown and uses 
explicit sections, e.g. s.6 reads ‘the lands described in the
schedule here to and known as Native Reserves, as also the appendant 
rights setforth in the said scheme, are hereby vested in the Secretary 
of State...’ See also ss3 and 4 dealing with Crown land granted 
to the Company and land alienated by the Company.
61. Seddon v. Smith (1877), 36 L.T. 168.
95
be severed from the ownership of the surface. And minerals so severed 
become a separate tenement, capable of being held for the same estates 
as other hereditaments and with the like incidental rights of ownership.62 
Where this has happened, it has been done by conveyance of minerals ex­
cepting the surface63 or by an Act of Parliament as in the Zambian Mines 
and Minerals Act. The Company claimed title to mineral rights which 
until severence remained in the owner of the land, yet there is nothing in 
any of the concessions or Orders in Council which could possibly be 
interpreted as severing title to minerals from land ownership. The 
government had no power, apart from any provision in the statutes (and 
there appears to have been none), to deal with minerals except in so far as 
they passed under the common law by a grant of the law. The passing of 
the 1928 Order in Council itself is further support for the argument ad­
vanced above, since the situation was otherwise it would not have been 
necessary to execute the Order. The admission in the various legislation 
prior to this order that all minerals belonged to the British South Africa 
Company with no separate ownership of unserved minerals legally possi­
ble and customary land rights still in force, were merely mistaken admis­
sions that the Company had rights which in fact could not actually 
belong to it. Thus the legislation was entirely nugatory and without any 
operative effect at all.
Legislation and the rights in the Company
The main argument here is that most of the legislation passed in relation 
to mining rights did not suffice to rebut the presumption of the owner­
ship of minerals arising from surface ownership.64 Thus since the conces­
sions did not operate to vest the mineral rights in the Company, for the 
reasons discussed earlier, it was necessary to have a vesting statute. There 
is no doubt that none of the statutes could be said to have vested such 
mineral rights in the Company.65 Partly this is because most of the 
legislatures that passed the enactments in question were all of limited 
authority and partly because the laws in question have general laws 
which would not be expected to deal with private rights whose terms
62. Cox v. Clue (1884), 5 C.B. 533.
63. Ibid.
64. Humphries v. Broaden (1850), 12 O.B. 739.
65. Howley Park Coal and Cannel Co. v. London and North Western Rail Co 
[1913], A.C. 11.
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required to be examined with some strictness.66 The same contention 
applies to any of their clauses that claimed to be for the private advan­
tage of the Company.67 This consideration is particularly important here 
where, for part of the time the legislature was itself controlled by the 
party in whose favour the enactments were being passed, and where 
throughout the period, all legislation relating to minerals had to be 
approved by the same party, without doubt a person with power to, 
legislate could do so for his own benefit,68 but the courts today might not 
follow this reasoning as what is here being dealt with is essentially a 
privilege and not anything else.69
The 1912 Mining Proclamation
Before dealing with this legislation, it is important to refer briefly to two 
Orders in Council which made references to mineral rights, namely the 
Company’s Charter and the 1911 Order in Council.
T he Company’s Charter of 1889 gave no rights of property or power 
of administration, but only capacity to acquire them. It recited certain 
concessions or agreements which had been obtained from native chiefs, 
and one of its clauses empowered the Company to hold their full benefit 
so far as valid for the purposes of the Company.70 The 1911 Order in 
Council on the other hand granted powers to the Company as a govern­
ment to grant land and mineral rights.71 These powers were revoked in 
1924 when the Company ceased to be government.72
Having mentioned the two orders in Council in this respect, the 1912 
Mining Proclamation was the first formal mining legislation and in its 
preamble it stated that:
Whereas the right of searching and mining for and 
disposing of all minerals and mineral oils in Northern 
Rhodesia notwithstanding the dominion or right which 
any person, company syndicate or partnership may
66. Attorney-General fo r  Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers (1924), A.C. 337.
67 Union o f  South Africa (Minister o f  Railway) v. simmer and Jack Proprietary 
(1918) A.C. 603; See also Commissioner o f  Public Works (Cape Colony) v. 
Logan [1903] A.C. 335
68. Philip v. Eyre (1869), 5 Q-B. 225.
69. R.v. Lord Crewe [1910] 2 K.3. 628.
70. Royal Charter of Incorporation of the British South Africa Company,
29 October, 1889, clause 2.
71. Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911, S.40.
72. Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924, S.2.
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possess in and to the soil on or under which such 
minerals and mineral oils are found or situated is vested 
in the British South Africa Company73
However this recital was not conclusive evidence as to the ownership of 
mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia nor did it vest them in the Com­
pany. A mere recital in a statute, though admissible in evidence as proof 
of the facts recited74 is not conclusive, and a court is at liberty to consider 
the facts or the law to be different from the statement in the recital.75 
Thus the recital in the 1912 Mining Proclamation can well be read as 
meaning that the rights mentioned belong to the British South Africa 
Company as a government, and not to it beneficially, or alternatively, it 
may well be that the recital is not conclusive as to the truth of its allega­
tion,76 or it may be disregarded as a mis-recital.77 Such mis-recitals have 
been held not to be absolutely unknown even in acts which have been 
framed by skilled and careful draftsmen.78 However that may be, this is 
also a case where the variation between the recital and the earlier 
documents make its accuracy suspect. At most it amounts to nothing 
more than a statement that the Company has certain rights which are cer­
tainly not exclusive or vested as every claim taken out under the later pro­
visions of the Ordinance limited the area over which these rights could be 
exercised. But the claim of the right of interference with private land, 
advanced for the first time here, makes it fair to suppose that at this date 
the Company had already realised that any rights they might have acquir­
ed depended solely on their land ownership and did not extend to land in 
other ownership and as such they sought to enlarge their rights if possible 
by this recital.
The 1958 Mining Ordinance
The 1958 Mining Ordinance in its section 3 did, after vesting the minerals 
throughout Zambia in the Crown, state that:
73. Mining Proclamation No. 1 of 1912.
74. Sturla v. Freccia (1879), 12 Ch.D. 411.
75. Kent Coast Rail Co. v. London, Chatham and Dover Rail Co.
(1868), 3Ch. 556; and also Houghton v. Fear Brothers Ltd., and
Willsher, [1913), 2 K.B. 342.
76. Merttens v. Hill [1901] 1 Ch. 842 at p.852.
77. Headland v. Caster [1905] 1 K.B. 231.
78. Ibid., p .231.
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Nothing in this section (a) shall operate to vest in Her 
Majesty any right of ownership in, of searching or mining 
for minerals, mineral oils or natural gases which is now 
vested in the Company.79
Again this provision did not suffice as being able to grant mineral rights 
to the British South Africa Company. It merely makes a statement that 
certain mining rights are vested in the Company but does not purport 
actually to vest them, or to give any foundation for the statement thus 
made. In fact it offers a sharp contrast in construction to section 3 
vesting the minerals in the Crown which declares that:
All rights o f ownership in, of searching and mining for 
and of disposing of all mineral oils and natural 
gases are hereby vested in Her Majesty notwithstanding 
any right o f ownership or to any minerals, mineral oils 
or natural gases or in or to the soil on the or under 
which such minerals, mineral oils, or natural gases are 
found or situated.80
Until this legislation was passed the legal title to the minerals between 
1928 and 1958 remained in the owners of the land where they had been 
vested by the Northern Rhodesia (Crown Lands and Native Reserves) 
Order in Council of 1928 and which as shown earlier was valid under 
common law principles of land tenure and also by reason of the absence 
of any legal severance of the title to minerals from that of the land before 
them. The statement in the legislation that certain rights belonged to the 
Company was erroneous as there were none since the Company never 
owned the land as unsevered minerals cannot be the subject of separate 
ownership from land ownership. Thus, the vesting of mineral rights in 
the Crown in 1958 constitutes in itself a positive and practical recognition 
of i he contention discussed here in that it implicitly recognised that until 
that lime mining rights were not vested in the Crown alone but in all land 
owners. Consequently the Crown could not have been the source of the 
Company’s title to minerals, since if the righ s were not owned by surface 
owners there would not have been any need for vesting the minerals in
79. Mining Ordinance, 1958, s.3 (2).
80. Ibid.
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the Crown and the severing of ownership of minerals from the ownership 
of land which this Ordinance actually effected. Taking the position of 
ihis contention in respect of the Company, if the company already own­
ed these rights, what was the neeed of its making the statement contained 
in the 1958 Ordinance? It would seem that the Company knowing it had 
not secured these rights attempted here to strengthen its position by 
transferring its claims from a mere recital where it was placed in the 1912 
Proclamation to a substantive section in the 1958 Ordinance.
By implication this suggests that there was a reason for this difference 
as no change would be made in dealing with the same subject unless the 
object was either to limit, or at least vary, the exercise of the claim made, 
or alternatively to provide an additional mode of attaining the subject 
previously aimed at. And by the same contention if a statute records 
existing powers, nothing would be gained by its enactment as nothing 
would be added to the existing law.81 Hence, it could be submitted that 
this provision did not alter the Company’s position at all and that the 
reason for making it was that this was not a true vesting section it re­
quires a very clear and unmistakeable language in a subsequent statute to 
revive or recreate a void right.82 In the case of a corresponding section 
under construction in an Australian case Colonial Sugar Refinery Co. v. 
Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners,83 the section was held not to 
vest any rights in the Company involved for the first time or as it was put 
by the court:
It is not a vesting section in the sense that it operates 
to transfer any lead at all. It refers to the vesting as a 
state of things already accomplished.84
or later in the same judgement:
The circumstances existing are to continue to have the 
same operation and effect as they would have had 
without the section.85
81. Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, (1920], A.C. 561.
82. Lauri v. Read [1892] 3 Ch. 402 at p.420.
83. Colonial Sugar Reßnery Co. v. Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners [1927] 
A.C. 359.
84. Ibid., p .360
85. Ibid., p.361 See also Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker [1901] A.C. 567.
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Section 3 cannot be construed as having been intended to be an 
interpretation of the preamble in the 1912 Mining Proclamation either. 
For although Parliament can by statute declare the meaning of previous 
Acts, and it is competent for parliament to do so even though its declara­
tion offended the plain language of the earlier Act,86 it would be an un­
necessary step to take unless it were intended and this contrary to the 
general principles of legislation, to make the explanatory Act retrospec­
tive, seeing that the subsequent statute could by independent enactment 
do what was desired. As has been suggested,87 great unfairness may 
ensue if an interpretation which an act of parliament would fairly bear 
unaided by subsequent statutes was inferentially changed by other words 
in a subsequent act. In any case had this section been intended to be used 
as an intepretation section, it would have been easy and necessary to have 
used words to the effect that these rights always were, and should be 
taken to be vested, as had been done in some cases88 instead of making 
the bare statement that they were vested as was done in this ordinance.
It could be submitted in this respect that if a statement was erroneous 
it can be disregarded, as was held in some cases89 which apparently over­
ruled earlier decisions and that if a legislature had made a mistake only 
the legislature could correct it.90 Thus this section in the 1958 Ordinance 
could alternatively, be regarded not as a mis-statement of fact, but as 
merely a legal opinion which was not to be looked upon as part of the 
law. For although the legislature can declare what the law is going to be, 
it cannot say what the law was.91 It was held in Ormond Investment 
Company v. Betts92 that a subsequent legislation, if it proceeded upon an 
erroneous construction of previous legislation, cannot alter that legisla­
tion. Later in the same case the House of Lords stated that the interpreta­
tion of an Act cannot be inferentially changed by other words in a subse­
quent Act.93
86. Ormond Investment Company v. Betts, [19281, A.C. 143.
87. Armond Investment Company v. Betts [1927], 2 K.B. 346.
88. Ibid. _  „
89. Colonial Sugar Refinery Company v. Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioner,
supra, p. 123.
90. Labrador Company v. R. [18921, A.C. 104.
91. Princess Estate Cor. v. Registrar o f  Titles, [1911], T .P.D. 1076.
92. [1927] i  K.B. 334
93. Ormond Investment Company v. Betts, [1928], A.C. 143, at p. 155
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Therefore, the importance of any change of wording has been shown 
by several cases94 because any change in the words of a statute imports 
vagueness as to what is really meant.95 Besides the interpretation of such 
statutes which were urged upon the legislature by the Company were con­
trary to principles relating to the construction of statutes. A statute is not 
to be construed so as to deprive a man of his property without his having 
an opportunity of being heard, unless it clearly appears that, that was 
intended. Thus, there seems to be nothing in the 1958 legislation indica­
tive of the legislature having intended such a breach of natural justice.
The Matter of Levying Royalties
If the British South Africa Company owned exclusive mineral rights, 
there is no doubt that it could then levy royalties by agreement without 
any statutory authority,96 but the miner received his rights from public 
officers and the officials were exempt from public liability. If the miner 
got his rights from the Company as owners of exclusive mining rights 
then the royalties would come to them as monies derived directly from 
the right to minerals,97 but if the correct view be that he got his title from 
the state, and not at all from the Company, then the royalties were due to 
the state which gave the title. Hence such royalties were not a source of 
revenue connected with the mineral rights of the Company98 and in the 
same way one can no more say that these were sources of revenue con­
nected with the mineral rights, than that the purchase money for a thing 
is connected with the thing that is sold. They are a consideration for the 
rights obtained by the person exercising mining rights. The British South 
Africa Company could only be entitled to sources of revenue connected 
with mineral rights, i.e; which go with mineral rights, which are attached 
to them, and which the owner of the mineral rights can get by virtue of 
mineral rights, and not monies paid for the right to use such rights. The 
fact then that these royalties were levied under statutory authority raises 
a strong presumption that they were the property of the state, and not of
94. Esqumault Water Works Company v. City o f  Victoria Corporation,
[1907], A.C. 507.
95. Labrador Company v. R., supra p .120
96. R. v. Visagie, 1963-1964 Z and N.R.L.R. 140
97. Commissioner fo r  Inland Revenue v. L.P. Syndicate Ltd., [1928] T .P.D . 199, at 
p .206.
98. Rocher v. Registrar o f  Deeds. [1911] T .P.D . 996, at p.998.
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the Company. Thus, when they were expressed to be paid to the Com­
pany, it was the Company as government that the payment had to be 
made to, a presumption reinforced by the provisions giving officials 
powers in connection with them. Moreover, although in one sense these 
are a tax, royalties are really a reservation out of the grant of the right to 
mine by the owner of minerals" and so are presumably due to the 
government. If this contention is not correct, the legislation which 
granted the royalty to the Company might as well be held to be obnox­
ious on the ground that the one thing that a subordinate legislature, can­
not do is to levy a charge for the benefit of a private individual as that 
would not be a taxing measure and hence would be illegal.100 In practice 
such a case would not arise although it seems however, that such a case 
did indeed arise in the legislative grant of royalties to the British South 
Africa Company, and that no doubt such legislation was therefore 
illegal.101
Also as the Company claimed mineral rights on the basis of grants it 
was necessary for it to prove the legal basis of its claim to the right to 
charge royalties. A royalty interest could perhaps have been created in 
favour of the Company by grant or by reservation or exception just like a 
mineral interest. This could have been done by the landowner conveying 
a royalty interest in the land. But a graver doubt exists still as to whether 
the minerals were due to the Company and this arose from the fact that 
no instrument existed granting the Company these rights.
This discussion leads us to the conclusion that with no separate owner­
ship of minerals and royalty, all this legislation gave, whether in connec­
tion with vesting or royalties was nothing beneficial and was therefore 
entirely nugatory and legally unenforceable.
Recognition by the Crown as a basis for the Company’s Claims
Here, the issue is whether the Crown did anything that gave the Com­
pany a title to any mineral rights. It has been shown that the Crown had 
made no grant since recognition by the Crown as a source of title means
99. Chappelle v. R. [1904], A.C. 135.
100. Union o f  South Africa (Minister o f  Railways) v. Simmer and Jack Proprietary, 
[1918], A.C. 603.
101. Mchlary v. R. [1912], A.D. 199.
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nothing unless it means that a grant of exclusive rights by the Crown is to 
be implied. There can be no such implications as there are known 
foundations for the Company’s claims namely, the concessions. In re 
Southern Rhodesia102 it was stated that ‘erroneous acquiescence by the 
first party in the view of his own rights and asserted by the second neither 
extinguished title in the one nor created it in the other.’103 Later it was 
again stated that ‘the Crown recognised the concession for what it might 
be worth on its true construction, recognition could give no title where 
none existed already.’104 Similar statements in substance had been said in 
Labrador Company v. R .105 where it was expressed that for a recognition 
to be effectual for the purpose of curing a defective title. It must be made 
with the knowledge of the defects to be cured, and no such knowledge on 
the part of the Crown can in this case be inferred from its officers,’ 
mistaken view of the position of the Company. Thus, there is no hint 
anywhere either in the legislation or anywhere else of any intention by the 
Crown to remedy a defective title held by the Company or to create a new 
one. The ordinances were all passed for the purposes of regulating min­
ing, not with any object of dealing with the Company title. This recogni­
tion is according to the Company supposed to proceed from the recogni­
tion of the concessions, the Devonshire agreement, the 1950 agreement, 
and legislation.
The Concessions
Here, it should be stated that if the Company’s title rested on the conces­
sions, no new recognition by the Crown could carry the matter further. 
The concessions had been recognised for what they were worth as stated 
in In re Southern Rhodesia, thereby leaving the value of the concessions 
to be decided, when necessary, by the proper tribunal. As the Privy 
Council in In re Southern Rhodesia stated, only public acts by which one 
independent sovereign, however humble, enters into political relations 
with the agents of another can derive their judicial characters from their 
recognition and adoption by the Crown106 and went to hold that:
102. supra.
103. Ibid., p.228.
104. Ibid., p.238.
105. Supra, p .122. Also the same principle prevails in mistakes in the law of contract, 
See Blay v. Pollard and Morris, [1930], 1 K.B. 628.
106. Supra p.228. See also Cook v. Spring, supra p.572 and
Nissan v. Attorney-General, [ 1970], A.C. 179.
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the concession is not of this character, like the Rudd 
Concession, it received the approval of the High 
Commissioner on behalf of the Crown, but is essentially 
a private contract though entered into by the concessionaire 
with the paramount chief, and like other legal documents 
its effect must depend upon the construction of its 
terms according to ordinary legal rules. It is indeed, of 
importance to the Company’s case largely because it 
confers private rights and is not in any sense a mere public 
act of state107
All the concessions obtained in Zambia by the Company are identical 
with the Rudd and Lippert concessions referred to already obtained in 
similar circumstances and by the same Company, and consequently seem 
indeed to be covered by the Privy Council decision.
Legislation
This as a ground of recognition can hardly be seriously maintained. Thus 
it cannot be said that by approving the Company’s ordinances and other 
mining legislation the Crown gave them any effect beyond their true con­
struction: and certainly the Crown is not bound where its prerogative 
would be affected as it is shown later that it would be, where this legisla­
tion held to touch precious minerals or precious stones in cases where 
these v/ere not expressly provided for. No better example of this could be 
had than is afforded by the decision in In re Southern Rhodesia. In that 
case it appears that the Company had passed regulations, which had been 
duly approved by the Colonial Office, claiming land as their own, but 
these the Privy Council disregarded.108 Given such a precedent there 
would seem to be no reason why the claims made by the Company in its 
mining regulations to own or control all the minerals and to own the 
royalties could not be equally questioned, and if need arose, be 
disregarded also.
107. Ib id ., p .229
108. S upra , p .226.
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This ground was unlikely to succeed given the Privy Council’s decision in 
a similar case. It was held by the Privy Council that a legislative recogni­
tion of the rights confirmed and guaranteed by the Crown by the second 
article of the Treaty of Waintangi could not of itself be sufficient to 
create a right in anybody cognisable in a court of law.109
The Devonshire Agreement of 1923
This document stated that:
Subject to the Provisions contained herein the Company 
shall retain and the Crown shall recognise the Company 
as the owner of the mineral rights acquired by the 
Company in virtue of the concessions obtained from 
Lewanika in North-Western Rhodesia covered by the 
aforesaid certificates of claim issued by Sir H.H. Johnson 
and by the two further certificates of claim issued by 
Sir H .H. Johnson and dated 25th September, 1893110
Here again it appears that only any existing rights the Company might 
have had under the concessions were recognised. The agreement did not 
pretend to be a new grant by the Crown, or to give any rights. The limita­
tions of the word ‘recognise’ were well known when the clause was 
drafted and therefore the word must have been used advisedly. Further­
more, in 1923, African land rights had not yet been extinguished and the 
common law presumption that the owner of the surface land owned the 
mineral rights had not been rebutted as mineral rights had not as yet been 
severed from land rights.111
The Devonshire agreement and the 1950 agreement
109. Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, supra, p.567
110. The Devonshire agreement, supra, clause (3) (g)
111. This as observed earlier happened only in 1928.
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The 1950 Agreement
This agreement in clause (a) provided that:
The Company shall subject to terms of this agreement, continue 
in undisturbed enjoyment, as now of the mineral rights owned by 
the Company in Northern Rhodesia until the 1st day of 
October, 1986.112
Here once more only mineral rights owned by the Company as of that 
date were guaranteed ‘undisturbed enjoyment’ to the extent that they 
already existed. The ordinance did not pretend to make a new grant nor 
add to those rights. And also applicable here are the other arguments 
advanced in connection with the Devonshire agreement so that even after 
this new agreement the Company’s claim to title had to be founded upon 
the original concessions and treaties and those as we have already shown 
did not convey any title.
It has been demonstrated that recognition cannot in any way be the 
basis of the Company’s claims as it still left unanswered the question of 
what rights were being recognised. It would be surprising indeed if the 
Crown had purported to deprive its protectorate of one of its principal 
assets by granting it to a Company especially one largely composed of 
foreign shareholders. Such a position would be difficult to reconcile with 
the position of the Crown as ‘champion and guardian of public rights’, 
and if indeed any such grant had been made it could well be said of it on 
the authority of Simpson v. Attorney-General113 that ‘no similar patent 
has ever been upheld in the worst days of the Stuarts.114
Concessions and Their Validity Regarding Mineral Rights Ownership
If the concessions are to be treated as valid by such a contention, there is 
a need to examine the nature of the rights and the areas they covered. 
First, the concessions have to be construed strictly against the grantees,
112. Agreement with the British South Africa Company on the Mineral Rights Owned 
by the Company in Northen Rhodesia and for the Eventual Transfer of those 
Rights to the Government of Northern Rhodesia, Cmd. 1950 
113 11904] A.C. 487. 
if4 . Ibid. p.487.
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both because they were drafted by them as observed earlier and because 
these concessions alienated public assets to private persons.115 Second, it 
should be submitted that the Company could never have acquired all the 
minerals and as such the concessions did not cover the whole country.
Precious stones
The concessions did not expressly give any rights of precious minerals 
and precious stones. But more than this, the concessions did not mention 
either of them and that being so, it might well be that they were not 
included in the rights granted and especially so as the distinction between 
them and base metals was well known in Kimberley where the company 
originated. Even if it were to be held that the company’s rights were 
founded on a grant from the Crown, they could not all the same include 
precious stones and precious minerals. For it was held in Attorney- 
General o f  British Columbia v. The A ttorney-General o f  Canada.1161 hat 
a conveyance by the Crown does not imply any transfer of its interest in 
revenues arising from the prerogative rights of the Crown and that the 
precious metals in, upon, and under such lands are not incidents of the 
land, but belong to the Crown and an intention to transfer them must be 
expressly or necessarily implied, and that cannot be until they have been 
severed from the title of the Crown.117 Any document purporting to do 
that is as was stated in Hudson’s Bay Company v. Attorney-General fo r  
Canada1 J8 to be construed strictly against the Company. In that case the 
Crown had granted by Charter to the Hudson’s Bay Company territory 
together with the silver and gold therein. Later by deed the Company sur­
rendered to the Crown all the rights and privileges it has been granted ex­
cept and subject to a right to retain the posts and stations which it then 
occupied, a right to blocks of land adjoining to be selected by the Com­
pany, and a right to certain other lands to be claimed within the fifty 
years following. Pursuant to the deed the Company received Crown 
grants of selected blocks which grants included the posts and station ad­
joining thereto, and Crown grants of land subsequently claimed by the
113. Union o f  South Africa (minister o f  Railways) v. Simmer and Jack Proprietary,
[1918), A .C . 603.
116. [1889], 14 A pp . C as. 295.
117. Wolley v. Attorney-General fu r  Victoria, [1876), A .C . 163. 'a s  the  iwo tides are
distinct’ p.202.
118. [1929), A .C . 285
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Company. The Company claimed rights to gold and silver in those ateas. 
However the court held that the precious metals in all the lands so vested 
in the Company belonged to the Crown and that the grants to which the 
Company was entitled under the deed were crown grants of lands with 
those incidents which ordinarily attached thereto, and that it was settled 
law that those incidents did not included the precious metals and that the 
right to retain the postsand stations was an exception to the general sur­
render, and was to be construed strictly against the Company; the use of 
the word ‘retain’ being held insufficient for this purpose.
The question o f the areas covered
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There is abundant evidence from Colonial Office reports and historical 
studies which conclusively supports the submission that all the conces­
sions obtained by the Company taken together did not cover the whole 
Country and in particular the Copperbelt, shown in Fig. 1 where the 
country’s mineral wealth that had been discovered was and from which 
the Company collected its loyalty payment.
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In considering the-question of territory among the Africans it is impor­
tant to remember that there was seldom if ever a need to define a boun­
dary with the precision with which it is normally defined in any system of 
law of European origin.· A boundary need be only as precise as the users 
of the land require it to be for the uses to which they put the land. It was 
not the habit of the Africans to mark, either notionally or actually, by 
any line on the ground a boundary between the land of one tribe and that 
of another. This necessarily means that all the attempts by the Company 
officials in the concessions purporting to indicate tribal areas by 
references to watersheds, rivers and, points of latitude and longitude 
must be rejected as meaningless.
With reference to the Copperbelt only, one of the concessions purports 
to be with a chief of the Lamba or the Lala, the indigenous tribes of the 
area and the only Lamba chief being Mushili. But according to historical 
studies,119 the Lambas were once under one paramount chief, but during 
the reign of Nkunine, in the early nineteenth century, Lambaland was 
divided between two chiefs, the present Zambia-Zaire frontier forming 
the rough dividing line between the two. The chief in the Congo Lamba­
land had greater power than his counterpart on the Zambian side. 
Mushili, from whom Thomson obtained his treaty, was fourth in succes­
sion to Nkunine. His original name was Mputo, but he took the name of 
Nkana when he became chief. However, in 1885 he submitted to Msiri of 
the Congo and adopted the latter’s name as token submission. The 
Southern boundary of Mushili’s chiefdom was roughly fifteen miles (24 
kilometres) south of the Kafulafuta river, his village being near the river 
Miengwe, a tributary of the Kafulafuta. When Thomson visited the 
country, he found Mushili near the Katanga river. This was the territory 
pf the Swaka which was divided by two chiefs, Nkote and Chitime. Con­
sequently, the Company could never have had mineral rights over the 
areas.
But the Company claimed that the Lewanika concessions covered the 
Copperbelt. Lewanika himself when asked to describe the boundary of
119. Dolce, The Lambas of Nothern Rhodesia. 1931, pp. 33-42.
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his kingdom, gave a list of seventeen tribes, none of which was Lamba or 
Lala.120 Their absence from the tribes under Lewanika’s suzerainty is 
confirmed by Coillard in his own list of tribes under Lewanika121 and by 
the Barotseland Boundary Arbitration proceedings.122 In Doke’s history 
of the Lamba tribe, the Lozi and Lewanika are not even mentioned, and 
it is important to remember that when Doke collected his material many 
Lambas were still alive who had been alive during the period of the mak­
ing of the Concessions.123 A Colonial memorandum by the Assistant 
Chief Secretary for Native Affairs on the extent of Lewanika’s domi­
nions124 stated that it regarded Lewanika’s dominions as that area in 
which there were indications that the people regularly paid tributes to 
him about the beginning of the century or regarded him as an overlord. 
The Lambas and the Lalas are not listed anywhere as any of the tribes 
that paid tribute to Lewanika at any time in history. In any case with 
regard to taking tribute as a test of suzerainty, the King of Italy’s Award 
on the Western Boundary of Barotseland of 1905 cautioned that:
Tribute can not, as such be considered as proving the 
authority as paramount ruler of him, in fact it often happens 
that a tribe, although independent, pays tribute to the chief 
of another stronger tribe, either in order by this means to escape 
being harassed by him and to avoid war or in order to gain his 
goodwill and protection125
120. See list compiled by Major Adams in letter from him to Foreign Office, 24 
August, 1897. C.O. African South, 552.
121. Coillard listed twenty one tribes but again there is no mention of the Lamba. See 
Northern Rhodesia Government, British South Africa Company Claims to 
Mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia, supra p. 15. There are other reports which 
argue that it covered large areas e.g. Report by Major Harding to Colonial 
Office, 30 April 1902, C.O. African South 695, and Corydon to Colonial Office, 
25 July 1901, C.O Africa South 659. But these were Company commissioned 
reports. Whitt has criticised reports by Gibbons & Harding, ‘Ethno History of 
the Upper Zambezi' (1962), 11 African Studies, p. 23. Mainga, criticises the use 
of evidence of foreigners on the grounds that they did not know the country well 
but ironically goes on to rely on selected evidence, of the same worse still of those 
who were interested parties, that is favourable to her case that the boundary was 
wider than suggested in this study without convincing reasons as to why it is more 
acceptable than that which limits Lozi influence and treats raiding as proof of 
owne ship of territory. Buiozi under the Luyana Kings, supra, p. 165.
122. Ibid. This is from a list taken from the papers of the Barotseland Boundary 
Arbitration, 1963. The Lambas once again fail to appear.
123. Doke, supra.
124. Letter from Native Affairs Comm, to Chief Secretary, 15 Oct. 1S27, ZA1/9 File 
No. 35 (National Archives), Lusaka.
125. C.O. 795-99, File No. 45015.
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None of the concessions also purported to be with a Tonga ruler. The 
Lozi rule did not extend over the area covered by the present day 
Southern Province, although there is evidence that Lewanika raided 
them as did the Matebele. Chief Monze, a senior Tonga Chief claimed by 
the Company to be included in Lewanika’s concessions, laughed, it is 
reported, when it was suggested to him that Lewanika was his Para­
mount Chief.126 With regard to the Gwembe district, an area within 
Southern Province. The Native commissioner for the district during the 
Company administration wrote in the following terms:
There is no recognised paramount chief of the natives inhabiting 
this district. They are all Batonga, with the exception of a few by 
the Kafue — Zambezi confluence but subdivided into lesser tribes. 
There are the Bana Mweemba, the Bawe, the Balumbila and the 
Nanainga; the last include a number of Bagoba, who are totally 
distinct from the Batonga, speaking a different tongue.127
Most of Central Province does not appear to have been covered either. 
Stephenson, who opened the Ndpla station in 1905 as a Company official 
and who was very familiar with the area, in a letter to the governor
stated:
possibly the Lenje Chiefs Chipepo (or Mwashi) and Chinamamighi 
occasionally have paid Lewanika tribute though they never told me 
they had or were doing so but even with these doubtful exceptions 
there is not the least doubt the Natives of Ndola, Broken Hill, 
Chilanga, Feira and Mkushi sub-districts of the territory, never had 
anything to do with Lewanika and whose taxes ten percentum have 
been paid to the Barotse fund, have suffered a great wrong to the 
extent of some thousands of pounds sterling, which I have no 
doubt your excellency will see righted.12®
126. Ibid.
127. Letter from Griffin to the Company, March 1914, Ibid.
128. Letter from Stephenson to Sir Hubert Young, 10 September, 
1925, Ibid.
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Early in 1905 when Colonel Harding, an official of the Company with 
Barotse native police and some indunas entered the Lenje country west 
of what is now Kabwe, he is reported to have caused protests from the 
Administrator of North-Eastern Rhodesia, on the ground that this was 
not Lozi country.129 In 1900 one Gielgud and one Anderson were sent by 
the Company to establish a station in the Hook of the Kafue; in their 
report they stated that:
(a) the whole of the Hook of the Kafue is inhabited by 
Mbaluba, Amalamba, Amankuni and Mbayila. (b) None 
o f these people were o f Barotse blood, nor with one 
exception, do we know of any Barotse living east of the 
Kafue. I do not however go so far as to state that 
there are none.130
Another area not covered is the Kaonde and Lunda country. In 1905 the 
then District Commissioner, a Company official wrote to the Secretary 
for Native Affairs disclaiming any Lozi influence in the area.131 Mellard, 
a Company official in Kasempa132 wrote that the Lozi had no influence 
in his area and later in his book on the Kaonde country there is no men­
tion of the Lozi ever ruling this part of Zambia.133 There is on the con­
trary a statement by one Mutendi, a Lunda headman on the Kabompo 
river who swore before the District Commissioner that the Lunda:
never recognised Lewanika. The Lunda have never 
recognised him and have no wish to do so. We do not 
want to pay tribute to Lewanika, we pay our tribute to 
the Boma every year.134
Thus none of the North-Eastern concessions covered the Copperbelt nor 
were any of the chiefs alleged to have entered into them of any impor­
tance.135 They could not cover the whole country unless they were 
granted by all the native chiefs of the country. But only 24 chiefs were
129. Ibid
130. C.O. 795-90
131. Letter, Copeman to Secretary Native Affairs, 25 May, 1905, C.O. 795-99, File 
No. 45015; also in 1N/1/9, (National Archives), Lusaka.
132. Ibid.
133. Mellard, In Witch Bound Africa, 1923.
134. C.O. 795—99, File No. 45015. The Lunda elder swore before Bruce Miller, 
Native Commissioner on 20 January, 1916.
135. E.g. Chitimukulu of the Bemba is missed out.
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parties to them, whilst there are seventy three tribes in Zambia, as shown 
in Figure 1. Lewanika and the other chiefs named by the Company were 
never in fact, in territorial possession of the land over which the Com­
pany claimed they granted it mineral rights.
The Company’s knowledge Regarding concessions and areas covered
The British South Africa Company knew that its concessions did not 
cover the whole country and particularly the Copperbelt. In 1817 the 
Foreign Office sent to the Colonial Office a report by Major Adams on 
the extent of the Barotse Kingdom.136 This was accompanied by a map 
on which the boundaries of the Barotse Kindgom were marked by a line, 
which in certain respects fell short of the boundary subsequently defined 
in the Order in Council of 1899. This was pointed out by the Company to 
the Colonial Office but it made no claim that the line was inaccurate137 
And earlier in 1902, its own officials had reported to it that Barotse 
influence was non-existent in the entire Hook of the Kafue.138 The 
awareness of the Company is confirmed by the events leading up to the 
change of the boundary in 1905. Then the Company had suggested that 
the boundary between North-Eastern and· North-Western Rhodesia be 
altered. The proposed new boundary involved adding to North-Western 
Rhodesia, considerable country from North-Eastern Rhodesia. It was 
recognised at the Colonial Office that if North-Western Rhodesia was so 
extended it would no longer be coterminous with the country over which 
Lewanika ruled. The Company stated however that the change was 
necessary for administrative reasons.139 The proposal was subsequently 
approved by the Colonial Office.140 But Company correspondence 
reveals that its claims that it wanted to change for administrative reasons 
was fiilse. In 1902 the Secretary of the Company wrote to the Admini­
strator of North-Eastern Rhodesia, to explain why some of his territory 
was being removed. He stated that:
136. Letter, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 14 October, 1917, C.O. 795-99
137. Letter, British South Africa Company to the Colonial office, 8 December, 1917 
Ibid.
138. Report of Val Gelgud, 30 October, 1902 to Mr. Mullon, Company 
Administrator in Salisbury, C.O. 795-99, File No. 45015.
139. See letter by Jones, Secretary to the Company’s London Board to Codrington 13 
February, 1904 and in Company’s London Board to Codrington 13 February, 
1904 and in Company letter to the C.O 24 June, 1904 African South; 746. Also 
Company letter to C .O .i l  October, 1903 Africa South No. 717.
140. Gazette Notice 29 September, 1905, of both North-East Rhodesia (P.T.O)
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Under the Johnson concessions our rights are founded 
upon the very large number of contracts made with 
personages whose existence to say the least are some 
what mythical. Had we ever to prove our title to any 
of these rights we should not be in quite so favourable a 
position in your territory as Barotseland141
In reply the Administrator for North-Eastern Rhodesia wrote:
But as regards the proposed boundary with North-Western 
Rhodesia I cannot quite understand your views, your 
rights to minerals may be very clear under the 
Lewanika concession but to contend that any such 
concession or any agreement whatever with Lewanika 
has any connection with territory or natives further 
east than sitanda is beyond all reason, if you are 
going to hold your rights on such a fiction they will rest 
on a less secure basis than at present. The contracts on 
which you hold your rights to minerals in North-Eastern 
Rhodesia are all made regular by Johnson, there is a lot 
o f humbug about the original agreements but nothing so 
fictitious as the suggestion that Lewanika had at any 
time any influence there. 1 think there must be some other 
reason for your desire to add territory to North-Western 
Rhodesia.142
In another letter, after agreeing that the change should go on since it was 
in the interests of the Company, the administrator discussed and dismiss­
ed each and every reason advanced for the change.143 Further he stated 
that the Mashukulumbwe country was not covered by the Barotse con­
cessions. Even after the change of the boundary in a letter to the Colonial 
Office the administrator stated that:
and Norih-West Rhodesia, Notice No. 88. C.O. 795-88 the letter approving 
boundary change is 28 October, 1904 Africa South No. 164
141. Letter by Fox, Secretary of the British South Africa Company, March 1901, cited 
in Northern Rhodesia Government, British South Africa Company Claims to 
Mineral Rights to Northern Rhodesia, supra, p .23
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
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I think that Lewanika and his Council have made up 
their minds for sometime that the Eastern part of North- 
Western Rhodesia is nothing to them. They exercise no 
control, almost no influence outside the Barotse 
valley.144
Oddly, there was never any acceptance by the British government that 
the concessions covered the whole country. That is revealed by Colonial 
Office correspondence. For example, at the time of the Yeta agreement 
the Colonial Office wrote to the Company that:
unfortunately the question of the area covered by the 
Lewanika concession is still under consideration, and 
this, of course, affects the Map, and through it, the 
agreement. We are now awaiting a letter from Young 
on the subject145
In fact when it was suggested to the British government by the company 
that they approve the 1905 boundary changes as confirmation of what 
amounted to the Barotse boundary, the Colonial Office insisted that:
There has never betn any specific declaration on behalf 
of the Colonial Office that the Lewanika concessions 
covered the whole of North-Western Rhodesia as extended 
in 1905 in approving the extension of Barotse-North- 
Western Rhodesia in 1905, H.M.G. did not intend to 
extend Lewanika’s suzerainty over areas in which he did 
not then exercise and had never previously exercised 
it.146
The object of the British government in approving the extension is 
indicated in a letter written to approve the transfer which stated:
The adoption of the boundary now proposed would involve 
the transfer of a large area from North-Eastern to 
North-Western Rhodesia. If it is in the interest of both
144. Letter by Codrington to Colonial Office, 12 November, 1909, Africa South No 
932.
145. Letter by Malcom President of the Company, 23 June, 1937, C.O. 795-88 Filj 
No. 45050.
146 Ibid.
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territories that this area should be administered as part 
of North-Western Rhodesia, Mr. Lyttleton will not object 
to the transfer, but before taking the necessary action 
for effecting such a transfer he proposes to consult the 
High Commissioner and Consul-General for the British 
Central African Protectorate.147
Later in the 1930s it was more insistent in its explanation and stated in a 
letter to the Company:
your deduction from this that His Majesty’s government 
had accepted the view of the Company is erroneous.14*
It has to be remembered that the suggestion for the division emanated 
from the British South Africa Company and was put forward ostensibly 
on administrative grounds, and in fact the Company appreciated that the 
transfer was made for administrative convenience as shown by a strictly 
private and confidential memorandum by the Company’s secretary refer­
red to earlier. The Lewanika concession was not mentioned in the whole 
course of the correspondence as providing any basis for the new bound­
ary. In fact there was support within the Colonial Office for the submis­
sion advanced here that some areas within the country were not covered 
by the concessions. In an internal note one Colonial Official stated:
It is impossible not to have great sympathy with the 
Northern Rhodesia point of view. There are certainly areas 
o f Northen Rhodesia where the authority of the Paramount 
Chief o f Barotseland on which the mineral rights in the 
Western part o f the territory are based never ran.149
147. Letter from Colonial Office to the Company, 20 October. 1904, C.O. 79MS. PBe 
No. 45050.
148. Letter from Colonial Office to the Company, June, 1937, C.O. 795-M
149. Note by Cohen, See Northern Rhodesia Government, British South Africa 
Company Claims to Mineral fUfhts in Northern Rhodesia, supra, pp. 29-30
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The Crown rejected any suggestion that their recognition of the 1905 
boundary implied a change in the area in which the Company owned 
minerals and categorically stated:
It is simply inconceivable that the Colonial Office should 
have accepted the argument that the Company acquired 
rights in a specified area, based upon the renunciation by 
Lewanika of any such rights within that area, involved the 
simultaneous recognition by His Majesty’s government 
not only that Lewanika owned mineral rights throughout 
the area (even in those parts of it where the mineral had 
already been granted to the Company and where he had 
himself never claimed or exercised suzerainty), but also that 
the basis of the Company’s rights was in consequence 
automatically converted.150
From the available evidence, therefore, there can be no doubt that the 
concessions did not cover the whole country. Further the considerations 
advanced in the preceding sections lead us to conclude that there was no 
legal basis for the British South Africa Company’s claims to own mineral 
rights in Zambia. Also our analysis has shown that the practice whereby 
the Company was allowed to regulate mining and collect royalties was 
mistaken and that the royalties from the minerals were payable to the 
government and not the Company.
1*0. I cltci from  C olon ial O ffice to  British S ou th  A frica C om pany , 1938. C .O . 795-88.
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MINING RIGHTS BEFORE THE 1969 
MINING LEGISLATION
All legislation dealing with Mining during this period was introduced by 
the British South Africa Company. Such legislation created problems 
which were inherent in the nature of the legislation’s origins. These led to 
its repeal and replacement by the 1969 legislation.
Origins of the Legislation
The Company, as owners ot the mineral rights of Zambia, could by 
reason of the common law and without the aid of any legislation grant 
rights to prospect, mine and take away minerals. At common law, just as 
the owner of the land can dispose of his whole estate or interest in the 
land, including all that is beneath the surface, or a specifically defined 
portion only of that interest in the same way the owner of minerals can 
grant and dispose of his minerals.1 The Company did not, however, 
adopt the common law system of mineral tenure. The country was large­
ly unexplored and under-developed. With few mineral discoveries the 
common law conception of tenure was built around known mineral 
deposits as the Company could not hope to lease mineral land as it did 
not know which parts of the country were mineralised. Besides the coun­
try had not even been surveyed. It was in its interests, therefore, to pro­
mote a system which as far as possible opened the country to prospecting 
and mining. It was also imperative to the Company’s scheme to create 
mining rights exercisable under a system of licence and control, which 
were not dependent on the possession of full rights of ownership in the 
ground worked since although the Company claimed to own all the 
mineral rights in the country in reality it did not own all the land.
Essentially the Company sought a system which would best enable it to 
enjoy its ownership of mineral rights. The actual choice of the South 
African system was influenced as much by the factors already described 
and by the fact that most of the early miners were people and companies 
with a South African background — a country where the state had 
already devised legislation by which mining rights were granted over
1. The owner of minerals can grant a mineral lease of a mine to another for a term 
of years (See Can  v. Benson, (1868), 3 Ch. 524) or he may give a licence (See 
Sutherland v. Henthcote, [1892), 1 Ch. 475).
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private land. The real property law of South Africa, based as it did upon 
Roman-Dutch law, differed fundamentally from the common law. 
Under it the owner of the surface of the land was the owner of the whole 
of the land and of all minerals in it.2 But though this was so, the Roman- 
Dutch lawyers had not yet developed the theory of dominium in such a 
manner as to permit the severance of holdings horizontally. It follows 
that it was not possible, under the South African system, for one person 
to have ownership of the surface and another to have ownership of the 
subject minerals.3 No one could therefore transfer the dominium in 
unsevered minerals unless he transferred ownership in the land contain­
ing minerals.4
Gold and diamonds were discovered on the surface in the Transvaal in 
1881. Thus, at first mining consisted of surface workings which was 
something that could be undertaken by the landowner himself. But when 
the gold reef was not near the surface, prospecting and mining 
necessitated heavy expenditure. Then the landowner wanted to sell the 
prospecting and mining rights, and the intending mine owner, who had 
the available capital, was anxious to acquire them. Landowners began to 
give mining rights in the form of leases. To cope with this the Transvaal 
government modified the Roman-Dutch law in the 1885 Gold Mining 
Law,3 which was later consolidated into the 1908 Transvaal Precious and 
Base Minerals Act. In Section 67 o f this legislation, the state, while leav­
ing dominium in the minerals in the owner of the land regardless of 
Whether the owner was the state or a private individual reserved to itself: 
(a) the right of mining for and disposing of all precious metals and 
precious stones and (b) the right to proclaim land a public digging or 
mine.6 The significance of this was that the owner of the land remained 
the owner of all precious metals, but could not mine them although he 
could still exercise his Roman-Dutch rights of mining the base minerals 
on his land.
Further, the Act provided for the granting of mining leases which, m 
the first instance, were offered to the owner of the land and mineral 
rights on better terms than when granted to other persons but when these 
rights were not offered other compensation was provided in addition to
2. Rich and Bhyat v. Union Government, [1912], A.D. 719 at p.734.
3. Neebe v. Registrar o f  Mining Rights. [1902], T.S. 65 at p.85 per Wessels, J. 
Rocher v. Registrar o f  Deeds, [1911], T .P.D . at p.315 per Masson, J.
4. Le Roux and others v. Loewenthal, [1905], T.S. 742 at p .745
5. By this law, minipg rights could be granted by the state. See Gold Mining Law  
No. 8  of 1885.
6. See Precious Stones and Base Minerals Act. 1908, s.67.
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the mining lease. In addition to the mining lease it also adopted the claim 
system and the practice of proclaiming gold fields or public diggings 
whereby claims could be pegged by members o f the public holding a pro­
specting licence. The claim licence which was subsequently granted 
depended upon the fulfilment of its terms, and in particular, upon the 
punctual payment of the claim licences or where ore was being produced, 
of the digger’s licence fee. As a result the state gained effective control 
over the miner who had to fortify himself with the necessary state per­
mits, licences or leases and had to conform to the regulations, give the 
necessary notices, and carry out the various duties imposed upon him by 
the gold and diamond laws, in order to protect his holdings and escape 
the penalties imposed by these laws. Effectively, therefore, the South 
African system achieved over South African minerals what the Company 
wanted to achieve over Zambian minerals.
The South African influence in Zambian mining legislation came 
through Southern Rhodesia, where the claim system was introduced by 
the Pioneer Column. It was part of the contract with each member of the 
column that he was allowed to peg a certain number of claims. Though 
there were regulations governing the terms on which prospectors could 
acquire rights as early as 1890 in Southern Rhodesia7 and later in 1891, 
the Company applied to the territory the Proclamation by Her Majesty’s 
High Commissioner for South Africa on 10 June, 1891,8 which brought 
into being rules designed to be the temporary framework within which 
mining operated. The first regular system of mining in Southern 
Rhodesia, however, was not established until the Mines and Minerals 
Ordinance of 1895, drafted by the British South Africa Company and 
based substantially on the mining legislation of the Transvaal. The law 
was amended in 1898 and in 1903 the amendments and the 1895 Ordi­
nance were incorporated into the 1905 Mining Ordinance of Southern 
Rhodesia. When diamonds were discovered at Gwelo in 1906, a Mining 
Ordinance for precious stones was enacted on very similar lines to the 
1903 Mining Ordinance.9
7. See Mashonaland Mining Legislation No. 1 o f 1890.
8. See Hone, Southern Rhodesia, 1909, at p .239 for a reprint of the regulations.
9. It was different in one respect. The Ordinance introduced for precious stones 
system whereby the prospecting licence formed a contract between the Company 
and the holder, and was not of statutory force as was the case in the 1903 Mining 
Ordinance. This was of later significance in Zambia.
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Fari;' Mining Law
Prior to the existence of any mining code in Zambia, the British South 
Africa Company granted mineral rights to individuals by means of an ex­
change of letters.10 The terms of the grants specified the number of 
claims to be pegged within a stipulated area and in some cases granted 
the right to acquire farms of stipulated sizes. The Company always 
included in its exchange of letters the obligations of the grantee to allot to 
the Company a certain percentage of the equity share capital of any 
Company established to work a discovery (ranging from 30% to 50%) 
and the Company charged a royalty on all the companies so granted the 
right.11 In some cases the grants were absolute and without any right of 
reversion to the Company, e.g. the grant of mineral rights in respect of 
all but ‘reserved minerals’ to the North Charterland and Exploration 
Company (1937) in respect of an area of land known as the North 
Charterland Concession, the grant to Rhodesia Railways of mineral 
rights in farms adjacent to the railway system and the grant to De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd., of all mining rights throughout the country 
with respect to diamonds. In such cases, particularly that of the North 
Charterland Company, the British South Africa Company placed the 
grantees on the same footing as itself in regard to its exercise of mineral 
rights. The grantee, for instance, was not liable to pay royalty to the 
Company, but could trade in mineral rights in his area on his own ac­
count. These grants were recognised and continued under the post 1912 
Mining Legislation.
The 1912 — 1969 Legislation
The Company did formulate regulations for the North-Eastern part of 
the country,13 as well. However it was not until 1911 that it applied to the
10. See e.g. concessions to F.R. Burnharm, Pearl Ingram, the Bechuanaland Explora­
tion Company Ltd., and the Chartered Goldfields Ltd., dated 13 February, 1895 
and to J.W. Dore, 9 April, 1895, in Company Register of Titles, Geological 
Survey Dept., Lusaka.
11. See e.g. letter from British South Africa Company to Northern Territories British 
South Africa Exploration Company in Register of Titles, Geological Survey 
Dept., Lusaka. See note 8(a) on the file, page 55.
12. See s.5 of the Mining Proclamation, supra. Also see s.6 of the Mining Ordinance, 
Chapter 91 of the Laws of Zambia, 1965 ed.
13. See C.O. 417-506, they are contained in a letter from the British South Africa 
Company to the Colonial Office, 5 November, 1906.
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British High Commissioner’s Office of Southern Africa for a mining 
code for Northern Rhodesia. The first draft of the mining law was ready 
in the same year, drawn up by the Company and submitted to the 
Colonial Office on 9 January, 1911, for approval.14 The idea it seems 
was that the law should come into force as soon as the Order in Council 
amalgamating the administrations of North-East and North-West 
Rhodesia came into force. The draft corresponded closely to the North- 
East regulations referred to already and the 1906 Precious Stones Mining 
and Trade Ordinance and the 1903 Mining Ordinance of Southern 
Rhodesia. In discussing the drafts, the Company rejected all attempts by 
the colonial office to secure benefits from mining activities to the chiefs 
from whom they claimed to have obtained the concessions. For instance, 
at one stage of the drafting of the legislation, the Colonial Office 
suggested that the legislation should include a provision for the 
commutation of 1% royalty to the native chiefs. The Company’s reply 
was that such a provision was not one which could properly be included 
in a mining law.15 Meanwhile, it inserted clauses entrenching its owner­
ship of the mineral rights,16 and categorically stated that it had no inten­
tion of applying for a mining law which would limit in any way the full 
exercise by it of its mineral rights.17 The draft was accepted by the British 
government and was promulgated as the Mining Proclamation of 1912 
which took effect on 1, July, I912.18 In 1934 it was renamed the Mining 
Ordinance of 1934 and it survived with little substantive amendments in 
the 1958 Mining Ordinance.
Prospecting Rights
The law as established by both the 1912 Mining Proclamation and 
the 1958 Mining Ordinance was that with the exception of the North
14. See C.O. 417-506
15. See C.O. 417-424, letter of High Commissioner reporting on his visit to Southern 
Rhodesia to the Colonial Office, 5 November, 1906.
16. S e · British South Africa Company letter to Colonial Office, 15 February, 1911, in 
C.O. 417-506.
17. The company stated this very explicitly in a letter to the Colonial Office, 15 
February, 1911, in C.O. 417-506
18. See Mining Proclamation No. 1 of 1912.
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Charterland concession,19 the Western Province20 and special rights in
respect of diamonds which had been acquired by De Beers, the right to 
prospect could only be acquired from the British South Africa Company. 
Such right to prospect was ordinarily conferred by a prospecting licence 
given by the Company. In its application there was no restriction as to 
who could obtain mining rights nor was there any machinery to investi­
gate the financial and technical competence of applicants for mining 
rights.21 This left the field open for people with little money and possibly 
no mining experience to take out prospecting licences and eventually 
mining rights, with the inevitable result that they could withold mining 
ground from those who could develop it.
In general, a prospecting licence was no more than a contract which 
was made between the British South Africa Company and the prospec­
tor. It set out the terms on which the prospector could prospect and 
which, when he had made a discovery, conferred on him mining rights on 
certain terms and conditions. The Company, at the time of the drafting 
of the legislation, took care that many of the more important provisions 
regulating the activities of the holder were not stated in the mining 
legislation but were left to be written into the licence by the Company. In 
this way the Company thus acquired machinery by which it could control 
mining without further recourse to legislation. This approach was pro­
bably inspired directly by the Company’s experience in Southern 
Rhodesia. In that country the Company had included the terms of pro­
specting licences in the 1903 Mining Ordinance, and mining rights had 
therefore to be held on the terms laid down in the legislation. The only 
way in which different terms could be included in a grant would have 
been by amendment of that legislation, which was in fact opposed by the 
pioneer settlers. Consequently, when the Company came to framing the 
mining legislation in 1912, and found there was no opposition by settlers, 
care was taken to avoid this dependence on the statute. In consequence, 
however, mining right holders often carried on business under varying 
conditions, and since the terms of the licences were subject to negotia­
19. See s .6 o f  M ining O rd inance , 1958
20. It was covered  by the  N orthen  R hodesia O rder in C ouncil, 1924, which in article 
41 p rovided th a t ‘it shall n o t be lawful fo r any  purpose w hatsoever to  alienate 
from  the  C hie f and  people o f  the  B arotse , the  te rrito ry  reserved from  prospecting  
by virtue o f  the  concessions from  Lew anika to  the  British S outh  A frica  C om pany , 
da ted  the 17th day  o f  O c to b e r, 1900 and  the  11th day  o f  A ugust, 1909.’
21. T he only  restriction  related  to  age. T he app lican t had  to be at least 21 years o ld. 
See M ining O rd inance . 1958 s. 17(2)
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tion, they could not be predicted with any degree of certainty. This was 
not particularly welcome in mining circles, which preferred to have 
ample advance notice of their obligations so as to be able to predict their 
expense before committing large amounts of capital.
As the prospecting licence conferred on the holder the right to search 
for minerals, prospecting could not be done by a person other than the 
holder. To do so without a licence was prohibited and a criminal 
c. fence.22 The licence entitled the holder to post one or more prospecting 
noticcs on any ground,23 which was usually done after the discovery of a 
vein or lode. There was no fixed rule as to the amount of mineral to be 
discovered in order to make a posting although such a notice had to be in 
a prescribed form, and had to be displayed in a prescribed manner.24 A 
subsequent prospecting notice could not be posted until the earlier 
discovery notice had been removed and notice of abandonment posted.25 
Having posted a prospecting notice, the holder of the prospecting licence 
had exclusive rights to prospect over an area within a circle having a 
radius of 1,000 feet (30.5m) from the point where such notice was posted 
in the case of precious metals or precious stones or 3,000 feet (91.5m) 
form such a point in the case of base minerals. This exclusive right lasted 
for 30 days.
A prospector was allowed to do this on any land throughout the coun­
try unless it was declared to be reserved against prospecting, or where 
prospecting upon such land was permitted only after certain statutory 
consents were obtained. In other words it was not necessary for land to 
be declared or Gazetted to be open for prospecting. It was only necessary 
for it not to be closed against prospecting.
The relationship between the prospector and the owner or occupier of 
private land was regulated by law. Prospecting could not take place 
without the consent of the private owner or occupier upon land which
22. Ibid., s.9 provided that ‘any person who prospects for minerals or exercises any 
righl under a prospecting licence in contravention of the provisions of the section 
shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 200 pounds.'
23. Ibid., s.22 (1).
24. Ibid.. s.25 (I).
25. Ibid., see s.22 (4) which provided that ‘No person shall post a second or 
subsequent prospecting notice within an area specified in subseciion (5) of this 
section until such lime as every such notice previously/posted by him |in|such area 
and the peg upon which it was carried have been removed.’
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was within 200 yards (182m) of any occupied or temporarily unoccupied 
house or building, or within 50 yards (45.5m) of land cleared, ploughed 
or bona fide prepared for the growing of farm crops on which farm crops 
were growing, or on land where during the twelve months immediately 
next preceding, farm crops had been reaped, or on land which was in the 
vicinity of any cattle dip-tank or any private water supply.26
Besides the above the prospecting licence included other conditions 
with which the holder had to comply when he acquired a mining loca­
tion. These concerned, for example, the amount of work that had to be 
performed within stated periods in order to develop the location with a 
view to establishing that it was a workable proposition as a mine, and of 
course, with a view to the profitable working of such a location by the ex­
traction and removal of minerals.
A prospecting licence carried the right to peg one mining location. In 
1936 a review form of the licence was introduced and it was valid for one 
year only, but in 1948 a further revision permitted the pegging of more 
than one mining location on the same licence.
Exploitation Rights
A right to exploit mineral deposits could be acquired in either of the two 
ways: by pegging the claims or mining locations on discovery of minerals 
as a result of a prospecting licence; or by obtaining a direct grant of min­
ing rights or special grant.27 The first step in the acquisition of a mining 
right through the first method was the posting of a prospecting notice. 
Once the holder of a prospecting licence had posted a registration notice 
he could then apply for the registration of the area concerned as a mining 
location.28 The law enabled the holder of a mining location to apply for 
and obtain a certificate of special registration. This was conclusive 
evidence that all formalities required for the acquisition of a location had 
been observed. It means that the holder was entitled to the location free 
from any adverse claim and that nothing done or omitted to be done 
before the date of the certificate of special registration rendered the loca­
tion defeasible.29 This was welcome in that the special registration
26. Ibid., s.20 (1)
27. Ibid., ss.38, 46
28. Ibid., s.25 (I)
29. Ibid., ss.44 (1) and 47.
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ensured a guaranteed title and one which justified the expenditure of 
large sums of money. But there remained the problem that no proof was 
required of the discovery of a mineral within the area covered by the pro­
specting notice, prior to the act of locating, and marking the area, on the 
surface.30 Thus before a registration took place the applicant did not 
have to certify that a mineral vein or lode was found on the location. 
This omission in requiring proof meant that the original locator could 
hold the ground even when he made the location before any mineral was 
discovered on such a location.
The special grants were rights to mine and were acquired on applica­
tion from the Company and not by pegging a mining location.31 They 
were intended to be granted to companies with the financial resources to 
undertake prospecting. They mostly ended up in the hands of powerful 
mining companies and these areas became closed to holders of ordinary 
prospecting licences. The special grants, like the prospecting licences, 
took the form of private contracts and again differed in their detailed 
provisions. The special grant areas were regarded as consisting of blocks 
equivalent in size to a mining location. As with all other mining rights, 
the special grants had to be registered within a prescribed period or they 
became null and void. The grants had no fixed term, but continued in 
force until abandoned or forfeited pursuant to the provisions of the 
grants and the law until surrendered by the holder.
Obligations o f  Miners
Provisions in the prospecting licence tended to require the holder to ex­
ecute at least thirty feet (9m) of obligatory development work within four 
months of the registration of the mining location and to obtain an in­
spection in respect of work that had been carried on. For each succeeding 
year after the expiry of the first period of four months, he was required 
to execute at least sixty feet (18m)of development work and at or before 
the expiry of four years obtain an inspection certificate. The holder 
could, however, obtain what were called inspection certificates by pay­
ment, on a sliding scale, of cash in lieu of work.32 Failure to obtain an in-
30. Infact the same requirement prevailed as in ordinary registration. See ss.44 (3) 
and (1), Ibid.
31. Ibid.. s.38 (a) 38 (1)
32. Ibid., s.80, provided that 'there shall be paid to the Engineer a fee of one pound 
in respect of every inspection certificate and of every certificate of extra work 
issued by the Engineer under the terms of the prospecting licence in respect of 
any mining location.'
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an inspection certificate rendered the mining location liable to forfeiture 
to the Company. This measure was designed to cause holders of mining 
locations to exploit them and not merely sit back and hold them for 
speculative purposes, but, as is shown later, these measures failed to 
achieve this desired objective.
Similarly, a holder of a special grant was required within the period of 
four months from the date of registration, to execute upon one of the 
subdivisions a footage of development work amounting in total to not 
less than thirty multiplied by the total number of subdivisions, and to 
obtain an inspection certificate confirming that the work had been car­
ried out. For each succeeding year from the close of the period of four 
months, he had to execute a footage of development work amounting in 
total to not less than sixty multiplied by the number of subdivisions, ex­
cluding those being worked for profit, and to obtain an inspection cer­
tificate. He too was entitled to obtain an inspection certificate by paying 
the sum of money specified in the grant in respect of the particular 
inspection certificate required, in lieu of doing the development work. 
Failure to observe the development provisions constituted failure to 
comply with the provisions of the special grant, and made it liable to 
forfeiture.33
There were several defects in these requirements which militated 
against their effectiveness. Although development work had to be under­
taken or inspection fees paid in lieu to protect a mining right, the work 
did not have to be done until the end of the year in which it was due. If 
begun just before the end of the year and continued until the required 
amount of work was done, the location or grant could not be forfeited 
even though such work was not completed within the year for which the 
requirement work was done. Consequently, in practice the act of locating 
alone could hold a mining location for practically two years. For 
example, if a location were made in January 1976, this would hold the 
claim until 1977 after the holder had done the required work for the first 
four months, and annual labour for 1977 need not be done until the end 
of 1977, so that nearly two years could elapse before development work
33. This was authorised by s.64 (1) of the Mining Ordinance, supra, which provided 
that ‘any special grant or prospecting licence may contain provisions for the 
forfeiture thereof or o f any rights granted thereby and, in the case of a prospect­
ing licence of any mining location or other rights acquired there under in toy  
circumstances specified there in and at any time however remote.’
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became necessary. This was also because the mining-rights holders were 
not required to follow a specific programme in their operations. 
Moreover, with respect to inspection fees as a result of carry-overs and 
transfer provisions it was possible to protect a right over a long period by 
work done in previous years on contiguous claims. The fees themselves 
were also too low to have much effect,34 and indeed no inspection fees 
were payable at all once a claim had been worked for profit. Hence many 
claims surrounding small, old mines could continue to exist virtually in 
perpetuity. In any case, with respect to a location where after forfeiture 
work was resumed and continued before anyone else located the area, 
this could preserve the original locator’s rights. Besides the person who 
forfeited the location did not lose his prospecting licence nor was he 
debarred from locating in the same area.
Additional Problems Created by this System of Mining Rights
Despite the shortcomings of the legislation, it must be acknowledged that 
mining activity under it was very successful and it led to the discovery 
and development of most of the present-day mines in the country.35 
However, the legislation and particularly the special grants created pro­
blems that could not have been foreseen when they were created. This 
was particularly so for the independent government which wanted to 
implement its own mineral policy after it had acquired the mineral rights 
from the British South Africa Company.
In 1964 the mineral rights formely held by the Company and the 
Crown became vested in the President on behalf of the Republic of Zam­
bia and this was implemented by the 1965 Mining Ordinance (Amend­
ment) Act.36 In this legislation all other existing rights, including the 
special grants, were preserved under the same conditions as were contain­
ed in them when they were granted by the Company. The relevant provi­
sions read:
34. 1st certificate — £5, 2nd certificate — £10, 3rd certificate — £20, 4th certificate 
— £20 and 5th certificate — £30. See Prospecting Licence Condition, 20.
35. Special grants are recommended widely as perhaps the most important single step 
which led to the opening up of the Copperbelt. See Coleman, The Northern 
Rhodesia Copperbelt 1899-1962, 1971; Bancroft, Mining in Northern Rhodesia, 
1963; and Davis, Modern Industry and the African, 1965.
36. This was also a tidying up Act which removed reference to the Company from the 
Mining Ordinance. See Mining Ordinance (Amendment Act) No. 5 o f 1965.
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Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), it is 
hereby confirmed that any prospecting licence, mining 
location, special grant, mining right or title granted by 
the Company prior to the twenty fourth day of October,
1964, shall continue to be held, subject to the provisions 
o f ¿his Ordinance, under the same conditions as are 
contained in such prospecting licence, mining location, 
special grant, mining right or title.37
The privileges and rights secured for the Company by virtue of the condi­
tions in such rights were, however, vested in the President on behalf of 
the Republic of Zambia, and included royalty payments. The power of 
granting new prospecting licences was vested in a government officer, the 
Mining Engineer.38 Prospecting Licences continued as under the Com­
pany to1 be granted outside the Mining Ordinance but their conditions 
were th,is time to be determined by the Minister of Mines. However, the 
recognition of existing grants meant that the North Charterland Explora­
tion Company and the Chief of the Lozi tribe continued to have the ex­
clusive right to grant mining rights in the North Charterland concessions 
area39 and the Western Province40 respectively.
The existence of the Litunga’s special powers undoubtedly caused legal 
difficulties which inhibited prospecting and in fact after sixty years the 
areas remained virtually unexplored. Also these powers of the Litunga 
were enormous by comparison with those of the other paramount chiefs. 
The recognition of existing rights also meant that over areas which the 
mineral rights were wholly or partly alienated, royalty on any minerals 
produced was only payable in proportion to the extent to which the 
government held the mineral rights. The Zambia government thus 
inherited a system which it operated within a legal framework built by 
the Company. It could make grants of prospecting rights only in areas
37. Ibid., s.3 (2)
38. Ibid., s.7 (1).
39. Ibid., s.3 (3) provided that ‘Nothing in this section shall operate to vest in the 
President on behalf of the Republic any right of ownership in searching or mining 
for, or of disposing of minerals, mineral oils or natural gases which was on the 
twenty-fourth day of October 1964 vested in persons deriving title from the 
Company’ see Mining Ordinance, supra.
40. Ibid, See s.4, which read ‘Nothing in this Ordinance contained in shall in any way 
effect the rights and privileges secured to the Litunga of Barotseland and the 
people o f the Barotse by virtue of article 41 o f the Northern Rhodesia Order in 
Council, 1924.'
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open to prospecting as this excluded areas already covered by valid and 
operative grants made by the Company. In practice it meant large areas 
of the country were held in perpetuity under such grants, in which neither 
prospecting nor mining was taking place.41 Government found itself with 
no legal power to compel such development, nor could it compulsorily 
acquire the land or terminate the grants as the rights of the grant-holders 
were safeguarded in the independence constitution.42
Thus, the fact that the areas were not being adequately developed was 
defeating the government’s main mineral policy which was mainly to 
obtain a rising supply of foreign exchange for development purposes. 
Since the mining-right holders were not using some of the areas they 
held, the government wanted to bring in completely different companies 
with fresh sources of capital to develop those areas. There was also some 
dissatisfaction with the rate at which companies were increasing their 
capacity in the then existing mines. In 1968 the government, in an 
attempt to put pressure on the grant holders to work their holdings, 
increased the rates for the inspection certificates,43 though it was realised 
that for this to have any real effect the government would have to wait 
for quite some time.
These practical realities meant that the government’s acquisition of 
mineral rights from the Company in 1964 was of little practical 
significance. The law in force tied the government so much to the past 
and consequently was far from ensuring national aspirations in mineral 
development. All it really meant was that the government received tax 
revenue and royalty payments if minerals were produced. If nothing was 
mined, however, there was nothing it could do. The inequity of the situa­
tion was not just that it denied the government power to do anything to 
galvanise the holders of rights into prospecting in and developing their
41. The area covered by special grants totalled 75,000 square miles (195,000 square 
kilometres). See Research Bulletin, Economic Financial and Technical Series, 7 
February, 1970 p .l, and also Copper Services Bureau, Copperbell o f  Zambia 
Mining Year Book, 1966, p.6. Almost all the companies that held the special 
grants were owned either by Roan Selection Trust Ltd. or Anglo-American 
Corporation Ltd.
42. See s. 18, Constitution of Zambia, Laws of Zambia, Appendix 3, 1965 ed.
43. S.2, Mining (Amendment) Act, No.52 of 1968, amended s.80 of the Mining 
Ordinance, supra and provided that ‘...there shall be paid to the Engineer in 
respect of such inspection certificate, a fee equal to three times the fee payable 
therefore in accordance with second schedule, and such fee shall be in addition 
to, and not in substitution for, any specified sum of money required to be paid in 
respect of such inspection certificate under the terms of such prospecting licence 
or of such special grant.'
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areas, or if this failed to bring in new mining partners who might show 
greater interest in the development of mineral resources but because it 
also prevented the state from exercising any control over such vital 
aspects of mining methods as the size of any mining operations and the 
recovery rate. Most of these have an enormous influence on the long­
term benefits to be derived from a nation’s mineral resources. The state’s 
role in the development of mineral resources was reduced by this situa­
tion to almost excusively a regulatory one — registering locations, 
recording production, issuing prospecting licences, ensuring that regula­
tions on questions such as safety were carried out, surveying the mineral 
resources, and preparing comprehensive geological maps for use in pro­
specting.44
There was also an important geological factor which concerned areas 
open for prospecting — i.e., areas other than those covered by special 
grants. In these areas the law had become largely irrelevant to the needs 
of a miner. The requirement of the discovery of a mineral in establishing 
location rights without meaningful exclusive prospecting rights made it 
legally impossible to obtain rights or title to many important types of 
deposits. Location practices are well suited to identifying mineral 
deposits with surface outcroppings, but these are no longer present in the 
country. Most prospecting now is for subsurface and difficult mineral 
occurrences which require a great amount of drilling and time before 
they can be discovered. This reason alone was enough to make it 
necessary to bring in a system of mining rights which granted exclusive 
rights to the prospector over his prospecting area without the require­
ment of the discovery of valuable minerals, so that ground without sur­
face exposure or other positive evidence of ore or valuable mineral 
deposits might be held for sufficient time to complete exploration or to 
secure evidence indicative of its prospective value. Thus in 1969 it was for 
these reasons that it was necessary to change the mining law of Zambia to 
eradicate the anomalies inherited from the past, and to give the country a 
new approach to prospecting and mining activity.
44. To stimulate development United Nations Report recommended the termination 
of mining grants. See Report o f  Economic Survey Mission on the Economic 
Development o f  Zambia, UN/ECA/FC, 1964 p.48.
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OWNERSHIP OF MINERALS AND THE NATURE OF 
MINING RIGHTS AFTER THE 1969 LEGISLATION
In 1969 the State introduced a new mining law.1 The Act introduced in 
1969 has since been replaced by one enacted in 1976. The two are more or 
less the same. The new mining law embodies a whole new approach to 
mining rights in Zambia.
Ownership of Minerals
Theory o f  Ownership
As already mentioned the property in all minerals within Zambia is 
vested in the President on behalf of the people of Zambia,2 and this not­
withstanding any right of ownership or otherwise which any person may 
possess in and to the soil on or under which minerals are found or 
situated.3 This enables the state to grant mining rights over private land 
and saves mining-rights holders from spending huge sums of money on 
land purchases which would otherwise be necessary.4 Further, the state’s 
ownership of mineral resources enables it to have complete power over 
the property within its boundaries, whether mined by the state, by its 
citizens, or by foreign countries.5 There is no doubt that government 
control in this area of natural resources is important in view of the ex­
haustible nature of mineral wealth. Any country’s minerals, once mined
1. See Chapter 329 of the Laws of Zambia and Mines and Minerals Act, No. 32 of 
1976.
2. s. 3(1) reads ‘All rights of ownership in, of searching for, mining and disposing 
of, minerals, are hereby vested in the President of the Republic of Zambia’. In 
most countries the sovereign's interest in the mineral resources is recognised at 
least to some degree, and in general it has always been recognised that the 
sovereign may have an overriding interest in essential and irreplaceable resources. 
In 1607 all the judges of England resolved that the King could mine the salt-petre 
necessary for the national defence without regard to private interests: 12 Co. Rep. 
12; 77 Eng. Rep. 1294. See also Mines and Minerals Act, Chapter 66:01 of the 
Laws of Botswana, s.2 and also Mining Act, Chapter 306 of th t Laws of Kenya, 
s.4.
3. s.3(2) reads: ‘the provisions of subsection (1) shall have effect notwithstanding 
any right of ownership or otherwise which any person possess in and to the soil 
on or under which minerals are found or situated.’
4. There is also the problem that a mine is never co-extensive with the surface. No 
two orebodies are alike; one may continue to depth but most tend to go 
horizontally. This may lead to confusion over the ownership of the mine and its 
exploitation where the owner o f land is the owner of the minerals therein.
3. The position could be said to be similar to the Royal Prerogative in some ways: 
See Attorney-General fo r  New South Wales v. Williams, [1915), A.C. 580.
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can never be replenished and stocks of them are fixed even though their 
extent is not all known. This view is recognised the world over by govern­
ments in different ideological blocs and having widely differing opinions 
about the role the state should play in the economy and about the rights 
and obligations of private property that exhaustible resources require 
special treatment from the government especially where the objectives of 
government may differ from those of private companies involved in the 
exploitation of the resources. The objective function of a government 
may, for example, include considerations which are only incidental to a 
private company,such as the preservation of a resource for future 
generations. Also, their ideas on the rate of development may differ.
Ownership by the state, although not specifically provided for, is 
regarded by the state as inalienable.6 There is no provision in the mining 
laws for the alienation of the mineral interest of the state and all interests 
the state can grant under the mining laws fall short of the state’s interest 
in minerals. Where a granted interest terminates, it reverts to the state.
Owner o f  land not owner o f  minerals
The principle of ownership established by section 3 of the Act, is based 
upon a fundamental distinction between ownership of the surface and 
that of the sub-soil. Although private property in land is fully recognised 
in Zambia, ownership of minerals contained in the sub-soil is always 
vested in the state by virtue of the Act, that is, the owner of land is not 
the owner of the minerals in it.7 It is apparent therefore, that a lease of 
land by the state per se creates no rights whatsoever to minerals therein, 
and that where the lease of land is coupled with the grant of a mining 
right or rights conferring on the grantee the rights to win minerals, it is in 
virtue of such a grant and not the lease of land that the right to win
6. This view of mineral resources has been encouraged by the work of the United 
Nations Permanent Commission on Sovereignty over Natural Resources which 
eventually found expression in the General Assembly Resolution 1803 of 1962. 
This states that ‘all countries have the right to exercise permanent sovereignty 
over their natural resources in the interest of their national development’. ,
7. The state’s mineral rights in land it has parted with can be regarded on this point 
as analogous to that of the owner of land in commAn law who at a fee parts with 
the land excepting the minerals. See Ramsay v. Blaier (1876), 1 App. Cas. 70.
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minerals arises. This is quite apart from the fact that the two interests 
will be conferred by two different organs of government pursuant to en­
tirely different statutes.8 This also means that the state may lease land for 
agricultural and other purposes to one man at the same time as it is the 
subject of a mining right to another. In practice most mining rights 
holders obtain both surface and mining rights, especially when they have 
reached the stage when they have to take out a mining licence.9 This 
distinction is of practical importance. The holder of a mining right can­
not for instance sue in trespass for wrongful acts committed solely upon 
the surface where he is mining on private land since the easements of 
necessity relating to mining of minerals springing from mining legislation 
do not amount to a lease of the land.
Legal implications o f  theory o f  ownership
The state as owner of the minerals has the exclusive right to decide as to 
who can and should work the minerals.10 The exercise of any mining 
right without its consent is thus a criminal offence punishable by im­
prisonment or a fine or both .11 As holder of the title to minerals, it is 
however arguable that the state is also entitled to maintain all legal and 
acquitable actions for actual or threatened injury that are accorded to 
owners of property at common law in addition to its power to invoke the
8. The lease will be granted pursuant to the land tenure laws where as the mining 
rights will be granted by virtue of the Mines and Minerals Act, Supra. See also 
Siamer Jack Proprietory Mines Ltd, (1918) A.C. 591 for a discussion of a similar 
situation in South Africa. In some countries this is expressly provided for, see 
Mines and Minerals Act o f Botswana, supra, s.3. (4) which provides: ‘No state 
grant of land issued subsequent to 22nd December, 1967 shall confer on the 
grantee any right to prospect for, mine or dispose of minerals found in or on 
such land’.
9. For instance, Chingola mine holds a mining licence over approximately 11,763 
hectares in the Nchanga mining area and 27,287 hectares leasehold surface rights 
in the same area; Mines Industrial Development Corporation, Zambia 
Mining Year Book, 1974, p.3.
10. The granting of mining rights as well as the supervision and controlling of related 
activities are carried out by five government institutions namely, (a) the Minister 
o f Mines, (b) the Chief Mining Engineer, (c) the Director of Geological Survey,
(d) the Chief Inspector of Mines and (e) the Mining Affairs Tribunal. The 
Minister decides whether to grant or reject application for mining rights and 
amendment thereto. Below him is the Chief Engineer whose major responsibility 
is to supervise and regulate the proper and effectual implementations of the provi­
sions of the Mines and Minerals Act. The Chief Inspector o f Mines has general 
responsibility for the safety o f mining activities and the Tribunal is the body of 
last resort in mining disputes. See s.6. (I).
11. S. 124 (f) A mining official when satisfied that an offence has been committed 
may summarily demand from such person the payment o f a fine not exceeding 
fifty Kwacha. See also t.127 (I) where defendant objects, the state can thenjpro- 
secute the matter before the court.
135
criminal sanction mentioned above.12 But the state can recover damages 
for trespassing sustained by reason of an  invasion of the mineral stratum 
by someone without a right, and if the trespasser serves and removes 
minerals, it may recover possession of the minerals (or their value, where 
the trespasser has already disposed of them).
Damages fo r  wrongful abstraction
Here the problem which arises is, what are the damages recoverable for 
the wrongful abstraction of minerals? At common law in ordinary land 
trespass cases in which injury to land results, damages are measured by 
the difference between the value of the land before injury and its value 
after injury.13 If the trespass is a continuing one, damages for the use 
and occupancy of the land are measured by the reasonable rental value of 
the land.14 The application of these rules in the case of the wrongful 
abstraction of minerals is somewhat difficult.
Minerals are a highly speculative commodity and their value at any 
time is extremely difficult to determine. Moreover the wrongful removal 
of minerals may involve great cost to the trespasser in the form of ex­
penses incurred in actual digging of the minerals and may also actually 
result in an advantage to the owner of the minerals as such action would 
save him possible prospecting expenses especially if the trespasser were to 
find a hitherto unknown mineral deposit. Thus, some other method of 
the amount of damages recoverable for the wrongful removal of 
minerals and their appropriation must therefore be used.
At common law, these may be assessed according to the value of the 
minerals at the pit’s mouth, without making any allowance for mining 
expenses, or they may be assessed according to the value when severed, 
thus allowing for the expenses incurred in mining them. Which rule is 
adopted depends on the conduct of the person guilty o f wrongfully 
abstracting the minerals and the circumstances of the invasion. The right 
of the defendant to an allowance depends on whether he acted bona fide
12. At common law as observed in Trinidad Asphalt Ltd. v. Ambord, [1899], A.C. 
594, if a stranger enters on another’s land and works or abstracts minerals 
whether by breaking bounds or otherwise, the injured party is entitled to a 
remedy.
13. Lavender v. Betts [1942], All E.R. 72
14. Hiller v. I.C.I. (Alkali) Ltd., [1936], A.C.I.
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or mala fide. If he acted without fraud or negligence, fairly and honestly, 
or under a bona fide  belief in his possession of a licence, or under the im­
pression that a licence would be granted in his circumstance, he should be 
allowed the expenses of extracting the minerals in question. If, on the 
other hand, the abstraction of the minerals was wilful and fraudulent 
and without mitigating circumstances, or was continued even after 
knowledge that a licence would not be granted, any allowance should be 
forfeited.
In the House of Lords in Livingstone v. The Railway Coal Com­
pany, 15 where the owner of coal sued for its value after it had been work­
ed and disposed of by the defendant, the action of the defendant was in­
nocent. It had believed that it had the right to work the coal. Then Lord 
Hatherly stated:
There is no doubt that if a man furtively and in bad 
faith robs his neighbour of property, and because it is 
underground is not for some time detected, the Court of 
Equity in this country will struggle, or I would rather 
say will assert its authority, to punish, fraud by fixing 
the person with the value of the whole of the property 
which he has so furtively taken, and making him no 
allowance in respect of what he has so done as would 
have been justly made to him if the parties had been 
working by agreement.16
His Lordship went to deal with a situation where the abstraction is inno­
cent. He stated the law in these terms:
These principles are that the owner shall be repossessed as 
far as possible of that which was his property, and that 
in respect of that which has been destroyed or removed, 
or sold, disposed of, and which can not therefore be 
restored in specie, there shall be such compensation made 
to him as will in fairness between both parties give to 
the other party the whole of that which was his, and will
15. [1880], App. Cas. 25. See also lay  or v. Mostyn, (1886), 33 Ch. D.226.
16 Ibid., at p.34.
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at the same time give to the others, in calculating that 
value, just allowances for all those outlays which he 
would have been obliged to make if he had been entering 
into a contract for that being done which had by mis­
fortune and inadvertence on both sides and through no 
fault been done.17
It is conceivable, however, that the wrongful mining could make it more 
difficult or impossible to mine the remaining minerals. This could hap­
pen for instance where the defendant has used bad mining techniques 
resulting in injury to the mine, such as flooding or subsidence. In Ledgon 
v. Vivian18 where the defendant had mined coal without the authority of 
the owner, a general inquiry was directed as to the damages which the 
plaintiff sustained by reason of the defendant’s workings. It seems that 
the defendant was directly liable for all consequential injury which may 
have been caused, whether by reason of the rest of the minerals being 
rendered unworkable or useless. The damages then included the value of 
the minerals that could not be mined or the increased cost required to 
work them. But the position should be otherwise, if the state could not 
have got them or could only have got them at ruinous expense. In any 
case the defendant should be allowed to remove fixtures and should their 
removal endanger the mineral deposits he should be credited with their 
value, which would be consistent with the basic principle that the objec­
tive should always be to compensate the plaintiff and not to punish the 
defendants.19
17. Ib id . See also  fo r the m easure o f  dam ages if a  m iner has ac ted  fairly an d  honestly  
Wood v. Morewood, (1841) 3 Q .B . 440, w hen he has ac ted  inadverten tly  Ledgon 
v. Vivian, (1871), 6. C h . D .742, w here he has ac ted  w ithou t an  express au th o rity  
b u t with the  know ledge o f  the  rightfu l ow ner (Ashton v. Stock, (1877), 6 C h . D. 
719) o r under a m istake o r expectation  tha t a  perm it w ould be g ran ted  ( Trotter v. 
Maclean, (1879), 13 C h . D .574) w here abstrac tion  o f  the  m inerals has been w ilful 
and  fraudu len t (Morgan v. Powell, (1842), 11 L .J .Q .B . 263) o r  having begun in 
the  hope th a t a  perm it w ould be given has been con tin u ed  a fte r  know ledge tha t 
such perm it w ould n o t be g ran ted  (Trotter v. Maclean, (1879), 13 C h . D.574).
18. (1871) 6 C h . D. 742 See also  Livingstone v. Railway Coal Company, supra .
19. T his is also in line w ith the  p ractice w here ab an d o n m en t o f  a m ining a rea  takes 
place. See s .87 (1) which provides ‘subjec t to  the p rovisions o f  th is section , the 
ho lde r o r  fo rm er ho lder o f  a m ining right m ay, w ithin six m on ths  o f  the  date  o f  a 
ce rtificate  o f  a b a n d o n m en t, rem ove from  any  area  ab a n d o n ed  by him  buildings, 
fixed m achinery  o r  o th e r m oveable p ro p erty , including in the  case o f  an  ab a n d o n ­
ed m ining  area  o r  p a rt th e reo f, any  m ineral p roduc t w hich m ay have been ex­
trac ted  th e re fro m .’
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Types o f  mining rights created
Because the working of minerals requires large amounts of capital, the 
state would not be able to mine all the minerals in the country even if it 
wanted to. In the interest of promoting the use of the mineral resources 
to the maximum desirable extent, the state has therefore brought about a 
system in which the development of mineral resources by private 
individuals and mining companies characteristically take place under a 
system of licences, as grants from the state.20 These licences are designed 
iO enable the maximum flexibility of arrangements for the exploitation 
of mineral resources and ensure a sufficient retention of sovereign con­
trol and title so that the state is at all times assured that the mineral 
resources are being adequately developed in the interests of the national 
economy, and that the state is receiving the maximum return from such 
exploitation. Thus; three categories of mining rights have been granted 
under the Act.21 These are a prospecting licence, an exploitation licence 
and a mining licence.22 The lowest form of the right is the prospecting 
licence and the highest form is the mining licence, and each higher right 
includes the lower. The holder of a mining licence, for example, may ex­
plore or prospect within the area to which the licence relates as though he 
were the holder of an exploration or prospecting licence. The gradation 
of rights represents progressive stages from searching through evaluation 
to mining a mineral deposit. In each of these stages the length of time 
and the amount of money required in terms of mining expenses increases 
with respect to that required for the preceding stage of mining 
developments. Each licence constituies a kind of constitution on which 
the holder of the mining rights bases his work, in the sense that the rights 
and obligations of the mining-right holders are contained in the docu­
ment finally issued to the miner.
20. The minerals for which licences may be issued are divided into four major 
categories (1) building minerals (sand, clay, gravel, laterite, limestone, etc;) (2) 
industrial minerals (non-metalic minerals such as graphite, gypsum,/nica and talc 
and sand and clays when used for industrial purposes;) (3) reserved minerals 
(mineral oils, gas, diamonds, emeralds, gold, the platinum group and radio active 
minerals) and (4) all other minerals. The licences for building minerals are called 
permits, see s.69 ibid.
21. The scheme follows a three stage concept of prospecting, exploration and mining 
which in one form or another is a feature of the pre-1969 legislation.
22. ss. 16, 27 and 44.
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IWho may obtain the licences?
Unlike the position under the earlier legislation, there are several restric­
tions on who can obtain these rights, aimed at ensuring that these rights 
do not fall into the hands of speculators and persons unable to utilise 
them. For example, mining rights cannot be granted to or be held by per­
sons who are under the age of eighteen and are not citizens of Zambia, or 
have not been ordinarily residents in Zambia for a period of two years. It 
cannot be granted to a person who has been declared bankrupt and is still 
undischarged. In the case of a company, before it can be allowed to 
obtain a mining right greater than the prospecting licence, it has to be 
incorporated under the company law of Zambia.23 A company in 
liquidation cannot acquire a mining right except where the liquidation is 
entered into voluntarily for the purposes of reconstruction or amalgama­
tion. If during the currency of any mining right, the holder is adjudged 
or otherwise declared bankrupt or goes into liquidation, the mining right 
terminates. The same is true where the holder of a mining right dies. Any 
document which purports to grant a mining right to any person not 
entitled to hold such a right is null and void and thus does not operate to 
pass any mining right.24 Also mining rights’ holders are not required to 
pay any fees or rents. Rights are therefore acquired free of charge, thus 
enabling miners to spend any funds they possess on actual mining activi­
ties rather than on paying rents and fees.25
Prospecting Rights
A person wishing to obtain prospecting rights over any area not closed to 
prospecting can apply for any number of prospecting licences. In its 
application a company is required to give the names and nationality of 
the directors, and the names of any shareholder who is the beneficial
23. s.5. The advantage of local incorporation is that it can to some extent be controll­
ed locally, e.g. it can be wound up, see Baroness Wenlock v. River Dee Co.
(1885), 36 Ch. D. 685.
24. s.5. The restrictions on who may mine are widespread in most mining systems. In 
some there are even requirements pertaining to literacy e.g. s .13 of the Mining 
Act of Kenya, supra, provides, ‘a prospecting licence shall not be granted (ii) to 
any person who, in the opinion of the Commissioner is unable to understand the 
provisions of this ordinance’.
25. This is unusual. On the whole most countries demand the payment of rentals. 
Compare the situation in Kenya, see Mining Regulations, Chapter 132 of the laws 
of Kenya. In others e.g. Botswana the licence fees are used to stimulate 
developments. See s.33 (1) of the Mines and minerals act, supra.
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owner of more than five per cent of the issued capital. Every applicant 
for a prospecting right has to show his financial and technical capability. 
He has to specify the names of the minerals he intends to prospect and 
give a detailed description of the area over which a licence is sought.26
Prospecting licences are issued for specified minerals. Where there are 
applications for licences for different minerals in the same or overlap­
ping areas they are considered in the order in which they are received. It 
is possible that minerals other than the ones specified in the licence are 
discovered in the process of prospecting, though this is unlikely as most 
prospecting licence grants include reference to most common minerals.27 
When, however, a holder of an exploration licence discovers any mineral 
not included in his licence, he is allowed to apply to the state for prospec­
ting rights in respect of such minerals. If another person is already the 
holder of a prospecting licence covering the mineral concerned, and the 
area in which it was discovered, the prospecting rights will not be granted 
without approval of the holder of such a licence.28 The need to secure the 
state’s approval is based on the assumption that the state owns any 
minerals which are discoverable by exploration licence holders and 
discovery does not give the holders of such licences any rights. Ordinari­
ly, as mining officials point out, however, an application in these cir­
cumstances is a mere formality and the person who discovers the mineral 
is more or less sure to be given the mining rights unless somebody else 
already holds rights in respect to that mineral. Any other policy would be 
unjust in view of the licence holder’s existing expenditure. It is not 
desirable to limit a prospecting licence to specific groups of minerals, ex­
cept possibly to exclude such obvious groups as oils and gas from a 
licence required primarily to search for base minerals, mainly because 
the methods used in prospecting are generalists in nature and are apt to 
reveal most mineral occurrences in existence in any area taken out. The 
explanation of the present situation given by mining officials seems to in­
dicate that a practical problem had to be faced in drafting the Act, in that 
overlapping licences for different minerals already existed such as the 
diamond right of De Beers. But as noted above, many mining right 
holders have got round this problem by applying for every conceivable 
mineral in their licences.
26. s.17.
27. See, e.g., the licence to Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd., which names up to 25 
minerals. Licence No. P.L. 122 issued to the company on 5 May 1975. Register of 
Mining Titles, (Lusaka).
28. ss. 34 and 24.
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ing for every conceivable mineral in their licences.
There is no limitation as to the size of the area which one can be 
granted, which is a significant policy decision. Without other safeguards, 
it could lead to the sort of monopoly of large areas as resulted under the 
previous legislation. However, the likelihood of this occurring is made 
somewhat remote in practice in that the areas a person holding an ex­
ploration licence can hold are limited partly by the minimum expenditure 
obligations, and more effectively by the programme of intended opera­
tions. For example, an application for an area of several thousand square 
kilometres over which it is intended to carry out an airborne geophysical 
survey would not be unreasonable, but it would probably be considered 
too large an area if the proposed programme did not include as an initial 
phase a previously untried or newly modified reconnaissance approach 
of some sort. It must also be borne in mind that every applicant for a 
prospecting licence has to prove that he has the financial resources and 
technical staff available to carry out the proposed programme of opera­
tion effectively. This practical requirement effectively limits the area a 
prospector can take out.
In theory, the prospecting licence does not confer an exclusive right to 
prospect in the area of which it is granted, i.e., the state has always the 
power to grant licences over existing areas. This fact that prospecting 
licences are not exclusive may of course cause worry to an investor who 
would like to do fairly concentrated prospecting over a given area and 
can give rise to the problem of simultaneous applications for the same ex­
ploration areas later. Nonetheless, the practice of the mining officials 
makes this very unlikely, since they do not as a matter of policy grant 
prospecting licences over areas for which licences have already been 
taken out. Besides the grant of a prospecting licence is discretionary 
following compliance by an applicant with all the preliminary steps re­
quired by the Act. The mere fact of such compliance does not in any way 
give an inchoate right to a licence.29 Once a prospecting licence has been 
issued, however, the state is committed to issuing subsequent exploration
29. Presumably an aggrieved party can challenge the rejection o f his licence should it 
be based on reason» other than those provided for in the mining laws by applying 
to the High Court for Certioran. See generally Patel v. A.G. Selected judgements 
o f Zambia No. 1 of 1968; and Sotinadis v. Patel, 1960, R. A N. 280.
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and mining licences. Both section 30 (1) and section 48 (1) being the pro­
visions relating to the grant of these licences state that the state 'shall’ 
and not 'may’ grant the licences, providing of course always that the ap­
plicant has discharged his obligations, and can show reasonable evidence 
of mineralisation in the area applied for and proposes an acceptable plan 
for the next stage.30
This concept is regarded as absolutely essential by most mining in­
vestors in order to encourage people to prospect. If it were otherwise, 
there could be no justification or incentive for a mining right holder to 
spend large sums of money which prospecting require s if he were not sure 
of getting the later licences and thereby have an opportunity to recover 
that expenditure.
A prospecting licence entitles the holder to enter freely upon the land 
specified in his licence to search for minerals.31 The activities of a pro­
spector usually involve the mapping of geological formations, 
mineralisations, and structural conditions as seen or interpreted in the 
field. The mapping may be generalised or may be very detailed. Surface 
geological mapping is usually accompanied by the use of topographic 
aerial maps. After making the geological maps, the geologists prepare 
geological cross-sections, make structural analyses, and otherwise inter­
pret the information using a variety of techniques. Drilling is employed 
in field geological prospecting to obtain sub-surface information which is 
not otherwise available. Laboratory samples are made of various 
samples collected in the field. Should the holder of a prospecting licence 
discover mineral occurrences, he would then be ready to obtain the 
second stage of the mining rights.
Exploration Licence
A holder of a prospecting licence may, not later than two months before 
the expiration of his licence, apply for and obtain an exploration licence 
for any area within his prospecting area and in respect of any minerals 
covered by his licence.32 He may, if he so wishes, apply directly for a 
mining licence.33 The intention is to get the prospecting right holder to
30. In this way the state has limited its discretion in the grant or withholding of ex­
ploration and mining licences. When considering applications for prospecting 
licences or other mining rights, the Minister of Mines is advised by his profes­
sional staff, particularly the Director of Geological Survey.
31. s.25
32. s.27
■>3. s.45
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the mining stage as soon as possible. Perhaps it is for this reason that an 
exploration licence is limited to an area of ten square kilometres in size. 
This also ensures that very large areas cannot be held for long periods 
with all the work confined to a small area and besides this would lead to 
the withdrawal from competitive prospecting and exploration of more 
land than an individual can reasonably explore. If, however, geological 
evidence indicates that a more extensive ore body may exist, he may 
apply for an extension to his area which the mining officials are certain 
to grant him.
Exploration licences are exclusive in respect of the areas for which they 
are granted. Their exclusiveness can be implied from the fact that the Act 
in section 19 does not permit granting of prospecting licences with 
respect to areas covered by exploration licences and the same Act in sec­
tion 31 provides against the granting o f exploration rights which overlap 
mining areas. This exclusiveness is considered essential in exploration 
activities by mining investors as the holder of such a right needs a lot of 
time and confidentiality. Much of this time is spent in carrying out 
laboratory tests and making the necessary drilling to enable him to 
evaluate the ore body and to determine the complex factors which will 
affect his working. This is a very important stage in mineral investigation 
as it will lead to a decision whether to work a mineral deposit or not. The 
need for time and exclusiveness is currently becoming greater, because 
of the necessity for large-volume operations, and for the discovery of 
deep-lying deposits not usually out-cropping at or near the surface since 
most such deposits have already been discovered.
As already noted, neither exploration nor prospecting licences 
authorise their holder to exploit minerals, but because they can remove 
ore for the purpose of having it analysed and determing its value or con­
ducting technological tests including tests on bulk samples,34 they do 
accumulate large amounts of ore. The mining laws do not, however, pro­
vide for what eventually happens to the ore particularly in cases where no 
further work goes on. In practice the state, the owner of the minerals, 
does not have anywhere to store it. It is, however, necessary to 
discourage holders of prospecting licences and exploration licences from 
engaging in mining as this may encourage bad mining methods. In this
34. 1.40 (a). In fact it is an offence to do so, see s. 125.
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regard the present situation seems to be unsatisfactory as it causes 
storage problems for most of the mining-right holders, who have ended 
up building huge ore sheds because the government does not collect the 
ore. It is suggested that provided the state is satisfied that the holder of a 
mining right has been conducting only such work as is reasonably 
necessary to enable him to test the mineral bearing qualities of the area, it 
should authorise him to dispose of the minerals on payment of the 
prescribed mineral taxes. The state should, however, retain some of the 
samples in order to keep a record of the work that has been done in the 
area.
Unlike the situation under the pre-1969 legislation, now mining rights 
may not be transferred without the prior approval of the state.35 Mining 
rights are valuable assets to their holders, and can be a source of con­
siderable revenue in the hands of speculators, without actually benefiting 
the economy by mining development. The requirement of statement ap­
proval is intended to prevent the augmentation of mining companies by 
the sale and resale of mining rights. So far there has not been any resale 
of mining rights since the introduction of this new legislation. Another 
purpose for the evidence requested is to enable the state to ensure that the 
transferees of the mining rights meet the requirements pertaining to 
financial and technical ability already discussed. If this were not the case, 
the policy of the state that only people with adequate financial resources 
should be allowed to mine would definitely be defeated.
Mining Licence
The last category of the mining rights created under the new legal regime 
is the mining licence. The holder of any of the previous rights may obtain 
a mining licence, for any area or areas within his prospecting or explora­
tion areas as the case may be and in respect of any mineral covered by his 
licence.36 The area a mining licence can cover is restricted and is not 
allowed to exceed the estimated area of the mineral deposit, though it 
may include such additional areas as may reasonably be required for pro­
tection of the miner’s machinery. Like the exploration licence, the min­
ing licence is exclusive. It conveys on the holder the right to mine, that is,
35. s.39 (1)
36. s.45
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a right to carry out the whole co-ordinated operation to obtain an in­
dustrial utilisation of a deposit from the extraction of the useful minerals 
to the processing that may be necessary. Like the lesser mining rights, 
and for the same reasons, a mining licence cannot be transferred without 
the approval of the state.
The Nature of Interest Created by a Mining Right
The interest created
It is important to have a clear understanding of the character of a mining 
right conferred by the mining licence in order to appreciate the degree of 
control the state exercises over mining rights in Zambia. In this respect, 
the character of interest transferred in any mining transaction 
throughout the world depends not upon the name given to the instru­
ment, for mining instruments bear several names,37 but upon the inten­
tion of the state as expressed in the mining legislation taken as a whole. 
From this observation, a mining right gives to its holder an exclusive 
right to prospect, exploit, process, and utilise the minerals within the 
boundaries of his licence for a term of years. This right is renewable at 
the end of such a term of years, on condition that the holder has observ­
ed and fulfilled all obligations demanded by the state through the mining 
laws. It is apparent from practice and statute that the grant of exclusive 
mining rights includes possession of two separate interests or estates: the 
surface covered by the licence, and the minerals within the bounds of 
that licence. But the possessory interests in a mining licence do not fall 
within the standard classification of property interests under the comm­
on law. Thus between the mining-right holders and all persons other than 
the state, the mining-right holder is treated as possessing all the 
attributes of a free title, so long as the requirements of the law with 
respect to continued development are satisfied and subject to the 
statutory limitations discussed later in this chapter. The lands embraced 
within a mining licence are usually segregated from the public lands and 
are not susceptible to intrusion by third parties under mining rights en­
37. e.g . they  w ere called  perm its  under th e  pre-1969 legislation and  are  called  leases 
un d er the  B otsw ana legislation.
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tries or otherwise. They are, however, intruded upon by the government 
officers for purposes of exercising their regulatory powers38 and by a 
private owner of the land where mining operations are taking place on 
his land. With the mining licence the holder of it is given the right, as well 
as the privilege, to go upon mineralised lands and sever minerals 
specified in the licence and the power by severence to acquire title to the 
minerals and dispose of them.
The mining right originates as a grant of a specific right from the state 
upon compliance with certain conditions. The tenure on which the min­
ing licence holder holds his rights depends entirely on the statute. 
Generally, there is no consensus between the government and a mining 
licence holder. First, because the right of mining for and disposal of all 
minerals is by statute vested in the state. Second, the terms under which 
the licence is held and their interpretation, the rights and their scope, and 
obligations reciprocally of the holder of the mining licence and the 
government are absolutely fixed by the Act. Third, with respect of the 
land covered by his mining licence, the miner only enjoys the use of the 
surface of his ground for the purposes subsidiary to the main object of 
his tenure which is the extraction of minerals. The title is split, in that the 
legal title to both minerals and the land is retained in the state as owner 
while the use of land and title after the severence of minerals passes to the 
holder of the mining licence. All mining rights are subject to the penetra­
tion of properly asserted extra-lateral rights into and within the physical 
boundaries of the subject matter of the right.
However, the nature of the relationship created between the state and 
the mining-right holder has not been discussed judicially in Zambia. But 
it has been discussed in a number of South African cases, a jurisdiction 
which was as shown, largely influential in shaping the Zambia mining 
laws and where the state owns the right to mine and adopts the practice 
of awarding mining licences. There is such a discussion of the relation­
ship as in some detail in Neebe v. Registrar o f  Mining Rights.39 Neebe 
applied for an order compelling the Registrar of Mining Rights to pass 
and register a transfer of certain prospecting claims as property rights. 
The Court rejected such an interpretation, concluding that the nature of 
a mining licence holder is one sui generis, specially created by
38. s.62 for instance authorises the Chief Inspector of Mines to inspect a mine under 
certain circumstances.
39. (1902), T.S.65.
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statute, thus the incidents of such tenure must be gathered from the 
terms of the statutes which establish it.
In the Cape Province, where the ownership of diamonds is in the state 
and the state only grants mining rights, the Supreme Court of the Pro­
vince has never decided that claims in a diamond mine upon Cape Town 
land are property rights. In the matter of the South African Loan and 
Mortgage Agency v. Cape o f  Good Hope Bank,40 it was distinctly stated 
by the Court that the claim licences in such diamond mines were in no 
sense of the word property rights. It added that the mining licence holder 
takes no title to the minerals unsevered but only the power to acquire title 
by severing minerals from the title when they have become personal pro­
perty and that therefore he never owns the minerals as long as they re­
main underground. In another South African case, Rocher v. Registrar 
o f  Deeds,41 three people decided to divide land they owned jointly, but 
they intended to hold the mineral rights in common. When the parties 
applied to the Registrar of Lands and Deeds to register the deeds of 
transfer, he refused on the grounds that a separate deed was required for 
the minerals as the mineral rights were personal rights. The court comm­
ented that the exact nature of these rights was a matter of some difficulty 
and added that ‘they confer the right to go on the soil o f another person 
and extract the minerals for one’s own benefit, but it is clear that until 
the minerals are extracted the owner of the surface remains the owner of 
the minerals.’42
The Privy Council had occasion to consider the nature of a mining 
right in a case that arose in the state of Victoria, in Australia. In Osborne 
v. Morgan and Others,43 mining rights had been issued pursuant to the 
Gold Field Act, 1874, which is based on the same principle of ownership 
as the Zambian mining laws. The Judicial Committee held that ‘Miners’ 
Rights’ are documents in the nature of a licence which are issued by the 
Warden under the authority of the Governor to any person applying for
40. 9 S.C.182.
41. (1911), T.P.311.
42. Ibid., at p. 312; see also Lazarus and Jackson v. Wessels and Others, (1903), 
T .P.D . 499, where the court confessed to the same difficulty and commented, ‘I 
must confess to having — a difficulty which pressed me during the argument — 
in finding an appropriate jurisdiction in which to place this right. Rights o fth a t 
nature are peculiar to the circumstances of the country, and do not readily fall 
under any of the classes of rcil rights discussed by commentators’ per Wessels, 
J., at p.510.
43. (1888), 13 App. Cas. 227. See also Burke v. Wright, (1882), 3 N.W.W .L.R. 145.
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them. The Judicial Committee further observed that the document, of 
itself, created no interest in any part of the gold, either legal or equitable.
In Zambia, it is easy to confuse the position of the holder of a mining 
right with that of the holder at common law of a profit a prendre, which 
confers a right to mine coupled with the right to carry away the subject 
matter of the interest. This right like the Zambian mining right, does not 
confer an estate or interest in the soil or mine minerals before they are 
actually severed. There are, however, some differences between them. In 
the first instance, there is no statutory grant in gross. The duration of a 
profit a prendre and of the right arising from a mineral’s licence are diff­
erent. The former is an incorporeal hereditament, the latter are rights of 
known and short duration. There is no dominant tenement and subser­
vient interest. Hence the ownership of minerals and land are distinct. 
Thus the Zambian right is more like a bare common law licence to mine 
which also only gives permission to mine, and gives property in such 
minerals as the licence holder holds. It is also like most licences at 
common law generally: as the Court stated in Robinson v. Blundell,
a licence to hunt in a man’s park and carry away the 
deer killed to his own use, to cut down a tree in a man’s 
ground and to carry it away the next day for his own 
use, are licences as to the hunting and cutting down a 
tree. And a dispensation or licence properly passeth no 
interest, nor transfers prospecting in any thing but only 
makes an action lawful which without it had been 
unlawful.44
The rights of the holder of a licence in minerals are in Zambia analogous 
to those of the purchaser of standing timber, who if his permit is in pro­
per form, gets a possessory interest in land but in principle not title to the 
trees until they are severed.
Because of their dependence on the mining statutes, the exercise of 
these rights can be restrained or new obligations imposed on them not­
withstanding the provisions or the rules in existence when the mining
44. (1867), Mac N.Z. 683; See also R. v. Fayle; (1872), 27 L.T. 64 and Lowmoor v.
S.anley, (1875), 33 L.T.436.
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right was granted, such as the move now to increase the levels of obliga­
tions to take into account the effects of inflation. As long as there is no 
denial of justice, the state can therefore enact legislation which creates 
new obligations, subject of course to section 18 of the Constitution 
which forbids confiscatory legislation which does not include the provi­
sion of compensation. Changes which affect existing mining right 
holders adversely are unlikely, however, as this might result in the 
intimidation of mining investors. In this regard mining investment is like­
ly to be attracted in a situation in which a miners’ ability to forecast the 
nature and extent of his licence obligations would be impaired. Where 
rules need to be changed, it would appear the state will follow the pattern 
established in 1969 and treat existing licence holders as a separate class 
and arrange an amicable settlement with them. In that year when all pre­
existing prospecting and mining rights were extinguished by the introduc­
tion of the new system of mining rights, provision was made for the 
immediate granting of mining licences to protect the producing mines.
Mining rights holders and third parties
The nature of the relationship created between the state and the holder of 
mining rights has consequences in the area of the miner’s relation with 
third parties. An example of this is the situation in which a third party 
other than the state interferes with the rights of a mining right holder. 
The interference may take several forms. It may be an unauthorised 
entry on mining ground, either upon or beneath the surface and in the 
case of extra-lateral rights under the general mining laws may be beyond 
the boundaries of the mining areas. Apart from the obvious cases of 
disputed boundaries, there may be a case where a third party deliberately 
and unlawfully extracts minerals. Another instance of harmful conduct 
which may arise on private land is where minerals are removed by the 
surface owner. Unfortunately, few cases have reached the courts. The 
problems have, however, arisen. Thus, the Chief Mining Engineer in 
Nkumbula v. Mines Industrial Development Corporation45 dealt with a 
situation where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant mined and 
removed minerals in his exploration area, constructed roads, and 
prospected over his prospecting area.
43. Chief Mining Engineer’s file on disputes at Ministry of Mines and Industry, 
Lusaka.
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The remedies of a mining-right holder for wrongful interference with 
his rights by the owner of the surface or by a stranger are to be determin­
ed according to rules of law in no way peculiar to the miner. Though he 
has no proprietary interest in the surface, it is burdened in his favour 
with certain rights for the use of such portions as will enable him to exer­
cise his exclusive privilege to minerals. Without the ownership of the 
minerals in the soil, the holder of a mining right cannot recover the value 
of the minerals wrongfully severed, for he never had title to the minerals. 
The right to recover their value is in the state. Undoubtedly, the act of 
the defendant is an infringement of the rights of the mining-right holder 
to exercise his mining rights. The injury, however, falls upon the state 
whose property has been taken. In any case the state having remained 
owner of the property, can protect its own ownership against injury. The 
mining-right holder too does not become obligated to protect minerals 
from trespassers and is in no manner made their guardian. The mining 
right holder can, however, sue for the invasion of his exclusive right. At 
common law when an exclusive licence is granted no one can interfere 
with the operations of the licence nor deprive the holder of the benefits 
of his licence.46 In Fitzgerald v. Fir bank,41 where a deed granted to the 
plaintiff for a term of years fishing rights in a defined part of a river, and 
the defendant wrongfully discharged into the stream water loaded with 
sediment, the effect of which was to drive away the fish and injure 
breeding; the Court upheld the plaintiff’s claim for damages and ruled 
that the plaintiff had a right of action against any one who wrongfully 
did any act by which the enjoyment of the rights given to him by the deed 
was adversely affected. Lord Lindley further stated that the action rests 
absolutely on a man’s right not necessarily to property, but to something 
which is valuable and is granted to him; whatever it is called if a stranger 
comes and interferes with or trespasses on his right, that ought to con­
stitute and does constitute a right of action. He bases his contingent right 
in the minerals excavated by the trespasser and his remedy is the common 
law action requiring the trespasser to account.48 This seems to have been 
accepted in A kumbula v. Mining Industrial Development Corporation,49 
in which the Chief Mining Engineer assessed damages as the actual
46. Newby v. Harrison, (1861), 4 L.T. 397.
47. (1897), 2 Ch. 96.
48. Wright v. Pitt, (1871), 25 L.T. 13.
49. Supra.
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takings from the minerals, less the costs of extraction, when the case was 
before him on the preliminary point of damages. But a mining right 
holder can maintain an action in conversion to recover any minerals 
actually removed from his mining premises and which are already 
severed from the ground, since title to minerals removed would have 
already been vested in him. Where the wrongful conduct is wholly con­
fined to the surface estate, the mining right holder has a possessory inte­
rest in the surface, to the extent at least of such part of the surface as he is 
actually occupying.50 On this principle, a mining right holder can also 
sue for trespass to minerals still unworked but covered by his licence. In 
this case his argument would be that the minerals are in his possession 
even though still unsevered, as was held in Greenwood Lumber v. 
Phillips,51 where the plaintiff recovered for trespass to logs of wood 
whose ownership was in the Crown but whose possession was in him.
Obligations of Holders of Mining Rights
Purposes o f  the requirements
In order to ensure the discovery of mineral deposits and their early and 
rapid development and to avoid the earlier situation in which mining 
right holders blocked a considerable acreage of mineral land for 
speculative purposes, thus preventing others from occupying and 
developing the minerals, the state has introduced a system of obligations 
on the mining-right holders. These obligations also have the effect of 
protecting government revenue interests, in that the amount of taxes and 
their payment are determined by the extent and promptness of the min­
ing operations of the holder of the mining rights and his marketing of the 
minerals.
It may be argued that this last reason is not important because the inte­
rests of the miner and the state in the development of a mineral deposit 
are the same. Yet no proof needs to be offered, beyond that in the 
previous chapter, of the fact that their interests in this respect are fre­
quently conflicting. Some of the obligations on the mining right holders.
50. See Hawkins v. Rutter, (1892), 1 Q.B. 668, which supports this view.
51. [1904], A.C. 405.
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however, are designed to ensure that mining proceeds with minimum 
waste of the mineral resources and also with minimum disturbance to the 
environment. Here the requirements are justified on the basis of the need 
to protect state property.
Obligations calculated to influence the rate o f  development
Mining laws have evolved a number of approaches to attain the above 
objectives. One is to restrict the exploration licence to a relatively short 
period, with few renewals while another is a stipulation for diligence in 
the form of stated work requirements, or minimum expenditure. The 
payment of advance royalties in fixed amounts to be credited against the 
state’s earned royalties when the mine goes into production has been 
used. Also a system whereby any miner who does not show production 
during the preceding year of a quantity of minerals in adequate ratio to 
the mineral reserves covered by the licence pays a surtax, doubled annu­
ally as long as he fails to exploit his minerals.52 Another is the require­
ment that fixed percentages of the original area be relinquished on each 
renewal,53 or a charge of surtax, at the rate per unit of area increasing 
with the number of such units of area held and increasing every year. 
This is a reference to a sliding scale which is fixed in the original agree­
ment, not a subsequently imposed increase in rentals or royalty rates.54
However, there is a particular problem where the state uses the 
withdrawal of area as a means of attaining a minimum level of activity. It 
may encourage bad mining methods and unnecessary damage to the en­
vironment, as it may encourage the mining right holder to prospect or 
mine quickly. It may also lead to inefficient prospecting, in that the 
mining-right holders might be forced to cover as much ground as possi­
ble, and not as efficiently as proper mining methods would dictate.
52. This for instance is the position in Paraguay, See Law 16; 066.
53. This practice appears to be prevalent in Australian mining agreements, e.g. Iron 
Ore (Dampier Mining Company Ltd. Agreement) No. 78, Statutes of Western 
Australia No. 18, Elizabeth II. This is combined with a requirement that the 
Company makes available a specified amount of iron ore per year.
54. For instance s.33 (1) of the Mines and Minerals Act of Botswana, Supra, imposes 
licence fees but in s.33 (2) provides that any fee paid under subsection (1) shall be 
refunded to the holder of the mining right by the Commissioner if such holder 
applies for such refund and approves to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that 
he has during any six months period in respect of which the refund is claimed 
carried out work on the mining area in the amount prescribed in s.34.
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The solution adopted under the Act embodies four of the above 
approaches. Thus, for instance, a prospecting licence is valid for a maxi­
mum period of four years and there is no right of renewal.55 Mining 
officials suggest that if you cannot find minerals in four years then you 
are not good enough at prospecting. The holder of a licence about to 
expire may, however, apply for a new licence over the whole or any part 
of his original area, but would then have to compete with any other 
interested parties.
Four years is generally considered long enough by most mining rights 
holders for the investigation of a normal mineral area. Problems have, 
however, arisen in rural parts of the country which are accessible only at 
certain times of the year, the effect of which is to considerably shorten 
the period available. The state so far has granted new licences to those 
who have found four years inadequate, such as in the case of the 
Kalengwa North licence area. The other area about which there is a con­
sensus of opinion that the period of four years may not be adequate is the 
Western Province of Zambia, an area where the geology of the country 
has not been investigated so that a prospecting licence holder would have 
to do a lot of preliminary work which his counterpart, say, on the 
Copperbelt, would not. To appreciate this point it has to be realised that 
ordinarily before prospecting — crews are sent into the field in search for 
ore bodies, the areas to be investigated are usually selected and outlined 
from a study of geological maps. That way a great deal of information 
can be gathered from a detailed study of these maps.56 Another added 
problem regarding Western Province is that most of the rocks are 
covered by sand and therefore, quite apart from the increased costs, it 
takes longer since one has to remove the sand before drilling.
An exploration licence is valid for up to three years with a right of 
renewal for a further two years, provided always that the progress 
achieved is satisfactory and the programme for future operations is ade­
quate.57 The state, it seems will almost certainly in special circumstances 
extend the period of renewal for a period longer than two years.
55. s. 18 and 22.
56. These maps are provided by the Geological Survey Department, whose main task 
under the Act is to provide a continuous updated inventory of Zambia's potential 
mineral resources and the background information required to explore for and 
develop these resources. See ss.10 and 14.
57. ss. 27 and 33 (1).
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A mining licence is granted for a maximum period of twenty-five years 
and may be renewed for a similar period,58 provided that the miner can 
show that ore reserves remain to be exploited and submits a satisfactory 
programme for future operations and minimum expenditure obligations. 
So far all the mining licences are still under twenty-five years old and 
therefore the state has not had occasion to consider their renewal.
The periods of which mining rights are gtanted vary tremendously 
throughout the world59 although the length of time is of the utmost 
importance to most mining-right holders. To be economically justifiable 
a mineral deposit’s prospective profits must be sufficient to pay back the 
capital investment within a reasonable time, in addition to the normal 
rewards associated with the risk, and this partly depends on how long 
one will be allowed to mine. Opening and developing a mine is, at best, a 
costly business. Shaft sinking costs something like K1,000 per foot for a 
modest three-compartment shaft, while drilling costs run to the order of 
K200 per foot. Consequently, any mine layout entails a great deal of ex­
penditure. In general, twenty-five years is considered long enough to 
recoup one’s investment in mining by most mining investors. Opening 
and developing a mine takes an average of about five years, which leaves 
the mining right holder with twenty years of operation. The state will 
also renew a mining licence once it expires, as under on his operations in 
a manner required by the Act.60 In the final analysis, in practice the life 
of a mining licence will naturally depend on the size of the ore-body and 
on its physical characteristics such as its quality and will normally con­
tinue until such time as the mimerals which are the subject of the licence 
and which can be profitably mined are exhausted.
The holder of a prospecting licence is required to commence prospec­
ting operations within three months of the date of the issue of the licence. 
But where the state is satisfied that an initial period is required to make
58. s.Sl (1)
59. The most generous seems to be Sierra Leone which grants 99 years. See Minerals 
Regulations, Chapter 196, s.31.
60. s.Sl (1) reads ‘Subject to the provisions of this Act a mining licence shall be valid 
for the period, not exceeding twenty five years, specified in the licence'. A fixed 
term of a Mining right would be bad business for the mining investor. For about 
the middle of the right if the investor wanted to raise money for investment, he 
would not be able to issue bonds easily for lack of adequate security.
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(he necessary preparations before prospecting operations, a date is 
specified in the licence which in no way can be more than six months 
after the date of issue of the licence.61 He has to carry out prospecting 
operations in accordance with the programme of prospecting operations. 
He must expend in direct expenditure not less than the amount which 
would result if a sum of K50 per 2.6 square Kilometres or part thereof, of 
the prospecting area, were expended annually, during the currency of the 
licence.62 Also, he must submit reports about his operations to the Chief 
Mining Engineer.
Similarly, the holder of an exploration licence has certain obligations. 
He is required to commence his operations within six months of the date 
of issue of the licence.63 He is obliged to carry on exploration operations 
in accordance with the programme of exploration operations. He has to 
expend in direct expenditure during the period of the initial grant of the 
licence a total of not less than the amounts of Four thousand Five hund­
red Kwacha. During any period of renewal of the exploration licence, the 
exploration licence holder is obliged to expend not less than the amount 
which would result if a sum of three thousand eight hundred Kwacha per 
2.6 sqaure Kilometres, or part thereof, of the exploration area, were ex­
pended annually during the period of renewal.64
The minimum expenditure obligations in both the case of prospecting 
and exploration are direct expenditures and have been set at a low level as 
far as prospecting is concerned in order to encourage the use of new 
reconnissance techniques over extensive areas. The state at the moment 
insists that the amounts stipulated must be spent in the year they are re­
quired. A prospecting right holder, for instance, who spends K10 per 2.6 
square Kilometres per year in the first year and K60 per 2.6 square 
Kilometres per year in the second year is considered in breach of his 
obligations by the Mining Officials, if he spends K20 in the third year. It 
could be submitted that this is unnecessary rigidity on the part of the 
state, for, if it took the average as a guide to when there has been a 
breach, the same total level of expenditure would be achieved. And it 
also runs counter to mining experience, for although in the earlier years 
much expenditure is necessary because of the extensive drilling that has
61. s.26.
62. s.26.
63. s.37.
64. Ib id .
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to  be carried on, in the later years laboratory tests do not cost much. The 
taking of an average as a guide would also be advantageous to people 
who hold licences in the remote areas of the country where during the 
rainy season the roads are impassable and work has to be suspended, 
such as is the case in the West Lunga river licence area. Already strong 
emphasis is placed, by mining officials, on the requirement that any 
applicant for any form of mining right must submit a programme of his 
intended operations. This programme is one of the more important 
criteria used in assessing applications for mining rights and in effect the 
issue of a licence means that the programme is approved especially that 
such programmes are examined, item by item, by mining officials. The 
work contemplated by the state and thus acceptable for inclusion in the 
programme is such as bears some direct relationship to the investigation 
and development of minerals in general and which tends to facilitate the 
extraction or investigation of ores in the licence areas. In the case o f the 
actual labour to be performed in mining or improvements in the way of 
hoisting machinery, there is no difficulty as the relationship of the same 
to mining activities is direct and apparent. The same could be said about 
airborne surveys investigating mineral occurrences where there can be no 
problem or in the case o f  laboratory work directly connected with the 
mining operations upon the licence area. But such work includes less 
direct expenses such as that on the construction of roads for access to 
licence areas, to facilitate mining activities.65 Thus the chief objection to 
the requirement of a minimum amount of work, as raised by some 
investors is that the mining industry is particularly susceptible to fluc­
tuating prices. When the price of the product from a particular mine 
justifies operations, the mine will be developed or worked regardless of 
the minimum work requirement. On the other hand, during periods of 
deflated prices, the minimum work requirement merely adds to the 
economic woes of the already troubled mining right holder. However, 
even if this objection were valid, it would be so only to mining right 
holders who are actually engaged in mining. It would not, therefore, be 
applicable to those persons who acquire mining properties for 
speculative purposes and who are the target of this legislation. It is 
nonetheless important, in view of this possibility, to require levels of ex­
65. Development work is not clearly spelt out in the Mines and Minerals Act.
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expenditure which are easily attainable given the nature of mining activi­
ties, which the Zambian levels seem to be. In practice the minimum levels 
of expenditure are far exceeded by most mining right holders. There are 
extreme cases such as when in the West Lunga river licence area Roan 
Consolidated Mines Ltd., mounted helicopter operations as the area 
could only be reached by air. The effort of getting there was enough to 
cover all needed expenditure obligations.
A useful programme of prospecting, it should be noted, involves a 
general reconnaissance which includes a search for previously 
documented mineral occurrences, the carrying of sediment sampling in 
appropriate areas at short intervals of say 200 metres, the geological 
mapping of the area, and a detailed examination of past workings, if 
any. In the second year, a more detailed programme of geological mapp­
ing is usually initiated, and in addition the overall structural relationship 
of rocks in areas of interest will be determined especially as they may 
relate to mineral occurrences and a lot of pitting and trenching is carried 
out in target areas. In the third year, the prospecting right holder will 
invariably require detailed pitting, trenching, and sampling. Such a pro­
gramme will on the average require thousands of Kwacha per year in 
terms of transport and personnel costs. At the very least, money is re­
quired for the remuneration of geologists, for machinery and for 
laboratory work.66
An exploration programme of work also requires invariably up to 
three stages. The first will usually involve a detailed geological survey 
and rock sampling, a detailed ground survey of the anomalous areas ex­
posed by prospecting and a systematic wagon or diamond drilling 
campaign. Drilling costs are extremely high. Though they vary widely 
depending upon the nearness or remoteness of the drilling location, the 
hardness of the work, depth of overburden and other factors, they are on 
the average in the order of K200 per metre. The second stage would in­
volve exploration ore drilling to provide mineralogical parameters of the 
mineralisation while the last stage would involve an intensification of the 
first stage. Such a programme will require the same inputs as in the
66. See for instance the estimated expenditure of Mines Industrial Development
Corporation Ltd; in one of their licences was; 1st year K9.SOO, 2nd year K 11,900, 
3rd year K23.800. Licence P.L. 67 o f 9 August, 1972. Registrar of Mining Rights, 
Lusaka.
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case of prospecting already discussed.67 Consequently, the levels of 
expenditure specified will not cause hardship to a genuine miner, and in 
any case, should that happen, the obligation may be waived provided the 
state is satisfied that the mining-right holder has been prevented from 
meeting the obligations by reasons beyond his control.68 Admittedly as 
most mining investors justifiably complain, minimum expenditure 
obligations are a clumsy way of trying to ensure that prospecting opera­
tions proceed at an acceptable level as these entail much paper work, and 
expenditure returns can in any case be inflated by including unreasonable 
charges, especially where the mining enforcement officers do not have a 
reasonable understanding of basic principles of mining. This has been 
mitigated in Zambia in that so far the calibre of the men to whom the 
returns are made has been high.
A holder of a mining right is required to commence production on or 
before the date fixed in the programme of development and mining 
operations as the date by which he intends to work for profit, a date in 
effect approved by mining officials. He is also required to develop and 
mine the mineral deposit covered by his licence in accordance with the 
programme of development and mining operations as required in terms 
of section 54 of the Act. A typical programme invariably includes such 
details as estimated tonnes of ore to be mined and milled, planned mine 
development and exploratory drilling, estimated mineral production and 
operating costs, capital projects, mining methods, and estimated staff 
and labour requirements. There are, of course wide variations in mining 
programmes reflecting the wide variations in the types of mines. They 
range all the way from small prospects which may have only a single level 
with lateral workings, such as Hippo mine in Mumbwa, through the deep 
and complex workings of mines that have been in production for many 
years such as Mufulira.
It has already been mentioned that a mining right holder is obliged to 
submit reports and information about his activities. The contents of such 
reports are confidential so long as the relevant licence remains in force 
and can be published or communicated only if and to a person consented
67. See Exploration Programme for Baluba Mining Area; 1st year K10.000, 2nd year 
K20.000 and 3rd year K30.800. Licence E.L. 41, Registrar of Mining Rights, 
Lusaka.
68. If it were not so then the obligations would be unduly restrictive on small mines. 
Mines Industrial Development Corporation has several small mines e.g. tin 
deposits scattered over an area of 31.2 Kilometres in Southern Province. 
Individually each of these deposits will contain no more than 3-5 tonnes o f tin 
worth about K 15,000, to justify the present levels of expenditure one would have 
to spend on 20 deposits.
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to by the holder of the licence.69 The reports are used as another way of 
checking the activities of mining right holders, but are disliked by most 
mining companies on the grounds that they are time-consuming, but no 
better alternative has been suggested.70 It seems, however, that they are 
resented partly because under the pre-1969 legislation no such require­
ment existed, so that as such most mining investors, particularly the ones 
that operated in the country before 1969, tend to feel that this require­
ment is there largely because the state does not trust them.
There is, however, a problem where the mining right holder gives up 
any of his rights, particularly the lesser rights of prospecting and explo­
ration. The problem is more obvious where a mineral deposit has been 
discovered but as a result of economic or other factors the holder is not 
in a position to start mining. The practice at the moment is that the state 
gives the information to the new company that takes out a mining right 
covering the area. There are two problems here. First, the new mining 
right holder gets an unfair advantage in that he takes free of charge 
information which cost the previous holder of the mining right several 
thousands of Kwacha and on which he depends a great deal. This may 
encourage the previous holder to give less than full information. On the 
other hand, if the state did not pass on this information to the new min­
ing right holder, there would be an unnecessary delay in mineral explo­
ration which would run counter to the country’s interest in having 
resources discovered and utilised. The State cannot at the same time 
allow the holder to hang on to the area until the time is in his judgement 
conducive for its development, as this again would delay mineral 
development. It could be submitted that the way out may be for the new 
company to pay a small fee towards the cost of that information. It is 
only fair that a successful searcher should be compensated for the 
benefits accrued through his effort, acumen, and powers of observation 
and deduction. This could also act as an incentive to the previous holders 
of mining rights to give fuller information.
69. s.54.
70. But the complaint appears to be genuine when it concerns a small mine in that 
the preparation of reports needs a qualified surveyor and engineer, which is not 
an optimal allocation of its resources. Mines Industrial Development Corporation 
Ltd. has an Engineer who spends SO*7·  of his time filling in forms.
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Obligations relating to manner o f operation
Wasteful mining practices
In addition to the requirements that are calculated to influence the rate 
of development, there are requirements within the mining laws which en­
sure that the activity of mining goes on in an acceptable manner as well. 
The objectives of the two are somewhat interrelated in that development 
at any cost can result in unnecessarily low recovery rates and also in 
damage to the environment, both of which can offset any benefit due 
from the development of minerals. Thus, a mining-licence holder is 
obliged to work the mineral subject to his licence in accordance with 
accepted mining standards by avoiding wasteful mining and 
metallurgical practices.71 It is an express duty to conduct mining opera­
tions with reasonable care and diligence. When the state mining officials 
consider that a miner is using wasteful practices, they notify him accord­
ingly and require him to show cause why he should not cease to use such 
practices. In this respect three types of disputes most commonly arise. 
These are: claims by the state that the operations are being carelessly 
carried out in such a way that they are unnecessarily causing damage to 
the environment; claims of premature abandonment of mines; claims 
that the miner is failing to maximise the recovery from the mine by using 
outdated methods of mining rather than advanced production techni­
ques.72 Such an obligation on the miner respecting mining methods is 
like the common law convenant in mining lease to work minerals in a 
proper and workmanlike manner.73 That proper mining methods be used 
is of the utmost importance to the state and the requirement is vigorously 
enforced by the mining officials. In benefit terms, it ensures that 
minerals are mined economically and at maximum recovery rates and 
that mine workings are carried on with minimum disruption to the en- 
viroment and danger to other human activities.
71. s. 55.
72. The state, for instance claimed the Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd. had breached 
this duty when the Company continued to use a method which had been found to 
cause too much dilution o f ores in other mines on the Copperbelt, at the Baluba 
mine. See letter from Chief Mining Engineer to the Managing Director of Rokana 
Consolidated Mines Ltd., 19 April, 1974, File No. 17.
73. Except that the common law duty is contractual and also more strict as miners 
can not be allowed to escape performance on the ground that the minerals are 
difficult to get. See Clifford v. Watts, (1879), L.R. 5 C.P. 577.
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Consolidation and problems common to it
The state’s interest in making sure that proper mining methods are used 
is carried further in section 87 of the Act. According to this section if 
after the inquiry, the Minister of Mines considers that the best interests 
of the country or of the holders of mining licences covering contiguous 
or neighbouring mining areas will be best served with regard to the 
economic exploitation of minerals by the merging or co-ordination of all 
or part of the operations of such holders, he may direct the holders to 
effect such merger or co-ordination within such time and on such terms 
as he specifies and the holders have to comply with his directions. The 
state is, however, bound to afford the holders of the mining licence con­
cerned a reasonable opportunity to make representations in writing 
before giving any direction as to consolidation of mining rights. It is 
important that such rights as these which involve heavy outlays of capital 
are not altered without providing for such things as adequate notice, 
hearing, and an opportunity to participate in the planning of the joint 
operation.74 So far there are no concrete examples of the state ordering 
consolidation, but state officials insist that they would order consolida­
tion only where they believe co-operative development of the areas to be 
consolidated will be achieved, such as the reduction of operating costs 
and capital expenditure. When justified thus this should result in permit­
ting the orderly mining of the ore body in accordance with engineering 
principles without regard for the priorities that might otherwise exist for 
developing one area before another. It should therefore avoid the con­
flict which might arise among licence holders. But consolidation will also 
be ordered by the state where it provides a method whereby small tracts 
of land may be mined when they cannot economically be separately ex­
plored or mined. It would appear the only problem that could arise in 
this area is a constitutional question as to whether the holders of the min­
ing rights would have been deprived of their rights where they are oppos­
ed to the consolidation order. Because the problem has not arisen, there 
are no cases to assist us on the question of the constitutionality of this
74. The representations are required to be in writing. See s.91 (2).
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exercise. But there are analogous situations in other fields of endeavour 
where, for instance, the state has compulsorily taken over land in the 
public interest without the concurrence of the owner75. Provided the 
state makes equitable compensation to anybody whose interest is thereby 
modified, there should be no problem. The justification for this view is 
based on the power of the state, as owner, to provide for the conser­
vation, greater recovery, and more efficient use of the State’s mineral 
resources as well as the protection of the correlative rights affected.
Standard o f  compliance o f  duty to develop and not to use wasteful min­
ing practices
Sections 54 and 55, which impose the obligation to develop the mine in 
accordance with the programme of development and mining operations 
and the duty not to use wasteful mining and metallurgical practices, do 
not indicate the standard the Chief Mining Engineer is required to use in 
coming to any conclusion that the two obligations have been met or 
breached. Two possible solutions suggest themselves: to measure the 
standard by (a) the good faith of the mining-right holder or (b) the test of 
the prudent mining-right holder. The first test suggests that as long as the 
mining right holder is acting in good faith in his judgement, he should 
not be held to be in default by the state. In a sense every man who invests 
his money and labour in a mining business does it in the confidence that 
he will be able to conduct mining operations in his own way. The state 
would not have power to impose a different judgement on him, however 
erroneous it may deem him to be. The State’s right would not arise until 
it has been shown clearly that he is not acting in good faith in his business 
judgement, but rather fraudulently and with intent to obtain a dishonest 
advantage over the state. This standard would not be adequate for pur­
poses of control and is not used in practice by mining officials. It is also 
implicitly excluded by the Act, since the holder of a mining right, once 
notified of wasteful mining practices, has to satisfy the Chief Mining 
Engineer that he is not using wasteful mining or metallurgical practices
75. See Land Acquisition Act, Chapter 296 of the Laws of Zambia.
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or that the use of such practices is justified in the circumstances.76 And in 
the case of the breach to develop in order for the mining-right holder to 
be so excused, the Minister of Mines has to be satisfied that in the cir­
cumstance the failure to follow the programme was justified. Thus in the 
case of Baluba Mining Area,77 where production of recoverable copper 
fell below the target given in the programme, the state raised a query and 
stated:
This p rogram m e envisages a substan tial d ro p  in the  
p rodu c tio n  o f  recoverable copper from  the  Baluba 
m ining area  as com pared  w ith previous forecasts and  
also fails to  give any in fo rm a tio n , in respect o f  the  p ro ­
duction  o f  cobalt concen tra tes , 1 am  unab le to  accept the  
p rog ram m e pending subm ission by you o f  sa tisfac to ry  and 
adequate  reasons fo r the  sh o rtfa ll in p ro d u c tio n  and  o f  
details concerning the  p roduction  o f  cobalt 
co n cen tra te .78
In such a situation it seems, and could possibly be submitted that the Act 
and practice of the state officials had taken the best standard in the cir­
cumstances. A test of good faith performance, being subjective, has two 
principal defects in relation to mining activities. It is difficult to apply 
and its meaning is vague, what does good faith mean in respect of mining 
operations? But more important it fails to meet the requirements of the 
purpose of the mining right. The purpose of a mining right is exploita­
tion of the minerals covered in the licence. This purpose is not satisfied 
by mere good faith action by the mining right holder — that is, refraining 
from fraudulent conduct will not by itself promote the exploitation of 
the minerals covered in a particular mining area. For the mining area to 
be mined properly, the mining right holder must conduct those opera­
tions as customarily conducted in the industry in those circumstances as 
the realisation of the purposes of the Act requires reasonable efforts 
towards that end.
76. s.55 (2) reads ‘if within the time specified in the notification the holder of the 
mining licence fails to satisfy the Engineer that he is not using wasteful mining or 
metallurgical practices, or that the use of such practices if justified in the 
circumstances, the Engineer may order the holder to cease using such practices 
and the holder shall so cease within such time as the Engineer shall allow, subject, 
however to '„is right of appeal under the Minister o f Mines.’
77. The production of recoverable copper was 13748 tonnes in 1972/1973 and in eight 
months to February 1974, 13543, which was the equivalent of 20, 314 tonnes for 
the year, which was 16.86 tonnes or 8% below target as given in the 1973/1974 
programme. See letter of Cassidy, Chief Mining Engineer to Managing Director, 
Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd., 14 June, 1974.
78. Ibid.
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In any case the mining licence cannot be said to make the mining right 
holder the arbiter of the extent to which, or the diligence with which, the 
mining development of his area shall proceed. Mining operations are not 
to be likened to those of a private business, into which a man Duts pro­
perty or money and labour exclusively his own. the profits and losses 
which are of concern only to him, and the conduct of which may be 
according to his own judgement, however erroneous it may be. By reason 
of the state property interest in the subject matter and the fact that the 
substantial consideration for the grant lies in the development of 
minerals and the provisions for payment of taxes on the minerals ex­
tracted, it has an immediate concern with extent to which and the 
diligence with which the operations are prosecuted. If mining-right 
holders were to damage the mine by reason of their mode of working, the 
interest of the state would be damaged too. In coming to a conclusion 
that one of the above duties had been breached, the state employs the 
standard of accepted mining practices, that is the standard of the prudent 
mining-right holder. For instance, in the dispute referred to above, the 
programme of Baluba mine was examined item by item and compared 
with standards of its past programmes.79 The prudent miner standard 
has the same function in here as the reasonable man standard in other 
branches of the law. The prudent miner is a hypothetical miner who does 
what he ought to do and does not do what he ought not to do with 
respect to mining operations. Since the standard of conduct is objective, 
a miner cannot justify his action or omission on personal grounds. It is 
no excuse that the defendant failed to mine, say, because he was short of 
money, was over-committed on mining programmes, had no need for 
more production, had no money to use conservationary methods, or 
preferred to spend his money on other things. In short, the question is 
not what was proper for the individual mining right holder to do, given 
his peculiar personal circumstances, but what a hypothetical miner acting 
reasonably would have done, given circumstances generally obtaining in 
the industry. Yet local conditions may differ from mine to mine, as was 
pointed out by Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd., in 1974, when the state
79. Letter o f Chief Mining Engineer to Managing Director, Roan Consolidated Mine· 
Ltd., 19 August, 1974.
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complained that it had breached its duty by using a method in its mine 
workings, ‘which had been found to cause too much dilution of ores in 
other mines on the Copperbelt, at its Baluba mine.’ The Company 
argued that it had not breached the obligations, since the ground condi­
tions in the Baluba mine area made it unsafe to work in unsupported 
slopes.80 In applying this hypothetical standard neither the interests of 
the state nor the miner alone are to be used as a criterion but, on the con­
trary, there must be a proper balancing of the interests of both parties. 
The determination of whether a miner has developed his mine with the 
diligence that would have been employed by a prudent miner under the 
same circumstances is a question of fact and depends upon a proper con­
sideration of all the special circumstances affecting the particular mine 
involved and general conditions prevailing in the mining industry.
Circumstances when breach o f  obligation to develop and not to use 
wasteful mining methods may arise
It is obviously impossible to discuss the extent of these duties under the 
infinite variety of circumstances in which the problems may arise. Some 
generalisations, however, are possible. It requires that mining operations 
should be carried on using efficient mining methods, implying a duty to 
‘work in a workmanlike manner.’ This means in such a manner as shall 
not be simply an attempt to get out of the earth as much mineral as possi­
ble for the particular purpose of the mining right holder, regardless of 
any ordinary workmanlike precautions which would, for instance, 
damage the environment or make mining more difficult for others who 
may take over the mining right. It also requires that after a mine had 
reached production, the miner must proceed to sink additional shafts 
according to the programme of operations until the area covered by the 
licence has been fully developed or until the licence expires. An exception 
would be where, for instance, cuts in production are ordered by the 
jta te .81 The mining officials are against the meeting of bare minimum re­
quirements. What is to be regarded as full development will depend upon
80. Letter of Managing Director of Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd., to Chief Mining 
Engineer, 28 October, 1974.
81. The state has power to order cuts in production under the Act see s.56. This 
power has been used mostly in an attempt to influence commodity prices.
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the productive qualities of the mining area as revealed by the mining 
operations on the area subject to the licence and upon other lands and 
upon proved ore reserves. If the area is sufficiently mineralised, it would 
seem that full development would require the mining of all the mineral 
underlying the entire premises subject to a licence. The duty not to use 
wasteful mining practices will often exclude negligent performance of 
mining operations. Thus it embraces within its scope all negligent con­
duct of mining operations other than negligent failure to follow the pro­
gramme of operations, such as using methods which bring about pollu­
tion or low recovery of ore, or unnecessary inhibition of other economic 
activities. Though the mining officials are fairly vigilant in their enforce­
ment of these requirements, they do not seem to harass miners un­
necessarily. A miner would not be considered in breach where a mere 
mistake of judgement is involved. The breach has to be plain and 
substantial in view of the actual circumstances at the time, as distinguish­
ed from mere expectations on the part of mining enthusiasts. Mining 
operations require that the state mining officials should act with caution 
particularly with reference to the following of the programme. The large 
expense incident to the work of exploration and development, and the 
fact that the mining right holder must bear the loss if the operations are 
not successful, require that he proceed with due regard to his own 
interests, as well as those of the state. No obligation should rest on him 
to carry the mining operations beyond the point at which they will be 
profitable to him, even if some benefit to the state will result from such 
action.
We have mentioned the question of relevance of the practice of other 
miners being considered in determining whether a wrong method of min­
ing is being used. Early common law cases dealing with the duty of the 
miner to mine in ‘a workmanlike manner’ suggest that this is a proper 
consideration. Lewis v. Fothergilft2 a lease contained a covenant by the 
lessee for working the coal in ‘a proper and workmanlike manner’. The 
lessees proceeded to work the coal by a method of mining known as 
instroke, from their adjoining colliery. The lessor alleged that the lessees 
ought to sink a pit and work the coal from the deep and filed an action to
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stop them. The court held that under the circumstances, working the coal 
by the method of instroke was working in ‘a proper and workmanlike 
manner.’ The Court pointed out that ‘a proper and workmanlike man­
ner’ may not mean the best possible mode of working for the lessor. It 
was found that working by instroke was the system almost invariably 
practised in the coal industry. Indeed the practice of other miners is often 
used as a measure by mining officials. In the case of methods, the state 
will not require a miner to change a method of mining simply because it 
prefers that method. An example of the use of this practice is the case of 
Baluba mine referred to earlier where the state queried the method used 
by Roan Consolidated Mines on the ground that there were other proven 
methods which caused less dilution of ore than the method employed by 
them which were being used by other mines on the Copperbelt. Yet it 
could also be submitted that practice alone, though important, is never 
the decisive factor. The question whether a particular method is un­
suitable is a question of fact which can be ascertained by scientific 
methods. This is so because it is possible that the majority of mining 
right holders could be using an unsuitable method or one not suited for a 
particular mine, as was the case in the Baluba case where the ground con­
ditions in the mine made it unsafe to work in unsupported slopes. Besides 
the rapid change of technology in the mining industry with the discovery 
of new and more efficient methods of mining makes it imperative to ap­
proach the question as one of fact.
Consequences o f  the breach o f  the obligations
The consequences of a breach of the obligations are in effect cir­
cumstances in which a right to mine may be terminated at the instance of 
the government. These circumstances, quite apart from the fact that they 
determine in effect the nature of the title conferred by a licence, are as 
much a matter of consequence to a potential investor as the duration of 
the rights which he seeks to obtain. They are also of significance to his 
financial backers where a mining company has raised loan finance which 
is secured by a charge on fixed assets located within the area of the min­
ing licence. The security would be of dubious value, if not worthless 
unless the circumstances in which the miner’s title was defeasible were
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limited by proper safeguards against arbitrariness.83 Even where loan 
finance is secured otherwise than by a charge on fixed assets, the title of 
the miner is of considerable significance. Most mining investors regard 
the present consequences as fair and the safeguards adequate. According 
to the Act any holder of a mining right is liable to a penalty not exceeding 
five thousand Kwacha.84 The state may recover the difference between 
the required expenditure and actual expenditure, if any. A breach of the 
obligations of a mining right holder is a ground for the termination of 
the mining right.85
The obligations on the mining right holder are not absolute but rest 
upon the reasonable expectations of parties to a mining right. The 
mining-right holder will generally be excused where he is not himself 
responsible for the breach,86 since it is thought that the mining right 
holder should not suffer punitive consequences for breaches not legally 
imputable to him. For a mining-right holder to be deprived of his right, 
therefore, there must both be failure to abide by the obligations and 
blameworthiness on the part of the mining-right holder. Thus, it is a 
defence to show that the failure to comply with the obligations that 
necessitated termination is due to circumstances beyond the control of 
the holder of the mining right, or the holder has a reasonable excuse for 
such failure to comply with the obligation. For example, it would be a 
defence to a charge of including false information in a report of failure 
to comply with any order, such as one ordering him to stop wasteful min­
ing practices that the holder has a reasonable excuse for such failure, or 
has taken all reasonable steps to comply with the direction.87
The breach of any obligation does not ipso facto  'terminate the right 
granted, but merely gives the state the option of terminating the right.88
So far no mining right has been terminated as a result of the occurrence 
of a breach. The cases that have arisen have been resolved without
83. The sort of provision that is unlikely to inspire confidence is the Tanzania Mining 
Ordinance as amended by an Act passed in 1969. The statute provides that the 
President may cancel a mining lease during the continuation of the period of its 
validity if he considers it desirable in the national interest to do so. The amending 
Act further provides that an order made by the President under this provision is 
final and ‘shall not be questionedin any court’. See s.65.
84. s.92.
85. s.94.
86. s.91. The mining right holder can appeal to a court of law against a termination 
o f his right.
87. s.96.
88. s.93.
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this necessity. The decisions of the state in respect of such matters can be 
appealed against to the Mining Affairs Tribunal, which has power to 
amend or vary the decisions of the state.89
These limitations on the life of a mining right should be distinguished 
from the general limitation relating to the life-span of a mining right. 
The operative effect of the expiry of the time limit of the light is that the 
right automatically terminates without the necessity of any affirmative 
actior. on the part of the state or the mining right holder, and in fact even 
without the knowledge or express wish of either party. This is particular­
ly so with respect to the prospecting right which is not renewable. With 
respect to the renewable rights the mining right holder has to start moves 
to have it renewed before it expires. In the case of the limitation arising 
from the breach of obligations, the state may waive its right to terminate 
the right as it is in its discretion to initiate termination proceedings. The 
state, however cannot waive the termination of a right by operation of 
the expiration of term of a mining right. If the mining-right holder re­
mains in possession after the expiration of the term of the right, he holds 
the right merely at sufferance. This is different from the position where 
there is a breach in that the mining right holder remains in possession 
after the happening of the event as the owner of the same right that he 
had before he breached the obligation, until the state takes affirmative 
action to bring his right to an end. A new mining right is necessary to 
revest a right in a mining-right holder once his term has expired. The ex­
piry of the term does not operate to cut short the right but simply fixes 
one of the natural limits of the right beyond which it cannot endure.
Mining Rights and Surface Rights
A person who acquires a mining right does not thereby acquire any right 
of disposal over the surface, which right is retained by the state. As can 
easily be inferred from the earlier discussion regarding the nature of the 
interest acquired through a mining right, the division of the use of the
89. s. 126 These in essence are appeals against the state’s refusal to allow an individual 
or company to mine and in some sense limit the state’s exclusive right to decide 
on who can mine its mineral resources; except thai this is only after the mine has 
acquired vested interests i.e. after the miner has incurred some expenses. The 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not concurrent with that of the ordinary courts.
The jurisdiction of the courts is specifically excluded by the Act, supra, in. s. 126.
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land surface between the land owner and the holder of a mining right is a 
very important issue to both mining-right holders and surface owners.90 
The surface may be required for use by the mining right holder for min­
ing purposes or for purposes ancillary to mining, including the milling, 
processing, and refining of the minerals extracted and the construction 
of the necessary plant, works and buildings for these purposes. But :t 
may be required simultaneously by the land owner for agricultural uses, 
or for other development purposes. It may also be required for roads or 
the provision of services such as electric power and water supply, or for 
the purposes of establishing a mine township.
During prospecting operations there is little area of disagreement bet­
ween the mining right holder and the surface owner, but once explora­
tion and mining activities have started, opportunities for disputes in­
crease markedly. The mining-right holder may require some of the land 
for exclusive use; the surface owner may run his cattle over the tract on 
which mining operations are being conducted and a cow may fall into a 
mining pit, or a farmer’s crops may even be damaged by the miner’s ac­
tivities. The miner may use water in such quantities as may affect other 
users adversely. Thus, as a result of this the rights of the mining right 
holder to the use of the surface and the circumstances in which the 
owner’s rights are protected are the subject of strict regulation under the 
mining laws.
Land rights o f  holders o f  mining rights
A mining right holder is often granted the right to surface use over public 
and private land. He can enter upon land covered by his mining right 
with his servants and agents, make bore holes and the necessary excava­
tions, and erect camps and any temporary buildings for machinery 
necessary for mining purposes.91 Such erection of structures does not, 
however, confer any right, title, or interest whatsoever in the land. He 
may remove on or before the termination of his rights any camps, tem­
porary buildings, or machinery which he may have erected. He may take
90. At the outset it is important to point out that an understanding of the position 
under the common law is helpful in regard to the position in Zambia. Under the 
common law, the relative rights of the land owner and mineral owner are, deter­
mined by a number of considerations and particularly by the express rights con­
ferred upon the mineral owner by the land owner on the severance of the minera 
rights from the land by the terms of the mining lease, which expressly or by im­
plication will determine the question of their relative rights.
91. ss.25 and 35.
171
for domestic use or mining purposes forest produce provided that where 
such taking is on private land, compensation is paid to the owner or oc­
cupier of the land involved. The reason for this is that the right to surface 
use cannot be construed as taking from the land owner or giving to the 
mining right holder any property in the product of the soil. He may make 
or erect roads, air landing grounds, and bridges.92 In addition, a mining 
licence holder may purchase the mining area or obtain a lease of land 
covered by his mining licence from the owner of the surface area.93 
Where the land owner refuses to make the land available to the mining 
right holder, the President may acquire by compulsion in his name such 
private land or rights over or under such land for use by the holder of a 
mining licence. Even though this acquisition is regulated by legislation, it 
should be borne in mind that acquisition of property is an administrative 
act. The President, in effecting an acquisition of such property, must 
observe the well-established principles of administrative law such as prin­
ciples governing the exercise of discretion and the maintenance of 
records. Before the President can acquire the land, however, the holder 
of a mining right has to show that he has taken all reasonable steps to ac­
quire on reasonable terms, by agreement, the land or the right which he 
wishes to use and has been unable to do so.94 The proper purpose of the 
President’s powers renders it imperative that compulsory acquisition 
should only be resorted to if it is absolutely necessary to do so after ex­
hausting the alternative possibility of achieving its object by means of 
purchasing. When the land is compulsorily acquired, compensation for 
the land so taken is payable by the mining right holder at a rate determin­
ed by the President.95 However, the Act does not provide any guidelines 
as to how the compensation is to be measured. The High Court in 
Attorney-General v. Bobat96 has stated that where the power of com­
pulsory acquisition is conferred by statute and the statute is silent as to 
the basis upon which compensation is to be assessed, the court will act on 
principles analogous to those applicable under common law. Such prin­
ciples will be: (a) the value to the owner of the land and not the value to 
the acquiring authority; (b) restrictions as to user applicable to the land 
are to be taken into account; (c) market price is not a conclusive test of 
real value; (d) any increases in value consequent upon the completion of
92. Ibid.
93. s.79.
94. Ibid.
95. s.80.
96. 5 N.R.L.R. 501
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the undertaking for or in connection with which the action is made must 
be disregarded; (e) the value to be ascertained is the price to be paid for 
the land with all its potentialities and with all the use made of it by the 
owner of the land; (0  the true relationship between the parties is not to 
be confused with and construed as that of indemnifier and indemnified 
and (g) that the arbitrator is entitled to consider all returns and 
assessments of capital value for taxation made or acquiesced in by the 
claimant, i.e. to consider them not as conclusive evidence but as a check 
on extravagant claims.
Every person exercising a mining right is required to produce evidence 
of his possession of a mining right to the owner or occupier of the land 
upon which such right is being exercised or to the fully authorised agent 
of the owner or occupier, whenever demand is made for he licence. No 
mining right holder is allowed to exercise any mining right upon any land 
until he has given notice in writing of his intention to t'o so in the 
Government Gazette and in a newspaper circulating in the area where the 
land is situated at least fourteen days before the exercise of the right.97 
The notice is required to state the area in which the rights are to be exer­
cised and the date of expiry of the mining right. The requirement for 
such a notice is to enable the surface owner to make arrangements to 
move livestock to another pasture, to gather crops in the area, and to 
guard generally against mishaps and thereby mitigate the damage which 
may occur as a result of mining activities. This is important since the sur­
face owner or occupier of any land within a mining area has a right to 
graze stock upon or to cultivate the surface in so far as the grazing or 
cultivation does not interfere with the proper working in the area for pro­
specting, exploration or main purposes. However, the rights of the sur­
face owner are somewhat curtailed. For instance, he cannot erect any 
building or structure on the land without the consent of the holder of the 
mining right, or if such consent is unreasonably withheld, the consent of 
the Chief Mining Engineer. This in practice means that the mining right 
holders have a right of action to stop interference with their rights by sur­
face owners (as where, for example, surface clay impervious to water is 
removed, with the result that surface water percolates through to 
underground workings) and have a right to remove obstacles to their
97. s.76 (4).
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use of the surface, e.g. where building structures are placed on the land 
or the land is cultivated so that the minerals there cannot be worked or 
investigated. Most of these rights granted to the mining right holder are 
necessary for and incidental to successful searching for, production and 
disposing of minerals.
Water rights o f  holders o f  mining rights
Mine workings by their very nature are prone to intercept or interfer with 
water resources on a mining site. They, for instance intercept subterra­
nean waters either as an incident of the mining activities or as an internal 
dewatering activity. The natural courses of the waters are thereby altered 
to flow along the mine workings from which they are either drained or 
pumped to the surface and are very often discharged at places different 
from their natural surface outlet. Mine workings also require surface 
water for various uses connected with mining. The basic common law 
concept that is usually applicable to the water problems of mining is 
riparianism. This is a variety of rights to water known as riparian rights, 
which arise solely from ownership of land adjoining a natural stream. 
Under the natural flow concept of riparianism, all riparian owners are 
entitled to have the stream flow past their lands as it was meant to do in 
its natural state, and except for minor domestic uses no riparian owners 
may impair the quantity of the flow of the stream to the injury of any 
other such owner. In tjje Zambian case the water Fights of the holder of a 
mining right are exercised in conformity with the Water Act.98 In this 
legislation the state has totally deprived riparian owners of their common 
law rights. The general scheme of the Water Act is to divide water rights 
into three groups — primary use, covering domestic purposes; secondary 
use, covering the irrigation of land; and tertiary use, covering industrial 
purposes. The holder o f a mining right may use private water which is on 
the land under his control but must do so with due regard to other users. 
The other users of water are entitled to complain against action of any 
other owner or occupier who fouls and contaminates the water and 
appreciably affects its quality in a manner calculated to interfere with its 
primary use by the person complaining. Where a miner wishes to make 
use of public water, he has to apply to the Water Board constituted under
98. See s.53 (1); and also Water Act, Chapter 312 of the Laws of Zambia.
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the Water A c t."  The Board will grant permission to use a reasonable 
quantity of water where such use does not prejudice the holder of exist­
ing rights, but where the water is being beneficially used by others, by 
virtue of a statutory right or any other law or by agreement with the 
state, then the grant will be made only after full inquiry and payment of 
compensation. In addition to the water rights which he can obtain from 
the Water Board, the holder of a mining right is authorised by the Mines 
and Minerals Act to lay water pipes and water courses and ponds, dams, 
and reservoirs, lay drains and sewers, and construct and maintain sewage 
disposal plants.100
Dominant interest
The implications of the above discussion and the practice of mining 
officials are that a mining right holder’s right to use the surface is 
superior to that of the surface owner. There is no doubt that the mining 
right is the dominant interest. Mining officials grant mining rights 
irrespective of the present use of the land. The dominance of the mining 
right is also clearly implied on section 74 of the Act and is reinforced by 
the provisions relating to the compulsory acquisition of land for mining 
purposes where owner of the surface refuses to have it purchased by the 
holder of a mining right.101 In this sense a mining right holder, as a mat­
ter of law, has the absolute right to use, damage, or destroy the surface 
subject to limitations to be discussed later.
There is no doubt that the state and its mining officials clearly seem to 
regard all mineral development and exploration as having preference 
over all other uses of the land including agricultural and residential uses. 
This is basically so because mineral deposits are by their very nature rare 
and their location is determined by the geology of the country. Thus, 
they must be mined wherever they lie and when they are produced, the 
production requires less surface area than most other uses of land. It 
must be admitted that few uses of land are as unaesthetic as an operating 
or abandoned site for mineral resource extraction but it must also be 
agreed that the development of a productive mineral deposit is ordinarily
99. Water Act, ibid, s. 14.
100. s.53 (1) (9).
101. ss. 79 and 80.
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the highest economic use of the land with enormous benefits to the coun­
try. Here any other interpretation of the situation would restrain the 
holders of mining rights from mining whenever their activities would 
injure the interests of surface right holders. Futhermore, the express 
mineral reservation implied by the theory of ownership in all rights in 
land carries with it, by necessary implication, the right to remove such 
minerals by the usual and customary methods of mining and thus reduce 
them to possession even though the surface ground may be wholly 
destroyed as a result thereof. To hold otherwise would in effect amount 
to a determination that the state’s ownership of minerals is of no effect in 
certain circumstances as the state, despite its ownership rights, would be 
precluded from enjoying or recovering that which it owned, where for 
instance there was a conflict with the interest of the surface owner.
The discussion so far implies that in every case where a clash of interest 
arises, the interests of the miner must prevail. It looks certain, however, 
that where the mineral to be mined is plentiful (such as limestone) and 
where the benefit from mining it is out of proportion to the interest it 
prejudicially affects, the miner’s interest will not prevail. This for 
instance will happen when the agricultural interest is greater than that of 
any possible mineral output. This is contained at a very early stage by the 
mining officials refusing to recommend the granting of prospecting 
licences for plentiful minerals in residential and other areas where other 
industrial activities are going on .102 But probably this is an area where 
legislation is needed to establish machinery for the protection of the en­
vironment and other industrial activities by way of a public inquiry. The 
policy and scheme of the legislation suggested here contemplates that in 
the pursuit of the conservation and protection of the above ends mining 
rights may be limited, or even at times denied. But it is suggested that 
before making an order, the Chief Mining Engineer should satisfy 
himself by way of inquiry that the order is necessary, and if so satisfied, 
he should then consider whether it would be just and equitable to make 
it. This can be achieved by the establishment of a board where objections 
to the granting of mining rights can be lodged by the general public.
102. If this were otherwise the exercise of a mining right for even common minerals 
like sand, it would paralyse any other economic use of the land.
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No such system exists at the moment. The board could endeavour to take 
into account and to weigh against each other, all the interests to be 
affected by the grant of the mining right where objections exist and the 
board can then recommend to the mining officials whether or not such a 
mining right should be granted. But any such machinery should not 
allow disputes to drag on as this could lead to delays and unnecessary 
discouragement to investment.
Limitation on Surface Use
The mining rights surface uses are however, limited by section 77 of the 
Act, which provides that the rights conferred on the holder of a mining 
right shall be exercised reasonably and not so as to affect injuriously the 
interests of any owner or occupier of the land on which such rights are 
exercised. The effect of the section is that these rights are considered to 
be restricted to those uses of the surface that are ‘reasonably necessary’ 
to mining operations. On their own these very general words do not con­
vey the proper limitations imposed on a miner and this can only be 
achieved of course by the examination of the ways the same words have 
been interpreted in mining activities.
Use to bear reasonable relationship to mining
In the first limitation, section 77 has been interpreted as suggesting that 
the state or surface owner is enabled by the section to intercede when in 
its or his judgement a particular use of the surface lacks a legitimate or 
reasonable relationship to mining activities. It would not be permissible 
for the mining right holder to use the surface land and its resources for 
non-mining purposes, say, to set up a shop or a golf-course, except where 
they are for the well-being of his workers. Where a mining-right holder 
cuts timber with intent to sell he will be stopped. Whereas, while he is 
mining, a mining right holder is entitled to erect and occupy houses 
although he may not let houses to some one other than one of his 
employees. The test, of course, is whether the use is necessary or inciden­
tal to production and though considerations of custom, usa^e and pru­
dent operation come into play, they cannot be the determining factors. It 
seems it is justifiable that the state takes this stand. When it grants a min­
ing right it does not grant an interest in land as well. Since it has not
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seen fit to give away the land containing the minerals, it would be wrong 
to allow the miner to exercise rights which are part and parcel of the 
ownership of land. While his licence segregates and withdraws the land 
from the public domain, in that no other miner could obtain any mining 
right to it until his licence has expired or been cancelled, it gives him 
nothing but the right of possession for the purposes of mining. Whoever 
wants to go further than this, and for any reason appropriate to his own 
use other than for his mining operations can only do so properly by pay­
ing the purchase price of the land and becoming the owner thereof. 
Indeed, it is difficult to see under what theory the public could 
gratuitously bestow upon an individual or corporation the right to devote 
mineral lands any more than any other public lands to value uses having 
no relation to mining, and for what reason could anybody construe a 
miner’s surface right otherwise?103
Use not to disturb other land users unreasonably
The second limitation established by Section 77 of the Act has been inter­
preted as imposing on the holder of a mining right in the exercise of his 
surface rights as that his activities must not endanger health or constitute 
a public nuisance. He will be liable for all surface damage which is a 
result of his excesses and his negligence even though he may not have 
made an excessive, or unreasonable use of the surface. Here again, as 
with the concept of ‘reasonably necessary’, one is faced with a very 
nebulous term. What constitutes and does not constitute ‘negligence’? In 
mining practice, this will depend on the facts of each case and any 
attempt to formulate a general definition here would be unpracticable. 
Thus, as in any other instance of negligence, one must apply the general 
rules to determine if a duty exists and if there was a breach of such a 
duty, and the damage which resulted was a proximate result of such a 
breach. It must be noted that wjiereas excessive or unreasonable surface 
use is involved almost exclusively with damage to land, the negligence 
concept will usually be concerned with injury to livestock, or to surface 
drainage such as would result from chemical leaks. A mining right holder 
would be liable where, for instance, livestock died because the mining 
right holder in his use of surface negligently left poisonous substances in 
grazing areas. One of the cases that has arisen involved prospectors who 
put beacon cement in a cattle raffle to the annoyance of the owner of the
103. In some countries this is expressly provided for in the mining laws e.g. Botswana, 
see Mines and Minerals Act, supra, s.7 (3).
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land rights.104 It would also apply where escaping substances pollute the 
surface water supplies to such an extent that they interfere with the sur­
face owner’s use of the water for irrigation of stock. This duty not to 
injure the interest of the surface owner also applies where an existing use 
by the surface owner of the surface would otherwise be precluded or 
impaired, and where under established mining practices there are alter­
native methods of equal effect and efficiency available to the holder of a 
mining right whereby minerals can be investigated or recovered. This rule 
plus the rule of reasonable usage of the surface may require adoption of 
an alternative investigation or recovery method which does not preclude 
or impair use of the surface. But it could be submitted here that to force 
a mining-right holder to change his mining method where there is such a 
conflict there would have to be a determination that the use under attack 
was not reasonably necessary, weighing harm or inconvenience to the 
surface owner against considerations pertaining to the mining right 
holder. The situation is one requiring proof from which a tribunal could 
infer that the mining right holder is doing something which a prudent 
miner would not do or is doing it in a way in which a prudent miner 
would not do it; considering the availability of other alternative 
methods, the balancing of the risks, costs and like factors.
The burden of proving that in the circumstances, the use of the surface 
for the mining right holder is reasonably necessary is upon the surface 
owner, since the mining right owner is entitled to make reasonable use of 
the surface for the production of minerals covered in his licence. Of 
course it is not ordinarily contemplated that the utility of the surface for 
agricultural purposes will be destroyed or substantially impaired.105 
Hence the question whether or not the use which is being made of the 
surface is reasonable or not is one of fact. A landowner claiming that a 
mine owner is using more land than necessary in the production or 
investigation of minerals is not required, as a pre-requisite to obtaining 
relief, to show evidence of industry custom, usage and practices of other 
mining right holders as to how much of the surface is necessary in min­
ing, so long as there is evidence that the mining right holder involved in 
the dispute is using more of the surface than is reasonably necessary to
104. This happened in the Mumbwa area with a prospecting team from Anglo- 
American Corporation Ltd. The prospectors removed the beacon cement.
105. An analogy can be drawn from an American case where the miner applied for an. 
order requiring the land owner to shut down his operations to allow the lessee to 
use a particular method of exploration, Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline CO. 260 
F Supp. 643.
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the enjoyment of his mining right. Though oustom is a fact which any 
tribunal considering the matter will weigh and consider, it cannot be an 
absolute test of the reasonable use of surface rights in such cases, for 
though observing the custom and practice, the majority of mining right 
holders may be using more land rights than they require. In any case min­
ing right holders tend to use more surface rights than is actually 
necessary where they are not likely to infringe anybody’s rights or they 
may use a particular method simply because they prefer it.
Although all cases arising in this area so far have been settled out of 
court, it could be submitted that since the mining right holder is by law 
restrained from negligent acts and excessive use of the surface, the sur­
face owner can if necessary, seek an injunction to prevent activities 
which are not reasonably necessary in mining operations. Where blasting 
operations at a mining area are carried on in a negligent manner so that 
stones roll down to lower ground occupied by others, for instance, action 
to prevent this can be taken. The landowner can seek an order t h a v e  an 
excavation fenced, which if left unfenced could be a source of danger 
e.g. where the excavation is so near a right of way as to amount to a 
public nuisance. But it seems from the case of Steward v. Lusaka 
Management Board,106 where the plaintiff fell in a pit which was 
originally used to get gravel and sustained a broken leg, the courts will 
not do this readily where ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff is defi­
cient. In this case the court refused a claim for damages on the grounds 
that ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff would have prevented the 
accident. An analogy can be drawn from the common law position as 
exemplified in Pullbach Colliery Company v. Woodman, 107 where a 
butcher sought an injunction in respect of nuisance to him in his trade by 
the defendant’s screening and breaking operations. The court stated that 
the grant of the right to carry on the trade of a miner did not authorise 
the commission of a nuisance without proof that the trade could not be 
carried on otherwise, and the plaintiff was not precluded by the terms or 
the circumstances of the grant from obtaining relief.
106 2N .R .L .R 1 141.
107. 11915] A.C. 634. See also Attorney-General v. Cory Bros, and Company, (1912) 
A.C. 521. Conversely the miner should be able to sue where his rights are being 
injured by the surface owner. It is somewhat analogous to the cause of action for 
breach of the right o f supitort at common law, see Dalton v. Angus, (1881), 6 
A.C. 791.
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Of course where there is only one manner of use of the surface 
whereby minerals can be produced, the holder of a mining right has the 
right to pursue this use regardless of surface damage. Where there is ex­
cessive use the state mining officials can order the mining right holder to 
stop his excessive activities and on state land order excessive structures to 
be removed, while on private land the owner of the land may presumably 
remove excessive structures provided there is no breach of the peace. 
Thus this could be done in the same way that at common law one can 
abate a nuisance by self-help.
Compensation to Surface Owner For Damage to His Interests
Liability fo r  surface damage
Quite apart from the section establishing liability of a mining-right 
holder for negligence, claims in respect of damage caused by his activities 
can also be based on section 80 of the Act. The relevant part of this sec­
tion provides that:
Whenever in the course of prospecting, exploration or 
mining operations the holder o f a mining right causes any 
disturbances of the rights of the owner or occupier o f land 
or damages to any crops, trees, buildings, stock, or works 
thereon, the holder of the mining right by virtue of which 
such operations are or were carried out is liable to  pay 
to such owner or occupier fair and reasonable compensa­
tion for such disturbances or damages according to their 
respective rights or interests in the property concerned.
The compensation payable is to be agreed between the parties, failing 
which it has to be referred to the Chief Mining Engineer who would deal 
with it as a mining dispute.108 It is important to point out that without 
this section, a mining-right holder would only be liable where the damage 
caused was as a result of excessive or negligent use o f the surface. This 
section, however, obligates the miner to pay compensation in respect of 
damage caused irrespective of whether or not the damage was the result 
of excessive or negligent use of the surface.109 But it does not confer on 
the surface-right holder the right to stop activities involved as is the case 
where damage is caused by negligent activity. The liability is not based
108. s.81.
10». Ibid.
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on any concept of fault and where, for example, crops have had to be 
destroyed to make way for exploration activities, the mining-right 
holders should compensate the owners of the crops so removed.
Measure o f  damages
The Act does not, however, give guidelines on how the compensation is 
to be calculated except to state that where the value of the land has been 
enhanced by the fact that prospecting, exploration or mining operations 
are taking place or have taken place thereon or nearby, the amount of 
any compensation payable under this section in relation to that land is 
not to exceed the amount which would have been payable if such value 
had not been so enhanced. This still leaves unresolved the question of 
how the amount of damages is to be calculated. The problem, of course, 
does not arise with reference to the value of crops and livestock, as those 
are easily ascertained by reference to their market value. It is in connec­
tion with straight-forward soil damage that the problem may arise where, 
for instance, agricultural land is denuded of its surface soil so that it has 
no agricultural value any longer whether this is caused by a flood due to 
mining excavation110 or simply by mining excavations themselves. So far 
most of the problems that have arisen have related to animal and crop 
damage. It is, however, quite likely that with the increased use of the 
land for settlement and agricultural purposes, the other problem may in­
crease in significance. Is the compensation to be estimated with reference 
to the ordinary rules regarding expropriation of land?
When an interest in land is taken as in expropriation cases, the com­
pensation is readily determinable on the principles laid down in these 
cases such as the owner being deprived of some interest in the affected 
land either permanently or for some predetermined term. Its value can be 
ascertained with some certainty. But the case of a mining-right holder 
causing surface damage is not, however, a case of compensation for land 
or for any interest in land taken — i.e. tort damages. It is compensation 
for the loss and damage caused by operations carried thereon. With pro­
perty after the taking, there remains only to determine the value of the 
land or interest at the time of the taking. On the other hand, in the case 
of mining rights activities, there is no divesting of the owner of the sur-
110. Such as the dispute between Moxon and the City Council of Kit we where
Moxon’s farm was flooded by water occasioned by the bursting of a sewage tank. 
The dispute was settled out of court in 1975. Disputes between miners can be 
brought before the Chief Mining Engineer but his jurisdiction is concurrent with 
that of the courts see s.99.
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face of any interest. The statutes give the mining right holder a right of 
entry which precludes his being liable for trespass but requires him to pay 
compensation where damage is caused in the process. Thus, a claim for 
compensation by the surface owner does not arise with respect to a tran­
saction whose efforts are completed in the past but it does arise with 
respect to damages whose effect will continue into the future simply 
because the principles governing the fixing of compensation in ex­
propriation cases do not apply. In this case, some other principle must be 
adopted rather than that of determining the compensation on the basis of 
the value to the owner of the land or interest taken at the time of the tak­
ing. Common law cases111 suggest that the amount of damages should be 
calculated with reference to the difference in the value of the land at the 
time of its damage and the value after its damage taking into account its 
uses at the time of the damage, but as stated in Attorney-General v. Mar- 
rapodi Trustees112 without regard to any improvement or works that 
could be construed thereafter on the said lands, while making due 
allowance for reasonable expectation of its use. This last criterion entails 
taking into account not only the present purposes to which the land is ap­
plied but also any other more beneficial purpose to which in the conrse of 
events it might within a reasonable period be applied. But as emphasised 
in Attorney-General v. Bobatlli  the words ‘within a reasonable period’ 
are important and they exclude long term potentialities.
However, the mining legislation does not provide for the eventuality of 
the mining right holder being unable to pay compensation where it is due 
to a surface owner as a result of the miner’s activities. It has been sug­
gested by some mining officials that it should be a requirement that a 
mining right holder should deposit an amount of money with the state, 
which would be refundable at the expiration of any right, in the absence 
of any claim, as security for the payment of compensation for the distur­
bance of surface rights. The problem with such a proposal is that it may 
tie up a miner’s much needed money and thereby operate as a cost to his 
investment. The best solution it could be submitted, is to make the non­
payment of claims a ground for the suspension of the operation of min­
ing rights.114
111. e.g. Mordue v. The Dean and Chapter o f  Durham, (1872), L.R. 8 C.P. 336.
112. 5 N.R.L.R. 416.
113. 5 N.R.L.R. 520.
114. In some countries e.g. Botswana, the owner of land may require the holder of the 
prospecting right to give security for the payment of compensation for the distur­
bance o f surface rights. See Mines and Minerals Act, supra, s.7 (5).
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The question that remains to be considered is whether in practice the new 
legal regime has removed the previous abuses and increased the state’s 
capacity to deal with the problems of ensuring that mining rights are ac­
quired by competent persons. Also whether the problems of access to 
mineral land existing under the previous mining legislation are likely to 
arise, or whether mining areas are no longer kept undeveloped thereby 
preventing others from taking out the areas involved, situations which 
existed during the pre-1969 Mining legislation.
Advantages o f  the new system
The Act has to a very large extent, succeeded in removing most of the 
anomalies of the previous legal regime and increasing the state’s capacity 
for preventing their recurrence. It is now possible to suggest that the state 
is always in a position to control mining operations at every stage. It may 
remove at any time any tract of land from availability for mineral ex­
ploration. It may also change terms of exploration and other mining 
rights or the operating requirements and ultimately, it may terminate 
mining rights in circumstances where mining operations are not being 
carried out in the interest of the country. On the other hand, the state can 
grant the miner the right to prospect over areas of sufficient size to 
enable him to select the sections of great potential in the prospecting 
area. If explorations are warranted because of the mineral potential, the 
mining right holder can get the exclusive legal right to occupy and ex­
plore for minerals of interest in a specified area based on his own 
technical judgement. Should he discover minerals, he will obtain the ex­
clusive right to develop and produce from the deposit and. at the produc­
tion stage, the right to develop the deposit and to sell and dispose of the 
product. The mining rights are granted under general restrictions 
calculated to influence the speed at which and the method by which 
mineral wealth should be extracted. Some of these general restrictions, 
where a mineral policy exists can be used for key development re­
quirements in the industry to the needs of the country. This means that 
healthy changes in policy cannot permanently be retarded as they were 
under the pre-1969 mining legislation which conferred vested rights upon 
the claimant from the date of his discovery.
The Effect of the 1969 Mining Rights System on Mining Activities
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The obvious advantage of the new system, however, has been the fact 
that the state, having power to grant or withhold the granting of prospec­
ting rights at its discretion, has been able to exercise a judicious power of 
selection of miners and has thereby ensured that mining rights are not 
granted to irresponsible persons and to people who have not the means to 
initiate and carry out mining development. The constant augmentation 
of the capitalisation of mining rights which can result from the sale of 
mining properties again and again, passing through the hands of agents 
and middlemen to the working mining company, has been completely 
avoided as the transfer of mining rights can be affected only with the ap­
proval of the state. This has meant that the system has, eliminated the 
chance of an individual taking up mining rights, through the obligations 
on miners relating to expenditure, which will almost certainly prove too 
high for him. Such a position had eventually happened even under the 
pre-1969 mining legislation, and it is an economic fact that whatever 
system of mining rights is adopted, the cost is such that it is more or less 
impossible for an individual to acquire control of most mining properties 
with the exception of the very small deposits. Besides the geological reali­
ty in the country seems such that most surface outcrops have been sub­
ject to at least a cursory examination. It follows from this that it is highly 
probable that those ore bodies with outcrops on the surface have already 
been found and are being worked. So that invariably a future mineral 
discoverer has to be able to extract information from situations overlain 
by heavy burden or by rock capping which an ordinary individual 
without technical competence and financial ability will be incapable of 
accomplishing.
There are, however, very small deposits, e.g. of tin in the Southern 
Province, in Zambia, where the services of a small miner are still useful. 
A big company will not look at such deposits because the overhead ex­
penses which its management structure requires would not justify it. 
During the interviews, it was suggested by miners involved in small scale 
mining that they should have their own legislation. Although it is 
preferable that all miners be treated equally, there is a case for separate 
legislation for small scale miners — for although they can get exemptions 
from expenditure obligations, the fact that it is only after application is
185
and may cause delays. The state could also create a machinery and skills 
pools from which such prospectors and miners could hire machinery and 
skilled manpower for their use. It is in the interest of the nation that even 
small mineral deposits be worked properly if resources are not to be 
misused and therefore wasted.
It is obvious too that the new Act has minimised the possibility of 
monopoly of mineral land, through its expenditure obligations, fixed 
tenure of mining rights and its requirement of programmes of operations 
which to a large extent was a feature of the pre-1969 Mining System. It 
has thereby also eliminated the holding of mineral land for speculative 
purposes.
Practical results o f  the Legislation
Most of the assertions above can be proved by the practical results of the 
change in the mining rights system soon after the new Act was introduc­
ed. The state mining officials were inundated with inquiries relating to 
the Act and requests for geological information concerning the areas that 
had been relinquished by the special grant holders. These enquiries stem­
med from companies based in Canada, the United States, Britain, 
France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Japan and South 
Africa. It is a measure of the interest shown that the majority of 
interested companies sent senior technical personnel to Lusaka to 
examine the available data. Of course interest centred on areas on the 
Copperbelt; Mokambo was regarded by many as the most promising 
area since economically significant mineralisation had been to a large ex­
tent proved by an extensive diamond drilling programme. Information 
concerning areas adjacent to the Copperbelt and its possible extension to 
the west, the former Chisangwa and Mwinilunga areas, was also very 
much in demand, and there was some interest in the more widely scat­
tered economic potential which had at least been demonstrated to exist 
e.g. in Semberere. The majority of the inquiries were concerned with the 
prospcct for copper mineralisation, but some also were interested in the 
potential for other metals.
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Soon after the Act was passed, it is reported that Mitsui and Mit­
subishi Shaji Kaisha both Japanese companies, sent representatives to 
study the feasibility of an international corporation jointly prospecting 
for copper and other minerals. They suggested that if the government 
would agree to freeze the mining legislation as represented in the new Act 
for 30 years, they would then promise to invest heavily in exploration. In 
the belief that mining investors regarded the new Act as favourable to 
them, however, the government rejected this suggestion.
The government has granted licences in several parts of the country. 
Anglo-American have taken three prospecting areas at Kansanshi and 
Luangwa North. Roan Selection Trust Ltd., have taken out three areas 
at Mukimbefi, Kalumbi and Kalengwa. Sidco, a Yugoslavian company, 
has one area at Mulinanshina. Somiren, an Italian company, is prospec­
ting for Uranium and Copper in the Mwinilunga area. Sinico, a 
Japanese-American Consortium, took out a licence near Solwezi. 
Geomin, a Rumanian company, took out two areas, one at Ntambu and 
another around Kasempa. Mokambo Development Company, a joint 
venture between Mines Industrial Development Corporation and 
Geomin of Rumania, is undertaking geological and mineral investiga­
tions into the Mokambo copper ore body situated near the Zambia-Zaire 
border. The deposit is thought to contain sufficient ore to enable produc­
tion of 15,000 tonnes of copper concentrates to be mined annualy for 
over twelve years. Mindeco-Noranda, a joint venture between Mines 
Industrial Corporation Ltd., and Noranda Mines Ltd., of Canada, is 
undertaking mineral prospecting, exploration and mine development and 
holds licences in the Central, Copperbelt and North-Western Provinces.
On the Copperbelt itself a number of prospecting areas have been 
taken out by Anglo-American Ltd., and Roan Selection Trust Ltd. In the 
Eastern and Central Provinces, various companies, including Equitex, 
Petroleum Ltd., and Dc Beers Consolidated., have taken up prospecting 
licence. In 1970 a Yugoslav Consortium to prospect for copper was 
formed and five Yugoslav enterprises and the Yugoslav Investment Bank 
joined the Zambian, Sidco; the Zambian partners have 51 per cent of the
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capital and the Yugoslav company, Energoprojekt 48 per cent. The 
French company Redimey Ltd., sent representatives to prospect, De 
Beers Consolidated Ltd, took out five exploration rights over Kimberlite 
areas in the Luangwa valley. Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., 
holds prospecting rights in the Luano area, and Roan Consolidated 
Mines Ltd., holds prospecting areas around the Mufulira area, 
Chibuluma exploration, and prospecting areas, and Mufumbwe prospec­
ting area.
Of course, at this stage all these groups are undertaking prospecting 
and exploration, and it will be some time before it is possible to assess 
whether or not the prospecting activity is producing results. The 
operating mines have continued active exploration in their licence 
areas.115 Some indication of the level of prospecting activity can be ob­
tained from the proposed expenditure noted in the applications for pro­
specting and exploration licences, though there has been a definite slow­
down in the past year because of the difficulties of the industry brought 
about by the current recession.
Largely, the effects of the Act have been beneficial to the country. 
However, the extent to which it will continue to be beneficial will depend 
upon the state’s willingness to adapt the legislation to changing cir­
cumstances in the mining industry, so that it ensures the best climate for 
investment and vigorous entrepreneurship in mining aimed at promoting 
increased production and discovery of copper and other minerals. But 
side by side with increasing mineral production and its discovery, the 
state should devote some thinking to a mineral policy which will consider 
the problem of the rate of development. To this end it would be submit­
ted that the rate of development should relate to the expansion of other 
industries so that when the mineral resources are exhausted a viable 
economy will be left behind. As things are the government does not seem 
to have adopted any policy at all. All mining efforts seem to be geared 
towards the maximum production possible of whatever mineral that is 
being mined. Zambia’s mineral resources will necessarily be exhausted at 
some time. Present estimates are that some of the mines will be exhausted
115. The existing mines also continued to increase their production. See Mines In­
dustrial Development Corporation, Zambia Mining Year Book, 1974.
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by the turn of the century,116 and it is therefore of paramount impor­
tance that the exploitation of the country’s minerals should serve to 
diversify the government’s source of development revenue.117 Quite 
apart from the possibility of exhaustion, Zambia’s folly in depending on 
its mineral wealth was exposed in 1976 when low commodity prices 
plunged the country into one of its worst economic crises. 118
116. The declared ore reserves of the Copperbelt are reported to total 745 million 
metric tonnes. Mines Industrial Development Corporation, Prospects fo r  Zam­
bia's Mining Industry, 1970, p .20. Of course in rich mining areas, the proved 
reserves tend to increase as mine development proceeds. However, the life span of 
a mining complex depends upon the level and intensity of exploitation.
117. For discussion of the Zambian economy and its agricultural potential, see Elliot, 
‘Constraints on the Economic Development o f  Zambia,’ 1971; Bamber ‘The 
Economy o f  British Central Africa: A  Case Study o f  Economic Development in a 
Dual¡stic Society,’ 1961.
118. See Daniel, ‘Increasing Strain on Zambia’s Copperbelt’, The Guardian, 31 
March, 1976, p.22.
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DOMESTIC PARTICIPATION IN MINING VENTURES
The Mines and Minerals Act1 makes mandatory domestic participation a 
pre-condition for the establishment of any mining enterprise by a  foreign 
investor. And the law fixes the conditions, of the requisite domestic 
capital participation.
Background to the Policy
The policy of requiring domestic participation was announced in 19692 
and was subsequently incorporated into the Mines and Minerals Act in 
the same year. It is not a novel provision in the context of the history of 
mining activities in Zambia. In the early period of mining in Zambia, the 
British South Africa Company required every registered mining location 
to be held by the registered holders on joint account with it in the propor­
tion of two-thirds to the registered holders and one third to the British 
South Africa Company.3 It exercised this interest at the time formal per­
mission was requested to work for profit.4 In the case of the Zambian 
government in the period following the attainment of independence in 
1964, it virtually confined itself to increasing the tax revenue obtained 
from the mining companies and demanding that the existing companies 
Zambianise mining posts at all levels as rapidly as possible.5 This was 
despite a 1963 United Nations Economic Commission recommendation 
that in view of the significance of the industry in the economy of the 
country, the government should have direct participation,6 and also 
despite the fact that in 1964 the existing mining companies had offered
1. Mines and Minerals Act, supra s.20.
2. Kaunda 'Towards Complété Independence’ 1969, p.36.
3. In fact the Company wanted a fifty per cent interest it wrote 'So far as Northern 
Rhodesia is concerned, the Board has decided to retain a fifty per cent interest in 
all minerals, with the object o f reserving to the Company full liberty of action in 
exceptional cases. It does not however, attach great importance to this point, and 
is prepared to substitute a one third interest for fifty per cent'. See Letter from 
Secretary o f the Company to the Colonial Secretary, 5 May, 1911. C.O. 417-507. 
Later, this could be substituted for royalty payments, See Imperial
Institute, The Mining Law o f  the British Empire and o f  Foreign Countries, 
Northern Rhodesia, 1930, p. 17.
4. The requirement was unpopular among miners who complained that it made it 
impossible to procure capital for many propositions which would otherwise 
attract capital by their intrinsic merit, and that where investors were prepared to 
invest their capital subject to the condition, it resulted in an undue inflation of 
the capital and in a consequent repetition o f mining propositions. See Letter of 
High Commissioner to The Colonial Secretary, 5 November, 1906,
C.O. 417-424.
5. The year after Independence, export tax was introduced and the Income Tax rate 
was increased. See Copper Export Tax Act, 1966 and Taxes Charging and 
Amendment Act, 1965, s. 19 (2).
6. U .N.I.E.C.A ./F.A .O. Economic Survey Mission o f  the Economic Development 
o f  Zambia, 1964, p.39.
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the government minority participation in their mining ventures.7 The 
government’s attitude can be attributed to the fact that soon after 
independence there was general insecurity on the part of mining com­
panies and their workers. As a result, it did not want to take measures 
which might have increased the insecurity.8 And not unnaturally, there 
was also lack of confidence on the part of government in its own ability 
to manage such a large enterprise. The policy change in 1969 was in fact a 
government reaction largely due to the behaviour of foreign firms in 
Zambia, both mining and non-mining. In the 1953-1963 period when the 
country was still a British protectorate, and a member of the Federation 
o f  Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the tendency was for secondary industry in 
the Federal Sector to be concentrated in Southern Rhodesia. Thus the 
North retained a status of a supplier of revenue from the copper mining 
industry and a market for manufactured goods.9 It was not only the 
Southern Rhodesia industries which served Northern Rhodesia, but also 
those o f  South Africa.10 The major mining companies, for instance, 
were subsidiary companies o f South African mining houses. It had been 
the custom over many years for the Zambian subsidiaries to be ad­
ministered from the South. Hence, most foreign firms, mining and non­
mining looked to South Africa for supplies and stock was brought up 
from Southern Rhodesia or South Africa as needed. After the Unilateral 
Declaration o f  Independence in Rhodesia, the companies went on as 
before, although it became increasingly contrary to government policy, 
especially as Zambia responded to the United Nations’ call to impose 
sanctions on Rhodesia.11 Apart from Rhodesia, the country was also 
committed to reducing her dependence on imports from South Africa. 
But it seems many companies appeared unwilling to seek alternative 
sources of supply of goods in East Africa and elsewhere despite govern­
ment requests. A marked reluctance to set up genuine separate company 
structures in Zambia was also apparent. Besides some branches had little
7. Prain, Address to the National Affairs Association, Lusaka, 1964.
8. The government attributed its lack o f action to the fact that the mines were too 
big. See Kaunda, Zambia’s Economic Revolution, 1968, p .50.
9. The scale on which this was done was massive and it is estimated Zambia lost well 
over 84 million Kwacha over the ten year period of the federation. See 
U .N .I.E.C .A ./F.A .O ., Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development 
o f  Zambia, 1964, p .36.
10. In 1964 Southern Rhodesia supplied 39 per cent of all imports and South Africa a 
further 21 per cent. See Central African Research — 4, The Significance o f  
Zambia’s New Economic Programme, 1965, p .l.
11. Ibid, p.2, for example, coke from Wankie had to be replaced for mining use at 
great cost with supplies from Germany, see Zambian Economic Survey, African 
Development, 1973, p .13.
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more than a nominal existence and were used to ordering imports from 
Britain which were off-loaded enroute in Rhodesia to circumvent sanc­
tions.12 Allied to these economic consequences were political side effects. 
Africans could find little opportunity to acquire managerial or technical 
expertise. During the colonial period it was impossible for them to obtain 
loan capital on the terms granted to Europeans and various legal restric­
tions prevented them from advancing beyond certain levels. .For exam­
ple, until 1960 Africans were' barred from becoming apprentices.13 
Academic limitations were also severe such that at the time of in­
dependence, Zambia had only 960 Africans with school certificate 
qualifications and less than 100 graduates.14 As a result, the mines 
were staffed at senior levels totally by expatriates. In 1969, of the 
employees of the mining companies operating in the country, 40,000 
were Zambians (mostly unskilled) and about 7,000 expatriates were in 
skilled jobs. On the boards of the mining companies there were two Zam­
bians, one indigenous Zambian and one expatriate who had taken Zam­
bian nationality.15 Efforts to Zambianise in the five years since in­
dependence had been largely unsuccessful.16
TABLE VIII
EXPATRIATE LABOUR STRENGTH IN THE MINING INDUSTRY
YEAR Average Strength Engagements Résignations Displaced by
Zambianisation
1965 7,035 902 1,131 247
1966 5,981 1,213 1,403 360
1967 5,378 1,011 1,058 292
1968 4,845 1,088 1,134 178
1969 4,727 947 1,127 100
Source: M ining Year B ook o f  Zam bia , 1969. Mosl replacem ents o f  expatriates were in the personnel divisions o f  the  min 
ing com panies and  noi on  operational levels. E .g. in 1965 there were only 9 Zam bian shift bosses out o f  823 
See Prospects o f  Z am bia  M ining Industry , supra , p . 18.
12. Republic o f Zambia. Commission of Inquiry. Report o f  the Tribunal on 
Detainees, 1967. This report revealed many practices th a t w ere going  on  and  
showed that there was general sympathy among the w hite  p o p u la tio n  to 
Rhodesia’s point o f view .
13. Central African Research — 4 supra, p. 2.
14. U .N .I.E .C .A /F.A .O ., Economic Surrey Mission on the Economic Development 
o f  Zambia, supra, p .34.
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Zambians, one indigenous Zambian and one expatriate who had taken 
Zambian nationality.15 Efforts to Zambianise in the five years since 
independence had been largely unsuccessful.16
In the years 1964 — 1969, the Zambian economy expanded rapidly. With 
the end of Federation, the return of control over the country’s revenue 
made possible a great increase in government spending. Manufacturing 
developed at a fair pace and its contribution to the gross domestic pro­
duct rose significantly.17 But this rapid expansion was inevitably 
accompanied by inflationary pressures and these were made dangerous 
by the desire of some companies to extract high profits from a relatively 
small capital investment. Some companies committed the smallest possi­
ble paid up capital and exported most of their profits while relying exten­
sively on local borrowing. Quite apart from the fact that local borrowing 
was in conflict with the interest of the host state, it also meant less credit 
available for domestic entrepreneurs.
There was no exchange control For the first  ^few years after indepe­
ndence and the absolute freedom to export profits was used to the full.18 
Some resident companies purchasing merchandise from oarent organisa­
tions abroad added as much as a third on to the cost price when making 
payments. This allowed them to remove capital at a still higher rate 
whilst at the same time increasing Zambia’s cost of living. This 
behaviour did much to whip up an anti-foreign companies feeling within 
the country. Thus, the major reason for the introduction oÇthe policy of 
government participation therefore was to ensure that mining rights’ 
holders operated within the framework of the overall economic and 
social goals of the country. The policy was also borne out of a desire to
15. Central African Research — 4 supra, p.2. The situation has not changed much 
with government participation in existing mines of the over 30,224 workers only
107 Zambians held senior staff positions. See Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines 
Ltd., Annua/ Report, 1974. And yet government target was much higher, see 
Zambianisation Committee, Report Progress o f  Zambianisation, 1972.
16. An official inquiry in 1966, however, found no reason to doubt the sincemy or 
good faith of the companies with respect to their programmes for the training and 
promotion of Zambians Report o f  the Commission o f  Inquiry into the Mining 
Industry, 1966, pp.73-74. But there is a contrary view e.g. Buroway, The Colour 
o f  Class on the Copperbelt Mines; From African Advancement to Zambianisa­
tion, 1972. The local employees seem to believe that the companies are to blame, 
see Times o f  Zambia, 11 February, 1974, p.l.
17. The contribution of manufacturing to groil domestic product rose from 
£14,100,000 in 1964 to £30,000,000 in 1967. Its volume rose by 25% per year on 
average. This was despite the limitation imposed by the Rhodesian situation, see 
Central African Research — 4, supra, p.2.
18. This led the government to limit the amount of dividends that could be 
externalised to SOVt of profits. See Kaunda, Zambia's Economic Revolution,
1968, p.7.
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ensure that the mining industry was not completely foreign owned and 
controlled — a desire widespread among developing countries, par­
ticularly in relation to extractive industries.19 In most of these countries, 
the ordinary man in the street sees no value in theoretical political 
independence if most of the decisions relating to employment, inflation, 
pricing and basic economic considerations which affect his ability to 
work and look after himself and bring up his family are in the final 
analysis dependent upon decisions made in other countries. Hence, the 
need for this domestic involvement can best be understood when it is 
realised that before 1969, there was no direct indigenous Financial par­
ticipation in mining activities as such, although some local capital had 
been invested in the big mining companies and there were a few local 
companies exploiting minerals such as mica and limestone.20
The new policy was first implemented in 1968 with regard to non­
mining activities.21 Two other precedents could be said to have been 
drawn on Zaire, a neighbour and a fellow member of the International 
Copper Organisation which had taken similar moves in relation to its 
mining industry in 1966, and another example was Chile also a fellow 
member of the Copper Conference.22
However, this desire for economic independence should be 
distinguished from a desire to cut off all foreign investment. In fact in 
the Second National Development Plan, one aspect of the government’s 
mineral policy was stated as being the creation of a favourable invest­
ment climate in order to encourage the private sector to increase its .level
19. This desire though widespread among developing countries is not confined to
them. Such rich countries as France and Canada have been concerned about the 
limitations on their independence created by large scale American investments and 
Britain is frequently worried by the loss of freedom that arises out of running a 
reserve currency with inadequate backing. Canada’s concern has been so great 
that in 1973 the government passed the New Foreign Investment Review Act 
which in clause 2 states, ‘This Act is enacted by parliament of Canada in 
recognition by parliament that the extent to which control of Canadian industry, 
trade and commerce has become acquired by persons other than Canadians and 
the effect thereof on the ability of Canadians to maintain effective control over 
their economic environment is a matter of National Concern’. See also Wahn, 
Towards Canadian Identity, the significance of Foreign Investment, (1973). 11 
Osgoode Hall Low Journal, p.517.
10. United Nations, Report o f the Commission o f the Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Wealth and Resources, 1962, p. 170.
21. Kaunda, Zambia's Economic RevohUkm, 1968, p.11.
22. Members of the C.I.P.E.C. have undertaken to keep each other informed of 
important developments in their own mioiag industries and to co-operate on 
measures aimed at improving the price of copper e.g. cutback on production, see, 
Chairman's Statement. Nchanga ConsoUdMad Copper Mines Ltd., 1973.
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of interest in exploiting the mineral potential of the country.23 It 
emphasised that legislation must always reflect this objective and, as it 
seemed, there was a general realisation of the need for foreign capital in 
the development of the country’s mineral resources. Throughout its 
history, the industry has been developed by foreign capital.24 In the early 
part of its development, it was largely British, American and South 
African capital which put mining on a sound footing. In fact to this day 
foreign capital has a significant interest in the existing mines, although 
now control rests in the state. Moreover, even if foreign investment were 
not to take the form of financial investment, at least in the beginning 
‘Know-how’ would have to be controlled from abroad and financing 
arranged by borrowing from abroad if new mining projects are to be 
generated and successfully realised. Because of these and other benefits 
discussed later which the country derived from foreign capital, it did not 
wish to nationalise the mines completely.
The Terms of Participation
Various ways exist of enforcing domestic participation. One such way, 
which has been adopted in Botswana, is for the government to be issued 
with a certain percentage of all equity stock free of charge to itself. 
Another, of which the operations of the government of Ghana in relation 
to that country’s gold and diamond mines provide one of many 
examples, involves enunciating a policy that a certain proportion of the 
equity of all major mining companies should be owned by the govern­
ment and then inviting the companies concerned to enter negotiations 
with a view to giving effect to this policy.
The Zambian mining legislation follows neither of the above two out 
instead legislates a government option to participate up to the extent of 
51% of the equity shares on terms fixed by it. TTiis option is in practice 
held by the Mines Industry Development Corporation whose issued 
capital is held 100% by the state. This condition is imposed by section 20 
of the Mines and Minerals Act, and the granting of a prospecting licence 
is made dependent on the applicant agreeing to this condition being in­
cluded in the licence. So far all prospecting licences that have been issued
23. Second National Development Plan, 1972, p.91. Se« also K»unda in Industrial 
and Mining Corporation Ltd., Annual Report, 1974
24. Basic sources on the history of the industry include; Bradley, Copper Venture 
1952; Bancroft, Mining in Northern Rhodesia, 1962; and Coleman, The Northern 
Rhodesia Copperbelt 1899-1962, 1971.
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have carried this condition and no licence has been refused on the 
grounds that the applicant does not wish this condition to be included. 
The relevant part of the section reads as follows:
An application for a prospecting licence may be granted 
subject to conditions, including, in particular (a) a condition 
requiring the applicant to agree to the Republic or any 
person nominated on behalf of the Republic, having an 
option to acquire an interest in any mining venture which 
might be carried on by the applicant or by any person 
to whom he transfers his mining right, in the proposed 
prospecting area.25
The Decision to Participate
The state does not have to participate, and has in fact refused participa­
tion in one case,26 although the case in point is not a very good example 
of government’s non-exercise of the option, since it was an existing mine 
and the mine was operating at a loss. It may also indicate that the state 
will not exercise its option in the case of projects of doubtful viability. It 
makes a decision whether to participate or not and the extent to which it 
will participate within limits of 51%. It may also ask another person to 
participate on its behalf. The procedure for the implementation of the 
policy where a condition as to participation has been included in a pro­
specting licence or carried over into an exploration licence is that, prior 
to applying for a mining licence, the holder of a prospecting licence or an 
exploration licence must notify the state and the holder of the option that 
he intends to apply for a mining licence and requires the holder to exer­
cise his option.27 An application for a mining licence may only be 
granted if the holder of the option exercises the option or informs the 
holder of the licence in writing that the option will not be exercised or
25. This is carried on in the exploration licence in s.31 (a) which provides that ‘An 
application for an exploration licence may be rejected where the applicant is 
unable or unwilling to comply with any terms or conditions on which the relevant 
prospecting licence was granted and which are applicable to the granting of the 
exploration licence,’ see Mines and Minerals Act, supra.
26. This is the case of Mkushi Copper Mines Ltd.
27. See s.46 (1) (b) of Mines and Minerals Act, {upra.
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fails to act within six months of being required to exercise his option.28 
Should the option not be exercised at the time of the grant of the mining 
licence, it is not exercised thereafter except upon the invitation of the 
mining right holder. This stipulation appears in an annexure attached to 
prospecting licences. The provision is generally interpreted by miners and 
mining officials as meaning that once the government does not exercise 
its option at this time the mining right holder can operate without any 
fear of government participation as any such measure would be a breach 
of the prospecting licence. Any other interpretation would be contrary to 
the concept of vested rights, which, is an essential element in the en­
couragement of mining investment in that it would be eroded if negotia­
tions relating to participation by government or its nominee were to take 
place after the issue of prospecting or exploration licences.
Government participation in prospecting
The state’s policy at the moment is that as far as possible prospecting in 
all fields should be by the private sector and that prospecting by the 
government or a parastatal group should only be undertaken when there 
is no probability by the private sector.29 This attempts to rule out the 
possibility of domestic participation in the earlier stages of mining activi­
ty. The stage at which the state decides to take an interest is regarded as a 
disincentive by many mining rights’ holders, in that the high risk part of 
mining is left to private companies. In the initial stages of prospecting 
and exploration there is a relatively low capital requirement but a very 
high risk element. This gradually changes as a project matures until at 
the time of the exploitation of a mineral deposit there is a very high 
capital investment and the risk factor has been reduced to a minimum 
level. It also means in practice that domestic capital jumps on the band­
wagon of the the winner but not on that of the losers in that if a firm 
spends K8,000 on finding minerals, it may then have to give 51% of its 
shares to the state; whereas if a firm loses K8,000 in trying to find 
minerals and finds none, the state will not be interested in its ventures 
and it will have to bear the loss alone.
28. Notification takes the form of a notice which states the percentage o f the 
ordinary shares in the company to be acquired and signed on behalf o f the 
government and sent by registered post to the registered office of the company. 
Notification is given where the option is held by any person on behalf o f the 
Republic of that person and where it is held by the state to the Minister of Mines.
29. Government of the Republic of Zambia, Second National Development Plan, 
supra, p.91.
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It is understandable that the state should insist on minimising the use 
of  its funds in the high risk period as it would be difficult to  justify in a 
_E0Qr country, the expenditure o f  much-needed public revenue for what is 
to the public eye seemingly unproductive activities in the short-term ex­
cept in exceptional circumstances where prospecting has virtually dried 
up which is not the case in Z am bia .30 Besides, if government participates 
at low levels without technical back-up, it is not very helpful. Also it is 
not exactly true to state that when the government does not participate 
in prospecting directly it contributes nothing. The government in fact 
contributes indirectly in several ways. When a company is prospecting 
although on the debit side it has risk and the am ount o f  its investment, it 
has on the credit side, the mineral to be discovered, the infrastructral 
costs though limited, general social and educational costs and it uses free 
o f  charge the basic geoscientific data  compiled by the Geological Survey 
Department. The actual contribution o f  the government in respect o f  the 
last item alone can usually be as high as 10% o f  the expenditure incurred 
by the prospector in a normal prospecting p rogram m e .31 Nevertheless, 
perhaps there is a need to re-examine this policy in the light o f  better 
resource utilisation and the realisation that with the acquisition by 
government of  the natural resources in its country, the long-term is now 
much more significant than the short-term goals. The development o f  a 
logical mineral policy and rational mineral resources management 
becomes increasingly significant. Since the cost o f  the shares can be 
either in cash or properties, the state could modify its policy by, for in­
stance, building the infrastructure where it does not exist and use this to 
earn a proportionate equity share. One advantage would be that it would 
be spending money on non-risk factors which are also o f  some use to 
other spheres o f  the economy. The setting up o f  a mining investment 
fund should also be considered, whose aim should be the prom otion and 
development o f  mineral exploration. The fund could be owned jointely 
by the government and private mining interests. Its funds could be lent to 
miners to  finance mineral development on a loan basis at reasonable 
rates o f  interest, particularly for programmes o f  prospecting and 
exploration. Increasingly there should be a move by the state from
30. lo r instance it is ex peeled that the production of copper will increase by 39.5
per cent from 645,300 metric tonnes in 1971 to 900,(XX) tonnes in 1976 which gives
6 .K per cent average annual rate of growth for 1972-1976 as compared with 0.6 
per cent for the 1969-1971 period. See Government of the Republic of Zambia, 
Second Motional Development Plan, 1972, p.91.
31. See Woakcs, Some Personal Notes on the Mining Industry in Zambia, 1972.
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simply taking over existing properties to creating new instruments and 
tools for achieving mineral development.
Indeed the state seems to have modified its policy in practice to take 
account of the complaints by miners as may be evidenced by two recent 
participation agreements. Two new ventures have been formed before 
the stage of mining has been reached. Firstly, the Mokambo Develop­
ment Company has been established as a joint venture between Mines 
Industrial Development Corporation and Geomin of Rumania.32 The 
Company, incorporated in May 1974, is undertaking geological and 
mineral investigations into the Mokambo Copper Ore body situated near 
the Zambia-Zaire border. Secondly, there is the Mines Development 
Corporation — Noranda Mines Limited of Canada.33 The Company, 
incorporated on 29 July 1974, is undertaking mineral prospecting in five 
licence areas in Central Copperbelt and North-Western Provinces. Mines 
Industrial Development Corporation is also carrying out its own pro­
specting on a small scale through its prospecting wing, Mindex.
Payment fo r  the government interest
Unless otherwise agreed to by the government and the holder of the min­
ing right, the consideration for the interest for which the option is exer­
cised is payable in cash to the holder (if shares are transferred by the 
holder) or to the company (if shares are issued by the company). In the 
first case the cash paid has to be a sum equal to such proportion for all 
expenditure reasonably incurred for prospecting, exploration, develop­
ment and relevant evaluation, metallurgical test work, feasibility studies 
in or in relation to the prospecting area as well as a reasonable propor­
tion of overhead and general administrative expenses in cases where the 
holder holds or had held, or his predecessors in title have held, mining 
rights for other areas in Zambia. The expenses have, however, to be 
those incurred by the holder of the mining right and his predecessors in 
title from the date of issue of the prospecting licence under the Act to the 
date of exercise of the option as may be equal to such interest (not ex­
ceeding 51 per cent thereof) as the state may decide to acquire in the min­
ing company.34 In the second case, the cash paid is ascertained by
32. Mines Industrial Development Corporation, Zambia Mining Year Book, 1974, 
p . l l .
33. Ibid.
34. See Annexure attached to prospecting licences.
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reference to the following formula: X  = y  X  z/100 -  z where X = the 
amount to be subscribed, y = the total of the said expenditure and z = 
the percentage interest nominated by the government. The expenditure 
must be reflected in annual accounts certified by a firm of independent 
accountants, acceptable to the government and the accounting year 
relating thereto shall be agreed upon by the holder of the mining right 
with the government, where upon the accounts are to be produced to the 
government within three months after the end of such an agreed year. 
However, it is important that the government pays for its shares in a fair 
form, if its action is not to frighten away other mining investors. On the 
basis of the formula above, the state agrees to pay for its share of pro­
specting and development, carried out in the whole of the original pro­
specting area in which the new mine is found, and to pay for mine con­
struction expenditure on the same terms as other shareholders. 
Although, of course, for all the original prospector’s outlay on prospect­
ing, he ends up getting only half a mine instead of a whole mine. The 
only loss he incurs is the interest and reward for risk on the prospecting 
expenditure. In fact a problem has arisen at times with regard to explora­
tion expenses. Where a company finds minerals, does the state on acquir­
ing an interest pay exploration expenses for the whole licence or only for 
those expenses that can be said to be related to the mineral to be mined? 
Such was the case in the Lumwana licence area where there was a dispute 
as to whether the state was to pay for investigations of uranium when the 
mine in which it is to participate is going to be one of copper. The state 
refused to pay the exploration expenses for uranium. This problem may 
not easily arise with respect to prospecting because at that stage the min­
ing right holder is investigating mineral occurrence generally, whereas at 
the exploration stage specific ore bodies are investigated. Such misunder­
standing really arises out of the problem already discussed of the state’s 
non-involvement in the high-risk stages of mining. The government’s 
decision concerning Lumwana was consistent with its declared policy. 
And the payment of exploration expenses by the state of minerals not 
being mined would be unjustified in that the state would be reimbursing 
the better off miners in so far as such a miner would have had some 
results for his expenses as it does not reimburse miners whose prospect­
ing programmes produced no results. In so far as this practice is a 
disincentive to the attainment of an increased level of prospecting, the
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cost to the prospector could be mitigated if a company wishing to utilise 
data could pay something and also by the establishment of a mining fund 
from where some of the money for prospecting might have been obtained 
at a reasonable rate of interest. Also, it must be realised that whatever 
the position, the company does in fact recover the money when it starts 
to mine for profit as the tax laws allow for such expenditure. Once pay­
ment of the government share in the expenses has been made according 
to the formula outlined, the government then requires the mining right 
holder to make available to it free of all encumbrances such number of 
the issued ordinary voting shares in the capital of the mining company 
being formed These shares represent the percentage of voting rights of 
the issued share capital of the company equal to the percentage of the 
interest in the mining company for which the option is exercised. A new 
mining company has to be formed with itself and the private investor as 
the sole shareholders in the new company.
There is usually no difficulty in valuing the shares to be acquired by 
the state. The value of the shares is usually taken to be the estimated 
value of the investment. There is no difficulty largely because the cir­
cumstances in this case are different from those prevailing in an on-going 
mining venture. In an on-going concern a government is usually mindful 
of the historical cost of the project and the write-offs that have been 
allowed, as was the case in 1969 when the state acquired a majority 
interest in the existing mines. A company running an existing mine will 
be mainly concerned with its current and future cash flow from a project, 
as was the case with the pre-1969 mining companies.35 In such cases the 
state tends to discount the reward due to the investor for originally find­
ing a deposit and for taking the risks of bringing it into production. In 
doing so, it is usually influenced by high levels of past profits earned by 
the project.
Participating in new mining projects is a different matter. In this situa­
tion the participation required by the state is in a sense part of the price a 
company is paying for its mining right. It is directly analogous
In the negotiations leading to the settlement over the 1969 Nationalisation there 
were differences o f opinion as to how much compensation; see Martin, Minding 
Their Own Business, Zambia's Struggle Against Western Control, 1972, p. 176.
201
to a tax on distributable profits. To the mining right holder the financial 
aspect of participation is more or less just a form of taxation.36 The 
investor is interested in his next return on the money he puts into a pro­
ject. When he does, his calculations before making his investment deci­
sion or before determining whether to continue with a project, he 
estimates the profit he will make, and then deducts the various taxes he 
has to pay, thus arriving at his after-tax profit. If there is participation by 
the state, he must then also deduct the dividend he has to pay to the state 
as shareholders. This gives him his true net profit, though of course he 
has also to allow for the fact that the government contributes to expendi­
ture on investment once the state has decided to participate.
Objectives of the State and the Reaction of Mining Rights’ Holders
The country aims to derive from this policy the well-known advantages 
of local equity participation in foreign ventures in developing countries 
as cited by several writers on foreign investment.37
Obejelives o f  the state
Government participation reduces deeply ingrained suspicions of foreign 
economic domination. This is particularly important in mining opera­
tions because usually their size is large in comparison with other indus­
tries. Whether such suspicions are justified in a particular case or not, 
they have been recognised to be a real and an important aspect of that 
national sensitiveness which characterises many emancipated peoples 
who were formerly held in a state of political and economic dependency. 
It stimulates the engagement of responsible local capital in productive 
enterprises where the option is exercised in favour of a private local
36. The joint company will pay mineral tax 51% of the pre-tax profits in the case of 
a copper mine — and company tax — currently 45 per cent of the balance of the 
pre-tax profits — though neither tax is payable until all the pre-production costs 
have been offset i.e. all capital expenditure is immediately deductable. See 
Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., Annual Report, 1974, p.9.
37. Friedman and Beguin, Joint international Business Ventures in Developing 
Countries, 1971, p.2.
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company.38 It may even help to develop a nucleus of experienced 
managerial personnel in the public and private sectors in proportion to 
the participation of public authorities and private capital in joint ven­
tures, in that local labour becomes directly involved in the industry 
through the equity participation.39 This in fact has been the result in the 
other spheres of the economy where the state has participated. These 
companies have made the deliberate choice of hiring local talent, which 
has paid off in the sense that several former employees of the state- 
owned companies have gone into business for themselves, providing an 
indirect benefit to the economy. In addition to the skills which the 
inhabitants of the country acquire from employment in these enterprises, 
equity participation is also simply a mechanism for the transfer of 
technology from the developed countries. However, the overriding con­
sideration for this policy is control of mining activities so that they 
operate within the overall economic and social policy of the country. 
There are many areas of conflict between the state and the mining rights’ 
holders in their mining operations; one was the rate of development in 
the 1960s, when the mining rights’ holders were keeping the minerals in 
the ground while the state was concerned to increase the speed of extrac­
tion. Another major area of conflict which has often emerged is the use 
to which investible resources should be put. In the past, for instance, the 
miners have wanted the reinvestible profits confined to mining activities 
whereas the states wanted them applied to other spheres of the economy. 
There is also the problem of how much of the profits should be 
reinvested at all.
Sometimes the conflicts arise because of a conflict of interest between 
the state and the mining companies. A case in point arose over the use of 
formed coke in processing lead and zinc at Broken Hill mine. The 
government, mindful of its obligations to the international community in 
relation to sanctions against the Rhodesian regime, proposed that Waelz 
Kilns should be constructed to produce ‘coke’ locally which should be us­
ed in the reprocessing of slag. This, it was anticipated could prolong the 
life of Broken Hill mine by eight years, since the reserves were 
diminishing. The process cost approximately K70 to produce a ton of 
coke, whereas the cost of importing a ton of coke from the Rhodesia
38. Ibid.
39. Nwogugu, The Legal Problems o f  Foreign Investment in Developing Countries. 
1965, p .12.
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Wankie coal mines was about K27 per ton. Anglo-American Corpora­
tion Ltd., favoured leaving the Wankie market still open. In the first 
place they argued that it was cheaper to do so, but at the same time one 
must remember that the Anglo-American Corporation Ltd., owned equi­
ty interests in the Wankie Collieries.
There are conflicts about sources of equipment and other resources. 
The state, mindful of its duty to develop the country would prefer local 
sources even if it means a small sacrifice in performance whereas the 
mining rights’ holders tend to insist on the best and cheapest sources of 
supply. This was the problem over the development and the exploration 
of Zambia’s coal resources for use in the mining industry. Although the 
problem was partly also due to the fact that the coal is not as good in 
quality as the Wankie coal.
Thus, in theory participation of domestic capital in foreign enterprises 
is acknowledged to have positive advantages in the possibility of fair 
policy decision of the enterprise in that government directors sitting on 
the board are in a better position to scrutinise the activities of the 
business and to deduce its intentions correctly than would be an external 
group of officials to whom the miners might otherwise have to report in 
its absence. Further, the state has financial interests also by way of par­
ticipation. Its equity participation in the existing mines has proved to 
have overall benefits in the area of profits in that it has effectively 
increased government revenues from mining activities.40 It has also 
reduced the concern that any immediate benefit to the balance of 
payments arising from the inflow of foreign capital would be more than 
offset in the long run by the onflow of dividends. The burden of 
dividends transfers and repatriation of foreign capital is thereby reduced, 
while still achieving the gains in acquisition of techniques and manage­
ment skills, as well as in industrial activity, that a sole venture would 
have provided. State participation has also given the state an opportunity 
to control the extent to which companies allow their parent bodies to 
profit from their relationship with their subsidiaries. This in certain 
circumstances is important particularly with regard to the fact that most 
of the mining companies operating in Zambia are worldwide. It has been 
established that multinational corporations develop a planned and global
In 1974 quite apart from its tax receipts a dividend of K43.2 million was decided1 · 
by the holding Company to the state. See Zambia Industrial and Mining Corpora­
tion Ltd. Directors Report, 1974.
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strategy in their foreign operations and that sometimes through transfer 
of products within a vertically integrated company, the prices which are 
used for these transfers are often a major avenue for a subsidiary to 
receive or transmit financial resources to another subsidiary or to the 
head office. Participation affords the government directors an oppor­
tunity to scrutinise purchasing and marketing arrangements, the fees for 
provision of technical and consultancy services and investment of surplus 
funds all of which can be used by companies to make hidden or disguised 
profits outside the host country.
Reaction o f  miners to government participation
There has been a change in attitude from ten years ago so much that now 
there is no doubt that the great majority of mining rights’ holders within 
the country welcome and are prepared to undertake joint ventures with 
the government,41 in mine development and exploration although given a 
choice they would prefer minority rather than majority participation. So 
far there has not been any case in which mining capital has had to 
withdraw because of the government’s insistence on acquiring equity in a 
new mining venture and there are no mines that have been discovered but 
are not in production because of this policy. In some cases the mining 
right holders consider that there is an absolute business advantage in the 
association of the state with their enterprise. They may be short of 
capital, as in the case of Mjcushi Copper Mines, which several times invit­
ed government to take an interest in it, as a solution to its liquidity pro­
blems.42 Also, the country presents certain political and economic risks, 
such as nationalisation, devaluation, foreign exchange blockage, 
depreciating currency and excessive taxation and so some mining right
41. Mr. Oppenheimer has recently given lome indication of the thinking of hi« group. 
In the course of hu Statement to Shareholders at the 1974 Annual Oeneral 
Meeting he said: ‘No government like* it* basic industries to be entirely foreign 
owned and yet in many developing countries individual members of the public 
either do not have the resources to invest in industry or, for ideological reasons 
are prevented from doing to. The only alternative in such cases to full foreign 
ownership is for government to take a direct interest. In these circumstances we 
wittingly I T  a partnership between the government as owners of the mineral 
rights and private companies that can provide the necessary financial resources
and technical know how’. -
42. MfrTf*1* Mine has ****** doted. See Mining Mirror, 3 October, 1975, p.7.
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holders are often willing to accept domestic participation in order to 
reduce the financial risk involved in mining investment. Their reaction to 
risk is to ask themselves whether the company is able to absorb a possible 
loss before proceeding and then inquire into the possibilities of 
diminishing its exposure to risk. This was partly the reason why Anglo- 
American Corporation Ltd., and Roan Selection Trust Ltd., in the early 
1960s invited the state to take minority interest in their mining activities. 
Financially, they could have gone on without difficulty on their own.
More recently this attitude is particularly noticeable in the new com­
panies; the larger the capacity for investment in relation to the amount of 
the pre-discovery investment, the better able the company is to absorb a 
possible loss. It must be realised that new mines are expensive to bring 
into production. For instance, any investment in exploration must be 
backed by a determination to follow up by further investments of ever- 
increasing amounts, the indications proved by initial prospecting efforts. 
An example of this is that an aerial geographical survey generally re­
quires an additional expenditure of the order of ten times its costs, on 
follow-up checking of indications provided by the survey. Thus, an 
investment of K1 million on a large aerial survey will require an invest­
ment of an additional K10 million for follow-up on the ground and 
unless these follow-up works are carried out, the purpose of conducting 
the survey is negated. The following-up will in turn lead to the develop­
ment of one or more mines involving the expenditure of millions of 
Kwacha. One way of reducing the impact of risk is by reducing the 
amount of capital investment. From this point of view, the availability of 
government or any other local currency loans is a very important incen­
tive, in that it minimises the amount of equity capital committed by the 
mining company and therefore reduces the impact of risk. There is a 
good example in the case of Lumwana prospecting area which is suppos­
ed to come into production in two to three years time. The prospecting 
was done jointly by Anglo-American Corporation and Amax, the pro­
specting wing of Roan Selection Trust Ltd. When they reached the stage 
of exploration, the two companies indicated that they would not go on 
unless the state joined them. Although it contains one of the largest ore 
bodies, Lumwana has very low copper content but the state has decided 
to join the companies. Anglo-American Corporation Ltd., seems to be
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coming to nearly the same position over the recently discovered nickel 
deposits in its Munali prospecting area. The Company seems to be par­
ticularly worried over infrastructural costs. Other positive benefits deriv­
ed from such associations by the mining companies are that local voting 
control causes the state to feel a greater sense of responsibility for the 
success of the enterprise. For some it provides ready access to know-how, 
manpower, and knowledge of the geology of the country. The govern­
ment, through its geological survey department, has the most complete 
information about the geology of the country. Writers on foreign invest­
ment recognise that a joint enterprise provides a bulwark against govern­
ment interference or greater government participation,43 in that the state 
will be more reluctant to impose profit restrictions, import controls, or 
even expropriation in most cases sufficiently satisfies nationalistic aspira­
tions to forestall any need for greater participation by the government 
itself by deflecting harmful emotional charges which the foreign venture 
may attract when it is big, successful and still completely foreign. Better 
still state participation provides a helpful liaison with local government 
authorities and financial institutions mainly because the local directors 
are able to influence government action by private negotiations with 
government officials and politicians. This is especially true in a small 
country such as Zambia, where the limited population means that the 
individuals sharing power will often have much of their life experience in 
common. It is true that the foreign officials can do the same but it is also 
equally true that the function is better performed by local patners mainly 
because they know the local situation better. In any case it is obvious that 
reports about the companies in which the state has participation will be 
given more credence if they are made by government officials than when 
they are made by the foreign company’s men. It appears also that since 
the state began taking equity participation in the mining companies, 
greater local interest has been generated in their operations. The com­
panies themselves have also become more interested in local programmes 
such as education, sport and the like. Friedmann suggests that there is an 
important managerial advantage of a relatively intangible kind which 
could result from this. He suggests that it has a favourable effect on the
43. Friedmann and Reguin, supra, p.385.
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morale of the local employees, since it is a major step in the process of 
localisation by which a foreign investment assumes a local character and 
status. When this is achieved, it makes it easier for the local employee to 
integrate his loyalties, with a consequent reduction in tension and 
improved work performance.44
Participation as a disincentive to investment
Some international mining companies dislike the requirement of par­
ticipation and try to avoid areas in which it is an established policy. To 
this extent it is a disincentive to investment. It has been cited as the 
reason why for instance low grade minerals of porphyries are being min­
ed in the United States while exceptionally fine deposits of the same 
mineral are being neglected in Chile and Peru.45 Several reasons have 
been suggested by writers on foreign investment for the companies’ 
dislike of such requirements. Friedmann suggests that local participation 
can seriously inhibit an internationally integrated company in its opera­
tions. What might otherwise be complete freedom to fix transfer prices, 
marketing areas, and so forth, may be substantially circumscribed in the 
case of a joint venture with local equity participation. And that to some, 
political and psychological conditions militate against joint ventures. 
The reason for this is that when difficult and unstable conditions prevail 
in a country, the association of a foreign investor with local interest may 
increase the precariousness of the situation.46 Yet perhaps the most 
widespread discouraging factor to a foreign investor is what has been 
widely acknowledged to exist — the disparity of outlook between the 
foreign investor and the local partners. In the business activities of 
developed countries, there is a certain community not only of tradition 
but also of scientific, technical and legal standards, and there has also 
been more experience with responsible investment practices and legal 
supervision.47 In a country like Zambia, this stage has not yet been 
reached. Power and wealth are concentrated in relatively few hands, and 
are not matched by a corresponding sense of responsibility. For instance,
44. Ibid.
45. Carman, ‘Notes on Impediment! to Mining Investment! in the Developing 
World,* (1975), 14 Bagmnda Paper.
46. Friedmann and Begum, supra, p.388.
47. Ibid.
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the partner from an industrialised country, usually a large corporation 
with world-wide experience, generally takes a long term view of profits, 
placing the development of the enterprise before quick dividends.
Some of the investors, it is stated, resent direct participation by the 
government or a government-owned corporation in a capital importing 
country.48 This is particularly so in American mining circles where it is 
felt that there is something inherently unsuitable about mixed 
government-private enterprises, since the government ‘wears two hats’ 
— as regulator and partner. Others fear government partnerships 
because they feel they would be subjecting themselves to the dangers of 
frequent changes in government policy. But it cannot be denied that in a 
country like Zambia the only alternative to initial participation by 
government is no local participation at all. There simply is nobody big 
enough to form a mining concern.
Some writers have suggested that the policy of requiring domestic par­
ticipation in foreign ventures is somewhat inconsistent with a declared 
policy of attracting maximum foreign investment. The government 
option, when exercised, utilises local capital that could have financed 
alternative development and thus would have enhanced the development 
of other sectors of the economy.49 It has further been argued that the 
inconsistency between the two sets of motives stands out sharply when it 
is realised that through government participation outside investors may 
be forced to divest themselves of their equity to make room for local 
interests, resulting in true disinvestment, with the foreign investor repar- 
triating part of the capital he would otherwise have used. If this 
happened it would be unfortunate because this is capital which would 
already have been attracted into the country. However, it is unlikely to 
happen in Zambia because section 20 of the Mines and Minerals Act en­
sures that prospecting licences, the very first mining rights, are granted to 
discovered. It must also be realised, as has been demonstrated by the ex­
ample of Lumwana and Mokambo licence areas, that the reverse is 
equally possible — that is that lack of government participation may 
discourage some investors who do not want to take a greater risk in
48.
49.
Ibid.
Nwogugu, supra, p. 13.
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searching for minerals and would prefer to share their risks with the 
state. Besides the arguments also make a basic assumption that all min­
ing companies that start or wish to start a mining venture have adequate 
financial resources to engage in such a venture. Mining being an 
expensive and risky business, this is not always so. It is not necessary to 
go further than Mkushi Mine which closed after the government had 
refused its invitation to take equity participation to prove that not all 
mining companies have enough money to complete their venture. Even 
when they do have the money, they may not be willing to use it because 
of the size of the risk its use entails without government participation. As 
observed earlier in the Lumwana licence area for instance, the companies 
have indicated that they might not have gone ahead without government 
equity participation. More recently, Anglo-American Corporation Ltd., 
has invited government participation in respect of its Munali nickel pro­
spect and has indicated that it might not go on if this is not forthcoming.
It has been suggested that since the government in the event of it 
deciding to participate would have to get its money from some other 
source, it is open to question precisely what the state receives for the 
percentage of the development costs that it subscribes and that since the 
funds would readily have been provided by others, the state money 
would not be optimally allocated.50 It is submitted that where the 
government indemnifies the company to the total amount spent on pro­
specting and exploration, it still gains. In the first instance, it cuts out the 
risk part and anyway the recoverable value of the mineral discovered will 
always be far in excess of the prospecting and exploration expenses. In 
that sense the money is optimally allocated. And as already stated, 
money is not readily available once a deposit has been found.
Nowadays, the disincentive impact of government participation is 
minimal since direct government participation in mining ventures has 
spread both among developed51 and developing mining countries, so that 
its disincentive impact can no longer be as serious as when its practice
30. Bostock and Harvey, supra, p.203.
51. Britain is now for instance insisting on participation before issuing any prospect­
ing licences. See the Guardian, 28 May, 1976, p .l. Canada has government 
participation, see Drolet, Mining Legislation and Responsible Authorities, paper 
presented at International Symposium of technical Research in Mineralogy and 
Management of Mineral Patrimony. Orleans-Lasource, 197S, p. 11.
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was limited. This means that there are less and less alternatives available. 
In fact among developing countries recent demands for a new interna­
tional economic order have led to an ever increasing number of govern­
ments, in these countries, demanding participation in the mining sector 
of their economies. In fact the disincentive impact is definitely not placed 
very high on the list of disincentives by most mining rights’ holders cur­
rently operating in the country. Several others are considered as more 
discouraging — such as the threat of outright nationalisation at undefin­
ed compensation levels, the political environment, which may threaten the 
validity of contracts or result in the imposition of onerous controls, cost of 
services, legal complexities which make it difficult to know what the law is, 
foreign exchange restrictions, taxation and the sheer magnitude of the in­
vestment required where the mine to be brought into production is on a large 
scale.
It may be questioned whether it is wise at all to have any measure 
which has the least prospect of discouraging any amount of much needed 
capital. In the final analysis the answer becomes a question of balancing 
two evils. Thus, the cost of discouraging some mining investment, a 
government may argue, may not be too high a price to pay for the con­
trol of the mining industry, the direct participation in profits which 
results, and the consequent reaction in the outflow of profits. Similarly it 
is important for Zambia to attract mining investment as it is for her to 
regulate the repatriation of profits which considerably reduce the invest­
ment resources in the country and limit its positive effects within the 
country which could well be greater than the amount of investment 
discouraged.52 The key to the government policy should be fair play with
52. The Organisation of African Unity Conference of Head] of State at iti 1973
meeting recognised this problem and resolved among other things to: (a) defend 
vigorously, continually and jointly the African countries’ inalienable sovereign 
rights and take concrete measures to recúlate the repatriation of profits which 
considerably reduce the investment resources of African Countries, see Organisa­
tion o f African Unity, Declaration on African Co-operation. Development and 
Economic Independence. 28 May, 1973. Part of the problem faced by the 
countries in playing host to foreign private investment is illustrated by the follow­
ing quotation: ‘During the period 1950-1968 foreign assets of United States based 
Corporations rose from S121.000 million to $174,000 million. In that same period 
net outflow of U.S. direct investment fefl short of income by over $15,000 
million. In other words overseas assets race by 53,000 million while there was a 
net flow of money to the U.S. of $15,000 million. With reference to British 
private investment in the developing countries, for example, the following Figura 
are equally pertinent: In 1967, British private investment in the developing 
countries was £60 million whereas Britain earnings from the pml investment 
amounted to £140 million, the same year’ See Economic Development and 
Co-operation Among Non-Aligned Countries, Draft Document No. 23. Third 
Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, Lusaka, September, 1970. 
(NAC/CONF.3/C7/23) and also Boctock and Harvey, supra, p.9.
211
the private sector over its terms of participation to minimise the disincen­
tive effects of the policy.
The Level of Equity Participation
It has been mentioned that the state is at liberty to acquire any amount of 
shares up to a maximum of 51% in any new mining venture. A decision 
whether or not to take minority or majority shares in a venture must 
depend on which of the two levels is more likely to reflect effective 
control.
Minority participation
The desire to make mining rights holders operate within the wider terms 
of government’s economic and social policy rather than in their own 
narrow terms can be achieved to some extent by limited participation of, 
say, 51% to 30% with two or three directors on the board but in reality 
this achieves little more than increasing the information available to the 
state about the company. State-appointed directors sitting at board 
meetings receive reports and schedules, but the real decisions continue to 
be made at the head office of the parent company. It would also only 
have the advantage that the state directors can ensure that the board of a 
company is fully apprised of government’s policies in respect to matters 
which come up for discussion.
Thus, majority participation by a foreign company will entitle it to a 
virtual power of veto in respect to a wide range of motions and decisions 
of the joint venture since its equity holding would entitle it to a majority 
of seats on the board. Several majority corporate actions would require 
the approval of the foreign firm with the result that the state would not 
have effective legal control of the source of all executive functions (the 
board of directors) and over matters on which it is necessary to have a 
say if government control of the industry is to be effective. Some relate 
to all decisions on finance and including the development of new mines 
which would be subject to the majority veto. Thus, if the state wanted 
the company to engage in further exploration which did not appeal to the 
foreign partner then it cannot push forward its views very forcefully. The 
area of finance and planning of capital programmes of mining compan­
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ies is one in which the state must exercise some control or rather have the 
opportunity to exercise meaningful control if any appreciable influence 
on the activities of mining companies is to be achieved. For as a United 
Nations study on multinational companies53 has noted, even in the most 
loosely knitted international firm the minimal control or restriction 
which is exercised is control over the capital budget. Where the state par­
ticipates only to the extent of less than 50%, it would not also be in con­
trol of the general meetings. Under the Companies Act of Zambia only 
three resolutions can be passed, a simple solution, an extraordinary one 
and a special resolution. The first one requires a simple majority and the 
other two require much higher majorities in order for them to be 
passed.54 Free voting at these meetings is out of question in that in prac­
tice only two people attend a general meeting of a joint venture, since its 
members are the two holding companies of the equity participation. Ad­
mittedly, the same limitations apply to the foreign mining companies as 
they too may not be in control of the board of directors when they take 
less than 50% of the equity. Thus, they cannot change any major areas 
of policy in a general meeting without the consent of the state if the com­
pany’s amount of shares make it impossible to pass a resolution without 
the state’s co-operation. These lfmitations, however, are likely to hurt 
the government more than the private miner in that it is the government 
that is interested in changing certain attitudes of the mining investors.
Majority participation
If the government is to have a chance of a real say in the decision making 
of a mining company in which it wishes to participate, it must acquire 
majority equity participation. This will then entitle it to have half the 
directors, as in the Mokambo Development Company and Mindeco 
Noranda, so that its directors on the board have a real sanction to apply 
in terms of voting numbers. The state in Zambia is insisting on at.least
51 % participation and there Is at present no îndïcaTîon that it will exer­
cise its option in a mining venture for any share less than this. A large 
number of mining rights holders hesitate to agree to participation at over
53. United Nations, Report on Multinational Corporation in World Development. 
1976, p.46.
54. Companies Act, Chapter 686 of the Laws of Zambia, ss. 12, 14, 15 and 112.
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50% without a management agreement. This was the case in the 1969 
partial nationalisations of the then existing mines. The experience of the 
state has been that these should be resisted, as they go a long way 
towards negating government control and influence on mining activities 
and it has recently terminated its previous management agreements.55 
However, the control of the board of directors is not sufficient in itself. 
The board does not run a company, its affairs are manned by executives, 
who are charged with implementing the board’s policies. It is therefore 
important to have some control over the executives. This in fact 
sometimes explains why foreign investors although not concerned with 
staffing of the operational levels and in fact do encourage it because of 
the political pressures in favour of localisation and the lower cost of 
labour, they have a strong interest in controlling decisions with regard to 
the staffing of the management functions. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that it is also because it is not easy to get expatriates on hire ex­
cept on secondment and management agreements. But it is preferable 
that joint ventures should be self managing. The employment of manage­
ment agreements could only be justified if there was such a thing as the 
‘neutrality’ of management i.e. that management systems are capable of 
universal application regardless of the social-political context and the 
ideological basis of the economic system. This of course is not the case. 
Management agents have their own values and their judgements on 
policy matters are going to be influenced by these values. Besides their 
employees will obviously owe their first loyalty to them.56 It may be 
argued that their recommendations are not imposed on their principles 
and that their job is only to offer a possible solution to the organisation. 
This argument assumes that a technocratic board is capable of perceiving 
alternatives, which as will be pointed out later, is still lacking in Zambia. 
In addition they are extremely expensive, (sometimes deliberately so that 
their advice will be regarded as pre-eminent) as they proved in the case of 
the management agreements concluded in 1969 between Anglo-American 
Corporation Ltd.. Roan Selection Trust Ltd., on one hand and the 
government of Zambia on the other.
35. For the announcement cancelling the management agreements, see Times o f  
Zambia, 31 August, 1973, p .l.
J6. Sklar supra, quoted some mining executives of Anglo-American Corporation as 
saying, ‘I feel as though 1 belong to the Company more than any country’ and 
‘My first loyalty is to Anglo, Harry Oppenheimer sent me here and there is 
something I can do for the group in this place’, at p.203.
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TABLE IX
MANAGEMENT AND CONSULTANCY FEES PAID TO ROAN SELECTION TRUST 
LTD., BY ROAN CONSOLIDATED MINES LTD., 1970 — 1973.
Elements of Fees Fees Paid
Million Kwacha
1970 1971 1972 1973
3/4% of sales proceeds 1.335 1.461 1.434 1.779
2% Consolidated Profits before Income tax
but after Mineral Tax 1.045 .82 .526 .742
Total 2.380 2.473 1.960 2.521
OURCE: Calculated from  figures o f  gross sales and profits in the Company’s Annual
Report.
This is disregarding the recruitment fees of 15% gross emoluments of a 
recruit in the first year of duty if not less than six months in service.
The employees of management agents tend to stay for short periods of 
time and thus make themselves open to the criticism that they frequently 
use developing countries as a training ground for young staff fresh out of 
business schools. There is some truth in the criticism that most expatriate 
employees, particularly at the higher levels, tend to be largely more con­
cerned with furthering their careers with the foreign company that is 
employing them57 than with the service they give to the local company.
57. Since, for instance, the termination of the management agreements; the mines 
have experienced loss of senior staff. See Chairman's Report Nchanga 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., 1975.
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The distinction between majority and minority participation may of 
course and in certain circumstances be rather artificial as equity alone 
even when accompanied by joint management can not lead to effective 
control. Thus, participation needs to be backed up by government 
insistence on formalised planning. Only if management techniques such 
as corporate planning and managment by objectives are used, will the 
board be consulted on all major matters. These techniques are designed 
to see that a company has a clearly defined policy. After careful thought 
and consultation on each facet of its operation, this policy is made 
known throughout the company and related to each employee’s job. 
These techniques are particularly relevant in that they will reveal the 
areas in which there is a conflict of interest between the partners so that 
an explicit policy is laid down to remove such conflict. At the moment 
the existing joint ventures have a very poor working relationship with 
government. There are no accepted policy guide-lines, for instance, for 
state officials who have become board members.
There is no doubt that the State must appoint directors and executives 
to represent it on the board who are capable of looking after its interest. 
Its nominees must have a general knowledge of mining, finance and 
management in order that they can withstand any arguments from their 
fellow directors from abroad when pressing for the carrying out of 
government objectives such as localisation and reinvestment of profits. 
The effectiveness of the control government appointed directors can 
exercise on a mining venture will depend on their being a capable, alert, 
astute and qualified team so that together with the foreign directors they 
can supervise the activities of management. Care must be taken to see 
that people appointed to these posts understand and sympathise with the 
government’s objectives because some local people, because of their 
training, tend to be very sympathetic to the point of view of foreign com­
panies.58 In this respect the Zambian government is fairing rather badly. 
Owing to the relative youth of the country and the colonial neglect of 
education, there is no local stock of retired executives on which the
Factors affecting control
58. This is particularly so if they have been trained by one of the companies involved 
as such companies teach them how to approach problems from their own point of 
view.
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government can draw to strengthen the technical knowledge of the 
government side of these boards. The paucity of available technical 
management is also a result of the disproportion established at the 
university level between the student population in technical faculties and 
other faculties, and this is also reinforced by the high percentage of 
failures in the technical faculties.
The problem is more complex than that. Board appointments are 
usually a contentious question, as political and other factors such as 
ethnic considerations seem to play significant roles.59 Even in the cases 
where reasonably able people have been given such positions, they have 
been transferred from company to company and also in and out of com­
panies far too often and frequently for political rather than technical 
reasons. In this regard several cases can be cited of managing directors 
being moved three times in a year60 with the result that few of them have 
the opportunity to become familar with their management tasks or con­
versant with the industry and its difficulties. Consequently, they are 
rarely able to make rational judgements based on time tested operations. 
Their difficulties are increased too, by regular reorganisation of com­
panies. Another problem arises in cases where the government has 
appointed civil servants to the boards of directors of some mining com­
panies.61 In practice this is unwise, because civil servants simply do not 
have the time to do the work effectively without sacrificing efficiency in 
their real jobs, and this problem is exemplified by the fact that they are 
usually unable to attend board meetings by either being on tour or busy 
in another way. All these factors combine to produce board members 
without the necessary knowledge and ability. And the scarcity of 
available people produces a situation in which it is common practice to 
find one person who is a member to several boards, much more than he 
can cope with. In consequence, his supervision and control diminishes 
considerably and his contribution becomes weak.
59. Complaints by members of parliament are frequent that appointments are made 
on political grounds, see Times o f  Zambia, 28 January, 1976, p. I.
60. For instance Mines Industrial Development Corporation, Managing Directorship 
changed hands three times in 1975 alone.
61. See Mines Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., Directorate of 1974, and 
Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd., Directorate of 1974. Both in Mines Industrial 
Development Corporation, Zambia Mining Year Book, 1974.
The need for directors who have mining experience cannot be over­
emphasised. After all management is largely a question of decision, and 
decisions cannot be properly taken unless the mind is clear about objec­
tives and priorities. It is not being suggested that a director needs to 
possess a huge intellect to do his job properly but that what he needs far 
more urgently is a clear comprehension of what he is aiming at — the 
object of the exercise — from which he is able to issue clear and 
unequivocal instructions because he is in no doubt about the purpose of 
his management task. In a highly technological industry like mining, 
there are very few management tasks that do not call for a general 
understanding of technological operations.
Additional measures towards effective control
Zambianisation is not only an important instrument in the transfer of 
technology to one’s nationals, it is also an important way of increasing 
control over foreign ventures. Therefore the state should ensure that it 
operates efficiently but reasonably. The well-intentioned policy of Zam­
bianisation can create management difficulties which can endanger the 
performance of the industry where haste results in people with little or no 
knowledge at all of the operations they are supposed to manage being 
placed in management positions.
It is the policy o f the government to increase local employment, But 
the measures employed to implement it do not seem to be very effective. 
The main check on the rate at which the industry is being localised is 
through the control on immigration of expatriates. The Immigration 
Department will not grant any entry permit to an expatriate unless the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Services certifies that there are no local 
citizeds with the necessary qualifications and experience, to fill the job he 
is to take up and further that adequate steps have been taken to train 
local personnel.62 The problem with this provision that the Labour and 
Social Services Ministry acts mostly on the recommendations of senior 
mining officials who are themselves expatriates, for occupying the posi­
tions they do only they are better placed to judge on questions of 
qualifications and experience required by people to fill the jobs
62. Immigration and Deportation Act, Chapter 122 of the Laws of Zambia, ss. 18.
19, and 20.
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concerned. Another check could be the application of tax on ex­
patriates63 in the mining industry as is applied to other categories of 
industry. It is suggested that an additional measure to the one pertaining 
to the control of immigration could be taken by creating a financial 
incentive to the localisation of a different nature and one which does not 
create the same problems as the one already discussed. By providing that 
when a company has Zambianised to a given percentage — a level to be 
determined by the educational standard of the country — it can deduct a 
fixed percentage of its net income free of taxes, to reinvest in the activi­
ties of its own firm or in other mining activities.
Foreign investors draw their special strength from their ability and 
opportunity to think in terms that extend beyond any single country. 
They also think of the use of resources that are located in more than one 
jurisdiction,64 and sometimes try to end up making the largest profit in 
the lowest tax country by transfer of pricing. It is important to start 
thinking in terms of devising measures which can assist in the control of 
this phenomenon where it exists. This can be done by regulations 
through which the state can get hold of the total accounts of a company, 
to supplement the present limited regulations in the Companies Act, 
which were originally devised for national companies.65 An example of 
what is being suggested is the recent agreement among the members of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
establishing a code of conduct among multinationals. Among other 
things, the code out-laws transfer pricing methods and requires multina­
tional companies to give wide ranging information about themselves 
including annual financial statements of profits and sales, investments 
and numbers of employees on a geological basis and the disclosure of a 
consolidated profit and loss account.66 Although this can best be under­
taken on an international basis a start can be made with some measures 
on an individual national basis.
In the final analysis the ultimate source of power of foreign companies
63. See Selective Employment Tax Act, No.9 of 1975.
64. For a detailed discussion of this, see Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multina­
tional Spread o f  United States Enterprises, 1971, p .265.
65. Companies Act, supra. All information relates to a company’s domestic activities, 
see ss, 29, 90 and 120.
66. The Guardian, 22 June, 1976, p. 14.
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is in their control over the process of technological change.67 Even if 
Zambia purchased advanced machinery, it may well find itself backward 
in a space of ten years. This is also the primary vehicle for foreign com­
panies in their acquisition of abnormal profits where they exist. They re­
tain this power by keeping research and development at home. Thus, 
Zambian legislation should try to encourage foreign companies to con­
duct research related to their projects in Zambia. This could be done by 
creating incentives such as exempting profits to be spent on research 
studies from any form of taxation.68
67. The problem of technology is discussed at length in Kapalinsky, ‘Accumulation 
and the Transfer of Technology; Issues of Conflict of Mechanisms for the 
Exercise of Control,’ (1974), 80 Institute c f  Development Studies Discussion 
Paper.
68. A limited incentive exists but one has to spend the money first as it is allowed in 
ascertaining the gains or profits o f a business, see Income Tax Act, supra, s.43.
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MINING RIGHTS AND MINERAL TAXATION
Governments in most mining countries tend to exploit the fiscal capacity 
of mining-rights holders to the fullest extent through a variety of fiscal 
measures. The rates and types of measures have implications which are 
not always realised by those who propose them and often fail to provide 
a framework within which a just balance is struck between the political 
and financial needs of the country and a reasonably effective incentive in 
prospecting and mining thereby discouraging much needed investment.1
Taxation and Investment Decisions
The imposition of a tax on mining rights will tend to affect investment 
decision-making in several ways. In order to understand these influences, 
the cost-price structure of an extractive industry must be reviewed. The 
basic economic unit of the extractive industry is the mineral reserve. Pre­
tax costs of development of a mine ore-body include discovery of the ore- 
body, acquisition of the rights to extract the resource, equipment for the 
mining and extraction of that resource, and the marketing of the pro­
duct. Factors which determine the cost of extracting the resource include 
the grade, size, shape, continuity, and depih from the surface of the 
resource, rock conditions and other impediments, and the rate of 
recovery. Besides a mining-rights holder usually competes in regional or 
world markets and is able to exert little influence on the prices in these 
markets. Consequently, while costs of production of the resource are 
subject to some control by the producer, the prices received for resources 
are fixed by market factors. A mining-rights holder will therefore extract 
those resources which he determines through cost-price analysis can be 
profitably removed. Those reserves below the break-even or cut-off 
point will be left in the ground and considered waste until changes in 
prices or extracting and processing methods or other factors make
1. For the exploitation of mineral resources, massive capital is needed e.g. Rokana 
mine is to spend K5 million on the -edeeming of Number one shaft from 240M to 
about 350M level. See Mining Mirror, 3 October, 1975, p.3. Another good 
example is the construction costs of Otjhase mine in Namibia which are reported 
to be K423 million. See Mining Mirror, 3 October, 1975, p.4. In 1970 it was 
estimated that a minimum of K1.000 was required for every one tone increase in 
annual production of refined copper. See Bostock, Murry and Harvey, Anatomy 
o f  the Zambian Copper Nationalisation, an Occasional Paper by Maxwell Stamn 
(Africa) Ltd., 1970.
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extraction profitable. The break-even point determines the level of 
recovery. As the break-even point rises, a large portion of reserves falls 
into waste, or into the delayed production category. The rate at which a 
deposit is exploited generally depends upon the relationship between the 
costs that vary directly with production and the costs that are indepen­
dent of production. If a miner expects market prices to rise more rapidly 
than variable costs, then his present rate of recovery may be increased to 
allow more production. However, fixed costs do not vary with the rate of 
recovery, but recur each year that the mine is operating. With high cur­
rent fixed costs, a mining-right holder will tend to extract the resource in 
as little time as rising variable costs will allow so as to lower the total fix­
ed cost.
The Basis of Taxation in Zambia
The basis of taxation in Zambia is income that has its source in Zambia.2 
The recipient of the income may be resident outside Zambia, but so long 
as the income has its origin in Zambia he will be taxable on it. The 
Income Tax Act makes no attempt to define income. The reason is not 
that the legislature has deliberately left it vague with a view to include 
everything but because it is almost impossible to provide a precise defini­
tion which would include everything which is assessable and which would 
exclude everything which is not assessable.3 It could be said that income 
is what capital produces e.g. if a mining-right holder invests some money 
and earns more money in return, that money is income. In this example 
the income flows out of capital, as it were, in the same way that a man’s 
salary has its origins in his work. Income can often be related to a period 
of time e.g. it can be said that a man’s dividends are so much per year 
while capital may appear to be fixed in comparison. Thus, if the mining 
right holder invests K1,000, it would remain at K1,000 year after year 
and any increase of the amount in the account would be because of the 
income.
2. See s. 14, Income Tax Act, 1966, supra. The rationale for this test is that a 
country which produces wealth by... virtue o f its natural resources or the... 
activities of its inhabitants is entitled to a share of that wealth wherever the 
recipient of it may live.
3. This lack o f a definition is true o f other countries as well. See, Spiro ‘The 
Receipts or Accrual Basis o f the South Africa Income Tax’ (1973) 3 Comparative 
and International Law Journal o f  Southern Africa, p. 199.
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The question of source, however, poses a little problem. As a general 
rule it has been held that the originating cause of income decides its 
source. Where a person holds mining rights, the originating cause of pro­
fits are the minerals let to the miner by the state. A good example of the 
principle that the originating cause of income determines its source is 
found in the South Africa income tax case of Millin v. C.I.R .4 Mrs. 
Millin had written a book in South Africa. Although the right to publish 
was granted to an English publisher and although the contract with the 
publisher was concluded in England, it was held by the court that the 
source of the royalties from the book was in South Africa because it was 
in South Africa that she had actually conceived and written the book. 
Unlike the United Kingdom Income Tax Act, the South African Act 
resembles the Zambian one in having ‘source’ as the main criterion when 
deciding whether or not various types of income should be taxed. In each 
charge year, however, only income received is charged5 and income is 
received by a miner when in money or in money’s worth or in the form of 
any advantage, whether or not that advantage is capable of being turned 
into money or money’s worth, it is paid or granted to him or it accrues to 
him or in his favour or it is in any way due to him or held to his order or 
on his behalf, or it is in any way disposed of according to his order or in 
his favour.6 This makes it plain that, as used in the Act, the word 
‘received’ is very far from its normal everyday dictionary meaning 
because it includes income which is due to a taxpayer but which has not 
yet come into his actual possession.7 Here circumstances can arise in 
which a mining-right holder is entitled to income on a different date from 
that upon which it is due to him. Thus, for example, income may accrue 
to a miner in one tax year but it may be several years before the miner is 
able to gain possession of that income. In circumstances like these the 
state may either not charge such income or alternatively, charge such 
income to tax in the charge year in which it may be realised.8
4. [1912] A.D. 207. This case was approved in Mufulira Copper Mines v. Commis­
sioner o f Taxes', (1958), R. & N. 336. But its specific mineral taxes are different 
from the Zambian taxes. It has different taxes for different commodites and its 
system of capital allowances is different.
5. Income Tax Act, supra, s.17.
6. Ibid, s.J.
7. Ibid, s.5 uses the word ‘accrued’; for all practical purposes it has the same 
meaning as ‘due to ' or ‘entitled to ’.
8. The taxpayer must apply to the Commissioner o f taxes to avail himself of his law. 
See. s.16 o f  Income Tax Act, supra.
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The Pre-1970 Legislation
Before 1969 there were three main taxes on mining-rights holders in 
Zambia: the royalty; the export tax and the income tax.
Royalty
As used here a ‘royalty’ describes the rent or tax payable to the owner of 
the minerals purely on the basis that he is the owner. It has a long general 
history in that royalty (regalia) is said to have been charged by Roman 
Emperors on the produce of all mines.9 In feudal times, landowners were 
in most cases not at liberty to open mines on their own ground without 
the consent of their sovereign. They were nevertheless, admitted to a par­
ticipation in the produce of such minerals, in proportions which varied 
according to the nature of the produce and according to the particular 
law of the state. In some states the royalty was divided equally between 
the ruler and the landowner, in the case of some minerals the ruler claim­
ed no portion of the produce. At times the royalty was generally 
modified according to the circumstances of the mine, sometimes royalty 
was wholly relinguished. Thus, the concept of royalty is that it is a share 
of the product or profit reserved by the owner for permitting another to 
use his property. In England the word was also used to designate the 
share in production reserved by the Crown from those to whom the right 
to work mines and quarries was granted.10 In Zambia until 1964, the 
royalty was fixed by and was payable to the British South Africa Com­
pany.11 Just before it was repealed the royalty was a levy of 13.5% on the 
price of copper less K16 per long ton produce.12 The reduction of K16 
was intended to eliminate royalty when the price of copper was low. 
Thus, the formula exacted no taxation at a price of less than K118.52 per 
long ton. After independence, the tax was continued by the Zambian 
government for some time largely because it proved to be very profitable 
in terms of actual government revenue. Most mining companies were by 
1966 paying an average of £87.86 royalty per short ton and this brought
9. Collins, supra, p.A 22.
10. Webster International Dictionary, 1973.
11. The royalty was incorporated in the prospecting licence. It became payable to the
Zambian government by virtue of the Mining Ordinance (Amendment) Act, No.5
of 1965.
12. Prospecting Licence Condition No. 14.
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in an appreciable amount of income for the state.13 It was also a political 
decision in that the government was not very sympathetic to mining- 
rights holders on this issue as they had done little about it under the 
British South Africa Company.14
However, the figure estimated by the royalty formula bore little rela­
tion to modern costs of production but was established in the 1930s when 
costs were low.15 In 1966 the average cost of transport alone was for 
instance £50 per ton .16 This is the cost from miner to customer. But 
royalty, being a tax on production, ignored costs and the government 
always received the same royalty share of each long ton on mineral pro­
duced regardless of great fluctuations in the cost of production to the 
miner in different mines, and even in the same mine between different 
shafts. The costs of extraction from the various mines of course varied 
tremendously in most aspects of production arising from differences in 
ores and several technical factors. Chililabombwe, for instance, had to 
drain 62.82 million gallons (282.7 million litres) of water per day, 
whereas Chambishi drained 1.60 million gallons (7.2 million litres) per 
day. Further, Chililabombwe needed 1053 thousands of cubic feet 31.6 
thousand cubic metres of air whereas Chilibuluma needed only 491 
thousands 14.7 thousand cubic metres.17 The price used in calculating 
this tax was an average of eight prices on the London Metal Exchange at 
the time of production. This frequently bore little relation to the prices 
reported as actually received by the companies. Generally, the price had 
risen beyond what it was when the royalty formula was fixed in the 
1930s18 as the comparison of the following two periods shows in Table 
X.
13. In 1966 for instance the mines paid a total sum of £37,324,126 in royalty 
payments alone. See Copper Service Bureau, Copperbell o f  Zambia Mining 
Industry Year Book, 1966.
14. Kaunda, Towards Complete Independence, Zambia, 1969, p.35. The president 
remarked that ‘I don’t remember any of the chairmen of the mining companies in 
their annual statements to their share holders complaining that the royalties 
charged by the British South Africa Company were too high but after 
independence we have been hearing nothing else’. But this was denied publicly by 
one of the companies. Roan Section Trust Ltd, stated that it had been opposed to 
it for years, see Statement by the Chairman, August 22, 1969.
15. Imperial Institute Mineral Resources Department, Mining Royalties and Rents in 
the British Empire, 1936, p.35.
16. Mines Industrial Corporation, Mining Year Book o f  Zambia, 1974, p.35.
17. Ibid, p.26.
18. The problem was largely due to the post 1949 rise in the price o f copper to levels 
not foreseen when the royalty formula was fixed before the war. The royalty pay­
ment affirmed a dimension which lost any reasonable relationship either to other 
costs or to profitability.
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TABLE X
AVERAGE YEARLY PRICES PER LONG TON OF COPPER
(London Metal Exchange)
1965-1968 1947-1950
Year Price Year Price
1965 £541 1947 £130.6
1966 £411 1948 £134.0
1967 £517 1949 £133.0
1968 £611 1950 £179.0
SOURCE: Zam bia M ining Year Book, 1974 and R ep o n  o f  the Commission o f  Permanent Sovereignty over natural 
wealth and Resources, United Nations, 1962, p. 165.
The exchange price was much higher than the actual price at which the 
mining companies made their sales. But as a tax on production the 
royalty constituted a direct operating cost. It increased the cost to the 
mines of each ton of copper produced and thus made it unprofitable to 
mine every type of ore because of such factors as quality, position, and 
grade. In 1963, for instance, the average cost of producing a long ton of 
primary refined copper in the world was about K330.19 This was the cost 
of a ton delivered to the buyer, and included provision for depreciation 
after subtracting any credit from the sale of by-products. It did not 
include company tax. Of this figure (K330), the Zambia average cost of 
K320 in the same year was very close. Zambia copper production costs 
mcluded K46 per long ton in transport costs and royalties on the 1963 
scale (averaging K48 per ton making a total in the way of costs in 
transport and royalties of K94 per ton.)20 Furthermore, as an additional 
cost of the mines, the royalty could of course prevent development of an 
otherwise profitable mine by reducing or eliminating the potential pro­
fits. This was a real, and not a hypothetical problem for a mine like
19. Prain, ‘Some Thoughts on Copper-Production’ Selected Papers, 1963-7, Roan 
Selection Trust, 1968, p.21.
20. Ibid.
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Chililabombwe, which made a loss of K9.18 per long ton in 1967 after 
paying K 102.60 per long ton royalty.21 Any tax reduces the rate of return 
on an investment, but a profit-oriented tax cannot eliminate a profit 
whereas a royalty could. Royalty also affected the recovery rate of 
minerals.22 As an added cost to production it pushed the cost of marginal 
ores over the cut-off point thus making marginal ores to be considered as 
waste. To a large extent the state was the loser in that some lower grade 
ores that were not mined in the past because of the royalty may never be 
mined because it would only have been possible or profitable to mine 
them at the same time as higher-grade ores.
TABLE XI
COPPER ROYALTY PAYMENTS COMPARED WITH 
ORE GRADES, 1968
Mine Copper subject to Average royalty
Royalty Ore grade per ton
Chambishi 21,542 2.70 88.52
Chibuluma 25,505 2.29 89.00
Chililabombwe 55,919 3.40 81.84
Luanshya 103,729 1.90 88.85
Mufulira 197,979 2.47 87.91
Nchanga 225,337 2.57 88.09
Rhokana 103,299 2.11 89.77
SOURCE: Copperbell o f  Zam bia M ining Year Book, 1969.
21. Copperbell o f  Zambia Year Book, 1968. A mine could however have royalty 
remitted as did Kabwe at times. The conditions attached to this procedure were 
such that it still left the mine with a zero profit and that remittance of royalty 
was not certain beforehand.
22. This meant that minerals that could be economic to mine in other countries 
would be uneconomic to mine in Zambia. A Phillipine Corporation is known to 
have been mining 0.74% copper ore on martinique Island which would have been 
impossible in Zambia with royalty. Roan Selection Trust, Bulletin, 1968.
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The royalty was also inequitable between mines in that it could and did 
take a higher proportion of the profits of less profitable mines than it 
took of the profits of more profitable mines.23 Although the major min­
ing groups in Zambia contain both high-and low-cost mines, the 
individual mines also had other shareholders, who were differentially 
and unfairly treated by the royalty. So far thejnsensitivity of the royalty 
system to changes in production costs can best be illustrated by examin­
ing the figures in respect of two hypothetical mines, designated A and B. 
In an extreme case in which Company A has a production cost of K300 
per ton and Company B has one of K600 per ton, then at a price level of 
K!,000 per ton the amount of royalty in both cases is K119.00 since in 
calculating royalty the cost of production has to be ignored. Still using 
the K1,000 price level, Company A has an advantage of K300 per ton 
over company B in that it suffers less expenses in the production of its 
minerals. Given such an example and with the rise in the cost of heavy 
machinery and other inputs required in the production of minerals, the 
royalty had over a period of time the effect that those mines which were 
previously profitable and were so profitable because of high copper 
prices remained profitable as only the profit margin was reduced. Quite 
apart from its influence on profitability, the royalty also had an 
influence on other spheres of mining such as exploration as there would 
have been no point in pursuing any search for mineralisation below 
certain grades which would be uneconomic to mine. Here, one is tempted 
to say that the problem could have been forestalled by exempting from 
royalty tax very low-grade ores. The problem with this is that the high 
grade mines are not necessarily the cheapest producers, e.g. Konkola is a 
high-cost mine but has the highest grade while Luanshya with one of the 
lowest grades is a low-cost mine. Sometimes this is due to the fact that 
low grade mines are open-cast mines where the greatest advances in pro­
duction machinery have been able to offset the increasing wages per ton 
an hour as well as the decline in grade, resulting in the labour cost per 
pound of minerals remaining virtually static.24 Perhaps one way out of 
the dilemma of royalties is to abandon the idea that royalty rates should
23. Between the highest and lowest production costs there is a variation of about K3 
per long ton.
24. E.g. in 1965 in the United States, mines with less than 1% grade showed an 
average cost of 17 cents per pound, those with l-2°7o showed 22 cents per pound 
and those over 2% showed 24 cents per pound, Northern Miner Press Ltd., 
Mining Explained 1968, p .191.
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be uniform for all mines or any group of them, of a particular mineral 
within a country. This is entirely logical in economic terms but there are 
other reasons of a political and administrative nature, such as the 
arithmetical complication involved in administering different rates for 
different ores which is why mineral owners are reluctant to take this 
course. Another way out is to attach the royalty rate to some measure of 
profitability and a third possibility is to abandon the idea of a royalty as 
a charge upon production and to take the rest of the payment for the ore 
in another form.
Export tax
Another tax imposed was the export tax. This tax was charged, levied, 
and collected on every long ton of finished copper exported.25 The rate 
of the tax was 40 per cent of the price of copper per long ton of copper, 
above the price of K600 per ton. No export tax was payable when the 
copper price was below K600. It was introduced in April 1966 when the 
producer’s price was dropped, in order to try to obtain for the govern­
ment a large share of the ensuing windfall profits26 and it was moderately 
successful in its main objective.27 Since it was charged on exports, it was 
effectively a tax on production since virtually all production of minerals 
in Zambia is exported. Furthermore, it took no account of cost so it 
simply added to the bad effects created by the royalty.
Income Tax
The third tax charged was income tax. The first income tax laws in the 
country were rather general. Persons deriving income from mining, 
whether they were companies or natural persons, were governed by 
the same principles.28 Thus, the allowances deducted against profits were
25. Copper (Export Tax) Act, Chapter 669 of the Laws of Zambia. The Minister of 
Finance could grant exemption to any person from liability to pay export tax.
26. Previously the Zambian Companies had been selling copper at a producer price 
which was much lower than the London Metal Exchange market. This was mainly 
to counter the threat to subsitution for copper by lower priced metals. E.g. in 
1966 they were selling at £336 per ton while the market price was £700 per ton.
See Sklar, supra, p .S3.
27. In 1968 alone the mines paid £65,185,585, in export tax alone see Copperbeil o f  
Zambia Mining Year Book, 1969, p .34.
28. Income Tax Proclamation, 1921.
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as for ordinary business. Miners were allowed to claim for reasonable 
wear and tear of any machinery arising out of its use or employment in 
the trade.29 Although company tax was then introduced, its application 
to the mining industry was moderated by granting mining allowances. 
Just before the change in the tax system income tax was charged on pro­
fits at the rate of 37.5 per cent of the first K200.000 of profits and 45 per­
cent of the remainder.30 In computing profit for the purposes of tax, a 
deduction was allowed for expenditure on surveys, boreholes, trenches, 
pits and other prospecting or exploratory works undertaken to acquire 
the right to mine minerals or incurred on a mining location in the coun­
try.31 Also allowed were incidental expenditures, provided their sum 
total did not exceed K200,000 in any one year.32 Separate and distinct 
mining operations in non-contiguous mines were allowed deductions 
calculated separately according to the approved estimated life of each 
mine.33 But miners could elect to deduct such expenditure on income 
from a producing mine.34 At the cessation of mining operations the 
miner could deduct his undeemed capital expenditures.35 In addition to 
the above deductions a miner was allowed a redemption allowance at the 
rate of 2%. It was however, not allowed to companies that were liable to 
be taxed in a country outside Zambia on the income from mining opera­
tions carried on by the company within Zambia in respect of which a 
deduction similar to a depletion allowance was not made in terms of the 
tax laws of that country.36 Where such an allowance was made, the 
depletion allowance was not to exceed that allowance. No depletion 
allowance was allowed to a person where the amount due by the formula 
exceeded his income attributable to mining operations.37 The effect, 
however, of the export and royalty tax system was to render these capital 
allowances somewhat ineffective and this position was partly reflected in 
the resultant level of mining activity.
29. Income Tax Proclamation, 1926, s.5.
30. Income Tax Act, 1966, supra, charging schedule.
31. Income Tax (Amendment) Act No. 26 of 1970, s.19 (1).
32. Ibid., s.2 (1).
33. Ibid., s.20 (2).
34. Ibid., s.23.
35. Ibid., s.21 (1).
36. Income Tax Act, supra, s.33.
37. Ibid.
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During the period 1964-9 the rate of development of mines was very 
slow. Mining companies were disinclined to reinvest their profits in the 
development of new mines. There is no doubt in fact that the govern­
ment’s anxiety about the rate of development of new mines was justified 
although there is sharp disagreement about the causes. Table XII below 
shows that among the leading copper exporting countries, Zambia had 
the lowest projected rate of expansion.
TABLE XII
PRINCIPAL COPPER EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
PRODUCTION FORECASTS
(Thousand Tons)
Country 1969 1975 % Growth
Chile 700 1,100 57%
Peru 350 500 43%
Zaire 320 430 35%
Zambia 700 811 16%
SOURCE: Potter, Som e A spects o f  the  Zam bia Nationalisation, ‘A frican Public Sector Econom ics’, Edinburgh, 1973
Although marginal increases in capacity can be produced fairly quickly 
by increasing the production of existing mines, the gestation period of a 
new mine may be as long as seven years. The mining companies gave the 
tax system as the only reason for the lack of adequate mineral 
development.38 Without denying that this was a major reason, it is
38. Kaunda blamed the inadequacy of mining development on the investment policies 
of the companies, Kaunda, Zambia Towards Economic Independence, supra, 
p.45-46. But both mining groups blamed the problem on tax, see Anglo-American 
Corporation of South Africa Ltd., Statemem by the Chairman, May, 1968„p.4 
and Roan Selection Trust Ltd., Statement by the Chairman, November, 1968, 
p.7.
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important to point out that there are additional reasons. Though denied 
by the companies in 1968, it had long been their practice to distribute 
most of their disposable earnings as dividends abroad. This can be shown 
by examining the period 1945 — 56 before the impact of the royalty 
system was severe because of the relatively low prices at the London 
Metal Exchange and before the export tax was ever introduced.
TABLE XIII
ACCOUNT OF MINING INDUSTRY SHOWING 
INVESTMENTS AND DIVIDENDS, 1945 — 57
(Million Pounds)
Year Gross
Investment
Flow of Direct Private 
Investment into Federation 
of Rhodesia & Nyasaland
Dividends
Paid
Abroad
1945 1.09 — 1.7
1946 0.9 — 2.8
1947 2.4 — 8.6
1948 2.9 — 9.3
1949 6.6 — 11.1
1950 8.5 — 18.6
1951 11.4 — 22.0
1952 15.2 — 20.3
1953 16.5 — 17.9
1954 14.5 — 18.3
1955 21.4 3.4 20.8
1956 18.0 2.5 25.5
1957 — 2.9 —
SOURCE: Report o f  the Commission o f  Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and 
Resources, United Nations 1962, p. 170
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Another reason was that the mining companies suspected, and rightly so, 
that nationalisation would come sooner or later and were consequently 
not particularly anxious to plough profits back into capital investment 
which could be expropriated in the near future, at a compensation level 
which was undefined.
Post — 1970 Legislation
Mineral Tax
In 1969, to correspond with changes in the system of mining rights, the 
government changed the taxes affecting the mining-rights holders. The 
royalty and the export tax were both abolished and a new tax, the 
minerals tax, was introduced.39 The new tax is entirely based on profits 
and is at the rate of 51% of profits for copper, 13% for lead, zinc, and 
amethyst, and 20% for gold. The mining-rights holders continue to pay 
income tax of 45% on their profits after payment of mineral tax, giving a 
rate of tax on profits of 73.05% for copper.40 Here section 7 of the 
Mineral Tax Act is also particularly significant. It provides, ‘that a com­
pany shall be entitled to a refund of mineral tax in respect of any 
prescribed period if its average income in the prescribed period is less 
than twelve per centum of its average equity in the period. Where a com­
pany is entitled to a refund of mineral tax, the amount of the refund is 
the difference between 13% of its average equity in each charge year 
while average income means the prescribed period’.41 The average equity 
is the sum total of assessable income less mineral tax and income tax for 
each charge year in the prescribed period divided by three. The implica­
tion of this refund provision in the case of new copper mines is that there 
is in fact a sliding scale in the overall rate of taxation ranging from a 
minimum of 22.05% when all mineral tax is refunded, to a maximum of 
73.05%. However, most mining companies tend to feel that the protec­
tion of 12% level of profit is actually of no use, since most of them 
would not carry on a venture that indicated such a low yield. They argu« 
that, since they can earn that level of profit in a bank at no risk
39. Mineral Tax Act, 1970
40. Ibid. This was very nearly the same as the sum total of previous taxes except th 
the base changed.
41. Mineral Tax Act, supra, s.7.
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there is no greater incentive to go into mining which is a heavy-risk 
industry, and that since this is an exemption rather than a repayment, the 
taxable profit would still bear income tax at 45% even when the whole of 
the mineral tax is exempted. Thus, a mine with this exemption would still 
be at a disadvantage compared with a mine without it if the mine were 
earning net profits less than 12% of equity. The government on the other 
hand, believes that the refund system is of great incentive value to both 
potential and existing investors. The exact value of this concession can­
not be generalised since it depends largely on the debt — equity ration of 
the initial investment. The higher the debt proportion the less the net pro­
fit on which the refund may be claimed. In normal times, there has not 
been a single occasion when the average income of any mining company 
has fallen below 12% of its average equity, although this year (1976) it 
appears that no mining company will pay any tax to the state, on account 
of the extremely low commodity prices brought about by the current 
world recession.42
There is no doubt that a flat rate tax of 73% based on profit clearly 
removes most of the anomalies discussed earlier. All mines now pay the 
same percentage of profit in tax. Tax can no longer amount to more than 
100% of profits nor can it be charged on a mine making no profits at all. 
Besides the percentage of profits paid in taxation is constant as the metal 
prices changes since marginal and average rates of taxes are now 
identical. Furthermore, the net-income related tax has the least economic 
effect on the level and rate of recovery. The tax liability approaches zero 
when the extractive industry reaches the cut-off point, and operators are 
not thereby discouraged from developing marginal ores.
Capital expenditure
Other new measures involved mining allowances. Companies operating 
mines which commenced production after April 1, 1975 are allowed to 
offset capital expenditure in the year in which the expenditure takes 
place. Capital allowances in respect of mining operations for established
42. See Daniel, supra, p .21.
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companies are allowed according to the length of time a mine has been in 
production.43 They are provisionally permitted to claim allowances on 
the basis of the legislation which existed prior to the enactment of the In­
come Tax (Amendment) Act of 1970. The effect of this legislation is that 
in the case of mines which have been in operation since 1953,of which 
there are seven, expenditure is allowed in full in the year it is incurred. In 
the case of the pre-1953 mines, of which there are four, the expenditure 
has to be allowed under specified headings and allowances are calculated 
at fixed rates. The rates are for plant and machinery (40% in year of pur­
chase, thereafter 20% on diminishing balance); heavy earth-moving 
mechanical equipment (50% in year of purchase, thereafter 30% on 
diminishing balance); industrial buildings (15% in year of construction 
thereafter 5% on original cost); low cost housing (20% in year of con­
struction, thereafter 10% on original cost); and for capital expenditure 
not covered in the above groups, the rate allowable over the life of the 
mine is one-twentieth of diminishing balance.
The main point on which the treatment of allowances for old mines 
seems to differ from that of the new mines is the timing of such 
allowances. In the final analysis, the whole of the capital expenditure for 
both categories of mines is written off against taxable profits. The basis 
of the difference seems to be that to allow both categories of mines to 
deduct the whole of their capital expenditure in the year incurred would 
allow the established companies to deduct their expenditure on new pro­
jects from their tax liabilities for current profits. This advantage would 
not be available for new entrants. The Income Tax Act of 1970 allows a 
deduction against both mineral tax and income tax. This is because the 
meaning of capital expenditure has been extended beyond the pre-1970 
concept. It now means expenditure in relation to mining operations, 
buildings, works, railway lines or equipment including any premium 
period for the use of these including land.44 It further includes shaft sink­
ing, money paid on the purchase of or on the payment of a premium for 
the use of any patent, design, trademark, process or expenditure of a 
similar nature, and expenses incurred prior to the commencement of
43. In the 1970 Income Tax (Amendment) Act all mines were permitted to deduct the 
whole of the capital expenditure in the year incurred. But in 1973 the Income Tax 
Act was further amended by the Income Tax (Amendment) Act of 1973. The 
amendment withdrew the 100% immediate deduction from established mines.
This is now incorporated in the Income Tax (Amendment) Act 1975.
44. See Income Tax (Amendment) Act No. 10 o f 1975, s. 19 (a).
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production or during any period of non-production on preliminary 
surveys, boreholes development or management, and interest payable on 
loans used for mining purposes.45 However, it does not cover non-capital 
expenditures such as labour. Previously, the system in force was one of 
capital allowances that varied according to the category of expenditure 
and could only be offset against income tax and not against royalty or ex­
port tax.
Thus, the amount of capital spending that is effectively paid for by the 
government under this system is now 73% for all mines compared with 
45% previously. In addition, tax relief is available immediately in the 
case of all companies with the exception of Nchanga Consolidated 
Copper Mines and Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd. Instead of being 
spread over a number of years with respect to prospecting and explora­
tion activities, now section 21 (1) of the Income Tax (Amendment) Act of 
1970 provides that a person or company incurring the expenditure may 
retain it as a deduction, or a company may renounce the deduction in 
favour of its shareholders. Thus, any person who contributes money to a 
prospecting enterprise can offset the expenditure against his current tax­
able income in Zambia instead of waiting for the chance to offset it 
against ultimate profits. If the contributor is a non-mining company then 
the value of the immediate deduction in terms of tax paid will only be 
45% as he can only offset his expenses against income tax. Expenditure 
that is retained for tax purposes by a prospecting company also may be 
renounced in favour of a subsequently formed mining company of which 
it is a shareholder.46 Thus, all the expenditure of a prospecting company 
that finds a workable deposit (including expenditure in areas outside the 
location of the ultimate mine) can be offset against profits of the mine. 
This may be attractive for a group of investors prospecting in several 
areas at once and who decide to form a mining company to exploit a 
mine in one of the areas while they continue prospecting in the other 
areas. If other investors are brought into the mining venture, this opera­
tion will only be attractive if the new investors compensate the prospect­
ing investors for tax advantage so conferred on the new mine, on the 
whole this is acknowledged to be quite an incentive to mining-rights 
holders.
45. Ibid. s.22.
46. Ibid. s.23.
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The amount of capital effectively paid for by the government is 
increased if a mine is subsequently opened. This happens through Sec­
tion 22 of the Income Tax (Amendment) Act of 1975 which allows a new 
mine to deduct pre-production expenditure incurred in each charge year 
increased at a rate of 10% per annum compounded for the period 
commencing with the first day of the charge year in which such pre- 
production expenditure is incurred and ending with the last day of the 
charge year to the production charge year. This in effect means that the 
unamortised part of any pre-production expenditure and capital expendi­
ture incurred during production would, for tax purposes, be increased by 
a factor of 10% per annum until the first year in which the-Company is 
charged tax in respect of its mining income. An owner of a mine, who is 
also the owner or has the right to work a non-contiguous mine from 
which he had no production during the year, may elect to deduct the 
amount of capital expenditure incurred on that non-contiguous mine 
from his income derived from his other mining operations in the same 
year in which such capital expenditure is incurred.47 This certainly en­
courages expansion projects in the industry for if the tax position were 
otherwise, with respect to contiguous mines, mining holders would be 
reluctant to spend money derived from their mining operations to 
develop new mines. The effect of this provision is to treat non­
contiguous mines as though they were part of existing mining operations 
where there is actual production.
Weaknesses o f  the new system
This system of mining allowances relating to operating mines has created 
some problems. The allocation of expenditure which has to be made for 
tax purposes differs from that given in the accounts and consequently 
time and effort is wasted in extracting information. Development 
naturally depends very largely on viability and the tendency must be to 
favour the projects which offer the best returns. The 100% write-off on 
‘new mines’ would, however, give them an artificial advantage over ‘old 
mines’, and this in turn could lead to decisions which might not be the 
most economic from the national point of view. Although one can argue 
that since no write-off on capital is given for manufacturing companies,
47. Ibid. s.23.
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it cannot therefore be right for mining companies. However, the pattern 
of expenditure of mining ventures is vastly different from that of 
manufacturing concerns. The latter given the right conditions, could 
continue to operate almost indefinitely and large outlays of capital ex­
penditure are normally only related to expansion or modernisation pro­
grammes. Mines on the other hand are wasting assets with limited life 
spans and to operate them require the constant outlay of large amounts 
on what could easily be termed ‘recurring capital expenditure’. This 
arises from two main causes, namely: mining at constantly increasing 
depths which are also hotter and wetter and diminishing ore grades which 
compel increasing tonnages of ore to be hoisted and treated simply to 
maintain the level of finished metal production. Increased production 
through output capacity generally lowers the point at which the ore 
grades become marginally viable and by bringing this down, the effect 
should be to extend the life of the mines quite appreciably, which would 
be in the national interest.
Perhaps the problem the government finds is that capital allowances 
are likely to be easily inflated, especially where all machinery is import­
ed. Also that the allowances are made to help infant industry, there 
seems to them little justification for assisting the older mines, some of 
which have been in existence for over 40 years. However, since capital 
allowances are against income, it is obvious that they are no incentive if 
one does not have a Zambian source of money. They thus tend to favour 
a company which has a taxable income in Zambia. Another problem is 
that the new tax incentives, being geared entirely to capital spending, has 
the effect of making capital cheaper than other inputs such as labour. In 
general, import duties, tax on industrial inputs especially capital equip­
ment, are relatively low, while duties on consumer goods are relatively 
heavy. Since the prices of consumer goods affect the cost of living, they 
tend ultimately to be reflected in wages, while import duties have the 
effect of making labour expensive relative to all other inputs. In addi­
tion, the employer’s contribution to the National Provident Fund, based 
on wages, has the effect of a tax on labour despite its principal intention 
and so does the introduced tax on expatriate labour. However, generally 
to think that a government could legislate special tax provisions in order 
to make labour cheap on the mining industry, is unrealistic. The present 
high cost of labour is a general feature and it applies to all industries 
and other employment institutions throughout the world.
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Another problem arises with the writing-off of capital in that this en- 
;ourages capital-intensive mines. These drain foreign exchange, and also 
reduce available employment. Sometimes it can provide a way for com­
panies to manipulate their costs to avoid tax. For example, if companies 
A and B each spent K200,000, A on labour and B on capital, they would 
be entitled to the same deductions. And yet A spends most of its money 
in the country whereas B invariably spends it out of the country. Why 
should A pay the same tax as B? It may be argued that this sort of argu­
ment encourages ineficiency, but as a counter argument very few mines 
are going to be different just to gain a tax advantage.
It can also be argued that mining technofogy does not allow much 
substitution between capital and labour,48 but a great deal of evidence 
las been given to show that the relative cost and efficiency of African 
abour, expatriate labour, and capital equipment has caused significant 
:hanges in their relative utilisation in the past,49 although it has also been 
hown that at times of relatively low African wages and high African 
abour efficiency technical processes in the mines fell behind other 
opper producers in the sense of not using the latest labour-saving 
echnology.50
depletion allowance
>ome mining-rights holders contend that a depletion allowance should be 
ntroduced. Such an allowance would have the effect of reducing the 
nining right income upon which tax is assessed. Conceptually, it is 
irgued that depletion is necessary in view of the fact that minerals are ex- 
laustible resources and that when they are exhausted, the investment in 
he mine will have next to no residual value.51 It would be recognised that 
)art of the income from the mine constitutes consumption of capital, 
ind that therefore an allowance, analogous to the depreciation which is 
Ulowed against plant and equipment, should be established to reflect the
18. Bostock and Harvey, Economic Independence and Zambian Copper, 1972, p. 142.
49. Ibid.
50. Baldwin, Economic Development and Export Growth: A  Study o f  Northern 
Rhodesia, 1920-60, 1966, Chapter 4.
51. Reasons often advanced for depletion allowance can be found in Lynch v. 
Alsworth Stephens Company, 267, U .S., 364.
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gradual depletion of the orebody.52 Other proponents of the depletion 
allowance take a different approach. They cite the risk attached to min­
ing enterprises, especially in the early stages with the large outlays of in­
vestments which have to be made during exploration and prospecting, 
much of which is certain to be abortive, as reasons why income from 
mining should be effectively taxed, ihrough the depletion allowance, at 
lower rates than income from other types of endeavour. It could be sub­
mitted that under the Zambian system of mining tenure as described in 
Chapter 6 this would be unnecessary. First, the mining-right holder does 
not own the orebody and as such it is not his capital which is being 
depleted but that of the state. It may well be that the factors cited above 
have the effect of raising the minimum expected rate of return required 
before Finance can be raised or committed for a mining venture and 
-about the average minimum expected rates required for investment in 
other sectors. But this does not in itself indicate any misallocation of in­
vestment funds, nor does it constitute, in itself, any reason why a govern­
ment, particularly of an exporting country, should take special steps to 
lower the tax rate upon minerals as opposed to other enterprises. 
Moreover, even if it were decided that special encouragement should be 
given to the mining sector because of the desire to open up new mines the 
percentage depletion allowance is both a crude and expensive tool for 
government to use. Crude, because it does not differentiate between pro­
jects which require special encouragement and those that do not; expen­
sive because once established, it will extend over the whole life of the 
mine, and not merely assist in the early years when measures to allow for 
a reasonably early return on investment may indeed be sensible. In any 
case in respect of their exploration and prospecting expenses one may 
argue that manufacturing enterprises are liable to go out of business if 
they do not modernise or diversify their product, and changing condi­
tions may well induce them to change location. The expenditure that has 
to b<f put into research, market survey, product re-design and the pur­
chase of patents, may be regarded as similar to the outlays that a mining 
company has to make on prospecting and exploration if it intends to stay
52. See for instance Faulkner ‘Some Notes on Mine Taxation’, (1939-40),
Transactions o f  the Institution o f  Mining and Metallurgy, p.21 where he argues 
that profits from mining must be considered partly as interest on the capital 
invested and partly as a return of capital, source in calculating operating profit no 
deduction is made for the raw material — the ore in the mine — that has been 
used up in the process.
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in business. Besides, in Zambia, an investor in mining will have 
recovered the cost of his own capital by way of capital allowances. The 
expenditure on exploration, prospecting, and on proving the deposit and 
all the preliminary expenditure incurred in establishing a mine are deduc- 
table allowance against, mineral tax and the written value of plant and 
equipment which has to be scrapped, or the shortfall below such value 
realised in a final sale of property where a mine has to be closed down is 
similarly allowable as a cost against income. These allowances, one 
revenue and the other capital, take care of two aspects of a mine’s ex­
haustible nature.
Tax Incentives and the Attraction of Mining Investment
The rate o f  taxation
The preceding chapters show that the burdensome taxes on production 
have been abolished and the new mining-right system , has led to the 
release of large areas for prospecting which previously were not generally 
available. The state now it seems, expects that future prospecting and 
development will come in large measures through private initiative. It is 
with this background that it is necessary to examine the question of the 
attraction of mining investment.
Despite the tax reforms the existing mining companies were up to 1974 
taking as much .money out of the country as they could and were still 
disinclined to reinvest their profits at least to the extent that the govern­
ment would have liked them to and they still rely instead on external 
borrowing for their project.53 The period between 1975—8 is difficult to 
judge as the companies declared little or no dividends.54.
53. At 31 March long-term and short-term loans totalled K68.2 million for Nchanga 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltfl., Annual Report, 1974, p.9. See also Kaunda 
‘Our experience in the last three and a half years has been that they have taken 
out of Zambia every ngwee that was owed to them. A major part of the capital 
for expansion programmes of both mining companies has been obtained from 
external borrowing and not Irom regained profits. You may be interested to that 
right now, my government is being asked to approve external borrowing by the 
two companiesbf about K65 million.! Times o f  Zambia, 31 August, 1973, p .l.
54. Nchanga Consolidated Mine Ltd., Annual Report, 1979 and Roan Consolidated 
Mines Ltd, Annual Report, 1979.
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TABLE XIV
PERFORMANCE OF THE COMPANIES:
(a) ROAN CONSOLIDATED MINES LTD., (1970 — 4).
(All figures in Million Kwacha)
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Total Sales _ 218.8 191 237.2 407.7
Profit before Taxation 108.7 84.9 53.7 75.7 222.5
Profit after Taxation 38.8 48.8 43 47.2 78.5
Dividend declared 15 22 20.5 31 44.3
Capital expenditure 12.7 28.4 33.6 28.3 26.6
Total loans borrowed 6.9 5.3 7.7 7.2 6.1
Percentage dividend distribu­
tion 39% 45% 48% 66% 56%
SO URCE: R oan C onsolidated M ines Lim ited., ‘A n n u a l R e p o r t’.
(b) NCHANGA CONSOLIDATED COPPER MINES LTD.
(1971 — 4)
(All figures in Million Kwacha) 
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974
Total Sales 449 348 363 555
Profit before Taxation 204 100 100 277
Profit after Taxation 97 68 77 113
Dividend Declared 51 36 36 67
Capital expenditure 43 42 59 69
Total loans borrowed 25.2 47 64.7 41.6
Percentage dividend distribu­
tion 53% 53% 47% 59%
SO U RC E: N changa Consolidated C opper M inies L td ., ‘A n n u a l R ep o rts’.
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The mining-rights holders cite the rate of taxation as the factor inhibiting 
development in that it reduces their liquidity.55 The new level of taxa­
tion, for example, 73.5% for copper, it is argued, is very high by any 
standard, and although the tax system ensures that tax will not frustrate 
the recovery of the capital outlay, the very high rate of tax applicable as 
soon as the capital is recovered makes it a comparatively lengthy process 
to achieve both the return of the capital and a minimum profit.56 The 
present rate of tax means that a new mining investment has to earn a 
higher pre-tax rate of return than other investment in Zambia in order to 
earn the same rate after tax. This in a sense is strange in that one would 
expect the reverse to be true — i.e. that mining being a high-risk 
industry, a higher prospective rate of return is required to attract new 
investment than in other industries. The reality, however, is that 
throughout the world, proceeds from mining rights are taxed more 
heavily than those from ordinary industry despite these apparent con­
tradictions. It seems most governments regard mining as a very profit­
able industry and there is a feeling that minerals, because of their ex­
haustible nature, are a special commodity.57 Further, most governments 
are aware that there is a limitation in time to benefits that may be ex­
tracted from a mining industry and take the view that through taxation, 
they must make the largest possible contribution over the shortest possi­
ble period towards preparation for the inevitable end. It is important to i  
point out that although the rate of tax is 73.5%, no company has paid 
that much since the new tax formula was introduced. The average pay­
ment of taxation is around 50% because of the writing-off of capital — a 
rate not much higher than the combined effect of the pre-1969 taxes 
though much better and fairer in that it is based on profit. The high rate 
of taxation has led to suggestions by mining companies that the govern­
ment should introduce investment allowances to encourage the opening 
of new industries. Some years ago the government introduced the
35. Letter from Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd., to Minister of Industry, 5 June,
1974.
56. Oppenheimer has stated ‘The change over to a taxation system based entirely on 
profits is a.deyelonment which I very much welcome., though-thr nfijv low 
combined rate of mineral and income tax at 73.5% is very high indeed; too high I 
would judge to give adequate encouragement tb'the development of new low- 
grade minig projects’ Statement by the Chairman, Anglo-American Corporation, 
1970.
57. Papua-New Guinea has a rate of 10Vt. See Faber 'Boungainville Re Negotiated: 
An analysis o f  the New Fiscal terms. ’ (1974), December, Mining Magazine, p.2I.
243
Pioneer Industries Act and more recently, the Industrial Development 
Act, under which industries could apply for a tax-free period of five 
years. In addition, all manufacturers may claim the ‘investment 
allowance’ which entitles them to write-off 100 per cent of the cost of in­
dustrial buildings and 120 per cent of the cost of plant and machinery us­
ed in the manufacturing process. Since to explore for minerals and 
develop a new mine to the stage of regular production is a capital- 
intensive operation lasting several years and one which usually involves 
more financial risks than setting up an industrial venture, it has been sug­
gested that these should be extended to the mining industry. And that 
similary, no taxes should be levied on any dividends paid by the mining 
companies until a mine reaches the stage where it first pays tax on its 
mining profits. This would enable shareholders in a company which 
developes a new mine to recover not only the capital expenditure on the 
mine but also the rate of return.free of tax.
Taxation concessions and investment decisions
While agreeing that the level of taxation is one of the major reasons 
adversely affecting the level of mining investment in Zambia, it is 
suggested that it is not the most important and that the keeping of the 
level of taxation low would not solve the problem unless other factors are 
attended to as well. It is important to be clear about the extent to which 
tax rates affect investment decisions. Tax allowances which cannot 
achieve the desired results could simply be ignoring a ready source of 
much-needed revenue, and ignoring income in the case of minerals is 
more serious than in the case of other industries because of their ex­
haustible nature. In any case unnecessary tax holidays over a fixed period 
would only encourage earlier extraction of ore than other economic and 
technical factors dictate. Indeed a high rate of taxation reduces both 
outflow of profits and the building up of foreign owned assets'out of 
earnings from mining operations. It also directly affects a basic, 
economic factor, namely the investment rate of return.58 From the min­
ing investor’s point of view, any increase in taxes corresponds to a charge
58. Fatorous, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors, 1963 p .51.
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in the profit rate of his investment, without doubt very important con­
sideration to mining holders. It is important not to lose sight of the fact 
that capital required for mining investment is owned by ordinary people 
who will be motivated by the above predictable considerations. The 
emphasis on taxation is also based on the investment theory that in order 
to persuade and induce foreign firms to invest in the Zambian mining 
industry, foreign operations should be expected to yield higher returns 
than those available in their own countries to compensate for the extra 
trouble of and risk of doing business abroad. This line of reasoning is 
based clearly on the well-known arguments of classical economic theory, 
assuming unchanging technology, perfect competition, and a perfect 
knowledge of all future investment opportunities, prices, costs, and 
revenues. Further it assumes that the only motivation of the investor, 
who is the sole decision-maker, is the maximisation of profits, the invest­
ment decision becomes a simple mathematical formula: investors should' 
maximise the difference between the discounted (known) streams of 
earnings and the discounted (known) streams of costs of every possible 
investment. As long as the rate of return on any investment arrived at By 
this calculation is higher than the market rate of interest, the investment 
will obviously increase the value of the enterprise and this should be 
implemented. Therefore investment in foreign countries will be made 
when the rate of return abroad is higher than the rate of return in the 
domestic home market. Of course, no sophisticated economist would 
argue that this stereotyped model is an accurate or even approximate 
description of the real world or of the way businessmen behave. Indeed, 
many of the assumptions of this classical model have been relaxed or 
refined. It is well recognised that the businessman of today is usually not 
an individual enterpreneur, motivated solely by an urge for profits, but a 
large organisation each with its own set of goals and objectives. A 
forecast of high profits will not suffice by itself to attract mining invest­
ment at all.59
Theoretically, tax concessions are a form of subsidy granted to 
investors in a field of economic endeavour the government would like to pro­
mote. Governments hope that by granting such subsidies they will attract 
investors who would not invest otherwise. A tax concession is, therefore
59. Most studies are agreed that foreign investors say tax concessions and pioneer 
status play only an insignificant part in bringing them to a country. See 
Aharohni, Foreign Investment Decision Process', 1966, p.24.
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effective if it brings about incremental investments. The larger the 
benefits to the economy per Kwacha of government income foregone, 
the higher the efficiency of the measure. Clearly, it is inefficient to grant 
a subsidy to investors who would have invested even without it. The 
higher the number of beneficiaries of the subsidy who would have 
invested without it, or who receive the subsidy although they do not fulfil 
the conditions and goals desired by the government granting the subsidy, 
the lower its efficiency. But if the government spends a large part of its 
resources on ineffectual subsidies, it may not have resources left to pro­
mote other important economic endeavours, or it must resort to infla­
tionary means to finance its expenditures. In the allocation of its 
resources, a government should therefore weigh various measures 
according to their efficiency. Also when the efficiency of tax concessions 
is gauged, there are at least two governments whose policies should be 
taken into account: that of the capital-exporting country and that of the 
capital-importing country. The two may be looked upon as rivals in a 
game, the policy decisions of one being able to wipe out the effect of a 
policy decision of another in the absence of bilateral agreements. If 
income tax in Zambia is lower than that in a foreign country, income tax 
exemption would have almost no effect on the earnings of a foreign com­
pany if it is subject to tax in the foreign country. One has to consider the 
policies of other mining countries as well in that owing to their differing 
initial capital allowances, depletion allowances, tax holiday periods, and 
treatment of losses, income or profits and taxes even when the actual 
rates set in the budgets appear identical, in reality many affect mining- 
right holders differently. Within Africa, for instance, many governments 
have without regard to the policies of other African countries, pro­
mulgated investment laws which offer competitive concessions in the 
hope of attracting investment,60 thereby cancelling out each other’s ef­
forts. Similarly foreign companies in the same country may be different­
ly affected by the host country’s tax regime depending upon whether or 
not they operate in more than one country. With multinational com­
panies, there is also the danger that costs may be manipulated as they 
naturally prefer to end up with the largest profits in countries not only 
with tax incentives but also with generous exchange control regulations 
which a country such as Zambia cannot afford.
60. For »m e of the examples see Akimumi ‘A plea for the Harmonisation of African 
Investment Laws’, (1975), 19 Journal o f African Law, p. 134.
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Investment and cost saving measures
Theoretical calculations based on the traditional economic model point 
out that a tax exemption significantly increases the stream of earnings 
when such earnings are available (i.e. when there is a taxable income). 
The increase is greater, the larger the difference between the rate in the 
absence of concession and the tax rate during the exemption period, the 
larger the rate of discount used, the shorter the investment horizon, and 
the higher the expected taxable profits. Thus, in gauging the effect of 
tax, one assumes a profitable venture, and it is only then that taxes 
imposed become relevant. Here it is suggested that a number of things 
can be done other than the mere granting of tax concessions. As the min­
ing investor’s first consideration is to avoid the loss both of capital and 
management time and uncertainty, an inducement that is merely a func­
tion of profit will not alone suffice. Measures that reduce the size of 
investment, the cost of capital and the cost of production, in that order 
of importance, will be the most effective. According to the Mining Year 
Book, Zambia’s costs are high and in 1971 compared very nearly with 
costs of production of minerals in the United States, South Africa, Peru, 
and Chile.61 More recently, they have escalated in the aftermath of 
world-wide inflation.62 Of course the main reason for Zambia’s 
relatively high cost price, in spite of the very high grade of its ore, is its 
land-locked position. Distances from mineral production centres to its 
main shipping points on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans range from 
1,600 to 2,300 kilometres and are to a large extent beyond the capacity of 
the government to influence.63 But other cost-increasing factors are 
within the capacity of the government.64 One such factor concerns infra­
61. E.g. cost o f production in 1969 in the United States of America was 28.9 cents 
per lb., in Zambia 29 cents per lb., in Peru 22.4 cents per lb., in Chile 24.3 cents 
per lb. and South Africa 23.3 cents per lb. Mines Industrial Development 
Corporation Year Book, 1971.
62. One of the country's two big mining groups, Nchanga Consolidated Copper 
Mines Ltd., has reported production costs per tonne (excluding transport) of 
about £507 in the year to April 1975, See Daniel supra, p.21.
63. See Chairman's Statement, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., 1975. In 
fact this problem even affects delivery of supplies of the mines with the result that 
the completion of capital projects and repairs to existing plants is delayed.
64. Production costs include all operating costs and other costs; for example 
administrative costs, depreciation, export taxes, duties, and interest on charges on 
loans excluding taxes on profits. See De Vletter, ‘Mining Costs, Memorandum by 
the Director of the Metals and Minerals Development Unit’ Ministry of Land and 
Mines, 1968.
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structural costs. The mining-rights holder is expected to provide houses 
for employees, roads to areas of mining, his own water systems, and so 
on. These infrastructural costs are proving to be an increasing large part 
of project costs — as much as 25% — and can turn a commercially pro­
fitable project into an unprofitable one with the result that the project 
does not proceed.65 It must be realised that even when other things are 
equal, the costs of operating at a geographically remote property will 
inevitably be greater than at one in a more accessible and easily serviced 
mining area. This comes about in several Ways, including the obvious one 
of transport of personnel and supplies, and of the mine output. Mines 
are heavy consumers of electric energy, and the transmission costs to a 
remote property will tend to be heavy. Even historically, this point has 
been very important. It is generally recognised, for instance, that mining 
could never have emerged from the experimental stage until railway 
transport became available to carry machinery, fuel, and ore. Thus, 
measures should actively be considered for the establishment of 
machinery to prevent projects which are in the national interest being 
shelved because of this situation. The state should also take measures to 
create such infrastructure independently, thus effectively reduce the costs 
to the mining-rights holders. The point to be borne in mind is that unlike 
ordinary business, say a factory, one cannot site the mine where one 
wants, and unlike other business too there is no insurance. Measures to 
offset costs of infrastructure will also encourage the prospecting and ex­
ploration of areas far away from the present line of rail and unlike tax 
concessions can be used by other economic activities. In this context, the 
role of new mining investment would be not only to generate new oppor­
tunities for employment but also to develop new centres of economic 
activity away from existing urban areas and the line of rail.
Another factor is the customs duty imposed on mining equipment, 
which significantly increase costs. This is completely within the power of 
the government as its imposition is in the discretion of the Minister of 
Finance.66 It would be understandable if there were a local source of 
machinery in that the duty would be aimed at forcing mining-rights
65. The amounts involved often run into millions o f Kwacha. See Mining Mirror, 3 
October, 1975, p.7. Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., spent K2.4 million 
on housing and other social amenities in 1974 alone. See Annual Report, 1974, 
p.9.
66. See Customs and Exercise Act, Chapter 662 o f  the Laws of Zambia.
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holders to utilise the local source; but there is none.67 It is submitted that 
government could reduce costs to rural miners, where costs are higher for 
reasons referred to earlier, by charging lower customs duties on all 
machinery, plants, laboratory equipment, and instruments employed for 
the mining or prospecting of minerals in very remote places.
There is also the shortage of Zambian technological expertise, whose 
direct co-operation is essential for the effective operation of the mining 
enterprise. This means that the mining-rights holders have to engage in 
training programmes, which not only add to the cost of the investment 
but also cause delays in the completion of projects. Of course the scarcity 
of skilled manpower and trained personnel who can be used in both high 
managerial and technical positions is a general problem throughout the 
economy. But its existence places a special responsibility on the govern­
ment to formulate labour laws aimed at restricting the employment of ex­
patriates in industry in the light of the educational standards of the coun­
try and not to pursue policies which make it impossible or difficult to 
recruit competent expatriate manpower or delay the availability of local 
manpower to industry. Mining costs should not therefore be increased by 
a premature application to the mining industry of the tax on expatriate 
labour introduced in 197568 for such a measure can only not operate as a 
cost when it is justified by the local education standards.
Another factor completely out of the control of any one country but 
on which commodity producers can work together with consumers to 
eliminate is that of severe fluctuations in the prices of minerals which are 
likely to discourage investments in the development of new mines. High 
prices usually entail higher costs in the form of tax and wage increase 
that weigh heavily after prices have fallen.
Other non-cost factors affecting mining investment
Quite apart from the factors that affect the rate of return on investment, 
there are other factors such as the political situation and the exchange 
control restrictions whose disincentive effect is placed very high on the 
list of disincentives by the majority of mining-rights holders.
67. See Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., Chairman's Statement, 1975.
68. Selective Employment Tax Act, No.9 o f 1975.
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Exchange control
Exchange Control69 restrictions. affect mining-rights holders in two 
ways. At best it means that they have to submit to various requirements, 
formalities, and delays whenever they wish to transfer their earnings or 
their capital outside the country; at worst they are not allowed to  take 
out any. It also renders difficult the employment of foreign technical or 
managerial personnel in view of limitation on the transfer of their 
salaries abroad.70 Closely associated with this is the withholding of tax 
and the restrictions on the percentage of profits which can be exported. 
However, new mining investment is more deterred by remittance restric­
tions on dividends than by taxation. This is because to the investor the 
earning of a profit which he can remit home is the fundamental value and 
attraction of any mining venture. This is particularly so because of the 
risks involved in actually finding a mineral and then profitably mining it. 
Admittedly the problem is not an easy one to solve. The country cannot 
be expected to eliminate all measures of exchange control but since min­
ing investors are justified in preferring to invest in countries where they 
will be less affected by exchange control measures, reasonable provision 
should be made for foreign companies to transfer dividends abroad to 
their shareholders. This entails a realisation on the part of responsible 
authorities that although in the short term when money goes out of the 
country due to the easing of restrictions the country loses, in the long run 
it may benefit in that further investment will be forthcoming from the 
same source. At the same time measures designed to encourage investors 
to reinvest their profits should be considered such as allowing them to 
reinvest in the activities of their own company or in other mining activi­
ties, free of tax up to some percentage of their profits before tax with a
69. It is imposed by the Exchange Control Regu&tions Act, Chapter 593 of the Laws 
of Zambia. In law a state is competent to regulate its own monetary matters. 
Consequently, the imposition o f exchange control is in no way unlawful? See 
Hyde, International Law as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, 1974, 
p.690. The International Monetary Fund allows member states to ‘exercise such 
controls as *fe necessary to regulate international capital movements’ but 
members may not ‘exercise these controls in a manner which will restrict 
payments for current transactions or which will unduly delay the transfer o f funds 
in settlement o f commitments....’ The states which have accepted the obligations 
of the fund agreement are bound by its articles not to ‘impose
restrictions on the making of payments or transfers for current international 
transactions’ without the prior approval o f the Fund except under certain 
conditions governed by special or temporary authority contained in other 
provisions of the articles, see Article VI, Section 3 Article VIII, Section 2(a) also 
Article VII. Section 3(b) and Article XIV, Section 2, Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund.
70. See Fatouras, supra, p.35 and Nwogugu, supra, 19.
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maximum annual limit. This could reduce money available for export 
while at the same time promoting the developments and discovery of 
mineral resources.
Political and legal climate
With all the risks inherent in mining, the final criterion for an investment 
climate depends primarily on the political and legal security of the region 
and the country in which a deposit is located. One of the factors slowing 
down investments in the mining industry is that the mining-rights 
holders, particularly those that have operated in the country for a long 
time, are suspicious of the government. They are not reasonably certain 
of the future in view of the government’s conflicting statements with 
respect to the future of private investment.71 This situation is worsened 
by the naive but frequent pronouncements by politicians equating any 
form of profit with exploitation. There is need to convince miners that 
there is little or no possibility of the creation of an unfavourable legal 
situation at a later date which will be harmful to their investments. With 
the existing major companies, the credibility of the government has suf­
fered to some extent by the government’s unilateral cancellation of 
management agreements in 1973 which though necessary could be said to 
have been gone about in a wrong way.72 The reaction of the companies 
affected is justified too in that no government should expect the respect 
of the industry if it attempts to change agreements unilaterally and over­
night. Perhaps measures to restore such confidence in investment are 
urgently needed.
In general the special responsibility of the state in this area is to create 
a favourable political climate. To create and perpetuate an atmosphere 
of trust between itself and investors. It can only do this by committing 
itself to the future, to promise with reasonable credibility that arbitrary 
measures are not going to be taken once an investor has established 
his operations. Also that existing measures and agreements will continue
71. Even local businessmen have remarked that ‘government measures had created 
uncertainty, despondence and lack of confidence in the Zambian economy here 
and overseas,’ Times o f  Zambia,29 August, 1975, p .l.
72. The lawful redemption of Bonds and of local stock did not give the state legal 
title to revoke any of the 1969 take-over agreements which were not tied to 
redemption; see Master Agreements and also Ushewokunze, ‘The Legal 
Framework o f Copper Production in Zambia,’ 1974, Zambia Law Journal, 75 at 
p.92.
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to be respected or that should changes be desired, investors will be com­
pensated for any loss due to such changes. In short, mining investors 
have to be assured that they will receive, both today and in future, legally 
defined and controlled treatment, specified in the relevant legal instru­
ments. Consequently, they need not fear that many major changes in 
local legal or political conditions would be unfavourable to their in­
terests. It must also be borne in mind that Zambian problems are com­
pounded by the fact that Zambia is in Africa and that most investors 
consider Africa not only too risky anyway but also a continent ruled by 
dictators who have no regard for law and who do not keep promises. For 
them, an investment in Zambia is fraught with unknown factors. Thus 
they are reluctant to become involved in uncertain situations when there 
are other opportunities on much more familiar grounds. Associated with 
this is the need for skilled people and establishment of conditions which 
are necessary to attract and retain such skills.
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